

M. TULLII CICERONIS

DE FINIBUS BONORUM ET MALORUM

LIBRI QUINQUE

WITH INTRODUCTION AND COMMENTARY

BY

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LONDON

EDWARD ARNOLD

41 AND 43 MADDOX STREET, BOND STREET, W.

1909

PREFACE

ANY merit which this edition may possess it owes to the great work of Madvig, on which it is largely based. By the courtesy of his son and of his publishers, to whom my best thanks are tendered, I have been permitted free use of his third and last edition of 1876.

It was my first intention to adapt his commentary to the needs of younger students by translating so much of it as experience suggested would prove useful to them, excluding the vast mass of critical notes, and limiting the notes on syntax and Ciceronian usage to the minimum indispensable for elucidating the text. But it soon appeared that a simpler and fuller comment on the subject-matter than Madvig's was desirable, if the book was to prove helpful to the average Classical student. Moreover, the great critic's interests being chiefly philological, and his estimate of his author's capacity to understand and transmit his originals the lowest possible, he is prone to dismiss obscure or involved passages as insusceptible of other explanation than that Cicero has blundered. In several instances I venture to think that closer examination exonerates Cicero from anything beyond carelessness of expression, and while sharing Madvig's opinion of his philosophical standing, I have formed a higher one of his accuracy. Again, though Madvig's Excursus are monuments of learning and acumen, new light has been thrown since they were written on the post-Aristotelian systems and on the sources used by Cicero. I have tried to bring the commentary up to date in these respects.

As a general rule, I have refrained from giving references (outside the *De Finibus*) without quoting the passage, having learnt by observation that the young mind enjoys illustrative parallels when they are put before it, but will

never or rarely look them up. Madvig's numerous references to the Greek texts, which I have further supplemented, are a feature that I hope may commend itself especially to candidates for the Classical Tripos under present regulations.

The text of his latest edition has been followed throughout, with the exception of a few readings, mostly due to Müller, which are noted in the appendix. It is, I am aware, something of an innovation even in an edition of this modest scope, to dispense with a history of the text, but apart from considerations of space I am convinced that such facts "belong to a different inquiry" and are much better left alone till they can be studied scientifically and not learnt mechanically.

That no complete English edition of the *De Finibus* exists, is probably attributable to the fact that Madvig's answers every purpose of the advanced scholar. But it has seemed to me that an edition on the lines I have attempted might enable what is on the whole Cicero's best philosophical work to be read and appreciated not only by students at the Universities, but by Sixth Form boys. For while only a small minority can now care very much to understand the questions debated in the *Academica*, the *De Natura Deorum*, or the Tusculans, the problem of the *De Finibus* still comes home to the business and bosoms of us all. On the historical side, too, Cicero's account of those theories of life and conduct which practically influenced his greatest contemporaries, and permeated the society painted for us by Horace, has an abiding interest.

A list of the modern authorities I have consulted, as in duty bound, would be superfluous; I must however acknowledge my special indebtedness to Dr. Reid's commentary on the *Academica* and his translation of the *De Finibus*; also, for Books I. and II., to Usener's invaluable *Epicurea*.

I have to thank my friend, Mr. H. Rackham, of Christ's College, not only for his kindness in reading part of the proofs of this book, but for criticisms and suggestions without which its shortcomings would have been much more numerous than they are.

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Cambridge, 1909.

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INTRODUCTION

I. CICERO AS A PHILOSOPHICAL WRITER

§ 1. Like all the philosophical works of Cicero which we possess, the *De Finibus* was written in his last years, when his political career was closed by the triumph of Caesar, and when to his grief at the fall of the Republic was added a crushing domestic sorrow—the loss of his adored Tulliola. She died at Tusculum in February 45 B.C., and after a brief interval of seclusion at Rome, her grief-stricken father retired to his villa at Astura on the coast of Latium, where he sought forgetfulness in unremitting work. 'Totos dies consumo in litteris,' he writes to Atticus, and again, 'equidem credibile non est quantum scribam; qui etiam noctibus; nihil enim somni."[1] Here, besides at least one minor work, he composed the *Academica* and the *De Finibus*, which were both published in the summer of the same year. How tasks so considerable could be so rapidly carried out is concisely explained by his own words; 'Dices: Qui talia conscribis? Ἀπόγραφα sunt; minore labore fiunt; verba tantum affero, quibus abundo.'[2] 'The sad mechanic exercise, Like dull narcotics, numbing pain,' did for him what it has done for so many an 'unquiet heart'; he found a solace in translating and adapting Greek philosophical writings, a form of composition which suited alike his facile literary skill and the object which he soon proposed to himself.

For he could not long work without a definite aim; encouraged by the verdict of competent judges on his first essay in this kind,[3] he undertook as a last service to his countrymen to place the treasures of Philosophy within their reach by 'teaching her,' as he puts it, 'to speak Latin.' The plan which he pursued in successive works was to present for comparison the doctrines of the leading schools on some important

[1] Ad Att. xii. 20, 1; xiii. 26, 2. [2] Ad Att. xii. 52, 3. [3] De Fin. i. 1.

question, adding to the exposition of each theory the criticisms of its opponents. He professed himself the interpreter and to some extent the critic of other thinkers, and nothing was farther from his purpose than to make independent contributions to the subjects he treated. But even so limited, such a project called for a grasp of first principles, a thorough mastery of authorities and a faculty of logical arrangement which Cicero was far from possessing. To show what were his general qualifications for the task we must briefly sketch his philosophical education and opinions.

§ 2. When quite a boy, he received his first lessons in philosophy from the Epicurean Phaedrus, then lecturing at Rome. For this accomplished man he always retained a warm admiration, but unlike his fellow-pupil Atticus, he did not long adhere to the system of Epicurus. At the same early age he was studying Formal Logic (then considered indispensable for the training of an orator) with the Stoic Diodotus, whom he learned to esteem equally with Phaedrus, and who later became a permanent member of his household. But in 88 B.C. the renowned Academic Philo of Larissa came to Rome, and the young Cicero, completely fascinated by his teaching, was thenceforth a devoted adherent of the New Academy. Ten years after this Cicero left Rome on a long foreign tour, apparently to recruit his health after the heavy strain of his famous defence of Roscius, and made that six months' stay at Athens during which the Dialogue of our Fourth Book is supposed to take place. Besides the lectures of Antiochus, he attended those of Zeno of Sidon, then presiding over the Epicurean school, and of Phaedrus, who had returned to Athens and afterwards succeeded Zeno. In his two years of travel, Cicero visited Rhodes, and became intimate with the great Stoic teacher Posidonius. Thus, while still young, he had heard the doctrines of the leading schools of that day from the lips of their most distinguished representatives, and it was his boast that he kept up his commerce with philosophy throughout the crowded years of his later manhood.

§ 3. But we have to remember, firstly, that 'philosophical' studies then included a wide variety of subjects, all those, indeed, which went to make up the ancient equivalent of a University education, and secondly, that Cicero's interest in such studies was limited to those which directly bore on his profession of orator. It was by intense and prolonged cultivation of his natural gifts, combined with incessant practice, that he made himself supreme in that profession, and while he

often dwells with pardonable vanity on his love of letters and learning, which he sighs for leisure to indulge, it was never allowed to interfere with the real ambition and business of his life.[1] This devotion to a forensic career fostered in Cicero a temper of mind which he mistook for philosophic doubt, but which was simply the readiness of the expert advocate to make the best or the worst of a case, according as he is briefed by plaintiff or defendant. No wonder, then, that he was attracted to the New Academy, whose exponents were past masters of the art of 'arguing for victory,' and, though they claimed to derive their method from Socrates, had entirely lost the disinterested Socratic spirit that 'pursued the argument whithersoever it might lead.' Cicero himself alleges no deeper ground for his scepticism than the difficulty of deciding among the conflicting opinions of the wise. A consensus of authority, where it is forthcoming, has great weight with him. Thus he takes refuge in 'suspension of judgment' in questions of knowledge, but on moral questions he never hesitates to dogmatise; the general conscience of mankind is for him the final arbiter of right and wrong. He earnestly deprecated the uncertain pronouncements of his own school upon this subject; let it rather keep silence, he says, than bring perplexity and doubt into such a question.[2] Without undervaluing his own high moral principles, we may recognise in his ethical utterances the strong influence of that popular respect for *decorum* (a national institution only less dear to the Romans than to ourselves) to which he so well knew how to appeal in addressing a jury. This influence is especially prominent in his diatribes against Epicureanism. On the other hand, the narrow, harsh intolerance of Stoicism repelled his genial and sensitive nature, despite his admiration for its lofty idealism.

II. SUBJECT AND FORM OF THE 'DE FINIBUS'[3]

§ 4. The subject of the *De Finibus* is the Supreme Good, i.e. the Chief End or aim of human action. All ancient

[1] 'Ego, qui, sicut omnes sciunt, in foro iudiciisque ita verser, ut eiusdem aetatis aut nemo aut pauci plures causas defenderint, et qui omne tempus, quod mihi ab amicorum negotiis datur, in his studiis et laboribus consumam, quo paratior ad usum forensem promptiorque esse possim. . . . In Q. Caecil. Div. 13.

[2] De legg. 9.

[3] The title *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum* means 'concerning different theories of the supreme good and the supreme evil.' *Finis* has this meaning

philosophers agreed that this End is Happiness (εὐδαιμονία), but to the question, 'In what does Happiness consist?' they gave widely divergent answers. In Cicero's day, two rival theories held the field; that of the Stoics, who taught that the Supreme Good is Virtue, and that of Epicurus, who taught that it is Pleasure. The great majority of thinking Romans adhered to one or the other of these two philosophies, which had arisen at Athens in the dawn of the Hellenistic age, when the two great older schools—the Academic and the Peripatetic—were already declining in activity and importance. During Cicero's lifetime, however, a third theory of the Chief End attracted much attention from the studious; it was put forward by Antiochus of Ascalon as the genuine doctrine of the 'old Academics and Peripatetics.' Following the plan we have indicated, Cicero has confined himself to expounding and criticising each of these current theories in turn.

§ 5. The literary form he adopts, as almost invariably in his philosophical writings, is that of dialogue; not of the free dramatic type created by Plato, but that which he calls Aristotelian, in which the author himself sustains the leading rôle, and continuous exposition or polemic takes the place of question and answer. As the work falls naturally into three divisions, we have three imaginary conversations between Cicero, who plays as usual the part of critic, and the respective spokesmen of the Epicurean, the Stoic, and the 'Old Academic' schools. The first book sets forth the theory of Epicurus, the second contains Cicero's reply; similarly the Stoic arguments in the third book are controverted in the fourth; in the fifth book the Antiochean version of Peripatetic doctrine is followed by a brief adverse comment from Cicero.

We shall see, when we come to examine Cicero's sources for this work, that even his criticism is borrowed. This fact has caused the repetition in Book V. of arguments already given in Book IV. For he makes his main weapon against the Stoics the charge that Zeno plagiarised from 'the Ancients'; now this charge was trumped up by Antiochus in order to

Acad. ii. 114; 'finem bonorum et malorum constituas.' The word τέλος as first used in philosophy signified τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, 'that for the sake of which' a thing exists, or an action is performed. Thus it almost always = τὸ ἀγαθόν (though τελικὰ κακὰ occurs ap. Diog. L. vii. 97). Its Latin equivalent *finis*, which expresses the idea of 'last, limit,' rather than that of 'end, goal, completion,' is nevertheless coupled with *malorum* only in Acad. l.c., in the title of our work, and in Varro ap. Aug. Civ. D. xix. 1 (Hirzel. Unters. ii. 664).

conceal his own plagiarism from Zeno, and Cicero seeks to establish it in Book IV. by comparing the Stoic theory of the *finis* with the 'Old Academic.' As to Book II., Cicero uses Stoic arguments to refute Epicurus, but here he does allow his own sentiments free play, and dropping his pose of philosophic detachment, he assails with all his wealth of rhetoric and illustration the system he abhorred on moral grounds. Ineffective as a piece of reasoning, this lengthy book is interesting as a side-light on its author's habit of mind; instead of asking, 'Is this theory true?' he exclaims, 'How can there be truth in principles which must lead to such deplorable consequences!' That he did not write a sixth book, criticising Antiochus, may be owing partly to the fact that he must have resorted for arguments to the New Academy; for, as we have said, in spite of his adherence to that school, he could not tolerate scepticism in the sphere of morals. We know, also, that he highly respected Antiochus, and was much attracted by his ethical system, put forward as it was under the aegis of the two greatest names in philosophy—Plato, *deus philosophorum*, as Cicero calls him, and Aristotle. In a work dedicated to Brutus, who was an ardent follower of Antiochus, he may have wished to compliment both master and disciple by refraining from attack. In any case, the spokesman of Book V. is treated with marked consideration, and Cicero expresses himself as almost won over to his side.

III. DRAMATIS PERSONAE

§ 6. The scene of the first Dialogue, which Cicero himself named the 'Torquatus,' is laid at his villa at Cumae. The date is fixed by an allusion to Torquatus' praetorship (ii. 74), as the year 50 B.C. Two friends of Cicero appear as interlocutors. The rôle of spokesman for Epicurus is given to L. MANLIUS TORQUATUS, with whose father Cicero had been intimate from youth, and who was himself attached to the latter's consular suite in the memorable year 63. Father and son successfully prosecuted L. Sulla for *ambitus* after his election as consul (65 B.C.), and the resulting vacancy was filled by the elder Torquatus, whom Sulla had defeated. But when three years later the younger prosecuted Sulla for conspiracy, Cicero defended him in an extant speech and secured his acquittal. In the Civil War, our Torquatus followed Pompey to Greece; taken prisoner by Caesar, and

honourably dismissed, he fell in Africa, where he had rejoined the Pompeian forces. Cicero has pronounced his eulogy in the *Brutus* (265); 'L. Torquatum non tam cito rhetorem dixisses, etsi non deerat oratio, quam, ut Graeci dicunt, πολιτικόν. Erant in eo plurimae literae, nec eae vulgares, sed interiores quaedam et reconditae, divina memoria, summa verborum et gravitas et elegantia. Atque haec omnia vitae decorabat gravitas et integritas.' C. VALERIUS TRIARIUS, also a Pompeian, fought at Pharsalia. Cicero was left guardian to his children when he too fell in battle. He is thus commemorated in the same passage of the *Brutus*; 'Me quidem admodum delectabat etiam Triarii in illa aetate plena litteratae senectutis oratio. Quanta severitas in vultu! quantum pondus in verbis! quam nihil non consideratum exibat ex ore!'

§ 7. In the second Dialogue, Cicero's sole interlocutor is M. CATO, who appropriately appears as the champion of Stoicism. On his well-known character and opinions we need not dwell; but it may be remarked that the former pre-disposed him to adopt the older and more rigid Stoic ethics in preference to the milder doctrine which was fashionable at Rome. The friends meet in the famous Tusculan villa of Lucullus, whose orphan son and heir is Cato's ward. As a law carried by Pompey in 52 B.C. is called 'new' (iv. 1), and as Cicero was in Cilicia in 51, the conversation must be supposed to take place in the former year.

§ 8. The third Dialogue takes us to Athens and to a date much anterior to those of the two former—the year 79, when Cicero was studying there (p. x). Minor parts are given to ATTICUS, who had already entered on his twenty-three years of self-imposed retirement from Rome and its turmoils, to Cicero's brother QUINTUS, and to LUCIUS, his first cousin on the father's side. This young man, evidently so dear to Cicero, was associated with him nine years later in the prosecution of Verres, and died not long afterwards. The exponent of Antiochus' system is M. PUPIUS PISO CALPURNIANUS, an early friend of Cicero, who was some years his junior, and had received from him his first instruction in oratory. An accomplished Greek scholar, Piso had studied philosophy under the Peripatetic Staseas of Naples, long an inmate of his house. It is perhaps by a sort of dramatic licence that Cicero here makes him not merely a hearer but a follower of Antiochus. For in the dialogue *De Natura Deorum*, the time of which lies between 77 and 75 B.C., Piso is singled out for reference as a leading representative of the Peripatetic, in

contradistinction to the Academic school.[1] He was consul 61 B.C., and his unwillingness to proceed against Clodius in the affair of the profanation of the Women's Mysteries gave bitter offence to Cicero, who summed up his conduct in office as that of a man 'a quo nihil speres boni rei publicae quia non vult; nihil metuas mali quia non audet.'[2] Like Torquatus and Cato, Piso was no longer living when the *De Finibus* was written; it is not the least pathetic circumstance about its composition that Cicero's choice of *departed* friends as *dramatis personae* must have brought home to him his own age and solitariness.

IV. THE ETHICAL SYSTEMS OF ZENO, EPICURUS, ANTIOCHUS

§ 9. While the earliest Greek thinkers had been mainly absorbed by the question 'What is this world in which we live?' it was Socrates who, as Cicero says, 'brought down philosophy from heaven to earth,' by asking 'What is Man? What is his place and mission in the scheme of things?' Sharing the scepticism of his day as to the possibility of attaining certain knowledge in the sphere of physical and metaphysical science, he earnestly combated the popular teaching of the Sophists, that neither can we certainly know Good and Evil in the moral sphere, 'and fired with burning faith in God and Right, Doubted men's doubts away.' Plato, 'the complete Socratic,' embodied and developed the doctrine and method of his master in a vast harmonious system of philosophy, but there were other disciples who each caught inspiration from some one aspect of his many-sided genius, and founded the so-called 'imperfect Socratic' schools. Of these, Antisthenes and Aristippus were specially impressed by Socrates' *ethical* teaching, and each fastened upon a different element in it.

The Cynics

§ 10. Himself possessed of a will which held passion in complete subjection, Socrates had taught that men sin through ignorance alone. Virtue is knowledge, for we needs must will the Good, when we know it. Following out this line of thought, ANTISTHENES proclaimed that Virtue, or Wisdom, is the only Good, Vice, or Folly, the only Evil. The wise man

[1] N.D. i. 16. [2] Ad Att. 1, 13.

is self-sufficing, he fears nothing, and desires nothing external to himself, therefore he is always perfectly happy whatever befalls him. He alone is truly free; the great mass of mankind are fools, and the slaves of their own passions. They have need of the wise man, as of a physician, to heal their disease of folly. Again, Antisthenes carried to grotesque lengths the imitation of Socrates' simple frugal habits and disregard of convention; his followers, of whom the eccentric Diogenes is the best known, became wandering mendicant preachers of morality, who cast off all family ties and owned no country but the invisible Commonwealth of Man. They were called Cynics, at first because Antisthenes had taught in the gymnasium of Cynosarges at Athens, but the name soon came to express in popular use their audacious setting at nought not only of social conventions but of common decency.

The Cyrenaics

§ 11. Socrates had insisted that knowledge has no value for man except in so far as it promotes his welfare, or happiness. But he left it open to doubt in what sense he used these terms. Aristippus of Cyrene, adopting this practical standpoint and holding that Happiness and Pleasure are the same thing, founded the earliest Hedonistic school, which took its name from his native city. His teaching may be roughly summed up by the Horatian 'Carpe diem.' Our single rule of conduct, he declared, must be to get the maximum of pleasure out of the present moment. But in order to do this we have need of wisdom, for emotion or false opinion often blinds men to what will really give them the most pleasure, and a mind distracted by vain fears or desires is incapable of enjoyment. Although these principles easily lent themselves to abuse by the merely sensual, Aristippus himself cultivated independence of external aids to pleasure, and his successors laid so much stress on this as essential in a world full of vicissitude and pain, that at last their Hedonism joined hands with Cynic asceticism.

These two purely ethical schools could not seriously compete with more intellectual systems, but they directly influenced the two philosophers who had the widest following in the Graeco-Roman world—Zeno and Epicurus.

Zeno

§ 12. Zeno, a native of Citium in Cyprus, and said to be of Phoenician descent, began to lecture at Athens about 308 B.C., in a portico of the Agora called the Stoa Poecile from the frescoes that adorned it. As an earnest seeker after righteousness, he had been attracted by the austere morality of the Cynics, to one of whom, Crates, he attached himself as a disciple on first coming to Athens. The Stoics always claimed to be true Socratics, in virtue of Zeno having handed down the doctrine of Antisthenes unimpaired, and without advocating the Cynic mode of life, they justified its adoption in special circumstances. But while on its ethical side Stoicism is a direct outgrowth of Cynicism, Zeno transformed the narrow unintellectual creed of Antisthenes into a comprehensive theory of life and knowledge. Holding fast to the latter's definition of Philosophy as the 'practice of virtue,' he yet saw that without scientific knowledge there can be no sure foundation for morality. Therefore Philosophy must include Physics, i.e. the science which explains the nature and laws of man's being and of the world he lives in. Nor is this enough; Philosophy must furnish us with a method for attaining knowledge and a criterion or test whereby to distinguish truth from error. This is the province of Dialectic, or what we now call Logic. Thus Zeno was led to adopt the recently introduced tripartite division of Philosophy, of which the third and for him all-important member was Ethics, the science of human conduct.

§ 13. In constructing his Physical theory, he borrowed largely, as Cicero says, from the Peripatetics, but it was from the greatest of early Greek thinkers, Heraclitus of Ephesus (fl. 500 B.C.) that he derived the fundamental tenets which formed the groundwork of his Ethics. These are briefly the following. The Universe is a living, thinking Being, which viewed in different aspects is named, God, Nature, Providence, Creative Reason, Fate, Fire, Aether, Breath—*πολλῶν ὀνομάτων μορφὴ μία*. We can distinguish in thought two factors or principles (*ἀρχαὶ*) in everything that exists; that which acts (described by the above names), and that which is acted upon (unqualitied matter, the raw stuff of things). But these two principles are inseparable modes of this one Being, and both are corporeal, for only body can act upon body. The rational material soul of the Universe interpenetrates the whole, eternally working out its purpose of perfection

in and through the vast hierarchy of existences which it has created.

§ 14. Every event, then, is a link in an infinite chain of causation; every human action is ordained by Fate, and how can man be morally responsible for what he does? The Stoic answer is that though he cannot help obeying the Law of the Universe, he alone of creatures can *consciously and willingly* obey, because his soul is a direct emanation from the World-Soul. This 'reasonable service' of a will wholly conformed to Divine Will is his highest and sole Good; herein alone Virtue consists, for while our acts are not free, 'Our wills are ours, to make them Thine.'

Further, man's soul is a unity, like the World-Soul; his reason and his will are not different faculties, but essentially one; Virtue, or right intention, is identical with Wisdom, or right judgment. Psychologically speaking, Virtue is a permanent condition (διάθεσις) of soul, a tension or bracing of the whole material soul-substance. This complete tension, once attained, can never become relaxed.

It follows from all this (1) that no act is *in itself* either moral or immoral, (2) that every act of the Wise Man is perfectly virtuous, and every act of the Fool utterly vicious. There is no mean between Virtue and Vice; no such thing as a good man with faults, or a sinner with redeeming qualities. All sins are equal, from murder to robbing a hen roost.

These paradoxes not only left a loophole for the inference that the Wise Man, who could do no wrong, might 'make his liberty a cloke for maliciousness,' but had the more serious defect of setting up a moral standard beyond the reach of human nature. Instead of bidding men climb, the earlier Stoics told them they must fly, or remain in the miry slough of iniquity. Later leaders of the school, however, considerably softened this rigid idealism, and taught that a gradual progress (προκοπὴ) towards Virtue was possible to all.

§ 15. This brings us to the doctrine of τὸ καθῆκον, natural or 'fitting' conduct, which though an integral part of Zeno's theory assumed greater prominence as the Stoics came to recognise that the wisest and best of men fell far short of ideal perfection.

Zeno's definition of the Chief End was 'life in conformity with nature,'[1] which implied that the Wise Man will exercise a perpetual discrimination and choice of 'natural' objects of action. These objects, e.g. health, are 'indifferent' (ἀδιάφορα)

[1] This he borrowed from the Academic Polemo. See §§ 23, 26 (3).

in relation to the Chief End, i.e. neither their presence nor their absence contributes anything towards attaining it; but they have nevertheless a secondary kind of value (ἀξία) as contrasted with such things as disease, which are 'contrary to nature' and therefore possess negative or minus value (ἀπαξία). Action which aims at acquiring objects of the former class being thus relatively preferable may be described as fit or appropriate.

This conception afforded a practical standard of conduct attainable by all; the Wise Man alone could act virtuously, but the 'fool' equally with him could perform 'appropriate' actions. We must bear in mind, however, that the distinctions of 'virtuous' and 'fitting' do not apply to acts in themselves; the *same* act, done by the Wise Man is a κατόρθωμα (righteous action), done by the fool, a καθῆκον.[1]

The influence of language, and of national character, upon ideas was strikingly exemplified when Stoicism began to address itself to Roman hearers. Just as its thoroughly Greek conception of a universe governed by Pure Reason then took on the aspect of a Reign of Law, in sympathy with the Roman genius, so when τὸ καθῆκον was translated by *officium* as its nearest equivalent, the idea of 'fitness' merged into that of duty or obligation to external law which was the keystone of Roman morality.

Zeno's Successors

§ 16. Zeno was succeeded by Cleanthes, with whose important contributions to his master's philosophy we cannot here deal, and he in turn by Chrysippus (d. 206 B.C.), the 'second founder of the Stoa,' who expounded and systematised it in his voluminous writings. The Stoic Logic in particular received its most characteristic developments from him. Under this triumvirate orthodox Stoicism reached its fixed and final form. Two of Zeno's personal pupils, however, set up heterodox views of the Summum Bonum. Aristo of Chios reverted to Cynicism in insisting that everything except Virtue and Vice was absolutely indifferent: hence he made complete insensibility (ἀπάθεια) the Chief Good. He rejected Logic and Physics on the ground that the former deals with what is not worth knowing and the latter with what is

[1] Thus the Stoics distinguished between καθῆκον μέσον (intermediate or imperfect) and καθῆκον τέλειον = κατόρθωμα.

unknowable. Erillus of Carthage, on the other hand, represents a reaction towards Platonism; he placed the Summum Bonum in scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). Cicero always ranks him with Aristo as having extinguished morality by removing the springs of action, but he seems to have admitted that things indifferent as regards the Chief Good could form a secondary or subordinate End (ὑποτελίς). Along with these two Cicero often names the earlier Pyrrho of Elis (circa 365-275 B.C.), the first of the Sceptics, whose denial that we can know the nature of things led to the same practical conclusion. Since we cannot know whether sickness, health, pleasure, pain, etc., are good or evil, we have no grounds for choice; our only course is suspension of judgment (ἐποχή), which will secure us tranquil indifference to all externals. Another Zeno (of Tarsus) succeeded Chrysippus; then came Diogenes the Babylonian, one of the three Athenian envoys to Rome, 156 B.C.[1] At this time the criticisms of Carneades forced the Stoics to modify their doctrine on several points (iii. 57). Thus Diogenes' pupil, Antipater of Tarsus, defined the End as πᾶν τὸ καθ' αὑτὸν ποιεῖν διηνεκῶς καὶ ἀπαρβάτως πρὸς τὸ τυγχάνειν τῶν προηγουμένων κατὰ φύσιν (nihil, quantum in ipso sit, praetermittere, quo minus ea, quae natura postulet, consequatur, Cic. *de legg.* i. 56; cf. *Fin.* iii. 22 n.). Another pupil, Archedemus, who founded a Stoic school at Babylon, went further in the definition πάντα τὰ καθήκοντα ἐπιτελοῦντας ζῆν (iv. 15). Antipater's successor, Panaetius of Rhodes (180-111 B.C.), the chief apostle of Stoicism to the Romans, was the honoured companion of Q. Mucius Scaevola, Laelius and Scipio Africanus the Younger. A devoted admirer of Plato and Aristotle, he taught a much softened form of Stoic ethics in a style very different from the crabbed, technical jargon affected by Zeno's stricter followers (iv. 23, 79). His περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος, on which Cicero based his *De Officiis*, contains maxims which would not only revolt the straiter sect of whom Cato was typical, but are below the ordinary canons of morality.

Equally celebrated was his pupil Posidonius, founder of a school at Rhodes, whom Cicero heard there (§ 2), and later entertained as his guest at Rome. On the whole more orthodox than Panaetius, he was likewise influenced by Plato, whom he

[1] The other two were Carneades and Critolaus the Peripatetic. They were sent to plead for a mitigation of the fine of 500 talents imposed on Athens by the Sicyonians, whom the Senate had empowered to arbitrate between her and Oropus.

followed in contradiction to Zeno on a point of great ethical importance. The earlier Stoics, asserting the essential oneness of the soul, had denied that it has an irrational part to which the emotions belong; instead of requiring control of the passions by reason, they demanded their complete suppression on the ground that they are nothing but morbid perversions of the reason itself. Posidonius, on the contrary, adopted the Platonic division of soul into a rational, a 'spirited' and a concupiscent element, and substituted the Platonic ideal of a harmony between these elements, under the supremacy of the highest, for the Stoic ideal of complete 'apathy' or extirpation of the feelings. Cicero, who calls him 'the greatest of all the Stoics,' and says that he read his works oftener than those of any other writer, endeavoured unsuccessfully to persuade him to compose a panegyric upon his consulship. He died at the age of eighty-four, about three years before the *De Finibus* was written.

Another pupil of Panaetius, MNESARCHUS, who jointly with DARDANUS succeeded to his chair at Athens, is named by Cicero among Stoic authors of repute (i. 6). Of the very little that is known about him the only fact of interest for us is that he was the teacher of Antiochus.

EPICURUS

§ 17. It is one of the ironies of language that the word epicure comes from the name of a philosopher who was both in theory and practice an apostle of plain living.

Epicurus (341-270 B.C.), the son of an Athenian citizen, was born and brought up in Samos. He first taught in the cities of Colophon, Mitylene and Lampsacus, but settled in Athens about 306 B.C. Here he gathered round him a band of disciples, both men and women, whose regular meeting-place was his garden. The school thus formed was a society of friends, united no less by personal devotion to the master than by enthusiasm for his teaching, a brotherhood whose members would have held their goods in common like the Pythagoreans and early Christians, had not Epicurus taught them that such an arrangement was superfluous.

Their founder's aim was even more exclusively practical than Zeno's. For him the sole value of Philosophy lay in its power to better man's lot in life. Filled with 'the sense of tears in mortal things,' he looked deep into the causes of human anguish and saw men everywhere oppressed by two

haunting terrors—fear of death and fear of the gods. To rob death of its sting by showing that it is a dreamless sleep, to break the heavy yoke of superstition by proving that no divine interference with natural laws is possible—this he deemed the prime mission of Philosophy, which must therefore begin with Physics.

Physics

§ 18. The Atomic theory of Democritus (b. B.C. 460) which Epicurus had studied in his youth, provided just such an explanation of the universe as he sought. According to this, the constituents of the universe are Atoms of absolutely solid matter, and Void or Vacuum, without which motion would be impossible. The Atoms are indivisible, imperishable, and differ only in shape and size (and therefore in weight). The existing universe originated in the Atoms being borne vertically 'downwards' by their inherent gravity at speeds proportionate to their weight, and hence impinging on one another and forming compounds. All substances are produced by these combinations of the Atoms, and the different qualities of bodies result from the different shapes, sizes, arrangement of the component atoms. (No body is absolutely solid; even the heaviest, in which the atoms are most densely packed together, contains interstices of Void.)

Mind or soul consists of particles of ethereal matter diffused throughout the body; these owing to their fineness continually escape, but fresh particles are as continually inhaled in breathing. When we cease to breathe, we die, because the rapid outflow of the soul-particles is no longer balanced by inflow. All sensation is caused by contact, either with bodies themselves, as in the case of touch and taste, or, in the case of sight, with the filmy husks (images) which are continually thrown off from the surface of objects. All mental impressions are similarly caused by images entering through the pores of the body.

Thus even the forms we see in dreams, visions or fancy emanate from some real object; there must then be gods. But the gods neither created, nor can they control, the mechanism of the universe. Democritus held that they were mere chance aggregates of fine soul-particles, existing in the air. Some of these sylph-like beings were friendly to man, some malevolent. Of Epicurus' more exalted notion of the divine nature we shall speak presently; we must here notice his important modification of the Democritean atomism.

§ 19. Epicurus found himself in agreement with the Stoics in regarding all that exists as *material*, but he complained that by attributing all that happens to the working of universal Law, they had simply replaced the omnipotent Zeus of popular religion by a more inexorable tyrant—'Ἀνάγκη, or Necessity. If man is to be a free agent, there must be an element of chance in the operation of natural causes. The solution he propounded was this. Aristotle had pointed out Democritus' error in supposing that the atoms would fall at different speeds *through a vacuum*. Turning this correction to account, Epicurus maintained that the atoms move downwards at *equal* speeds, but nevertheless collide in consequence of possessing a power of spontaneous movement which enables them to swerve infinitesimally from the vertical line of descent. So their collision and the resulting formation of bodies obeys no invariable law, but takes place fortuitously. Now, since everything that happens in the universe is ultimately caused by this indeterminate atomic movement, this hypothesis involves a corresponding freedom in human action. Just as the atoms are not compelled to move in one direction rather than another, we are not compelled to act in one way rather than another. The material soul inherits the spontaneity of its constituent atoms.

Canonic

§ 20. In this 'world without a plan,' man need only inquire how he can best adjust himself to his environment. There is no purpose or design in the universe which his reason can search out and his will conform to. Yet Epicurus can still call his world a cosmos, not a chaos; things do not happen entirely by chance, but through the operation of mechanical causes, and man's well-being is conditioned by the knowledge of these, including those which govern his own nature. But all this he can learn directly from experience, and hence the methods of Dialectic are superfluous. For that branch of Philosophy Epicurus substituted *Canonic*, the science of the κανών or criterion of truth. In the sphere of knowledge, this criterion is *sensation*; in the sphere of conduct, it is *feeling* (i.e. of pleasure and pain).

From the Democritean theory of sensation, it follows that whatever our senses tell us, is true; to doubt their evidence is to abolish knowledge and paralyse action. Error only comes in when we misinterpret that evidence; when we speak e.g. of our eyes deceiving us, we really mean that we have passed a

false judgment on a true sensation. Ideas or concepts (προλήψεις) arise from sensations, which are permanently impressed upon the mental substance by repetition; hence, these too are always true. So long as we hold fast by experience, we are on firm ground, but everything beyond it, e.g. whether the sun will rise to-morrow, or how large it is, is matter of opinion (ὑπόληψις). We are justified in treating an opinion as true if it is either confirmed by experience, or not contradicted thereby; e.g. we may assume that the sun *will* rise to-morrow, and adopt any hypothesis we like as to its size which does not conflict with observed facts.

With regard to the criterion of conduct, Epicurus showed remarkable insight by drawing a distinction, overlooked by psychologists until quite modern times, between sensation and feeling proper.[1] He rightly recognised the latter as a distinct mode of consciousness, and as one that must be characterised simply as either pleasurable or painful.

Ethics

§ 21. Having made Feeling the standard whereby to measure the true and false in action, that is to say, the right and the wrong, Epicurus necessarily identified the Good, or that at which all action aims, with Pleasure, and pronounced this to be the Chief End of Man. For all sentient beings instinctively strive after Pleasure and shun Pain. So far, he is in accord with Aristippus, with whom he is so often classed, as the earliest preacher of Hedonism. But while Aristippus regarded Pleasure as positive, an active gratification of either the senses or the mind (which, as Cicero says, is what Pleasure means in common parlance), Epicurus went deeper into the matter. Like Plato before him, and many psychologists since, he held that Pain is the positive element in Feeling, and Pleasure merely the negative, i.e. that which only arises out of the removal of its opposite. Every pleasure, when analysed, turns out to be the satisfaction of a want, and the more painful the want, the keener the pleasure. Hence the highest Pleasure is absolute freedom from Pain, and this, not individual pleasurable sensations, must be the Chief End.

How is this End to be attained? Although all pleasures and pains have a physical *origin*, those of the mind affect us far

[1] The two are constantly confused in common speech. We say 'a feeling of cold,' 'patriotic feelings,' 'a painful sensation,' etc. The point to remember is that all these are complex states of consciousness, analysable into (1) cognitive elements, e.g. *sensations* of cold, (2) true Feeling, i.e. pleasure or pain.

nore powerfully than those of the body because they persist n consciousness as memories, hopes, or fears. We can to a arge extent control our mental feelings, and so greatly do hey exceed in intensity bodily pains and pleasures that, by ultivating serenity of spirit, we may not only dispense with he gifts of fortune, but triumph over the extremest physical uffering. No Cynic or Stoic proclaimed more fervently than picurus the paradox that the Wise Man is always happy, ven on the rack. Further, although Virtue is not an End in tself, it is so indispensable a means towards attaining inward eace that a moral life is the only happy life. Thus the ractical outcome of Stoic and Epicurean ethical teaching s the same; the exemplary lives of Epicurus and great umbers of his followers could challenge comparison with hose of his severest opponents, and, in the pictures of he Wise Man drawn respectively by Torquatus and Cato, ve see how nearly the moral ideals of the two schools oincided.

But the Epicurean philosophy is strongly contrasted with ts three ancient rivals by its almost passionate assertion f the independence and value of the individual. Roughly, ve may say that man is for Aristotle essentially the citizen f the Hellenic city-state, for Plato, of an ideal Common-vealth, for Zeno, of the cosmopolis of God. Epicurus roclaims that the State is made for Man, not Man for he State. Laws and institutions rest neither on divine uthority nor abstract justice; utility and security are the asis of social as of private morality. 'Sanctions and tales lislimn like mist' in the dry light of utilitarian analysis. et it were a mistake to conclude that Epicureanism, which epels at first sight by its lack of idealism, took no account f the two deepest needs of human nature—religion and omance. The latter was satisfied by its exaltation of riendship, as the lives of Epicureans bore witness—and ow much friendship could mean to Greeks, we know. As o the former, though Epicurus denied a Divine Creator nd Ruler of the world, his conception of the Godhead vas worthy of 'a free man's worship.' Its attributes are ternal existence, blessedness, perfection; for these alone, nd with no servile hope of reward or fear of punishment, is to be adored. Our world is one of an infinite number, ll subject to disintegration by dispersion of the constituent toms; that which is eternal must dwell aloof in the void nterspaces (μετακόσμια), and that which is perfect and

blessed cannot be touched with the feeling of our sins or infirmities.

§ 22. The almost complete loss of the 300 volumes written by Epicurus has left us mainly dependent on the accounts of such opponents as Cicero, two letters of the Master, fragments of writings of the school, and an abstract of his ethical teaching in the form of a collection of maxims (the so-called *κυρίαι δόξαι*). We possess therefore the bare skeleton of his system; what it was as a living whole we can only partly divine from the scanty historical and literary evidence. But its animating purpose, the emancipation of the human spirit from self-forged fetters of convention and superstition, remains enshrined for us in the work of the greatest Roman poet.

The profound veneration which Epicurus had inspired in his lifetime soon became a sort of cult of his memory among members of the school. They had their calendar of commemorative feasts, instituted by the Master himself; his writings were studied and learned by rote as their Scriptures, containing divine revelation rather than human discoveries. Hence none of his successors attempted any innovations on his system, though several permitted themselves more attention to dialectic and to literary culture than he had sanctioned. Among these were Cicero's teachers, PHAEDRUS and ZENO of Sidon.[1] A third name of interest is that of PHILODEMUS (ii. 119), whom Cicero in his speech *In Pisonem* describes as the accomplished but unprincipled tutor of that young reprobate. The great find of Epicurean papyri made about 1752 in a buried villa at Herculaneum which was almost certainly Piso's, included a number of writings of Philodemus. Comparison of one of these with the first book of the *De Natura Deorum* showed that Cicero had borrowed largely either from this Philodemian treatise itself or from some earlier Epicurean work on which it was modelled.

ANTIOCHUS

§ 23. In order to understand the position of ANTIOCHUS, we must rapidly survey the history of the Academy, which he professed to have led back to the true principles of its founder.

[1] *De Nat. Deorum*, i. 59; Zenonem, quem Philo noster coryphaeum appellare Epicureorum solebat, cum Athenis essem, audiebam frequenter . . . Non igitur ille, ut plerique, sed isto modo ut tu, distincte, graviter, ornate.

On the death of Plato, the leadership of the school fell to his sister's son, SPEUSIPPUS, whose teaching was strongly tinged with Pythagoreanism. We may note that he carried further the ascetic element in Plato's ethical doctrine by explicitly pronouncing Pleasure to be an evil. His successor, XENOCRATES, defined Happiness as 'the possession of Virtue and of the things which subserve it.' The tripartite division of Philosophy, so frequently employed by Cicero, is apparently due to him. Next came POLEMO (d. 270 B.C.), who formulated his view of the Chief Good in the phrase, 'life according to nature,' which, as we have seen, was borrowed by Zeno. Polemo was succeeded by CRATES, and he in turn by ARCESILAS (d. 241 B.C.). This philosopher left no writings, and his doctrine is imperfectly known to us; but its most important feature was a denial no less absolute than Pyrrho's of the possibility of knowledge, either through the reason or through the senses. Thus he was regarded as the founder of a second, or New, Academy,[1] which his immediate successors in Plato's chair led still further along the path of scepticism. Arcesilas had been mainly engaged in controverting the Stoic theory of knowledge; this was yet more vigorously assailed by the great CARNEADES, who had long presided over the Academy when he made one of the Athenian embassy of philosophers to Rome in 156 B.C. Carneades also wrote nothing; the destructive criticism of Stoic dogmatism which he put forward in discourses of extraordinary persuasiveness and power were handed down in the writings of his pupil and successor, CLITOMACHUS. In controversy with the Stoics, he defined the Chief End as 'the acquisition of natural goods' (*prima naturae*). But his practice of arguing on both sides of a question (he is said while at Rome to have given two brilliant lectures 'for and against justice') prevented his own disciples from deciding what were his real opinions on Ethics.

Cicero's teacher PHILO, who succeeded Clitomachus, initiated a reaction from scepticism by trying to find a halfway house between absolute certainty and the reasonable probability which Carneades had argued to be man's sole and sufficient guide in life. Some mental impressions, he said, have an 'obviousness' (ἐνάργεια) which warrants us in asserting that we 'know' the objects that produce them.

[1] Sometimes called the 'Middle,' Philo being regarded as the founder of the 'New.' Some writers even reckoned five Academies, founded respectively by Plato, Arcesilas, Carneades, Philo, Antiochus. But Cicero speaks only of the Old and the New; the latter being represented by Arcesilas, Carneades, Philo, and we may conveniently follow his usage.

§ 24. At this period the long disputes of the rival schools had brought about mutual concessions and modifications of doctrine, while the spread of philosophical culture and the desire for a practical rule of life favoured the rise of eclecticism or the fusion of elements of different systems into one. It was the nemesis of Scepticism that men who had learned to distrust Reason's power to attain truth reverted to the guidance of Authority, accepting as the nearest approximation to certainty that which commands the general assent of leading thinkers. Thus the time was ripe for the bold step taken by Philo's pupil ANTIOCHUS of Ascalon (d. 68 B.C.), who declared that the three foremost schools, Academic, Peripatetic, and Stoic, were substantially agreed, so far at least as concerned Ethics. Zeno, he asserted, had simply pirated ideas from the common stock of the two older schools, and had concealed his theft by disguising them under an uncouth new-fangled terminology—in fact, 'as gipsies do with stolen children, disfigured 'em to make 'em pass for his own.' Antiochus could only maintain this accusation by attributing to 'the Ancients' a number of Zeno's own most characteristic ideas, and even some of his technical terms. The Stoics, from Chrysippus onwards, were famous for 'accommodating' the doctrines of earlier thinkers to their own by the same method, and Antiochus, who had been a pupil of Mnesarchus (§ 16), was thus turning against them a weapon with which they themselves supplied him.

§ 25. That the differences between Academics, Peripatetics, and Stoics were merely verbal had been a favourite thesis for disputation with Carneades, but *more suo*, he entirely contradicted it in his famous classification of theories of the τέλος.[1] Antiochus, regardless of the inconsistency involved, adopted this scheme, which we may conveniently discuss here.

Starting from the assumptions that Wisdom, which is the Art of Living, aims, like every art, at an End extraneous to itself, and that this End must be (1) in harmony with Nature, (2) something which excites and satisfies instinctive desire (ὁρμή), Carneades declared that the whole question of the τέλος turns upon determining what is the object of ὁρμή. It must be one of three things, viz. Pleasure, Absence of Pain, or 'primary objects according to nature' (τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν). To acquire some one of these three, then, might appear to be the only possible τέλος. But Carneades abruptly introduces an entirely different standard

[1] v. 15, ii. 34.

—Virtue; this will consist not in acquiring but in *acting with a view to acquiring* one of the above objects. Hence there are six 'simple' Ends, but of the second group, only one has been seriously proposed, viz. by the Stoics. The reference of course is to Antipater's definition (supra, p. xx), and Carneades obviously added this second division expressly to include it, at the expense of upsetting his own postulate. For Virtue, thus defined, is *not* an object of ὁρμή; no instinctive want is satisfied by doing all one can to acquire something. By combining Virtue with (1) Pleasure, (2) Absence of Pain, (3) the πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν, Carneades further added three 'compound' Ends, the last of which he asserted to be that of 'the Peripatetics and Academics.'[1] The scheme thus exhibits their fundamental *disagreement* with Zeno on that which Antiochus constantly proclaimed to be the cardinal point in Philosophy!

§ 26. In a condensed survey like the present, it is impossible to discuss adequately the conceptions of ὁρμή and τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν which are so prominent in Carneades' scheme, and in Antiochus' argument (Bk. IV.) that Zeno set out from the self-same first principles of action as the Academics and Peripatetics. It must suffice to notice the following points: (1) ὁρμή, meaning the instinctive impulse, common to all creatures, toward self-preservation and the means thereof,[2] is a Stoic term, and always sharply contrasted with *reason*, which only comes into being in the adult human mind. Its objects include bodily health and perfection, and sound mental faculties, but not *Virtue*, for that is the perfection of the reason, and only by the reason can be apprehended and sought. These objects, as being the earliest which nature prompts the creature to strive after, are called τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν—a term which Cicero most commonly renders by *prima naturae*.[3]

(2) In iv. 15 sqq. and v. 24 sqq. we have Antiochus' exposition of the *prima constitutio*, or *institutio naturae*

[1] Carneades asserted that his division was exhaustive, whereas logically he might have arrived at six 'compound' Ends by combinations of the four 'simple.' Varro (ap. Aug. Civ. D. xix. 1) with ponderous ingenuity extends the scheme to include 288!

[2] See iii. 16 n.

[3] But also by *naturalia* (iii. 61), *prima naturalia* (ii. 34), *prima secundum naturam* (v. 18, 19, 45), *initia naturae* (ii. 38, iii. 22), *primae naturae conciliationes* (iii. 22), *principia naturae* (iii. 22, 23), *prima* or *principia a naturae data* (ii. 34, iv. 18), *principia naturalia* (ii. 35, iii. 17). In iv. 34, 45, and v. 72, *principia naturae* is used in a more general sense ('de universa prima conciliatione et fundamento vitae humanae, Mdv.) as is *principia naturalia* (=*prima constitutio naturae*) in v. 19.

(*prima invitamenta naturae*, v. 18), which he treats as identical with the Stoic *prima naturae*, and asserts that Zeno borrowed from Polemo (iv. 45). But by his own showing, this *constitutio* really corresponds to the Peripatetic division of Goods into mental, bodily, and external, and hence includes Virtue, the good or perfection of the highest part of mind. On the contrary, it is bodily *plus* external goods which virtually answer to the *prima naturae*. Accordingly, in Carneades' scheme 'Virtue combined with the *prima naturae*' is the τέλος of 'the Ancients.'

(3) What Zeno actually borrowed from Polemo was the idea of nature as the standard of morality. But the phrase 'life according to nature,' by which both of them defined the τέλος, was understood by each in a different sense. For Zeno, as we have seen, it meant life in conformity to the Law of the Universe; for Polemo it probably meant life regulated by 'natural' as opposed to artificial or conventional standards—the fulfilment of the requirements of φύσις rather than those of νόμος. Thus he more fully defined the τέλος as αὐτάρκειαν ἀγαθῶν πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων καὶ μεγίστων.[1] Now, incomparably the 'greatest good,' in the view of the Academics and Peripatetics, was Virtue. But Cicero, copying from Antiochus, renders the above definition by 'omnibus aut maximis (not *bonis*, but) *rebus iis, quae secundum naturam sint*, fruentem vivere' (iv. 15). That the words italicised are a Stoic gloss upon those of Polemo is clear from the Antiochean statement of his τέλος in Acad. i. 22; 'adipisci, quae essent prima natura, quaeque per se expetenda, aut omnia aut maxima.' According to the Stoics, the only *per se expetenda* are *moral actions* (iii. 55), and again, Virtue is in the highest degree *secundum naturam*; we see then that in both the above passages Antiochus is stating Polemo's definition in Stoic terms. In the first, the *maxima secundum naturam* take the place of ἀγαθὰ μέγιστα; and so do the *maxima per se expetenda* in the second. It was by thus manipulating terms that Carneades stated the old Academic τέλος as 'Virtue combined with the *prima naturae*.'

(4) Antiochus, and the Stoics before him,[2] made a more serious departure from fact in declaring that this τέλος was also that of Aristotle. Nothing more clearly illustrates the

[1] ap. Clem. Alex. Strom. ii. p. 180. αὐτάρκεια ἀγαθῶν here means an amount of goods which 'suffices by itself,' irrespective of one's having anything besides.

[2] isque finis bonorum, ut ab ipsis Stoicis scriptum videmus, a Xenocrate et ab Aristotele constitutus est, *Fin.* iv. 15.

complete neglect of Aristotle's writings at the period[1] than the ignoring throughout the 'Peripatetic' exposition in Book V. of the great theory set forth in the Nicomachean Ethics. Concerning this, we can only recall here that it defines the Chief End of Man as 'an activity of soul according to goodness,' thus differing from Xenocrates' and Polemo's conception of the *possession* of Virtue, and further contravening their definitions by making the possession of bodily and external goods not *part* of the τέλος, but merely conditions without which it cannot be realised.[2]

V. CICERO'S SOURCES FOR THIS WORK

§ 27. In the time at his disposal, Cicero could not attempt to collect his material from a large number of authorities, still less to digest it carefully. What he did was to take some one book on the subject in hand and reproduce as much of it as suited his purpose. Unfortunately this book was sometimes not the original work of a philosopher, but an abstract from one or more of his writings. It was an age, like our own, of little books on great subjects; manuals and anthologies were all the fashion, and were produced to order for the libraries of the wealthy by some *Graeculus esuriens*, or made by the studious for themselves.

Books I., II.

It has been plausibly argued that Cicero took Torquatus' exposition in Book I. direct from such a compendium, which he had borrowed from some Epicurean friend.[3] This is indicated by his prefatory remark about the doctrine to be set forth—'quam a nobis sic intellegas expositam ut ab ipsis qui eam disciplinam probant non soleat accuratius explicari.' From internal evidence it can be inferred that the compendium contained (1) an epitome of Epicurus' περὶ τέλους; (2) an

[1] The study of Aristotle was revived within Cicero's lifetime by Andronicus of Rhodes, and thenceforward absorbed all the energies of the later Peripatetics.

[2] Nic. Eth. I., viii. 15. See Burnet's ed., p. 5, on the metaphor there suggested. Just as a tragedy cannot be put on the stage without certain material accessories, which have nothing to do with its perfection or imperfection as a tragedy, so Happiness is to some extent dependent on things not in our power, which are yet no part of Happiness itself.

[3] Usener, *Epicurea*, p. 264. Cf. Hirzel, *Unters.* ii. 687.

appendix giving merely a condensed summary of the points in dispute between Epicureans and Cyrenaics. In the passage beginning 'Huic certae sententiae quae sint coniuncta explicabo' (i. 55 sqq.), Cicero has transcribed this summary without seeing its drift.

In i. 65-70 he reproduces, perhaps from the same compendium, an epitome of some Epicurean work on Friendship, written in answer to the Stoic criticisms which are urged in ii. 78-85. These, together with other arguments of the school against Epicurus, including those of Chrysippus (ii. 44, 100), Cicero probably took from Antiochus.[1]

Book III.

Madvig has pointed out (Excursus v.) the general correspondence between the order of exposition followed by Cato and that in Diogenes Laertius (vii. 84 sq.), and has shown that Cicero's source for this Book was some Stoic author not earlier than Carneades. It is scarcely doubtful that this author was Diogenes Babylonius, whom Cato follows in preference to other Stoics on a disputed point (§ 33), and whose view of Wealth is so inappositely interpolated (§ 49) as to indicate that Cicero had some work of his, or an abstract of it, before him at the time of writing. Besides this passage, the intrusion of irrelevant topics in §§ 35, 55 suggests that he was using a compendium, and in making hurried excerpts overlooked the want of connection between one heading and the next.

Books IV., V.

Throughout Books IV. and V. Cicero, as we have said, relies entirely upon Antiochus; how closely he copies him in at least one instance may be seen by comparing v. 34 with the parallel passage from Varro quoted in my note.

[1] Hirzel, i. 32, ii. 330.

DE FINIBUS BONORUM ET MALORUM

BOOK I. ARGUMENT

i-iv. Preface, addressed to Brutus. Cicero defends his design of rendering the works of Greek philosophers into Latin, against those who would have them studied only in the original. There are three other classes of critics, but to those who are radically opposed to philosophy, he has replied in his 'Hortensius,' while the irrational objections that the subject is unworthy (*a*) of strenuous pursuit, (*b*) of the attention of a statesman, are easily disposed of. He can still serve his countrymen by contributing towards their higher education, nor can he find a worthier theme than that supreme problem of philosophy—'What is the Chief End of Man?' v. He will discuss first the easiest and simplest theory, that of Epicurus. This he can set forth with the fulness and fidelity of a disciple, by reproducing the account he received from Torquatus, in a conversation held at Cumae.

vi-vii. On being asked by Torquatus to formulate his objections to the Epicurean system, Cicero briefly reviews and criticises it under the three divisions of Philosophy, Natural Science, Logic, and Ethics.

viii. Torquatus undertakes its defence, but proposes to limit the present discussion to Ethics. He proceeds to expound Epicurus' doctrine as to the Chief Good, following the latter's order of exposition, and freely quoting his words. ix. Every animal, from the moment of birth, instinctively seeks pleasure and shuns pain. Hence pleasure must be intrinsically desirable and pain intrinsically obnoxious. x. But this seeking and this shunning each involve an element of choice; pleasures are often foregone, and pains endured, with a view to resultant pleasures and pains. xi. By Pleasure, however, Epicurus means not only that of the senses, but also that highest kind of Pleasure which consists in absolute freedom from Pain. xii. That this latter constitutes the Chief Good, becomes manifest if we put the case of (*a*) a man enjoying every conceivable pleasure, without let or hindrance, (*b*) a man in the extremity of suffering. Thus the Chief Good is a Life of Enjoyment.

xiii-xvi. Virtues are not Ends in Themselves, but Means towards this Chief Good. This is shown by a discussion of Prudence, Temperance, Courage, Justice. xvii. *Mental* pleasures and pains have a physical basis, but differ from *physical*, which are limited to the actual present, by 'looking before and after,' and hence affect us far more powerfully. xviii. A Life of Enjoyment is necessarily a Moral Life, and vice versâ. Complete mastery over our passions alone leads to a Life of *Happiness*.

xix. Thus the Wise Man is (*a*) invariably happy, (*b*) not to any great extent dependent on vicissitudes of fortune. (Epicurus attached little importance to Dialectic (Logic), as being of no service towards the attainment of Happiness, but highly valued Physics (Natural Science), which directly subserves that end.) xx. It is an entire mistake to conclude that the Epicurean doctrine destroys the foundation of Friendship. Epicurus set the greatest store by it, and gave it a solid basis in utility.

xxi. We therefore owe the deepest gratitude to this philosopher, who, himself led by the voice of Nature, has guided our feet into the way of peace.

DE FINIBUS BONORUM ET MALORUM

LIBER PRIMUS

I. **1.** Non eram nescius, Brute, cum, quae summis ingeniis exquisitaque doctrina philosophi Graeco sermone tractavissent, ea Latinis litteris mandaremus, fore, ut hic noster labor in varias reprehensiones incurreret. Nam quibusdam, et iis quidem non admodum indoctis, totum hoc displicet, philosophari. Quidam autem non tam id reprehendunt, si remissius agatur, sed tantum studium tamque multam operam ponendam in eo non arbitrantur. Erunt etiam, et hi quidem eruditi Graecis litteris, contemnentes Latinas, qui se dicant in Graecis legendis operam malle consumere. Postremo aliquos futuros suspicor, qui me ad alias litteras vocent, genus hoc scribendi, etsi sit elegans, personae tamen et dignitatis esse negent. **2.** Contra quos omnes dicendum breviter existimo. Quamquam philosophiae quidem vituperatoribus satis responsum est eo libro, quo a nobis philosophia defensa et collaudata est, cum esset accusata et vituperata ab Hortensio. Qui liber cum et tibi probatus videretur et iis, quos ego posse iudicare arbitrarer, plura uscepi, veritus, ne movere hominum studia viderer, retinere non posse. Qui autem, si maxime hoc placeat,

1. non tam id reprehendunt, i.e. non tam id (philosophari) reprehendunt quam nimis magnum tudium'. For the second comparative clause Cicero substitutes n independent clause, to express more graphically the objections of the second class of critics.

2. eo libro. Entitled Hortensius. Fragments only are extant. It formed an introduction to Cicero's philosophical writings.

moderatius tamen id volunt fieri, difficilem quandam temperantiam postulant in eo, quod semel admissum coërceri reprimique non potest; ut propemodum iustioribus utamur illis, qui omnino avocent a philosophia, quam his, qui rebus infinitis modum constituant in reque eo meliore, quo maior sit, mediocritatem desiderent. **3.** Sive enim ad sapientiam perveniri potest, non paranda nobis solum ea, sed fruenda etiam est; sive hoc difficile est, tamen nec modus est ullus investigandi veri, nisi inveneris, et quaerendi defetigatio turpis est, cum id, quod quaeritur, sit pulcherrimum. Etenim si delectamur, cum scribimus, quis est tam invidus, qui ab eo nos abducat? sin laboramus, quis est, qui alienae modum statuat industriae? Nam ut Terentianus Chremes non inhumanus, qui novum vicinum non vult

Fodere aut arare aut aliquid ferre denique

(non enim illum ab industria, sed ab illiberali labore deterret), sic isti curiosi, quos offendit noster minime nobis iniucundus labor.

II. **4.** Iis igitur est difficilius satisfacere, qui se Latina scripta dicunt contemnere. In quibus hoc primum est, in quo admirer, cur in gravissimis rebus non delectet eos sermo patrius, cum iidem fabellas Latinas ad verbum e Graecis expressas non inviti legant. Quis enim tam inimicus paene nomini Romano est, qui Ennii Medeam aut Antiopam Pacuvii spernat aut reiciat, quod se iisdem

3. Etenim. As often in Cicero, = *porro*, *praeterea*. Introduces a fresh point against the 'moderates'. '*Further*, why should they grudge me a labour of love?'

ut . . . sic, 'although, yet'.

Terentianus Chremes. Heauton-timor. i. 1. 17. In Terence, there is a full stop after *ferre*, *denique* going with the next line. C. quotes as though *denique* qualified *ferre aliquid*, meaning 'even'.

4. Iis igitur est difficilius. For the mere busybodies are easily disposed of, but the third class of critics advance certain specious arguments.

in quo admirer. The reading appears to be sound, but the construction is very harsh. We expect *quod admirer*; the exceptional *in quo* is all the more awkward because it is logically, though not grammatically, the obj. of the verb.

paene nomini. *paene* qualifies *nomini*, not *inimicus*. 'Hostile, one might almost say, to the very name "Roman"'.

Antiopam Pacuvii. This tragedy (of which fragments remain)

Euripidis fabulis delectari dicat, Latinas litteras oderit? Synephebos ego, inquit, potius Caecilii aut Andriam Terentii quam utramque Menandri legam? **5.** A quibus tantum dissentio, ut, cum Sophocles vel optime scripserit Electram, tamen male conversam Atilii mihi legendam putem; de quo Licinius, ferreum scriptorem; verum, opinor, scriptorem tamen, ut legendus sit. Rudem enim esse omnino in nostris poëtis aut inertissimae segnitiae est aut fastidii delicatissimi. Mihi quidem nulli satis eruditi videntur, quibus nostra ignota sunt. An

Utinam ne in nemore—

nihilo minus legimus quam hoc idem Graecum, quae autem de bene beateque vivendo a Platone disputata sunt, haec explicari non placebit Latine? **6.** Quid, si nos non interpretum fungimur munere, sed tuemur ea, quae dicta sunt ab iis, quos probamus, eisque nostrum iudicium et nostrum scribendi ordinem adiungimus? quid habent, cur Graeca anteponant iis, quae et splendide dicta sint neque sint conversa de Graecis? Nam si dicent, ab illis has res esse tractatas, ne ipsos quidem Graecos est cur tam multos legant, quam legendi sunt. Quid enim est a Chrysippo praetermissum in Stoicis? Legimus tamen

was an imitation of a lost play of Euripides (Ribbeck, Fr. Lat. Tr. pp. 278 sqq.). Cf. Persius, Sat. i. 78 'sunt quos Pacuviusque et verrucosa moretur Antiopa, aerumnis cor luctificabile fulta'. Pacuvius (B.C. 220–132) was nephew to Ennius.

quod se delectari dicat. Idiomatic (but illogical) for *quod delectetur*.

Synephebos. This play also survives in fragments. Caecilius, a contemporary of Ennius, is elsewhere censured by Cicero for his bad style. This imaginary speaker makes the very objection C. has just asserted no one would make! With equal carelessness, C. proceeds '*A quibus* . . . dissentio', though the antecedent required is singular (the implied subject of 'inquit'). Notice *tantum* exceptionally used for *tantopere*.

5. Atilii . . . Licinius. Atilius, whose rugged style C. also alludes to, ad Att. xiv. 20, wrote both tragedies and comedies. The critic mentioned is probably one Porcius *Licinus* fl. ante 102 B.C.

Utinam ne in nemore.

Utinam ne in nemore Pelio securibus
Caesa accidisset abiegna ad terram trabes;

are the opening lines of the 'Medea Exsul' of Ennius. Cf. Euripides' Medea ll. 3, 4.

6. quam legendi sunt. Not 'all there are to read', but 'all that should be read' (by persons professing a knowledge of literature). 'Standard works.'

Diogenem, Antipatrum, Mnesarchum, Panaetium, multos alios, in primisque familiarem nostrum Posidonium. Quid? Theophrastus mediocriterne delectat, cum tractat locos ab Aristotele ante tractatos? quid? Epicurei num desistunt de iisdem, de quibus et ab Epicuro scriptum est et ab antiquis, ad arbitrium suum scribere? Quod si Graeci leguntur a Graecis, iisdem de rebus alia ratione compositis, quid est, cur nostri a nostris non legantur?

III. **7**. Quamquam, si plane sic verterem Platonem aut Aristotelem, ut verterunt nostri poëtae fabulas, male, credo, mererer de meis civibus, si ad eorum cognitionem divina illa ingenia transferrem. Sed id neque feci adhuc nec mihi tamen, ne faciam, interdictum puto. Locos quidem quosdam, si videbitur, transferam, et maxime ab iis, quos modo nominavi, cum inciderit, ut id apte fieri possit, ut ab Homero Ennius, Afranius a Menandro solet. Nec vero, ut noster Lucilius, recusabo, quo minus omnes mea legant. Utinam esset ille Persius! Scipio vero et Rutilius multo etiam magis; quorum ille iudicium reformidans, Tarentinis ait se et Consentinis et Siculis scribere. Facete is quidem, sicut alia; sed neque tam docti

Mnesarchum, Panaetium. These names should perhaps be transposed, as the rest are given in order of their succession to headship of the school. See Introd. (§ 16) for all the philosophers here mentioned.

7. male, credo, mererer. Rhetorical irony. C. has several examples of this type of sentence, where a second protasis is subjoined to bring out something implied in the first.

noster Lucilius. De Orat. ii. 25 'C. Lucilius, homo doctus et perurbanus dicere solebat, ea quae scriberet neque ab indoctissimis se neque ab doctissimis legi velle, quod alteri nihil intellegerent, alteri plus fortasse quam ipse; de quo etiam scripsit: "*Persium non curo legere*"; hic enim, ut noramus, omnium fere nostrorum hominum doctissimus; "Laelium Decimum volo"; quem cognovimus virum bonum et non illiteratum, sed nihil ad Persium'.

Two distinct passages from Lucilius seem to be referred to; in the first L. says he writes for the moderately cultured, like Laelius, in the second, for the wholly illiterate. See next note.

Scipio vero. P. Scipio Africanus Minor, the friend of such men as Terence and Polybius, and P. Rutilius Rufus (cos. 105 B.C.), distinguished for philosophical and literary attainments, possessed a degree of culture very rare among Romans of their day. Lucilius deprecated their criticism by professing to write for provincials whose Latin was notoriously far from pure. Consentia was in Bruttium, whose natives spoke Greek and Oscan.

sed neque tam docti, i.e. 'neque tum erant homines tam docti, quam

tum erant, ad quorum iudicium elaboraret, et sunt illius scripta leviora, ut urbanitas summa appareat, doctrina mediocris. **8.** Ego autem quem timeam lectorem, cum ad te, ne Graecis quidem cedentem in philosophia, audeam scribere? Quamquam a te ipso id quidem facio provocatus gratissimo mihi libro, quem ad me de virtute misisti. Sed ex eo credo quibusdam usu venire, ut abhorreant a Latinis, quod inciderint in inculta quaedam et horrida, de malis Graecis Latine scripta deterius. Quibus ego assentior, dum modo de iisdem rebus ne Graecos quidem legendos putent. Res vero bonas, verbis electis graviter ornateque dictas, quis non legat? nisi qui se plane Graecum dici velit, ut a Scaevola est praetore salutatus Athenis Albucius. **9.** Quem quidem locum cum multa venustate et omni sale idem Lucilius, apud quem praeclare Scaevola:

> Graecum te, Albuci, quam Romanum atque Sabinum,
> Municipem Ponti, Tritanni, centurionum,
> Praeclarorum hominum ac primorum signiferumque,

nunc sunt'. As, with rare exceptions, the Rome of Lucilius, unlike the Rome of Cicero, contained no educated readers capable of appreciating careful workmanship, the poet adapted his style to the taste of an unlettered public, and rightly though playfully (*facete*) objected to being read by the cultured few, who, moreover, preferred works of a more serious order than satires.

8. ne Graecis quidem. Brutus' philosophical writings are praised by Quintilian. Besides the De Virtute which he dedicated to Cicero, he wrote a De Officiis and a De Patientia. He was a follower of the so-called 'Old' Academy.

inculta quaedam. Treatises by Amafinius, Rabirius and Catius, Epicureans, whom C. frequently censures. Cf. Acad. i. 5, Tusc. i. 6, ii. 7, iv. 6, and infra, iii. 40.

Scaevola . . . Albucius. T. Albucius, as a youth, studied Epicurean philosophy at Athens, where he met and was snubbed by Q. Mucius Scaevola, the augur and famous jurist, who was proceeding to Asia as praetor. Albucius later returned the compliment by prosecuting Scaevola for extortion, but failed to get a verdict. After Albucius had been praetor of Sardinia, he was himself tried on the same charge and, being found guilty, went into exile at Athens.

9. Quem quidem locum. Either a word has fallen out, or the text has suffered some corruption. The omission of such a verb as is here required (*tractat* or the like) cannot be defended by comparing cases where the omitted verb is (*a*) a verb of saying, or (*b*) definitely indicated by the context (e.g. 'A me Caesar pecuniam?' Philipp. ii. 72).

cum multa venustate. This combination is explained by taking the preposition as expressing not manner, but attendant circumstances. But *locum cum* looks not unlike a dittographic slip.

Maluisti dici; Graece ergo praetor Athenis,
Id quod maluisti, te, cum ad me accedi', saluto:
Χαῖρε, inquam, Tite! Lictores, turma omni' cohorsque:
Χαῖρε, Tite! Hinc hostis mi Albucius, hinc inimicus.

10. Sed iure Mucius. Ego autem mirari *satis* non queo, unde hoc sit tam insolens domesticarum rerum fastidium. Non est omnino hic docendi locus; sed ita sentio et saepe disserui, Latinam lingvam non modo non inopem, ut vulgo putarent, sed locupletiorem etiam esse quam Graecam. Quando enim nobis, vel dicam, aut oratoribus bonis aut poëtis, postea quidem quam fuit, quem imitarentur, ullus orationis vel copiosae vel elegantis ornatus defuit?

IV. Ego vero, quoniam forensibus operis, laboribus, periculis non deseruisse mihi videor praesidium, in quo a populo Romano locatus sum, debeo profecto, quantumcumque possum, in eo quoque elaborare, ut sint opera, studio, labore meo doctiores cives mei, nec cum istis tanto opere pugnare, qui Graeca legere malint, modo legant illa ipsa, ne simulent, et iis servire, qui vel utrisque litteris uti velint vel, si suas habent, illas non magno opere desiderent. **11.** Qui autem alia malunt scribi a nobis, aequi esse debent, quod et scripta multa sunt, sic ut plura nemini e nostris, et scribentur fortasse plura, si vita suppetet; et tamen, qui diligenter haec, quae de philosophia litteris mandamus, legere assveverit, iudicabit nulla ad legendum his esse potiora. Quid est enim in vita tanto opere quaerendum quam cum omnia in philosophia, tum id, quod his libris quaeritur, qui sit finis, quid extremum, quid ultimum, quo sint omnia bene vivendi recteque faciendi

10. qui Graeca legere malint. We might expect the indicative, as the clause refers to a definite set of persons, already marked out, but as the subjunctive is wanted for the indefinite classes which follow (*qui velint . . . desiderent*), C. uses the more general form of statement. This makes the sudden return to the more definite, in *si suas habent*, all the harsher.

ne simulent. 'Cribs' were not yet invented. C. merely means, let them not, under pretence of reading only Greek books, read—none at all.

11. scribi a nobis . . . nemini e nostris (scripta). The dative of the agent is only used with past part. Cicero could write *scripta sunt nobis*; but not *scribuntur nobis multa*.

consilia referenda, quid sequatur natura ut summum ex rebus expetendis, quid fugiat ut extremum malorum? Qua de re cum sit inter doctissimos summa dissensio, quis alienum putet eius esse dignitatis, quam mihi quisque tribuat, quid in omni munere vitae optimum et verissimum sit, exquirere? **12.** An, partus ancillae sitne in fructu habendus, disseretur inter principes civitatis, P. Scaevolam Maniumque Manilium, ab iisque M. Brutus dissentiet (quod et acutum genus est et ad usus civium non inutile, nosque ea scripta reliquaque eiusdem generis et legimus libenter et legemus), haec, quae vitam omnem continent, neglegentur? Nam, ut sint illa vendibiliora, haec uberiora certe sunt. Quamquam id quidem licebit iis existimare, qui legerint. Nos autem hanc omnem quaestionem de finibus bonorum et malorum fere a nobis explicatam esse his litteris arbitramur, in quibus, quantum potuimus, non modo quid nobis probaretur, sed etiam quid a singulis philosophiae disciplinis diceretur, persecuti sumus.

V. **13.** Ut autem a facillimis ordiamur, prima veniat in medium Epicuri ratio, quae plerisque notissima est, quam a nobis sic intelleges expositam, ut ab ipsis, qui eam disciplinam probant, non soleat accuratius explicari. Verum enim invenire volumus, non tamquam adversarium aliquem convincere. Accurate autem quondam a L. Torquato, homine omni doctrina erudito, defensa est Epicuri sententia de voluptate, a meque ei responsum, cum C. Triarius, in primis gravis et doctus adulescens, ei disputationi interesset. **14.** Nam cum ad me in Cumanum salutandi causa uterque venisset, pauca primo inter nos de litteris, quarum summum erat in utroque studium; deinde Torquatus, Quoniam nacti te, inquit, sumus aliquando otiosum, certe

12. partus ancillae. It was a moot point among Roman jurists, whether the offspring of a female slave, hired out by her owner, belonged to him, or to the person who hired her. The latter was said to have the 'usufruct' of her, and the eminent lawyers, P. Scaevola (Pont. Max. 131 B.C.) and M'. Manilius (cos. 149 B.C.), held that her offspring was *in fructu*, i.e. included in such usufruct. Brutus (father of the conspirator) successfully maintained the contrary. (Ulpian, Digest. vii. 1. 68.)

13. a facillimis. C. often and justly remarks the clearness and simplicity of the Epicurean system.

audiam, quid sit, quod Epicurum nostrum non tu quidem oderis, ut fere faciunt, qui ab eo dissentiunt, sed certe non probes, eum, quem ego arbitror unum vidisse verum maximisque erroribus animos hominum liberavisse et omnia tradidisse, quae pertinerent ad bene beateque vivendum; sed existimo te, sicut nostrum Triarium, minus ab eo delectari, quod ista Platonis, Aristoteli, Theophrasti orationis ornamenta neglexerit. Nam illud quidem adduci vix possum, ut ea, quae senserit ille, tibi non vera videantur. **15.** Vide, quantum, inquam, fallare, Torquate. Oratio me istius philosophi non offendit; nam et complectitur verbis, quod vult, et dicit plane, quod intellegam; et tamen ego a philosopho, si afferat eloquentiam, non asperner, si non habeat, non admodum flagitem; re mihi non aeque satisfacit, et quidem locis pluribus. Sed quot homines, tot sententiae; falli igitur possumus. Quamobrem tandem, inquit, non satisfacit? te enim iudicem aequum puto, modo, quae dicat ille, bene noris. **16.** Nisi mihi Phaedrum, inquam, mentitum aut Zenonem putas, quorum utrumque audivi, cum mihi nihil sane praeter sedulitatem probarent, omnes mihi Epicuri sententiae satis notae sunt; atque eos, quos nominavi, cum Attico nostro frequenter audivi, cum miraretur ille quidem utrumque, Phaedrum autem etiam amaret; cotidieque inter nos ea, quae audiebamus, conferebamus, neque erat umquam controversia, quid ego intellegerem, sed quid probarem.

VI. **17.** Quid igitur est? inquit; audire enim cupio, quid non probes. Principio, inquam, in physicis, quibus maxime gloriatur, primum totus est alienus. Democritea dicit, per-

14. **illud adduci vix possum . . . ut.** *Adducor* = 'adducor ad credendum'. *Illud* adverbial. Cf. 'Hoc tibi irascor, illud tibi assentior,' etc.

15. **et tamen ego a philosopho,** i.e. 'a philosopho eloquentiam non flagitem, (etsi) non asperner, si afferat'. For similar omission of a concessive particle see v. 89. C. adds *tamen*, having admitted that Epicurus expresses himself clearly and aptly.

quot homines, tot sententiae. Terence, Phorm. ii. 4. 14, 'So many men, so many minds'.

16. **Phaedrum . . . Zenonem.** See Introd. §§ 2, 22.

17. **Principio . . . primum.** *Principio* refers to the first of the three divisions of philosophy (physics, or natural science, logic or dialectic, and ethics), in each of which C. has fault to find with Epicurus, and answers to *tam altera parte* (§ 22).

pauca mutans, sed ita, ut ea, quae corrigere vult, mihi quidem depravare videatur. Ille atomos, quas appellat, id est, corpora individua propter soliditatem, censet in infinito inani, in quo nihil nec summum nec infimum nec medium nec intimum nec extremum sit, ita ferri, ut concursionibus inter se cohaerescant, ex quo efficiantur ea, quae sint quaeque cernantur, omnia; eumque motum atomorum nullo a principio, sed ex aeterno tempore intellegi convenire. **18.** Epicurus autem, in quibus sequitur Democritum, non fere labitur. Quamquam utriusque cum multa non probo, tum illud in primis, quod, cum in rerum natura duo quaerenda sint, unum, quae materia sit, ex qua quaeque res efficiatur, alterum, quae vis sit, quae quidque efficiat, de materia disseruerunt, vim et causam efficiendi reliquerunt. Sed hoc commune vitium; illae Epicuri propriae ruinae: censet enim, eadem illa individua et solida corpora ferri deorsum suo pondere ad lineam; hunc naturalem esse omnium corporum motum. **19.** Deinde ibidem homo acutus, cum illud occurreret, si omnia de-

Primum marks C.'s first criticism under the head of physics, viz. Epicurus is a plagiarist. The second point, that where he is original, he merely spoils his model, is brought out in § 18 sq., and might have been introduced by *deinde*, answering to *primum*. But C. constantly omits to mark formally the successive steps in an argument.

Ille atomos. For the Democritean Physics of Epic. see Introd. § 18.

intellegi convenire. 'One must picture to one's self (this motion).' 'Il faut se figurer que.' *intellegi* here, as *cogitari* sometimes = 'to imagine,' 'conceive of'.

18. non fere labitur. Not that the theory is a true one, but as expounded by Democritus, it is logical and self-consistent.

duo quaerenda sint. In Acad. i. 24 C. attributes this view to the Peripatetics and the Old Academy, but it is properly Stoic. That school recognized two principles (ἀρχαί) in Nature, *matter* (τὸ πάσχον, τὴν ἄποιον ὕλην), and *energy* (τὸ ποιοῦν, τὸν ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ θεόν). (Diog. Laert. vii. 134.) C. has here put *causa efficiendi* (strictly = Final Cause, 'what a thing is made *for*') for *causa efficiens* (Efficient Cause, 'what makes a thing'). [Reid on Acad. i. 6 defends the expression, taking *efficiendi* as gen. of definition.]

illae Epicuri propriae ruinae. 'The flaw in E.'s own contribution to the theory is this.' Observe that the explanation introduced by *enim* is not given by *censet . . . motum.* The hypothesis that the atoms fall *suo pondere* may be false but is not illogical; the flaw consists in the contradiction presently pointed out between that assumption and a further one. Here, and not uncommonly in C., the illative conjunction refers beyond its own sentence and we get an apparent *non sequitur.*

19. Deinde ibidem. 'Then, almost in the same breath.' *Ibidem* is thus used of time ad Att. ii. 12. 2: 'ibidem ilico puer abs te cum epistulis'.

orsum e regione ferrentur et, ut dixi, ad lineam, numquam fore, ut atomus altera alteram posset attingere, †itaque attulit rem commenticiam: declinare dixit atomum perpaulum, quo nihil posset fieri minus; ita effici complexiones et copulationes et adhaesiones atomorum inter se, ex quo efficeretur mundus omnesque partes mundi, quaeque in eo essent. Quae cum res tota ficta sit pueriliter, tum ne efficit *quidem*, quod vult. Nam et ipsa declinatio ad libidinem fingitur (ait enim declinare atomum sine causa, quo nihil turpius physico quam fieri quidquam sine causa dicere) et illum motum naturalem omnium ponderum, ut ipse constituit, e regione inferiorem locum petentium, sine causa eripuit atomis; nec tamen id, cuius causa haec finxerat, assecutus est. **20.** Nam si omnes atomi declinabunt, nullae umquam cohaerescent, sive aliae declinabunt, aliae suo nutu recte ferentur, primum erit hoc quasi provincias atomis dare, quae recte, quae oblique ferantur; deinde eadem illa atomorum (in quo etiam Democritus haeret) turbulenta concursio hunc mundi ornatum efficere non poterit. Ne illud quidem physici, credere aliquid esse minimum, quod profecto numquam putavisset, si a Polyaeno, familiari suo, geometrica discere maluisset quam illum etiam ipsum dedocere. Sol Democrito magnus videtur, quippe homini erudito in geometriaque perfecto; huic pedalis fortasse;

declinare. De Fato 22, 'declinat atomus intervallo minimo; id appellat ἐλαχίστον; quam declinationem sine causa fieri, si minus verbis, re cogitur confiteri'.

quo nihil posset fieri minus. Periphrasis for τὸ ἐλαχίστον. Cf. Lucret. v. 219, 'paulum, Tantum, quod nomen mutatum dicere possis'.

ex quo efficeretur = et eo effici. C. avoids repeating *effici*.

quo nihil turpius . . . quam. The *quam* clause repeats and makes explicit the second member of the comparison. 'Nothing is more discreditable to a scientist than this, (namely) than to say,' etc.

20. si omnes . . . sive aliae. *Si . . . sive* the reading of all MSS. is unexampled in this class of sentence. The second 'horn' of the dilemma would properly be introduced by *sin* (si).

credere aliquid esse minimum. All other post-Aristotelians taught that matter was infinitely divisible.

Polyaeno. Of Lampsacus; a celebrated mathematician, whom Epic. converted to the view that there was no truth in geometry.

huic pedalis. This necessarily followed from the doctrine that the senses receive images or films thrown off by external objects. Heraclitus had likewise held that the sun was no bigger than its apparent size.

tantum enim esse censet, quantus videtur, vel paulo aut maiorem aut minorem. **21.** Ita, quae mutat, ea corrumpit, quae sequitur, sunt tota Democriti, atomi, inane, imagines, quae *εἴδωλα* nominant, quorum incursione non solum videamus, sed etiam cogitemus; infinitio ipsa, quam *ἀπειρίαν* vocant, tota ab illo est; tum innumerabiles mundi, qui et oriantur et intereant cotidie. Quae etsi mihi nullo modo probantur, tamen Democritum, laudatum a ceteris, ab hoc, qui eum unum secutus esset, nollem vituperatum.

VII. **22.** Iam in altera philosophiae parte, quae est quaerendi ac disserendi, quae *λογική* dicitur, iste vester plane, ut mihi quidem videtur, inermis ac nudus est. Tollit definitiones; nihil de dividendo ac partiendo docet; non, quomodo efficiatur concludaturque ratio, tradit; non, qua via captiosa solvantur, ambigua distingvantur, ostendit; iudicia rerum in sensibus ponit, quibus si semel aliquid falsi

21. quae mutat . . . quae sequitur. Mdv. with unwonted leniency says, 'Cicero, ut utrumque membrum simile esset, *cum abundantia quadam* dixit, quae sequeretur Epic., id est, quae a Dem. sumeret nec mutaret, ea esse tota Democriti'. We might expect '*cum tautologia apertissima*'! The context suggests that C. intended a chiasmus; 'Where Epic. is original, he is unsound; where he is not unsound, he plagiarises,' (§ 17, *Democritea dicit, perpauca mutans, sed ita, ut ea, quae corrigere vult—depravare videatur*; § 18, *in quibus sequitur non fere labitur.*) Writing hurriedly, C. balances *quae mutat* by *quae sequitur*, instead of by something = *quae non corrumpit*, spoiling the sentence exactly as he does ii. 35, fin.

nollem vituperatum. He called him Ληρόκριτος (Diog. L. x. 8). Yet according to some accounts he held him in the highest esteem, and that this was the tradition among Epicureans is confirmed by Lucretius' references to 'that revered man Democritus'.

22. altera . . . parte. Epic. rejected Logic as of no practical value, and replaced it by Canonic, i.e. the science of the test (*κανών*) of truth. This *κανὼν* being derived from sensation (see next n.), Canonic belongs properly to Physics (cf. § 63), but was sometimes reckoned separately, so as to retain the traditional tripartite division of Philosophy. C. instances some principal parts of logical doctrine in conventional order. Definition and Division (of a genus into species) are important in the treatment of Terms; *quo modo . . . ratio* refers to the rules of the syllogism; *captiosa* I take to mean '*dilemmas*', and *ambigua*, 'fallacies of equivocation', on both of which ancient logicians bestowed so much attention.

iudicia rerum = *iudicium veri* (Acad. ii. 29). Ἐν τῷ κανόνι λέγει ὁ Ἐπίκ. κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ προλήψεις καὶ πάθη (Diog. L. x. 31). *in sensibus* here includes *προλήψεις* (concepts) which arise from repeated sensations. See Introd. § 20. Mdv. says, 'nec *πάθος* a sensu distinguebatur'. This is an oversight; Epic. perhaps alone of ancient philosophers recognised

pro vero probatum sit, sublatum esse omne iudicium veri et falsi putat.**** 23. Confirmat autem illud vel maxime, quod ipsa natura, ut ait ille, sciscat et probet, id est, voluptatem et dolorem. Ad haec, et quae sequamur et quae fugiamus, refert omnia. Quod quamquam Aristippi est a Cyrenaicisque melius liberiusque defenditur, tamen eiusmodi esse iudico, ut nihil homine videatur indignius. Ad maiora enim quaedam nos natura genuit et conformavit, ut mihi quidem videtur. Ac fieri potest, ut errem; sed ita prorsus existimo, neque eum Torquatum, qui hoc primus cognomen invenit, aut torquem illum hosti detraxisse, ut aliquam ex eo perciperet corpore voluptatem, aut cum Latinis tertio consulatu conflixisse apud Veserim propter voluptatem. Quod vero securi percussit filium, privavisse se etiam videtur multis voluptatibus, cum ipsi naturae patrioque amori praetulerit ius maiestatis atque imperii.

feeling (i.e. of pleasure and pain) as distinct from sensation on the one hand and conation (will) on the other. Hence his view that man's own nature supplies him with guides to *both* the 'duo maxima in philosophia, iudicium veri et finem bonorum' (Acad. l.c.), *feeling* being the criterion of the latter, as *sensation* of the former. Cf. Acad. ii. 142 (Epic.) 'omne iudicium in sensibus et in rerum notitiis (προλήψεις) et *in voluptate* constituit', where C. correctly says *omne*, not *veri*, whereas Diogenes, if the text is sound, must be quoting inaccurately, for πάθη are criteria not τῆς ἀληθείας but τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

23. Confirmat autem illud. One or more preceding sentences are clearly missing, though no MS. marks a lacuna. C. has passed to the third division of his critique. I suggest that the lost transition was from the criteria (*iudicia*) of truth and falsehood to those of good and evil (see last note). C. seems to have stated that Epic. established his view that Pleasure is the Chief Good from the fact that Nature herself 'decrees and sanctions' Pleasure and Pain as our criteria. *Illud* is probably the subject of *confirmat* and the antecedent of *quod*, the object of *confirmat* being the preceding lost statement. *voluptatem* and *dolorem* should be nom. in apposition to *illud*, but are attracted to acc. by *quod.*

melius liberiusque. Because they frankly championed Pleasure in the ordinary sense, whereas Epicurus used the term in two senses. See infra.

neque eum Torquatum. Being about to speak of both the famous Torquati, C. begins a sentence of the regular disjunctive type (*neque . . . neque*), but owing to the length of the first part (down to 24) instead of the second *neque*, starts afresh with *Quid*? (Again) *T. Torquatus . . .* Cf. § 40 n. Torquatus' fight with the Gaul is told in Livy vii. 10.

tertio consulatu, 340 B.C. At this battle of the Veseris, Torquatus' colleague, P. Decius Mus, devoted himself to death to save his country. Just before it, the consuls had forbidden single combats with the Latins on pain of death; Torquatus' son disobeyed, killed his man, and was executed by his father's order (Livy viii. 7).

24. Quid? T. Torquatus, is qui consul cum Cn. Octavio fuit, cum illam severitatem in eo filio adhibuit, quem in adoptionem D. Silano emancipaverat, ut eum, Macedonum legatis accusantibus, quod pecunias praetorem in provincia cepisse arguerent, causam apud se dicere iuberet, reque ex utraque parte audita, pronuntiaret, eum non talem videri fuisse in imperio, quales eius maiores fuissent, et in conspectum suum venire vetuit, numquid tibi videtur de voluptatibus suis cogitavisse? Sed ut omittam pericula, labores, dolorem etiam, quem optimus quisque pro patria et pro suis suscipit, ut non modo nullam captet, sed etiam praetereat omnes voluptates, dolores denique quosvis suscipere malit quam deserere ullam officii partem, ad ea, quae hoc non minus declarant, sed videntur leviora, veniamus. **25.** Quid tibi, Torquate, quid huic Triario litterae, quid historiae cognitioque rerum, quid poëtarum evolutio, quid tanta tot versuum memoria voluptatis affert? Nec mihi illud dixeris: Haec enim ipsa mihi sunt voluptati, et erant illa Torquatis. Numquam hoc ita defendit Epicurus neque Metrodorus aut quisquam eorum, qui aut saperet aliquid aut ista didicisset. Et quod quaeritur saepe, cur tam multi sint Epicurei, sunt aliae quoque causae, sed multitudinem

24. T. Torquatus, cos. 165 B.C. Livy (Epitome) says the Senate empowered him to try his adopted son at his own request. But the Senate had no jurisdiction in such cases, nor could foreigners appear as the accusers of a Roman citizen. They could only lay their grievances before the Senate, which might pronounce the case to be one for the courts, and as such a decision would be prejudicial to the accused if a regular trial *de repetundis* followed, T. probably requested the Senate to postpone debating the matter till he had held an informal private inquiry. Tradition improved upon the story by making him condemn his son in open court.

pronuntiaret . . . videri 'gave it as his judgment.' *Videri* is a regular legal term in this sense. Cf. Acad. ii. 146, with Reid's n.

vetuit, a slip for *vetaret*; for the prohibition was part of T.'s *severitas*. Other writers add that the son slew himself, and T. refused to attend his funeral.

25. cognitioque rerum. Not, as at end of this section, 'knowledge', but 'research' ('historical' Reid, 'general' Mdv., who refers it to the encyclopaedic studies of the time). *historiae*, 'annals'; *evolutio poetarum*, 'thumbing the poets'; *memoria*, 'committing to memory'.

Metrodorus, Epicurus' most brilliant disciple, who died before him, 277 B.C. For *eorum*, which refers to Epicureans in general, we might expect *istorum*.

cur tam multi sint: In Tusc. iv. 7, C. says that while for various reasons the other schools produced few if any works in Latin, 'illis silentibus C. Amafinius (cf. § 8),

haec maxime allicit, quod ita putant dici ab illo, recta et honesta quae sint, ea facere ipsa per se laetitiam, id est, voluptatem. Homines optimi non intellegunt, totam rationem everti, si ita res se habeat. Nam si concederetur, etiamsi ad corpus nihil referatur, ista sua sponte et per se esse iucunda, per se esset et virtus et cognitio rerum, quod minime ille vult, expetenda. **26.** Haec igitur Epicuri non probo, inquam. De cetero vellem equidem aut ipse doctrinis fuisset instructior (est enim, quod tibi ita videri necesse est, non satis politus iis artibus, quas qui tenent, eruditi appellantur), aut ne deterruisset alios a studiis. Quamquam te quidem video minime esse deterritum.

VIII. Quae cum dixissem, magis ut illum provocarem, quam ut ipse loquerer, tum Triarius leniter arridens: Tu quidem, inquit, totum Epicurum paene e philosophorum choro sustulisti. Quid ei reliquisti nisi te, quoquo modo loqueretur, intellegere, quid diceret? Aliena dixit in physicis, nec ea ipsa, quae tibi probarentur. Si qua in iis corrigere voluit, deteriora fecit. Disserendi artem nullam habuit. Voluptatem cum summum bonum diceret, primum in eo ipso parum vidit, deinde hoc quoque alienum; nam ante Aristippus, et ille melius. Addidisti ad extremum, etiam indoctum fuisse. **27.** Fieri, inquam, Triari, nullo pacto potest, ut non dicas, quid non probes eius, a quo dissentias. Quid enim me prohiberet Epicureum esse, si probarem, quae ille diceret? cum praesertim illa perdiscere ludus esset. Quamobrem dissentientium inter se reprehensiones non sunt vituperandae; maledicta, contumeliae, tum iracundae contentiones concertationesque in dispu-

extitit dicens, cuius libris editis commota multitudo contulit se ad eam potissimum disciplinam, sive quod erat cognitu perfacilis, sive quod invitabantur inlecebris blandis voluptatis, sive etiam, quia nihil erat prolatum melius, illud, quod erat, tenebant. Post Amafinium autem multi eiusdem aemuli rationis multa cum scripsissent, Italiam totam occupaverunt'.

etiamsi ad corpus nihil referatur. Cf. ii. 98 'est autem a te (Epic.) semper dictum nec gaudere quemquam nisi propter corpus nec dolere . . . negas animi ullum esse gaudium quod non referatur ad corpus'. Torquatus answers this point, § 55.

26. De cetero vellem: E.'s lack of, and contempt for, liberal culture were perhaps exaggerated by his opponents. His famous advice to a friend, Παιδείαν πᾶσαν, μακάριε, φεῦγε, occurs in a spurious letter (Usener).

tando pertinaces indignae philosophia mihi videri solent. 28. Tum Torquatus: Prorsus, inquit, assentior; neque enim disputari sine reprehensione, nec cum iracundia aut pertinacia recte disputari potest. Sed ad haec, nisi molestum est, habeo quae velim. An me, inquam, nisi te audire vellem, censes haec dicturum fuisse? Utrum igitur percurri omnem Epicuri disciplinam placet, an de una voluptate quaeri, de qua omne certamen est? Tuo vero id quidem, inquam, arbitratu. Sic faciam igitur, inquit: unam rem explicabo eamque maximam; de physicis alias; et quidem tibi et declinationem istam atomorum et magnitudinem solis probabo, et Democriti errata ab Epicuro reprehensa et correcta permulta. Nunc dicam de voluptate, nihil scilicet novi, ea tamen, quae te ipsum probaturum esse confidam. Certe, inquam, pertinax non ero tibique, si mihi probabis ea, quae dices, libenter assentiar. **29.** Probabo, inquit, modo ista sis aequitate, quam ostendis. Sed uti oratione perpetua malo quam interrogare aut interrogari. Ut placet, inquam. Tum dicere exorsus est.

IX. Primum igitur, inquit, sic agam, ut ipsi auctori huius disciplinae placet: constituam, quid et quale sit id, de quo quaerimus, non quo ignorare vos arbitrer, sed ut

23. **ad haec . . . habeo quae velim,** sc. *respondere.* iv. 1 'aut omittamus omnino contra aliquid velle'.

29. **ut ipsi auctori . . . placet.** Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τὰ ὑποτεταγμένα τοῖς φθόγγοις δεῖ εἰληφέναι, ὅπως ἂν τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἢ ζητούμενα ἢ ἀπορούμενα ἔχωμεν εἰς ταῦτα ἀνάγοντες ἐπικρίνειν, Epic. Ep. i. Epic. anticipated the modern view that language arose naturally (φύσει) not artificially (θέσει). Primitive man, on first seeing e.g. a horse, uttered a sound which became recognised through repetition as the sign or name of that animal. Thus the 'meaning' of terms is simply 'the things underlying them', called in Logic their *denotation*, and this is what we must settle at the outset of a discussion. To do so, we need only appeal to the established use of terms (*ut consuetudo loquitur*, ii. 48); hence Epic. *tollit definitiones* (22), which give their *connotation*, i.e. the qualities in virtue of which an object is called by a certain name. In the view of Aristotelian Logic, the term 'Man' has a twofold meaning; (1) in denotation, Socrates, Plato, etc.; (2) in connotation, a rational animal (which is the definition of 'Man' according to *genus*, 'animal,' and *species*, 'rational'). Epic. rejected (2), but in dealing with abstract terms it is difficult to dispense with definitions, as Torquatus finds. C. twits him (ii. 6) with having stated *quale sit summum bonum*, whereas *ut ipsi auctori placet* he should merely have stated *quid sit* (viz. *voluptas*).

ratione et via procedat oratio. Quaerimus igitur, quid sit extremum et ultimum bonorum, quod omnium philosophorum sententia tale debet esse, ut ad id omnia referri oporteat, ipsum autem nusquam. Hoc Epicurus in voluptate ponit, quod summum bonum esse vult summumque malum dolorem; idque instituit docere sic: **30**. Omne animal, simul atque natum sit, voluptatem appetere eaque gaudere ut summo bono, dolorem aspernari ut summum malum et, quantum possit, a se repellere, idque facere nondum depravatum, ipsa natura incorrupte atque integre iudicante. Itaque negat opus esse ratione neque disputatione, quamobrem voluptas expetenda, fugiendus dolor sit. Sentiri haec putat, ut calere ignem, nivem esse albam, mel dulce, quorum nihil oportere exquisitis rationibus confirmare; tantum satis esse admonere; interesse enim inter argumentum conclusionemque rationis et inter mediocrem animadversionem atque admonitionem; altera occulta quaedam et quasi involuta aperiri, altera prompta et aperta iudicari. Etenim quoniam, detractis de homine sensibus, reliqui nihil est, necesse est, quid aut ad naturam aut contra sit, a natura ipsa iudicari. Ea quid percipit aut quid iudicat, quo aut petat aut fugiat aliquid, praeter voluptatem et dolorem? **31**. Sunt autem quidam e nostris, qui haec subtilius velint tradere et negent satis esse, quid bonum sit aut quid malum, sensu iudicari, sed animo etiam ac ratione intellegi posse, et

30. **Itaque negat . . . neque.** The regular construction. Cf. v. 41. **a natura ipsa iudicari**, i.e. *a sensibus ipsis* (ii. 36), for man's 'natural constitution' (*natura*) *is* nothing but an aggregate of senses (*detractis de homine sensibus reliqui nihil est*). *ad naturam* is ἄπ. λεγ. for *secundum* or *aptum ad*, *n.*

Ea quid percipit. 'Negabat Epic. quidquam a natura percipi, quo ad appetendum aut ad fugiendum moveri posset, praeter voluptatem et dolorem,' Mdv. This satisfactorily explains *quid percipit quo petat*, but *quid iudicat quo petat*, which edd. accept without comment, seems a strange expression. Dr. Reid tr. 'what facts does she grasp, or with what facts is her decision to seek or shun concerned', but *quo petat* must go with *quid percipit* as well as with *quid iudicat*, otherwise C. denies that the senses perceive colour, sound, etc. ! Without venturing to alter Mdv.'s text, I propose a different reconstruction of the MSS. variants in Add. n. i.

31. **animo etiam ac ratione intellegi posse**, sc. *dicant*, from *negent*. *Animo*)(*sensu* (*corporis*). Nothing more is known of this divergence from Epic.'s own view, but it was rather nominal than real. For by *naturalis atque insita in animis notio* C. means πρόληψις ; (cf. De Nat. D.

voluptatem ipsam per se esse expetendam et dolorem ipsum per se esse fugiendum. Itaque aiunt, hanc quasi naturalem atque insitam in animis nostris inesse notionem, ut alterum esse appetendum, alterum aspernandum sentiamus. Alii autem, quibus ego assentior, cum a philosophis compluribus permulta dicantur, cur nec voluptas in bonis sit numeranda nec in malis dolor, non existimant oportere nimium nos causae confidere, sed et argumentandum et accurate disserendum et rationibus conquisitis de voluptate et dolore disputandum putant.

X. 32. Sed ut perspiciatis, unde omnis iste natus error sit voluptatem accusantium doloremque laudantium, totam rem aperiam eaque ipsa, quae ab illo inventore veritatis et quasi architecto beatae vitae dicta sunt, explicabo. Nemo enim ipsam voluptatem, quia voluptas sit, aspernatur aut odit aut fugit, sed quia consequuntur magni dolores eos, qui ratione voluptatem sequi nesciunt. Neque porro quisquam est, qui dolorem ipsum, quia dolor sit, amet, consectetur, adipisci velit, sed quia nonnumquam eiusmodi tempora incidunt, ut labore et dolore magnam aliquam quaerat voluptatem. Ut enim ad minima veniam, quis nostrum exercitationem ullam corporis suscipit laboriosam, nisi ut aliquid ex ea commodi consequatur? Quis autem vel eum iure reprehenderit, qui in ea voluptate velit esse, quam nihil molestiae

i. 44, where he offers several renderings of that term, including 'insitas vel potius innatas cognitiones'), and προλήψεις are themselves derived from sensations (Introd. §20). Either C. has expressed himself carelessly, or he really thought, what his language certainly suggests, that Epic. held some ideas to be innate, i.e. possessed by the mind prior to experience. This was Plato's view, but Epic. agreed with the Stoics that the mind at birth is a *tabula rasa*. We know nothing of the group (*alii autem*) with whom Torquatus professes to agree, and, as instead of following their alleged method, he resumes the defence of Epic. himself, we may suspect that C. shares our ignorance.

32. inventore veritatis. Cf. the openings of Lucretius' 1st and 2nd Books.

Nemo enim. For *enim* introducing a promised explanation cf. § 18. This is Maxim vii.; Οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ καθ' ἑαυτὸ κακόν· ἀλλὰ τὰ τινῶν ἡδονῶν ποιητικὰ πολλαπλασίους ἐπιφέρει τὰς ὀχλήσεις τῶν ἡδονῶν.

Quis autem. Not parallel with the preceding question (*quis . . . consequatur*), but refers back to the first sentence of this chapter, and sums up what has intervened.

consequatur, vel illum, qui dolorem eum fugiat, quo voluptas nulla pariatur? **33.** At vero eos et accusamus et iusto odio dignissimos ducimus, qui blanditiis praesentium voluptatum deleniti atque corrupti, quos dolores et quas molestias excepturi sint, occaecati cupiditate non provident, similique sunt in culpa, qui officia deserunt mollitia animi, id est, laborum et dolorum fuga. Et harum quidem rerum facilis est et expedita distinctio. Nam libero tempore, cum soluta nobis est eligendi optio cumque nihil impedit, quo minus id, quod maxime placeat facere possimus, omnis voluptas assumenda est, omnis dolor repellendus. Temporibus autem quibusdam et aut officiis debitis aut rerum necessitatibus saepe eveniet, ut et voluptates repudiandae sint et molestiae non recusandae. Itaque earum rerum hic tenetur a sapiente delectus, ut aut reiciendis voluptatibus maiores alias consequatur aut perferendis doloribus asperiores repellat. **34.** Hanc ego cum teneam sententiam, quid est, cur verear, ne ad eam non possim accommodare Torquatos nostros? quos tu paulo ante cum memoriter, tum etiam erga nos amice et benevole collegisti: nec me tamen laudandis maioribus meis corrupisti nec segniorem ad respondendum reddidisti. Quorum facta quemadmodum, quaeso, interpretaris? Sicine eos censes aut in armatum hostem impetum fecisse aut in liberos atque in sangvinem suum tam crudeles fuisse, nihil ut de utilitatibus, nihil ut de commodis suis cogitarent? At id ne ferae quidem

33. mollitia, id est. As often in C., *id est* does not introduce an *explanation* of the preceding term, but serves to recall its identity of meaning with a term already employed in the argument. Cf. 25 *laetitia, id est, voluptas*, 72 *quo iucundius, id est, quo melius*.

eligendi optio. The definitive gen. is redundant, since *optio* = *potestas eligendi.* In the next sentence *et* (*aut officiis*) is clumsy, as if we said, 'There will be occasions and obligations, etc.', instead of 'occasions *when*, etc.' *debitis* goes only with *officiis*, and *necessitatibus* virtually = *propter necess.* Cf. de Legg. iii. 15 'regale civitatis genus non tam regni quam regis *vitiis* repudiatum est'.

hic . . . delectus, ut. 'This principle of selection, to . . .' Cf. § 36; *eo delectu, ut* . . .

34. memoriter. Never 'from memory'. To quote *memoriter* is to quote from full and accurate recollection. C. compliments Cato, infra iv. 1, on reproducing the Stoic arguments 'ut tam multa, memoriter'.

faciunt, ut ita ruant itaque turbent, ut, earum motus et impetus quo pertineant, non intellegamus; tu tam egregios viros censes tantas res gessisse sine causa? **35.** Quae fuerit causa, mox videro; interea hoc tenebo, si ob aliquam causam ista, quae sine dubio praeclara sunt, fecerint, virtutem iis per se ipsam causam non fuisse.—Torquem detraxit hosti.—Et quidem se texit, ne interiret.—At magnum periculum adiit.—In oculis quidem exercitus.—Quid ex eo est consecutus?—Laudem et caritatem, quae sunt vitae sine metu degendae praesidia firmissima.—Filium morte multavit.—Si sine causa, nollem me ab eo ortum, tam importuno tamque crudeli; sin, ut dolore suo sanciret militaris imperii disciplinam exercitumque in gravissimo bello animadversionis metu contineret, saluti prospexit civium, qua intellegebat contineri suam. **36.** Atque haec ratio late patet. In quo enim maxime consvevit iactare vestra se oratio, tua praesertim, qui studiose antiqua persequeris, claris et fortibus viris commemorandis eorumque factis non emolumento aliquo, sed ipsius honestatis decore laudandis, id totum evertitur eo delectu rerum, quem modo dixi, constituto, ut aut voluptates omittantur maiorum voluptatum adipiscendarum causa aut dolores suscipiantur maiorum dolorum effugiendorum gratia.

XI. **37**. Sed de clarorum hominum factis illustribus et gloriosis satis hoc loco dictum est. Erit enim iam de omnium virtutum cursu ad voluptatem proprius disserendi locus. Nunc autem explicabo, voluptas ipsa quae qualisque sit, ut tollatur error omnis imperitorum intellegaturque, ea,

35. **Et quidem.** 'Yes, and put it on himself, for self-defence.' It is supposed that the *torques* was worn for defence, not ornament. *Et quidem* is often used (sometimes *quidem* alone, as in T.'s next reply) to express that an opponent's statement is granted, but really proves the opposite of his conclusion. Cf. N.D. i. 100 'Habebam, inquis, in animo insitam informationem quandam dei. *Et* barbati *quidem* Jovis, galeatae Minervae; num igitur esse tales putas?'

36. **factis non emolumento . . . laudandis.** *emolumento* and *decore* are abl. of the thing in point of which praise is given. Cf. 42 'gubernatoris ars . . . utilitate, non arte, laudatur'.

37. **proprius disserendi locus.** Cc. xiii. sqq. *cursus* here = 'trend'.

quae voluptaria, delicata, mollis habeatur, disciplina quam gravis, quam continens, quam severa sit. Non enim hanc solam sequimur, quae svavitate aliquâ naturam ipsam movet et cum iucunditate quadam percipitur sensibus, sed maximam voluptatem illam habemus, quae percipitur omni dolore detracto. Nam quoniam, cum privamur dolore, ipsa liberatione et vacuitate omnis molestiae gaudemus, omne autem id, quo gaudemus, voluptas est, ut omne, quo offendimur, dolor, doloris omnis privatio recte nominata est voluptas. Ut enim, cum cibo et potione fames sitisque depulsa est, ipsa detractio molestiae consecutionem affert voluptatis, sic in omni re doloris amotio successionem efficit voluptatis. **38.** Itaque non placuit Epicuro, medium esse quiddam inter dolorem et voluptatem; illud enim ipsum, quod quibusdam medium videretur, cum omni dolore careret, non modo voluptatem esse, verum etiam summam voluptatem. Quisquis enim sentit, quemadmodum sit affectus, eum necesse est aut in voluptate esse aut in dolore. Omnis autem privatione doloris putat Epicurus terminari summam voluptatem, ut postea variari voluptas distingvique possit, augeri amplificarique non possit. **39.** At etiam Athenis, ut a patre audiebam, facete et urbane Stoicos irridente, statua est in Ceramico Chrysippi sedentis porrecta manu, quae manus significet, illum in hac esse rogatiuncula delectatum: Numquidnam manus tua sic affecta, quemadmodum affecta nunc est, desiderat?—Nihil sane.—At, si voluptas esset bonum, desideraret.—Ita credo. —Non est igitur voluptas bonum. Hoc ne statuam quidem

naturam ipsam movet. *natura* = *sensus*, as at end of 31. Cf. *voluptas ea, quae sensum moveat*, 56. Mdv. takes offence at *ipsam*, but it seems merely to mark the contrast, explicitly drawn in 56, between *voluptas* proper which is, and *indolentia*, which is not, an excitation of the senses themselves.

38. cum omni dolore careret. The subject is *illud ipsum*. Cf. ii. 32 'vacuitas doloris, quae, etiamsi malo caret'.

putat Epicurus. Maxim iii. *Ὅρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις.* Maxim xviii. *Οὐκ ἐπαύξεται ἡ ἡδονὴ ἐν τῇ σαρκί, ἐπειδὰν ἅπαξ τὸ κατ' ἔνδειαν ἀλγοῦν ἐξαιρεθῇ, ἀλλὰ μόνον ποικίλλεται.*

39. Athenis. The statue was seen in the 2nd cent. A.D. by Pausanias (i. 17. 2) in the Gymnasium of Ptolemy, near the Agora.

dicturam pater aiebat, si loqui posset. Conclusum est enim contra Cyrenaicos satis acute, nihil ad Epicurum. Nam si ea sola voluptas esset, quae quasi titillaret sensus, ut ita dicam, et ad eos cum svavitate afflueret et illaberetur, nec manus esse contenta posset nec ulla pars vacuitate doloris sine iucundo motu voluptatis. Sin autem summa voluptas est, ut Epicuro placet, nihil dolere, primum tibi recte, Chrysippe, concessum est, nihil desiderare manum, cum ita esset affecta, secundum non recte, si voluptas esset bonum, fuisse desideraturam. Idcirco enim non desideraret, quia, quod dolore caret, id in voluptate est.

XII. **40**. Extremum autem esse bonorum voluptatem, ex hoc facillime perspici potest: Constituamus aliquem magnis, multis, perpetuis fruentem et animo et corpore voluptatibus, nullo dolore nec impediente nec impendente; quem tandem hoc statu praestabiliorem aut magis expetendum possimus dicere? Inesse enim necesse est in eo, qui ita sit affectus, et firmitatem animi nec mortem nec dolorem timentis, quod mors sensu careat, dolor in longinquitate levis, in gravitate brevis soleat esse, ut eius magnitudinem

nihil ad Epicurum. 'In no way affects Epic.' The phrase sometimes has a different sense, 'nothing compared to'. Cf. *nihil ad Persium*, p. 6, n.

quasi titillaret. Cf. De Nat. i. 113 'voluptates, quibus quasi titillatio (Epicuri enim hoc verbum est) adhibetur sensibus'. Mayor ad loc. compares also Tusc. iii. 47, Off. ii. 63, Senect. 47, for the same rendering by C. of *γαργαλίζω*, *γαργαλισμοί*, 'always with the apologetic *quasi*'.

40. Inesse enim. Epic. Epist. iii. Ἐπεὶ τίνα νομίζεις εἶναι κρείττονα τοῦ καὶ περὶ θεῶν ὅσια δοξάζοντος καὶ περὶ θανάτου διὰ παντὸς ἀφόβως ἔχοντος καὶ τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἐπιλελογισμένου τέλος καὶ τὸ μὲν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πέρας ὡς ἐστιν εὐσυμπλήρωτόν τε καὶ εὐπόριστον διαλαμβάνοντος, τὸ δὲ τῶν κακῶν ὡς ἢ χρόνους ἢ πόνους ἔχει βραχεῖς. This description of the *sapiens* does not necessarily apply to the man in a state of enjoyment, nor is it relevant here. We find it again in §§ 57 sqq., where it properly belongs, as part of the eulogy on Epic.'s system.

et firmitatem. Instead of proceeding '*et* tranquillitatem, cum divinum numen non horreat, *et* memoriam', etc., C. begins afresh, (41) *ad ea cum accedit.* Cf. § 23, iv. 3, and de Orat. iii. 65, where for a second *vel* he substitutes *accedit quod.*

mors sensu careat. Maxim ii. Ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ γὰρ διαλυθὲν ἀναισθητεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἀναισθητοῦν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς. Cf. 49, 62, and see on ii. 100.

in longinquitate levis. Maxim iv. Οὐ χρονίζει τὸ ἀλγοῦν ἐν τῇ σαρκί, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἄκρον τὸν ἐλάχιστον χρόνον πάρεστι, τὸ δὲ μόνον ὑπερτεῖνον

celeritas, diuturnitatem allevatio consoletur. **41.** Ad ea cum accedit, ut neque divinum numen horreat nec praeteritas voluptates effluere patiatur earumque assidua recordatione laetetur, quid est, quod huc possit, quo melius sit, accedere? Statue contra aliquem confectum tantis animi corporisque doloribus, quanti in hominem maximi cadere possunt, nulla spe proposita, fore levius aliquando, nulla praeterea neque praesenti nec expectata voluptate; quid eo miserius dici aut fingi potest? Quod si vita doloribus referta maxime fugienda est, summum profecto malum est vivere cum dolore; cui sententiae consentaneum est, ultimum esse bonorum cum voluptate vivere. Nec enim habet nostra mens quidquam, ubi consistat tamquam in extremo,

τὸ ἡδόμενον κατὰ σάρκα (i.e. not the most intense, but only intense enough to 'preponderate over physical pleasure') *οὐ πολλὰς ἡμέρας συμβαίνει, αἱ δὲ πολυχρόνιοι τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν πλεονάζον ἔχουσι τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἤπερ τὸ ἀλγοῦν* ('chronic infirmities have a balance of pleasure over pain,' i.e. there are compensating intervals of pleasurable relief from pain). Pain of the highest degree is momentary, because it kills us straight off; nor can we live long in pain of the second degree. Cf. Plut. de Aud. Poët. 14, p. 36 B, *Οἱ μεγάλοι πόνοι συντόμως ἐξάγουσιν, οἱ δὲ χρόνιοι μέγεθος οὐκ ἔχουσιν*. See infra 49, ii. 22 and 94.

41. neque divinum numen horreat. For the gods, dwelling aloof in 'sacred everlasting calm,' have nothing to do with this world of ours. Maxim i. Τὸ *μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχει, ὥστε οὔτε ὀργαῖς οὔτε χάρεσι συνέχεται· ἐν ἀσθενεῖ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον.*

neque praeteritas voluptates. Plut. contra Epic. beatitud. 18, p. 1099 d, *ὥσπερ λέγουσι, τὸ μεμνῆσθαι τῶν προτέρων ἀγαθῶν μέγιστόν ἐστι πρὸς τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν.* Contrast Dante's 'Ness' un maggior dolore,' echoed by Tennyson's 'A sorrow's crown of sorrow is remembering happier things'. Torquatus returns to this point in 55 62, infra. Cf. C.'s criticism, ii. 104, 105.

cui sententiae consentaneum est. Irrelevant parenthesis. C. similarly interrupts the argument by adding the converse of a statement (ii. 86, v. 90).

Nec . . . habet nostra mens quidquam, sc. *aliud*, Mdv. (following Lambinus, who inserted it). I cannot think this satisfactory. 'The mind has no other ground whereon to rest as though arrived at the bourne,' i.e. 'has no other *finis*,' ought to refer to the Summum Bonum, but must refer to *Pain*, as the context shows, and is a strange way of saying 'Pain is the mind's supreme evil'. [Mr. Rackham points out that *mens* seems to be emphatic and understands 'the *mind*,)(the body, has no (independent) *finis malorum*'. But this again is an oddly obscure statement of the dictum 'nihil dolendum est animo quod sit a dolore corporis seiunctum' (59), which moreover is then virtually repeated in the co-ordinate clause, *omnesque*, etc., whereas we might expect *omnes enim*, etc.] Usener, Epicurea, p. 267, remarks that either C. or a scribe is responsible for some gap in the argument. I suggest that *praeter privationem doloris*, or something equivalent, is what is missing. Cf. Plutarch, contra

omnesque et metus et aegritudines ad dolorem referuntur, nec praeterea est res ulla, quae sua natura aut sollicitare possit aut angere. **42.** Praeterea et appetendi et refugiendi et omnino rerum gerendarum initia proficiscuntur aut a voluptate aut a dolore. Quod cum ita sit, perspicuum est, omnes rectas res atque laudabiles eo referri, ut cum voluptate vivatur. Quoniam autem id est vel summum vel ultimum vel extremum bonorum (quod Graeci τέλος nominant), quod ipsum nullam ad aliam rem, ad id autem res referuntur omnes, fatendum est, summum esse bonum iucunde vivere.

XIII. Id qui in una virtute ponunt et, splendore nominis capti, quid natura postulet, non intellegunt, errore maximo, si Epicurum audire voluerint, liberabuntur. Istae enim vestrae eximiae pulchraeque virtutes nisi voluptatem efficerent, quis eas aut laudabiles aut expetendas arbitraretur? Ut enim medicorum scientiam non ipsius artis, sed bonae valetudinis causa probamus,

Epic. beatitudinem, 7, p. 1091 a, *εἴ περ αὐτοῖς* (*τοῖς* 'Επικ.) *κακῶν ἀποφυγὴ τὸ χαρτόν ἐστι καὶ τἀγαθόν, ἄλλο δ' οὐδὲν διανοεῖσθαί φασιν, οὐδ' ὅλως τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν ὅποι τεθήσεται τἀγαθὸν εἰ μὴ μόνον ὅθεν ἐξελαύνεται τὸ κακὸν αὐτοῖς. . . .* Epic. made *depulsio mali*, not *adeptio boni* (ii. 39) the End of all action, *Τούτου γὰρ χάριν πάντα πράττομεν, ὅπως μήτε ἀλγῶμεν μήτε ταρβῶμεν. ὅταν δὲ ἅπαξ τοῦτο περὶ ἡμᾶς γένηται, λυέται πᾶς ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς χειμών, οὐχ ἔχοντος τοῦ ζῴου βαδίζειν ὡς πρὸς ἐνδέον τι καὶ ζητεῖν ἕτερον ᾧ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀγαθὸν συμπληρώσεται.* (Ep. i.) Note that §§ 37-41 deal with *voluptas stabilis*, which = *nihil dolere*. Torquatus shows from two extreme cases (1) that this is *summum bonum*, because no *bonum* can be added to it (40); and (2) that its opposite, *vivere cum maximo dolere* is *summum malum* because no *malum* can be added to it. In further proof that Pain is *summum malum*, C. appends what I take to be an epitomized extract from his Greek authority, stating (1) that *nihil dolere* is the mind's only goal, (2) that all ills of mind have their basis in bodily pain (*dolor*). The stress on *mens* seems due to the original point of the argument being that the mind is material, and only what is material can affect it (combating, perhaps, the Platonic view that nothing but its own evil can hurt the soul).

42. quod ipsum . . . ad id autem. When the rel. pronoun has to be repeated in an adversative clause it is changed to a demonstrative. *Ad quod autem* is not Latin.

Ut enim medicorum. Epic. said *διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς αἱρεῖσθαι, οὐ δι' αὑτάς, ὥσπερ τὴν ἰατρικὴν διὰ τὴν ὑγίειαν* (Diog. L. x. 138), and in his *περὶ τέλους, Τιμητέον τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰ τοιουτοτρόπα, ἐὰν ἡδονὴν παρασκευάζῃ· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ παρασκευάζῃ, χαίρειν ἐατέον.* (Athen. xii. p. 546 F.) For *non arte*, which is awkward after *ars*, C. might have written *non sua sponte*; cf. similar repetition of *natura*, ii. 33.

et gubernatoris ars, quia bene navigandi rationem habet, utilitate, non arte laudatur, sic sapientia, quae ars vivendi putanda est, non expeteretur, si nihil efficeret; nunc expetitur, quod est tamquam artifex conquirendae et comparandae voluptatis. **43.** (Quam autem ego dicam voluptatem, iam videtis, ne invidia verbi labefactetur oratio mea.) Nam cum ignoratione rerum bonarum et malarum maxime hominum vita vexetur, ob eumque errorem et voluptatibus maximis saepe priventur et durissimis animi doloribus torqueantur, sapientia est adhibenda, quae, et terroribus cupiditatibusque detractis et omnium falsarum opinionum temeritate derepta, certissimam se nobis ducem praebeat ad voluptatem. Sapientia enim est una, quae maestitiam pellat ex animis, quae nos exhorrescere metu non sinat; qua praeceptrice in tranquillitate vivi potest, omnium, cupiditatum ardore restincto. Cupiditates enim sunt insatiabiles, quae non modo singulos homines, sed universas familias evertunt, totam etiam labefactant saepe rem publicam. **44.** Ex cupiditatibus odia, discidia, discordiae, seditiones, bella nascuntur. Nec eae se foris solum iactant, nec tantum in alios caeco impetu incurrunt, sed intus etiam in animis inclusae inter se dissident atque discordant; ex quo vitam amarissimam necesse est effici, ut sapiens solum, amputata circumcisaque inanitate

sapientia . . . ars vivendi. A definition common to all the post-Aristotelian philosophers. *sapientia* here = practical wisdom, φρόνησις, which C. more accurately renders *prudentia* in the parallel passage v. 16. But neither Epicureans nor Stoics always preserved the Aristotelian distinction between σοφία, theoretic wisdom, which is intellectual Virtue, and φρόνησις, which is the first of the Four Moral Virtues. Thus in the following account, *sapientia* both regulates desires and conduct, which is the function of prudence, and teaches us that we need not fear death or the gods (*a formidinum terrore vindicet*, 46), which is the function of philosophic wisdom (cf. 62).

43. temeritate derepta. *deripere* for *detrahere* is rare, but expresses the removal of deeply-rooted error. Tacitus has 'tela Romanis derepta,' i.e. 'plucked out of their corpses'.

44. ut sapiens solum. *solus* would be more usual. But C. elsewhere indifferently writes 'non nobis *solum* nati sumus' and 'non sibi se *soli* natum'.

inanitate. The κενοδοξία of Epic. 'Vanity' in the Scriptural sense of empty unreality.

omni et errore, naturae finibus contentus sine aegritudine possit et sine metu vivere. **45.** Quae est enim aut utilior aut ad bene vivendum aptior partitio quam illa, qua est usus Epicurus? qui unum genus posuit earum cupiditatum, quae essent et naturales et necessariae, alterum, quae naturales essent nec tamen necessariae, tertium, quae nec naturales nec necessariae; quarum ea ratio est, ut necessariae nec opera multa nec impensa expleantur; ne naturales quidem multa desiderant, propterea quod ipsa natura divitias, quibus contenta sit, et parabiles et terminatas habet; inanium autem cupiditatum nec modus ullus nec finis inveniri potest.

XIV. **46.** Quod si vitam omnem perturbari videmus errore et inscientia, sapientiamque esse solam, quae nos a libidinum impetu et a formidinum terrore vindicet et ipsius fortunae modice ferre doceat iniurias et omnes monstret vias, quae ad quietem et tranquillitatem ferant, quid est, cur dubitemus dicere, et sapientiam propter voluptates expetendam et insipientiam propter molestias esse fugiendam? **47.** Eademque ratione ne temperantiam quidem propter se expetendam esse dicemus, sed quia pacem animis afferat et eos quasi concordia quadam placet ac leniat. Temperantia est enim, quae, in rebus aut expetendis aut fugiendis ut rationem sequamur, monet. Nec enim satis est iudicare, quid faciendum non faciendumve sit, sed stare etiam oportet in eo, quod sit iudicatum. Plerique autem, quod tenere atque servare id, quod ipsi statuerunt, non possunt, victi et

45. Quae est enim utilior . . . partitio. Maxim xxix. Τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι φυσικαὶ καὶ ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ φυσ. καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκ., αἱ δὲ οὔτε φυσ. οὔτε ἀναγκ. ἀλλὰ παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν γινόμεναι. Stock exx. of the three classes were (1) hunger and thirst; (2) sexual desire; (3) desire of luxury, pomp, etc.

ne naturales quidem multa desiderant. Mdv. regards this as an anacoluthon. Usener thinks a clause defining the 'natural but non-necessary' has fallen out after *expleantur*.

parabiles . . . terminatas. Maxim xv. Ὁ τῆς φύσεως πλοῦτος καὶ ὥρισται καὶ εὐπόριστός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπίπτει.

47. Temperantia est enim. Epic., like Plato and unlike Aristotle, uses σωφροσύνη in a wide and active sense, nearly = strength of purpose, or Wordsworth's 'temperate will'.

debilitati, obiecta specie voluptatis, tradunt se libidinibus constringendos nec, quid eventurum sit, provident, ob eamque causam propter voluptatem et parvam et non necessariam, et quae vel aliter pararetur et qua etiam carere possent sine dolore, tum in morbos graves, tum in damna, tum in dedecora incurrunt, saepe etiam legum iudiciorumque poenis obligantur. **48.** Qui autem ita frui volunt voluptatibus, ut nulli propter eas consequantur dolores, et qui suum iudicium retinent, ne voluptate victi faciant id, quod sentiant non esse faciendum, ii voluptatem maximam adipiscuntur praetermittenda voluptate. Iidem etiam dolorem saepe perpetiuntur, ne, si id non faciant, incidant in maiorem. Ex quo intellegitur, nec intemperantiam propter se esse fugiendam temperantiamque expetendam, non quia voluptates fugiat, sed quia maiores consequatur.

XV. **49.** Eadem fortitudinis ratio reperietur. Nam neque laborum perfunctio neque perpessio dolorum per se ipsa allicit, nec patientia nec assiduitas nec vigiliae nec ipsa, quae laudatur, industria, ne fortitudo quidem; sed ista sequimur, ut sine cura metuque vivamus animumque et corpus, quantum efficere possimus, molestia liberemus. Ut enim mortis metu omnis quietae vitae status perturbatur, et ut succumbere doloribus eosque humili animo imbecilloque ferre miserum est, ob eamque debilitatem animi multi parentes, multi amicos, nonnulli patriam, plerique autem se ipsos penitus perdiderunt, sic robustus animus et excelsus omni est liber cura et angore, cum et mortem contemnit, qua qui affecti sunt,

48. non quia . . . fugiat, sed quia . . . consequatur. Both subjunctives are due to their dependence on *intelligitur*. If the sentence were direct, it would run 'virtus expetenda est, non quia *fugit*, etc. (stating a fact, but denying that it is a reason).

49. ipsa, quae laudatur, i.e. as a virtue, whereas *vigiliae* and *assiduitas* are not *per se* commendable. *fortitudo* does not sum up the list of qualities and actions which fall under the general heading of courage (for in that case C. would write '*ita* ne f. quidem'), but = courage in the special sense of valour. This highest species of courage forms the natural climax to C.'s enumeration, and its omission would be strange. Epic. held τὴν ἀνδρείαν φύσει μὴ γίνεσθαι, λογισμῷ δὲ τοῦ συμφέροντος. (Diog. L. x. 120.)

in eadem causa sunt, qua antequam nati, et ad dolores ita paratus est, ut meminerit, maximos morte finiri, parvos multa habere intervalla requietis, mediocrium nos esse dominos, ut, si tolerabiles sint, feramus, si minus, animo aequo e vita, cum ea non placeat, tamquam e theatro exeamus. Quibus rebus intellegitur, nec timiditatem ignaviamque vituperari nec fortitudinem patientiamque laudari suo nomine, sed illas reici, quia dolorem pariant, has optari, quia voluptatem.

XVI. **50.** Iustitia restat, ut de omni virtute sit dictum; sed similia fere dici possunt. Ut enim sapientiam, temperantiam, fortitudinem copulatas esse docui cum voluptate, ut ab ea nullo modo nec divelli nec distrahi possint, sic de iustitia iudicandum est, quae non modo numquam nocet cuiquam, sed contra semper aliquid impertit cum sua vi atque natura, quod tranquillet animos, tum spe, nihil earum rerum defuturum, quas natura non depravata desideret. *Et* quemadmodum temeritas et libido et ignavia semper animum excruciant et semper sollicitant turbulentaeque sunt, sic *improbitas si* cuius in mente consedit, hoc ipso, quod adest, turbulenta est; si vero molita quidpiam est, quamvis occulte fecerit, numquam tamen id confidet fore semper occultum. Plerumque improborum facta primo suspicio insequitur, dein sermo atque fama,

in eadem causa sunt. See § 40, *mors sensu careat*. *causa* = *condicio*, as often in C.

si minus . . . e vita . . . exeamus. Cf. 62, ii. 95. Seneca gives as a saying of Epic. 'Malum est in necessitate vivere, sed in necessitate vivere necessitas nulla est' (Epist. xii. 10), and interprets this as a reference to the open door of suicide. But Seneca was a Stoic, and Stoics killed themselves on the slightest provocation. We have no other authority for Epic. advocating suicide, which indeed seems inconsistent with his ideal of the *sapiens*, and with his own endurance of suffering which a Chrysippus would have cut short by death. This dictum was perhaps merely aimed against the Stoic doctrine of ἀνάγκη (Introd. § 19).

50. quod tranquillet animos. Maxim xvii. Ὁ δίκαιος ἀταρακτότατος, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος πλείστης ταραχῆς γέμων. Maxims xxxiii. sqq. enunciate the doctrine that justice arose from a social compact entered into by mankind for security's sake.

non depravata, i.e. by vain desires. The desires of an unperverted nature are few and easily gratified.

id confidet fore . . . occultum. Maxim xxxv. Οὐκ ἔστι τὸν λάθρᾳ τι κινοῦντα ὧν συνέθεντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι, πιστεύειν ὅτι λήσει, κἂν μυριάκις ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος λανθάνῃ, μέχρι γὰρ καταστροφῆς ἄδηλον εἰ καὶ λήσει.

tum accusator, tum iudex; multi etiam, ut te consule, ipsi se indicaverunt. **51.** Quod si qui satis sibi contra hominum conscientiam saepti esse et muniti videntur, deorum tamen horrent, easque ipsas sollicitudines, quibus eorum animi noctesque diesque exeduntur, a dis immortalibus supplicii causa importari putant. Quae autem tanta ex improbis factis ad minuendas vitae molestias accessio potest fieri, quanta ad augendas, cum conscientiā factorum, tum poena legum odioque civium? Et tamen in quibusdam neque pecuniae modus est neque honoris neque imperii nec libidinum nec epularum nec reliquarum cupiditatum, quas nulla praeda umquam improbe parta minuit, potiusque inflammat, ut coërcendi magis quam dedocendi esse videantur. **52.** Invitat igitur vera ratio bene sanos ad iustitiam, aequitatem, fidem. Neque homini infanti aut impotenti iniuste facta conducunt, qui nec facile efficere possit, quod conetur, nec obtinere, si effecerit, et opes vel fortunae vel ingenii liberalitati magis conveniunt, qua qui utuntur, benevolentiam sibi conciliant et, quod aptissimum est ad quiete vivendum, caritatem, praesertim cum omnino nulla sit causa peccandi. **53.** Quae enim cupiditates a natura proficiscuntur, facile explentur sine ulla iniuria; quae autem inanes sunt, iis parendum non est; nihil enim desiderabile concupiscunt, plusque in ipsa iniuria detrimenti est quam in iis rebus emolumenti, quae pariuntur iniuria. Itaque ne iustitiam quidem recte quis dixerit per se ipsam optabilem, sed quia iucunditatis vel plurimum afferat. Nam diligi et carum esse iucundum est propterea, quia tutiorem vitam et voluptatum pleniorem efficit. Itaque

te consule. An otherwise unrecorded detail of Catiline's conspiracy.

51. hominum conscientiam, 'detection'. But just below, *conscientia factorum*, 'a guilty conscience'.

pecuniae . . . honoris . . . imperii . . . epularum. Idiomatically put for '*desire of* money,' etc. So *κέρδος*, *τιμή* regularly = avarice, ambition. Cf. §72, *numeris*, *astris* = arithmetic, astronomy.

52. infanti. 'The man who is no speaker,')(*opes ingenii*.

impotenti, rare in this sense, 'the man without means,')(*opes fortunae*.

53. Quae enim. *Οὐ γὰρ ἡ τῆς φύσεως ἡδονὴ τὴν ἀδικίαν ποιεῖ ἔξωθεν, ἀλλ' ἡ περὶ τὰς κενὰς δόξας ὄρεξις.* Epic. ap. Stobaeus, xvii. 35. See on §§45, 46.

non ob ea solum incommoda, quae eveniunt improbis, fugiendam improbitatem putamus, sed multo etiam magis, quod, cuius in animo versatur, numquam sinit eum respirare numquam acquiescere. **54.** Quod si ne ipsarum quidem virtutum laus, in qua maxime ceterorum philosophorum exultat oratio, reperire exitum potest, nisi dirigatur ad voluptatem, voluptas autem est sola, quae nos vocet ad se et alliciat suapte natura, non potest esse dubium, quin id sit summum atque extremum bonorum omnium, beateque vivere nihil aliud sit nisi cum voluptate vivere.

XVII. **55.** Huic certae stabilique sententiae quae sint coniuncta, explicabo brevi. Nullus in ipsis error est finibus bonorum et malorum, id est, in voluptate aut in dolore, sed in iis rebus peccant, cum, e quibus haec efficiantur, ignorant. Animi autem voluptates et dolores nasci fatemur e corporis voluptatibus et doloribus; (itaque concedo, quod modo dicebas, cadere causā, si qui e nostris aliter existimant, quos quidem video esse multos, sed imperitos;) quamquam autem et laetitiam nobis voluptas animi et molestiam dolor afferat, eorum tamen utrumque et ortum esse e corpore et ad corpus referri, nec ob eam causam

55. Huic . . . quae sint coniuncta. This chapter summarises five Epicurean arguments in reply to Cyrenaic criticism (Hirzel, ii. pp. 675 sqq.). On its insertion here see Introd. § 27; on the five points in dispute, the notes following.

Nullus in ipsis error. Point 1. Epic. argued 'All men seek Pleasure'. The Cyrenaics objected, *δύνασθαι τὴν ἡδονήν τινας μὴ αἱρεῖσθαι κατὰ διαστροφήν* (Diog. L. ii. 89), i.e. there are cases of Pleasure being rejected, owing to mental perversion. Epic. replies, In such cases the mistake made is about the means, not about the end. Pleasant things are never rejected *qua* pleasant, but always because we fear resultant pain, or think to gain some greater pleasure by foregoing them.

in iis rebus. *iis* should have been defined by a relative clause (*e quibus haec efficiuntur*); 'people go wrong about the things which produce Pleasure and Pain'. The form of the sentence being shifted, *in iis* virtually = *in eo*.

Animi autem voluptates. The 2nd objection answered is that 'all Pleasure is not physical'. Cf. Clement, Strom. ii. 21, p. 178, 43, Οὗτοι οἱ Κυρηναϊκοὶ τὸν ὅρον τῆς ἡδονῆς Ἐπικούρου, τοῦτ' ἔστι τὴν τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσιν (*vacuitas doloris*), ἀθετοῦσι, νεκροῦ κατάστασιν ἀποκαλοῦντες· χαίρειν γὰρ ἡμᾶς μὴ μόνον ἐπὶ ἡδοναῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ ὁμιλίαις καὶ ἐπὶ φιλοτιμίαις. ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος πᾶσαν χαρὰν τῆς ψυχῆς οἴεται ἐπὶ πρωτοπαθούσῃ τῇ σαρκὶ γενέσθαι.

quod modo dicebas. Cf. § 25. *cadere causa*, 'to be non-suited'.

nec ob eam causam. This is a 3rd point, and should have had a new sentence. Cf. Diog. L. x. 137, Ἔτι πρὸς τοὺς Κυρηναϊκοὺς (διαφέρεται

non multo maiores esse et voluptates et dolores animi quam corporis. Nam corpore nihil nisi praesens, et quod adest, sentire possumus, animo autem et praeterita et futura. Ut enim aeque doleamus cum corpore dolemus, fieri tamen permagna accessio potest, si aliquod aeternum et infinitum impendere malum nobis opinemur. Quod idem licet transferre in voluptatem, ut ea maior sit, si nihil tale metuamus. **56.** Iam illud quidem perspicuum est, animi maximam aut voluptatem aut molestiam plus aut ad beatam aut ad miseram vitam afferre momenti quam eorum utrumvis, si aeque diu sit in corpore. Non placet autem, detracta voluptate, aegritudinem statim consequi, nisi in voluptatis locum dolor forte successerit; at contra gaudere nosmet omittendis doloribus, etiamsi voluptas ea, quae sensum moveat, nulla successerit; eoque intellegi potest, quanta voluptas sit non dolere. **57.** Sed ut iis bonis erigimur, quae expectamus, sic laetamur iis, quae recordamur. Stulti autem malorum memoria torquentur; sapientes bona praeterita grata recordatione renovata delectant. Est autem situm in nobis, ut et ad-

ὁ Ἐπίκουρος)· οἱ μὲν γὰρ χείρους τὰς σωματικὰς ἀλγηδόνας τῶν ψυχικῶν· κολάζεσθαι γοῦν τοὺς ἁμαρτάνοντας σώματι· ὁ δὲ τὰς ψυχικάς· τὴν γοῦν σάρκα τὸ παρὸν μόνον χειμάζειν, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ παρελθὸν καὶ τὸ παρὸν καὶ τὸ μέλλον· οὕτως οὖν καὶ μείζονας ἡδονὰς εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς.

praesens, et quod adest. Emphatic repetition: 'The immediately present'.

56. Non placet autem. 4th point. The weightiest Cyrenaic argument against Epic. was that *non dolere* is not Pleasure, but a neutral state of feeling. If this be the Chief Good, 'why, then 'tis good to be a post!' This point was discussed by Torquatus, §§ 38, 39. Cf. Diog. L. ii. 59, *ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις, ὡς εἴρηται παρ' Ἐπικούρῳ, δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς (τοῖς* Κυρ.) *μὴ εἶναι ἡδονὴ οὐδ' ἡ ἀηδονία ἀλγηδών—ἐν κινήσει γὰρ εἶναι ἀμφότερα—μὴ οὔσης τῆς ἀπονίας ἢ τῆς ἀηδονίας κινήσεως, ἐπεὶ ἡ ἀπονία οἱονεὶ καθεύδοντός ἐστι κατάστασις.*

57. Sed ut iis bonis. Fifth point. *ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ μνήμην τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ προσδοκίαν ἡδονήν φασιν (οἱ* Κυρ.) *ἀποτελεῖσθαι, ὅ περ ἤρεσκεν Ἐπικούρῳ. ἐκλύεσθαι γὰρ τῷ χρόνῳ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κίνημα* (Diog. L. ii. 89), i.e. when the agitation (*κίνημα*) of consciousness by a pleasurable impression has subsided (*ἐκλύεσθαι τῷ χρόνῳ*), it cannot be revived either by memory, or by anticipation of its renewal. This is true on the whole of sense-pleasures (though imagination can normally revive certain kinds of sensation much more strongly than others), but not of higher pleasures, e.g. those of friendship or of the intellect, which Epic. has in view here.

Est autem situm in nobis. 'It lies in our power.' Cf. ii. 89, v. 12, and Acad. ii. 39, 'Ubi igitur virtus, si nihil situm est in ipsis nobis?'

versa quasi perpetua oblivione obruamus et secunda iucunde ac svaviter meminerimus. Sed cum ea, quae praeterierunt, acri animo et attento intuemur, tum fit, ut aegritudo sequatur, si illa mala sint, si bona, laetitia.

XVIII. O praeclaram beate vivendi et apertam et simplicem et directam viam! Cum enim certe nihil homini possit melius esse quam vacare omni dolore et molestia perfruique maximis et animi et corporis voluptatibus, videtisne, quam nihil praetermittatur, quod vitam adiuvet, quo facilius id, quod propositum est, summum bonum consequamur? Clamat Epicurus, is, quem vos nimis voluptatibus esse deditum dicitis, non posse iucunde vivi, nisi sapienter, honeste iusteque vivatur, nec sapienter, honeste, iuste, nisi iucunde. **58.** Neque enim civitas in seditione beata esse potest nec in discordia dominorum domus; quo minus animus a se ipse dissidens secumque discordans gustare partem ullam liquidae voluptatis et liberae potest. Atqui pugnantibus et contrariis studiis consiliisque semper utens nihil quieti videre, nihil tranquilli potest. **59.** Quod si corporis gravioribus morbis vitae iucunditas impeditur, quanto magis animi morbis impediri necesse est! Animi autem morbi sunt cupiditates immensae et inanes divitiarum, gloriae, dominationis, libidinosarum etiam voluptatum. Accedunt aegritudines, molestiae, maerores, qui exedunt animos conficiuntque curis, hominum non intellegentium, nihil dolendum esse animo, quod sit a dolore corporis praesenti futurove seiunctum. Nec vero quisquam stultus non horum morborum aliquo laborat; nemo igitur

Clamat Epicurus. Maxim v. *Οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῆν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως, οὐδὲ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ἄνευ τοῦ ἡδέως.* The discussion of the Virtues in §§ 42–54 showed that they are inseparable from Pleasure.

58. Neque enim civitas. A tag of proverbial philosophy, familiar to us from its use in the N.T., 'A kingdom divided against itself, etc.' (H. R.). Plato introduces it into the praise of Justice, Rep. i. 23, p. 352 a.

quo minus = *et tanto minus* (à fortiori, H. R.). Cf. *quo magis*, iii. 4 and 7.

Atqui. The logical 'but,' marking a minor premiss. 'A mind divided against itself cannot be *beatus*. But the mind swayed by conflicting desires is so divided.' The implied conclusion is, Therefore none but the wise and moral man is *beatus* (since he alone can have a tranquil mind).

stultus non miser. **60**. Accedit etiam mors, quae, quasi saxum Tantalo, semper impendet; tum superstitio, quā qui est imbutus, quietus esse numquam potest. Praeterea bona praeterita non meminerunt, praesentibus non fruuntur; futura modo expectant, quae quia certa esse non possunt, conficiuntur et angore et metu; maximeque cruciantur, cum sero sentiunt, frustra se aut pecuniae studuisse aut imperiis aut opibus aut gloriae. Nullas enim consequuntur voluptates, quarum potiendi spe inflammati multos labores magnosque susceperant. **61**. Ecce autem alii minuti et angusti, aut omnia semper desperantes aut malevoli, invidi, difficiles, lucifugi, maledici, monstrosi, alii autem etiam amatoriis levitatibus dediti, alii petulantes, alii audaces, protervi, iidem intemperantes et ignavi, numquam in sententia permanentes, quas ob causas in eorum vita nulla est intercapedo molestiae. Igitur neque stultorum quisquam beatus neque sapientium non beatus. Multoque hoc melius nos veriusque quam Stoici. Illi enim negant esse bonum quidquam nisi nescio quam illam umbram, quod appellant honestum, non tam solido quam splendido nomine; virtutem autem nixam hoc honesto nullam requirere voluptatem atque ad beate vivendum se ipsa esse contentam.

XIX. **62**. Sed possunt haec quadam ratione dici non modo non repugnantibus, verum etiam approbantibus nobis. Sic enim ab Epicuro sapiens semper beatus inducitur: finitas habet cupiditates; neglegit mortem;

60. **quasi saxum Tantalo.** Cf. Lucret. iii. 978, 'Atque ea nimirum quaecumque Acherunte profundo | prodita sunt esse, in vita sunt omnia nobis. | nec miser impendens magnum timet aere saxum | Tantalus, ut famast, cassa formidine torpens; | sed magis in vita divum metus urget inanis | mortalis casumque timent quem cuique ferat fors'.

61. **minuti et angusti.** Μικροψύχοι. *lucifugi*, 'misanthropes' (Reid), but Lucilius, who perhaps coined the word, joins it with *nebulo*, and evil-doers are 'light-dreaders'. *monstrosi*, 'moral freaks' has good MSS. authority, but *morosi* (Lambinus) gives better sense.

dediti, 'passion's slaves,' of whom *petulantes*, *audaces*, *protervi* are different types.

solido . . . splendido, 'a title more sublime than substantial'. For the sake of antithesis, *solidum*, which applies to the thing denoted by the name, is transferred to the name itself.

62. **Sic enim.** See on 42, *sapientia ars vivendi.*

de dis immortalibus sine ullo metu vera sentit; non dubitat, si ita melius sit, migrare de vita. His rebus instructus semper est in voluptate. Neque enim tempus est ullum, quo non plus voluptatum habeat quam dolorum. Nam et praeterita grate meminit et praesentibus ita potitur, ut animadvertat, quanta sint ea quamque iucunda, neque pendet ex futuris, sed expectat illa, fruitur praesentibus, ab iisque vitiis, quae paulo ante collegi, abest plurimum, et cum stultorum vitam cum sua comparat, magna afficitur voluptate. Dolores autem, si qui incurrunt, numquam vim tantam habent, ut non plus habeat sapiens, quod gaudeat, quam quod angatur. **63.** Optime vero Epicurus, quod exiguam dixit fortunam intervenire sapienti, maximasque ab eo et gravissimas res consilio ipsius et ratione administrari, neque maiorem voluptatem ex infinito tempore aetatis percipi posse, quam ex hoc percipiatur, quod videamus esse finitum. In dialectica autem vestra nullam existimavit esse nec ad melius vivendum nec ad commodius disserendum vim. In physicis plurimum posuit. Ea scientia et verborum vis et natura orationis et consequentium repugnantiumve ratio potest perspici; omnium autem rerum natura cognita levamur superstitione, liberamur mortis metu, non conturbamur ignoratione rerum, e qua ipsa horribiles existunt saepe formidines;

63. Optime vero. Maxim xvi. *Βραχεῖα σοφῷ τύχη παρεμπίπτει, τὰ δὲ μέγιστα καὶ κυριώτατα ὁ λογισμὸς διῴκηκε καὶ κατὰ τὸν συνεχῆ χρόνον τοῦ βίου διοικεῖ καὶ διοικήσει.*

neque maiorem. Maxim xix. *Ὁ ἄπειρος χρόνος ἴσην ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ ὁ πεπερασμένος, ἐάν τις αὐτῆς τὰ πέρατα καταμετρήσῃ τῷ λογισμῷ.*

dialectica vestra, 'which you Academics make so much of'.

Ea scientia, a singular statement. Mdv. says that C., misled by the fact that Canonic (which took the place of Dialectic in the Epic. scheme) was sometimes classed under Physics, assigns to Epic. Physics certain branches of Stoic Dialectic 'quae omnino Epic. non explicabat'. I cannot think this credible, but as the point cannot be adequately discussed within the limits of a footnote, I must refer the reader to Add. Note II. for a defence of C.'s statement.

levamur superstitione: the grand aim, as Lucretius so often repeats, of all physical science. Cf. Maxim x. Εἰ *μηδὲν ἡμᾶς αἱ περὶ τῶν μετεώρων ὑποψίαι ἠνώχλουν καὶ αἱ περὶ θανάτου, μή ποτε πρὸς ἡμᾶς εἴη, ἔτι τ' ἠδυνάμεθα νοεῖν τοὺς ὅρους τῶν ἀλγηδόνων καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν, οὐκ ἂν προσδεόμεθα τῆς φυσιολογίας.*

denique etiam morati melius erimus, cum didicerimus, quid natura desideret. Tum vero, si stabilem scientiam rerum tenebimus, servata illa, quae quasi delapsa de caelo est ad cognitionem omnium, regula, ad quam omnia iudicia rerum dirigentur, numquam ullius oratione victi sententia desistemus. **64.** Nisi autem rerum natura perspecta erit, nullo modo poterimus sensuum iudicia defendere. Quidquid porro animo cernimus, id omne oritur a sensibus; qui si omnes veri erunt, ut Epicuri ratio docet, tum denique poterit aliquid cognosci et percipi. Quos qui tollunt et nihil posse percipi dicunt, ii, remotis sensibus, ne id ipsum quidem expedire possunt, quod disserunt. Praeterea, sublata cognitione et scientia, tollitur omnis ratio et vitae degendae et rerum gerendarum. Sic e physicis et fortitudo sumitur contra mortis timorem et constantia contra metum religionis et sedatio animi, omnium rerum occultarum ignoratione sublata, et moderatio, natura cupiditatum generibusque earum explicatis, et, ut modo docui, cognitionis regula et iudicio ab eodem illo constituto, veri a falso distinctio traditur.

XX. **65.** Restat locus huic disputationi vel maxime necessarius, de amicitia, quam, si voluptas summum sit bonum, affirmatis nullam omnino fore; de qua Epicurus quidem ita dicit, omnium rerum, quas ad beate vivendum sapientia comparaverit, nihil esse maius amicitiā, nihil uberius, nihil iucundius. Nec vero hoc oratione solum,

delapsa de caelo . . . regula: the famous *κανών*. De Nat. Deorum i. 43, cuius rationis vim atque utilitatem ex illo caelesti Epicuri de regula et iudicio volumine accepimus. Cf. supra, § 22.

ad cognitionem omnium, obj. genit. 'To give us knowledge of all things'.

64. animo cernimus, i.e. by the impact of images. Cf. Lucret. iv. 722 sqq. *sensibus* here means 'sensations,' not 'senses'.

qui tollunt. The Sceptics, who deny the validity of sensations, having excluded them as evidence (*remotis*) are unable to proceed with their own argument. For if nothing can be perceived, how do we perceive that very fact?

rerum occultarum. Such natural phenomena as are discussed in the 5th and 6th Books of Lucretius.

ab eodem illo, 'by the same philosopher'. For *κανών* rendered by *regula et iudicium* cf. n. on *regula*, 63.

65. ita dicit. Maxim xxviii. *Ὧν ἡ σοφία παρασκευάζεται εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου βίου μακαριότητα, πολὺ μεγιστόν ἐστιν ἡ τῆς φιλίας κτῆσις.*

sed multo magis vita et factis et moribus comprobavit. Quod quam magnum sit, fictae veterum fabulae declarant, in quibus tam multis tamque variis, ab ultima antiquitate repetitis, tria vix amicorum paria reperiuntur, ut ad Orestem pervenias profectus a Theseo. At vero Epicurus una in domo, et ea quidem angusta, quam magnos quantaque amoris conspiratione consentientes tenuit amicorum greges! quod fit etiam nunc ab Epicureis. Sed ad rem redeamus; de hominibus dici non necesse est. **66.** Tribus igitur modis video esse a nostris de amicitia disputatum. Alii, cum eas voluptates, quae ad amicos pertinerent, negarent esse per se ipsas tam expetendas, quam nostras expeteremus, quo loco videtur quibusdam stabilitas amicitiae vacillare, tuentur tamen eum locum seque facile, ut mihi videtur, expediunt. Ut enim virtutes, de quibus ante dictum est, sic amicitiam negant posse a voluptate discedere. Nam cum solitudo et vita sine amicis insidiarum et metus plena sit, ratio ipsa monet amicitias comparare, quibus partis confirmatur animus et a spe pariendarum voluptatum seiungi non potest. **67.** Atque ut odia, invidiae, despicationes adversantur voluptatibus, sic amicitiae non modo fautrices fidelissimae, sed etiam effectrices sunt voluptatum tam amicis quam sibi; quibus

tria vix paria, Theseus and Pirithous, Achilles and Patroclus, Orestes and Pylades (Plutarch de Amic. Multitud. 2, p. 93 E).

una in domo. *domum* means 'school' (of philosophy), Acad. i. 13, where Reid cfs. this passage, which he takes in the same sense, ridiculing Mdv. for referring *domo* to Epic.'s own house (in the city) *and garden* (in the suburbs). But, (1) the extension of *domus* to mean the whole property is surely quite natural; (2) if it here means 'sect,' *angusta* is both pointless and untrue. Epic. bequeathed both house and garden to his school, and C. interested himself in the preservation of the former out of friendship to the Epicurean teachers Phaedrus and Patro (Ad Fam. xiii. 1).

66. Tribus modis. Of these, the second is stated § 69 (sunt autem quidam); the third in § 70 (sunt qui dicant); the third is Epicurus' own (Diog. L. x. 120): *τὴν φιλίαν διὰ τὰς χρείας γίνεσθαι· δεῖν μέντοι προκατάρχεσθαι· καὶ γὰρ τὴν γῆν σπείρομεν· συνίστασθαι δὲ αὐτὴν κατὰ κοινωνίαν ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς.*

quo loco. *quo* depends on *eum locum* in the next clause.

67. quam sibi, 'for one's self'. *sibi*, as often, refers not to the subject of a general statement (*amicitiae*), but to the implied person concerned. Cf. ii. 78, Amare est velle bonis aliquem affici quam maximis, etiamsi *ad se* nihil ex iis redundet.

non solum praesentibus fruuntur, sed etiam spe eriguntur consequentis ac posteri temporis. Quod quia nullo modo sine amicitia firmam et perpetuam iucunditatem vitae tenere possumus neque vero ipsam amicitiam tueri, nisi aeque amicos et nosmet ipsos diligamus, idcirco et hoc ipsum efficitur in amicitia et amicitia cum voluptate connectitur. Nam et laetamur amicorum laetitia aeque atque nostra et pariter dolemus angoribus. **68.** Quocirca eodem modo sapiens erit affectus erga amicum, quo in se ipsum, quosque labores propter suam voluptatem susciperet, eosdem suscipiet propter amici voluptatem. Quaeque de virtutibus dicta sunt, quemadmodum eae semper voluptatibus inhaererent, eadem de amicitia dicenda sunt. Praeclare enim Epicurus his paene verbis: Eadem, inquit, sententia confirmavit animum, ne quod aut sempiternum aut diuturnum timeret malum, quae perspexit, in hoc ipso vitae spatio amicitiae praesidium esse firmissimum. **69.** Sunt autem quidam Epicurei timidiores paulo contra vestra convicia, sed tamen satis acuti, qui verentur, ne, si amicitiam propter nostram voluptatem expetendam putemus, tota amicitia quasi claudicare videatur. Itaque primos congressus copulationesque et consvetudinum instituendarum voluntates fieri propter voluptatem, cum autem usus progrediens familiaritatem effecerit, tum amorem efflorescere tantum, ut, etiamsi nulla sit utilitas ex amicitia, tamen ipsi amici propter se ipsos amentur. Etenim si loca, si fana, si urbes, si gymnasia, si campum, si canes, si equos, si ludicra exercendi aut venandi consve-

68. **Eadem sententia.** Max. 28, Ἡ *αὐτὴ γνώμη θαρρεῖν τε ἐποίησεν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μηδὲν αἰώνιον εἶναι δεινὸν μηδὲ πολυχρόνιον καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὡρισμένοις* (*in hoc ipso vitae spatio*) *ἀσφάλειαν φιλίᾳ μάλιστα κατεῖδε συντελουμένην.*

69. **Itaque primos . . . fieri**, sc. *dicunt*, which is harshly omitted, though easily understood after *verentur . . . itaque.*

ludicra exercendi aut venandi. 'Athletic or field sports' are surely meant, not 'exhibitions of gymnastics, or of combats with wild beasts' (Reid). The latter would be odd examples of things we grow fond of by habituation; the former are good ones, being more enjoyed as practice makes us expert. Though *ludicrum* constantly means 'show' or 'stage-play,' Livy uses it of the Olympic and Isthmian Games, and it clearly = *recreation* not *spectacle* in Tac. Germ. 24, 'nudi iuvenes quibus id *ludicrum* est, inter gladios se atque

tudine adamare solemus, quanto id in hominum consvetudine facilius fieri poterit et iustius? **70.** Sunt autem, qui dicant, foedus esse quoddam sapientium, ut ne minus amicos quam se ipsos diligant. Quod et posse fieri intellegimus et saepe † enim videmus, et perspicuum est, nihil ad iucunde vivendum reperiri posse, quod coniunctione tali sit aptius. Quibus ex omnibus iudicari potest, non modo non impediri rationem amicitiae, si summum bonum in voluptate ponatur, sed sine hoc institutionem omnino amicitiae non posse reperiri.

XXI. **71.** Quapropter si ea, quae dixi, sole ipso illustriora et clariora sunt, si omnia [dixi] hausta e fonte naturae, si tota oratio nostra omnem sibi fidem sensibus confirmat, id est, incorruptis atque integris testibus, si infantes pueri, mutae etiam bestiae paene loquuntur, magistra ac duce natura, nihil esse prosperum nisi voluptatem, nihil asperum nisi dolorem, de quibus neque depravate iudicant neque corrupte, nonne ei maximam gratiam habere debemus, qui, hac exaudita quasi voce naturae, sic eam firme graviterque comprehenderit, ut omnes bene sanos in viam placatae, tranquillae, quietae, beatae vitae deduceret? Qui quod tibi parum videtur eruditus, ea causa est, quod nullam eruditionem esse duxit, nisi quae beatae vitae disciplinam iuvaret. **72.** An ille tempus aut in poëtis evolvendis, ut ego et Triarius te hortatore facimus, consumeret, in quibus nulla solida utilitas omnisque puerilis est delectatio, aut se, ut Plato, in musicis, geometria, numeris, astris contereret, quae et, a falsis initiis profecta, vera esse non possunt et, si essent vera, nihil afferrent, quo iucundius, id est, quo melius viveremus;—eas ergo artes persequere-

infestas frameas saltu iaciunt'. Cf. also De Nat. Deor. i. 102, 'pueri, etiam cum cessant, exercitatione aliqua ludicra delectantur'. ('Some active game,' Mayor.)

71. id est. Cf. *mollitia . . . id est*, § 33.

prosperum, ἀπ. λεγ. as applied to a thing, not an event. C. plays on *prosperum . . . asperum*.

nullam eruditionem esse. *nullam* is predicate. 'No education to be worth anything.' Cf. de Orat. ii. 5, 20, 'ut sine his studiis vitam nullam esse ducamus'; infra. ii. 33, 'Bestiarum vero nullum iudicium puto'.

72. numeris astris, 'arithmetic, astronomy'. Cf. § 31, *pecuniae*, *honor*, 'avarice, ambition'.

tur, vivendi artem tantam tamque operosam et perinde fructuosam relinqueret? Non ergo Epicurus ineruditus, sed ii indocti, qui, quae pueros non didicisse turpe est, ea putant usque ad senectutem esse discenda. Quae cum dixisset, Explicavi, inquit, sententiam meam et eo quidem consilio, tuum iudicium ut cognoscerem, quae mihi facultas, ut id meo arbitratu facerem, ante hoc tempus numquam est data.

DE FINIBUS BONORUM ET MALORUM

BOOK II. ARGUMENT

i. Cicero prefers to criticise the discourse of Torquatus by the Socratic method of question and answer, and presses Torquatus on the following points:— ii-v. (1) Epicurus, owing to his neglect of Definition, uses the same term to denote two different things; by *Pleasure* he sometimes means the feeling universally so-named, but sometimes *Absence of Pain*. These are perfectly distinct; *Absence of Pain* being a neutral state of feeling, between Pleasure and Pain. vi. Torquatus evades a dilemma by declining to be further cross-questioned. Cicero continues his argument in 'rhetorical' form; Epicurus might have *combined* Pleasure and Absence of Pain, and so have set up a twofold supreme Good, as Aristotle and others have done; as it is, he has attempted to identify them. vii. For (1) in many passages he advocates undiluted Hedonism (viii.) provided that a man be a refined and cautious sensualist (but self-indulgence is not Happiness. ix. Epicurus' threefold division of Desires is illogical); (2) elsewhere, as if ashamed of professing such principles, he proclaims that *Absence of Pain* constitutes the highest Pleasure, which admits of no increase by increments of Pleasure in the ordinary sense. x. Hence his argument from the instinct of children and animals is fallacious, for what they seek (according to him) is Pleasure in the ordinary sense, whereas his supreme Good is not this but Absence of Pain. xi. Further, what all new-born creatures instinctively seek is not Pleasure, but self-preservation; Pleasure is only one among many objects of instinctive appetition, which together constitute the starting-point of the whole theory of Good and Evil. From these 'Natural Goods' the Old Academics and Peripatetics deduced their conception of the Chief End, and all philosophers, except Epicurus, have avoided the inconsistency of making their Chief End something different from their First Principle of Action. xii. Next, our senses cannot tell us what is our Chief End; Reason alone can pronounce upon it, and she rejects every theory of it which either includes Pleasure or excludes Virtue. xiii. Guided by her, I dismiss from consideration all theories which do not include Virtue in the Chief End; thus limited, the case before us is that of *Virtue v. Pleasure*. xiv. If I can show that there is something *moral* which is an End in itself (*i.e.* desirable for its own sake) I shall have refuted the Epicurean theory (that Pleasure alone is desirable for its own sake). (The term *Moral* defined and illustrated.) xv. The Virtues have their roots in the nature of man; Morality is not, as Epicurus holds, a mere convention. xvi-xviii. He says Justice

is the result of men finding that 'honesty is the best policy;' but fear of consequences is a feeble deterrent to the clever or the powerful, besides, he himself teaches that risks are to be run for the sake of great pleasures, and the means thereto, such as wealth. xix. No action is truly just, temperate, or brave, which is performed from interested motives, and our annals furnish indisputable instances of absolutely disinterested virtue. xx. If Epicurus is right, we must call Thorius Balbus a happy man, because he was surrounded by every refinement of luxury, and took his pleasures scientifically; for my part, I count Regulus in his torments far happier. xxi. To the Epicureans, the deeds of Lucretia and Virginius are foolishness; their creed has no 'cloud of witnesses;' they picture the Virtues as handmaids of Queen Pleasure. xxii. But Epicurus says, 'The only way to live enjoyably is to live virtuously.' Yes, but to be moral because it pays (which is his notion of 'living virtuously') is merely counterfeit virtue. xxiii. What are we to think of principles which no public man could profess without ruining his reputation? xxiv. There can be no such thing as Friendship, if our relations with others are governed by self-interest. xxv. That Epicurus himself was a devoted friend, only shows that he was better than his creed. xxvi. Not one of your three propositions about Friendship will hold water. xxvii. Having shown conclusively that neither Virtue nor Friendship can find a place in your system, I will briefly notice your remaining statements: (1) If the supreme Good is Pleasure, the Virtuous Man will not be necessarily a happy man; (2) It is not true that pleasure is not increased by duration. xxviii. Even granting that the Virtuous Man's needs are few and simple, and that the keenest pleasures are cheap, what about Pain? If Pain, to which man is so constantly liable, be the supreme Evil, who can be happy? xxix-xxx. For your panacea, *Si magnus brevis, si longus levis*, is an ineffectual nostrum. The true antidote to suffering is such patience, such heroism as Epicurus himself manifested in his last agonies. Admirable as is his last letter to Hermarchus, certain provisions of his will seem to me neither worthy of a philosopher nor in keeping with his own view that death is annihilation. xxxii Criticism of Torquatus' assertion that pleasures persist in the memory, and of his (xxxiii.) account of the origin and superiority of mental pleasures. xxxiv-xxxv. Peroration: 'What a piece of work is a man!' Can we doubt that this paragon is born for a higher end than Pleasure? What can be the practical consequences of universal Hedonism but the subversion of all morality, and the reduction of society to anarchy? Final argumentum ad hominem.

DE FINIBUS BONORUM ET MALORUM

LIBER SECUNDUS

I. 1. Hic cum uterque me intueretur seseque ad audiendum significarent paratos, Primum, inquam, deprecor, ne me tamquam philosophum putetis scholam vobis aliquam explicaturum, quod ne in ipsis quidem philosophis magno opere umquam probavi. Quando enim Socrates, qui parens philosophiae iure dici potest, quidquam tale fecit? Eorum erat iste mos, qui tum sophistae nominabantur; quorum e numero primus est ausus Leontinus Gorgias in conventu poscere quaestionem, id est, iubere dicere, qua de re quis vellet audire. Audax negotium; dicerem impudens, nisi hoc institutum postea translatum ad nostros philosophos esset. 2. Sed et illum, quem nominavi, et ceteros sophistas, ut e Platone intellegi potest, lusos videmus a Socrate. Is enim percontando atque interrogando elicere solebat eorum opiniones, quibuscum disserebat, ut ad ea, quae ii respondissent, si quid videretur, diceret. Qui mos cum a posterioribus non

1. intueretur . . . significarent. The change of number is harsher than i. 1 and 24, where we have *eram . . . mandaremus*, and *omittam . . . veniamus*, but not in co-ordinate clauses.

scholam explicaturum, 'deliver a formal lecture'.

poscere quaestionem. Plat. Gorgias, 447 C, Ἐκέλευε γοῦν νῦν δὴ ἐρωτᾶν ὅ τι τις βούλοιτο τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντα ἔφη ἀποκρινεῖσθαι.

nostros philosophos, 'my own school,' i.e. the Academics. In C.'s day the constructive work of Gk. philosophy was done; its professors now displayed their talents in commenting on the doctrines of their own school and in polemic against rival systems. The Academics found additional scope for their ingenuity in habituating themselves to argue either for or against any given thesis, not *more Socratico* but 'perpetua oratione' (infra § 2).

esset retentus, Arcesilas eum revocavit instituitque, ut ii, qui se audire vellent, non de se quaererent, sed ipsi dicerent, quid sentirent; quod cum dixissent, ille contra. Sed eum qui audiebant, quoad poterant, defendebant sententiam suam; apud ceteros autem philosophos, qui quaesivit aliquid, tacet; quod quidem iam fit etiam in Academia. Ubi enim is, qui audire vult, ita dixit: Voluptas mihi videtur esse summum bonum, perpetua oratione contra disputatur, ut facile intellegi possit, eos, qui aliquid sibi videri dicant, non ipsos in ea sententia esse, sed audire velle contraria. **3**. Nos commodius agimus. Non enim solum Torquatus dixit, quid sentiret, sed etiam, cur. Ego autem arbitror, quamquam admodum delectatus sum eius oratione perpetua, tamen commodius, cum in rebus singulis insistas et intellegas, quid quisque concedat, quid abnuat, ex rebus concessis concludi, quod velis, et ad exitum perveniri. Cum enim fertur quasi †torrens oratio, quamvis multa cuiusquemodi rapiat, nihil tamen teneas, nihil reprehendas, nusquam orationem rapidam coërceas.

Omnis autem in quaerendo, quae via quadam et ratione habetur, oratio praescribere primum debet, ut quibusdam in formulis: EA RES AGETUR, ut, inter quos disseritur, conveniat, quid sit id, de quo disseratur.

II. **4**. Hoc positum in Phaedro a Platone probavit Epicurus sensitque, in omni disputatione id fieri oportere. Sed quod proximum fuit, non vidit. Negat enim definiri rem placere, sine quo fieri interdum non potest, ut inter eos, qui ambigunt, conveniat, quid sit id, de quo agatur;

2. Arcesilas. See Introd. § 23. His method really consisted in destructive criticism of his opponents (De Orat. iii. 67).

3. via . . . et ratione. 'The usual Latin equivalent for Aristotle's *μεθόδῳ*' (Sandys on Orat. 116).

EA RES AGETUR. 'This shall be the point at issue' (Reid). The preambles (*praescriptiones*) to certain forms of process at law began, 'Ea res *agatur*'. *agetur* (so the best MSS.) may have been a variant in use, or C. may have thus slightly modified the legal formula to suit the tone of philosophical discussion. *praescribi* is the regular legal term 'to premise'.

4. in Phaedro, p. 227 B, Περὶ πάντος, ὦ παῖ, μία ἀρχὴ τοῖς μέλλουσι καλῶς βουλεύεσθαι· εἰδέναι δεῖ περὶ οὗ ἂν ᾖ βουλή, ἢ παντὸς ἁμαρτάνειν ἀνάγκη.

velut in hoc ipso, de quo nunc disputamus. Quaerimus enim finem bonorum; possumusne hoc scire quale sit, nisi contulerimus inter nos, cum finem bonorum dixerimus, quid finis, quid etiam sit ipsum bonum? **5.** Atqui haec patefactio quasi rerum opertarum, cum, quid quidque sit, aperitur, definitio est; qua tu etiam imprudens utebare nonnumquam. Nam hunc ipsum sive finem sive extremum sive ultimum definiebas id esse, quo omnia, quae recte fierent, referrentur neque id ipsum usquam referretur. Praeclare hoc quidem. Bonum ipsum etiam quid esset, fortasse, si opus fuisset, definisses, aut quod esset natura appetendum, aut quod prodesset, aut quod iuvaret, aut quod liberet modo. Nunc idem, nisi molestum est, quoniam tibi non omnino displicet definire et id facis, cum vis, velim definias, quid sit voluptas, de quo omnis haec quaestio est. **6.** Quis, quaeso, inquit, est, qui, quid sit voluptas, nesciat aut qui, quo magis id intellegat, definitionem aliquam desideret? Me ipsum esse dicerem, inquam, nisi mihi viderer habere bene cognitam voluptatem et satis firme conceptam animo atque comprensam. Nunc autem dico ipsum Epicurum nescire et in eo nutare, eumque, qui crebro dicat, diligenter oportere exprimi, quae vis subiecta sit vocibus, non intellegere interdum, quid sonet haec vox voluptatis, id est, quae res huic voci subiciatur.

III. Tum ille ridens: Hoc vero, inquit, optimum, ut is, qui finem rerum expetendarum voluptatem esse dicat, id

5. Atqui. Not adversative, but the mark of the second premiss of an argument. Cf. i. 58. The implied conclusion is 'ergo definitione carere non possumus'. On this whole passage cf. Orat. 116, Et quoniam in omnibus, quae *ratione* docentur *et via*, primum constituendum est quid quidque sit—nisi enim inter eos, qui disceptent, convenit quid sit illud, de quo ambigitur, nec recte disseri nec unquam ad exitum perveniri potest—explicanda est saepe verbis mens nostra de quaque re atque involutae rei notitia definiendo aperienda est, si quidem est definitio oratio, quae quid sit id, de quo agitur, ostendit quam brevissime.

6. quid sonet . . . id est . . . The *id est* clause does not explain the term *sonet*, but draws attention to the fact that 'quid sonet vox' represents Epic.'s own expression, τὸ ὑποτεταγμένον τῷ φθόγγῳ, for which see i. 29.

Hoc vero optimum . . . ut is. This construction gives a different shade of meaning from the infin. If Torquatus had said *eum . . . nescire* he would merely have expressed surprise at the fact (that Epicurus

extremum, id ultimum bonorum, id ipsum quid et quale sit, nesciat! Atqui, inquam, aut Epicurus, quid sit voluptas, aut omnes mortales, qui ubique sunt, nesciunt. Quonam, inquit, modo? Quia voluptatem hanc esse sentiunt omnes, quam sensus accipiens movetur et iucunditate quadam perfunditur. **7.** Quid ergo? istam voluptatem, inquit, Epicurus ignorat? Non semper, inquam. Nam interdum nimis etiam novit, quippe qui testificetur, ne intellegere quidem se posse, ubi sit aut quod sit ullum bonum praeter illud, quod cibo et potione et aurium delectatione et obscena voluptate capiatur. An haec ab eo non dicuntur? Quasi vero me pudeat, inquit, istorum aut non possim, quemadmodum ea dicantur, ostendere! Ego vero non dubito, inquam, quin facile possis, nec est, quod te pudeat sapienti assentiri, qui se unus, quod sciam, sapientem profiteri sit ausus. Nam Metrodorum non puto ipsum professum, sed, cum appellaretur ab Epicuro, repudiare tantum beneficium noluisse; septem autem illi non suo, sed populorum suffragio omnium nominati sunt. **8.** Verum hoc loco sumo, verbis his eandem certe vim voluptatis Epicurum nosse quam ceteros. Omnes enim iucundum motum, quo sensus hilaretur, Graece ἡδονήν, Latine voluptatem vocant. Quid est igitur, inquit,

'does not know'); as it is, he indicates doubt as to the fact.

sentiunt = censent. So often, cf. iii. 34, v. 23; Acad. i. 22, Nat. Deor. i. 29.

7. testificetur. In his treatise περὶ τέλους. Quoted by Athenaeus (vii. pp. 278 F, 280 A), Οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε δύναμαι νοῆσαι τἀγαθόν, ἀφαιρῶν μὲν τὰς διὰ χυλῶν ἡδονάς, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ τὰς δι' ἀφροδισίων, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ τὰς δι' ἀκροαμάτων, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ τὰς διὰ μορφῆς κατ' ὄψιν ἡδείας κινήσεις. Cf. Diog. L. x. 6, and C.'s quotations, Tusc. iii. 41.

se sapientem. σοφὸν δὲ μηδένα φάναι πλὴν αὑτοῦ γεγονέναι (Plut. Non posse suaviter 18, p. 1100).

Metrodorus. Called 'paene alter Epic.' infr. § 92; (Epicuri) 'collega sapientiae,' Nat. Deor. i. 113, and elsewhere often ranked equal with his master by C.

septem . . . illi. The actual number of accredited 'Sages' is no less than 22. The number Seven, first found as traditional in Plato, perhaps got popularly established at Delphi, where seven famous apophthegms inscribed on the temple walls were each attributed to some well-known σοφός. Cf. Protag. 343 A. All accounts mention Thales, Bias, Pittacus and Solon, but the names of the remaining three are very variously given.

8. Epicurum nosse. Tusc. iii. 42, 'Atque haec quidem his verbis, quivis ut intellegat, quam voluptatem norit Epic.' *verbis his* = *cum his verbis utitur* . . . *sumo*, 'I assume as granted,' regularly used in logical argument of taking a proposition as major premiss.

quod requiras? Dicam, inquam, et quidem discendi causa magis, quam quo te aut Epicurum reprensum velim. Ego quoque, inquit, didicerim libentius, si quid attuleris, quam te reprenderim. Tenesne igitur, inquam, Hieronymus Rhodius quid dicat esse summum bonum, quo putet omnia referri oportere? Teneo, inquit, finem illi videri nihil dolere. Quid? idem iste, inquam, de voluptate quid sentit? 9. Negat esse eam, inquit, propter se expetendam. Aliud igitur esse censet gaudere, aliud non dolere. Et quidem, inquit, vehementer errat; nam, ut paulo ante docui, augendae voluptatis finis est doloris omnis amotio. Non dolere, inquam, istud quam vim habeat, postea videro; aliam vero vim voluptatis esse, aliam nihil dolendi, nisi valde pertinax fueris, concedas necesse est. Atqui reperies, inquit, in hoc quidem pertinacem; dici enim nihil potest verius. Estne, quaeso, inquam, sitienti in bibendo voluptas? Quis istud possit, inquit, negare? Eademne, quae restincta siti? Immo alio genere. Restincta enim sitis stabilitatem voluptatis habet, illa autem voluptas ipsius restinctionis in motu est. Cur igitur, inquam, res tam dissimiles eodem nomine appellas? 10. Quid paulo ante, inquit, dixerim, non meministi, cum omnis dolor detractus esset, variari, non augeri voluptatem? Memini vero, inquam. Sed tu istuc dixti bene Latine, parum plane. Varietas enim Latinum verbum est, idque proprie quidem in disparibus coloribus dicitur, sed transfertur in multa disparia: varium poëma, varia oratio, varii mores, varia fortuna, voluptas etiam varia dici solet, cum percipitur e multis dissimilibus rebus dissimiles efficientibus voluptates. Eam si varietatem diceres, intellegerem, ut etiam non dicente te intellego; ista varietas quae sit, non satis perspicio, quod ais, cum dolore careamus, tum in summa voluptate nos esse, cum autem vescamur iis rebus, quae dulcem motum afferant sensibus, tum esse in motu voluptatem, qui faciat varietatem voluptatum, sed

Hieronymus Rhodius. Fl. circa 250 B.C. He is reckoned a Peripatetic but his heterodox view of the τέλος is all we know of his philosophy.

10. quod ais = *quae in eo posita sit, quod, ut ais . . . simus.*

non augeri illam non dolendi voluptatem, quam cur voluptatem appelles, nescio.

IV. **11.** An potest, inquit [ille], quidquam esse svavius quam nihil dolere? Immo sit sane nihil melius, inquam; nondum enim id quaero; num propterea idem voluptas est, quod, ut ita dicam, indolentia? Plane idem, inquit, et maxima quidem, qua fieri nulla maior potest. Quid dubitas igitur, inquam, summo bono a te ita constituto, ut id totum in non dolendo sit, id tenere unum, id tueri, id defendere? **12.** Quid enim necesse est, tamquam meretricem in matronarum coetum, sic voluptatem in virtutum concilium adducere? Invidiosum nomen est, infame, suspectum. Itaque hoc frequenter dici solet a vobis, non intellegere nos, quam dicat Epicurus voluptatem. Quod quidem mihi si quando dictum est (est autem dictum non parum saepe), etsi satis clemens sum in disputando, tamen interdum soleo subirasci. Egone non intellego, quid sit *ἡδονή* Graece, Latine voluptas? utram tandem lingvam nescio? Deinde qui fit, ut ego nesciam, sciant omnes, quicumque Epicurei esse voluerint? Quod vestri quidem vel optime disputant, nihil opus esse, eum, qui futurus sit philosophus, scire litteras. Itaque ut maiores nostri ab aratro adduxerunt Cincinnatum illum, ut dictator esset, sic vos de pagis omnibus colligitis bonos illos quidem viros, sed certe non pereruditos. **13.** Ergo illi intellegunt, quid Epicurus dicat, ego non intellego? Ut scias me intellegere, primum idem esse dico voluptatem, quod ille *ἡδονήν*. Et quidem saepe quaerimus verbum Latinum par Graeco et quod idem valeat; hic nihil fuit, quod quaereremus. Nullum inveniri verbum potest, quod magis idem declaret Latine, quod Graece, quam declarat

11. [ille.] Probably spurious. Five out of six other Ciceronian exx. of *inquit* with subject occur in de Orat., extant MSS. of which are late.

ut ita dicam, indolentia. This coinage of C.'s was adopted by Seneca.

12. Quod vestri . . . vel optime. *Quod* refers to what is implied in *sciant . . . quicumque . . . voluerint*; *nihil opus*, etc., is epexegetically added.

13. esse dico = appello. Cf. Acad. i. 28, 'illa vis, quam qualitatem *esse diximus*,' and Müller's exx. in not. crit. ad h. loc. (who points out that Mdvg. unnecessarily brackets *esse* here).

idem declaret Latine, quod Graece, a slip for 'Latinum Latine,

voluptas. Huic verbo omnes, qui ubique sunt, qui Latine sciunt, duas res subiciunt, laetitiam in animo, commotionem svavem iucunditatis in corpore. Nam et ille apud Trabeam voluptatem animi nimiam laetitiam dicit, eandem, quam ille Caecilianus, qui omnibus laetitiis laetum esse se narrat. Sed hoc interest, quod voluptas dicitur etiam in animo (vitiosa res, ut Stoici putant, qui eam sic definiunt, sublationem animi sine ratione, opinantis se magno bono frui), non dicitur laetitia nec gaudium in corpore. **14.** In eo autem voluptas omnium Latine loquentium more ponitur, cum percipitur ea, quae sensum aliquem moveat, iucunditas. Hanc quoque iucunditatem, si vis, transfer in animum; iuvare enim in utroque dicitur ex eoque iucundum; modo intellegas, inter illum, qui dicat:

> Tanta laetitia auctu' sum, ut nihil constet,

et eum, qui:

> Nunc demum mihi animus ardet,

quod Graece Graecum.' 'No Latin word has a more precise equivalent n Greek than has *voluptas.*'

et ille apud Trabeam. Tusc. v. 35, 'ut ille, qui "voluptatem nimi nimiam summum esse error-m" arbitratur'. *dicere* here comines the force of *significare* and *ntellegere* with its own. Avoid endering it *describes*. 'The man in rabea's comedy' is not giving a lefinition of *laetitia*; 'when he says 'volup. anim. nimiam" he means *aetitia*'. Notice *et* left unbalanced s in i. 23. We expect a second hen C. proceeds to discuss the econd meaning of *voluptas* (comnotio in corpore). *Trabea*, a Roman omic poet of circ. 130 B.C., is only nown from C.'s quotations.

sic definiunt. Diog. L. gives eno's own definition as follows: Ἡδονὴ δέ ἐστιν ἄλογος ἔπαρσις ἐφ' ρετῷ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν (vii. 144).

14. In eo, i.e. *in corpore.* C. ys *laetitia* and *voluptas* are not nonyms, for the former, like *udium*, is not used of physical feeling, whereas *voluptas* is universally so used. *ponitur in* here = *ponitur de. Voluptas*, far more than ἡδονή, or our 'pleasure', is coloured with physical associations; a fact which C. makes rhetorical play with, § 12 (*Invidiosum nomen*, Pleasure compared to a courtesan). So here, 'dicitur *etiam in animo*' implies that its primary meaning is *sense-pleasure*, though it is extended also to *mental.*

ut nihil constet, 'that I'm all of a whirl' is perhaps not too colloquial a rendering. C. is probably quoting from the same verse of an unknown comedy in Tusc. iv. 35, 'tum efferetur alacritate, ut "*nihil ei constet, quod agat*"'. The next verse here quoted (spoken by a 'stern parent' in a play of Caecilius) occurs also pro Caelio 37, 'Nunc enim demum mihi animus ardet, nunc meum cor cumulatur ira'. Lastly, *Quamquam haec*, etc., are the opening words of Terence's *Hautontimoroumenos*, addressed by Chremes to his neighbour.

quorum alter laetitia gestiat, alter dolore crucietur, esse illum medium:

Quamquam haec inter nos nuper notitia admodum est,

qui nec laetetur nec angatur; itemque inter eum, qui potiatur corporis expetitis voluptatibus, et eum, qui excrucietur summis doloribus, esse eum, qui utroque careat.

V. **15.** Satisne igitur videor vim verborum tenere, an sum etiam nunc vel Graece loqui vel Latine docendus? Et tamen vide, ne, si ego non intellegam, quid Epicurus loquatur, cum Graece, ut videor, luculenter sciam, sit aliqua culpa eius, qui ita loquatur, ut non intellegatur. Quod duobus modis sine reprensione fit, si aut de industria facias, ut Heraclitus, cognomento qui σκοτεινός perhibetur, quia de natura nimis obscure memoravit, aut cum rerum obscuritas, non verborum, facit, ut non intellegatur oratio, qualis est in Timaeo Platonis. Epicurus autem, ut opinor, nec non vult, si possit, plane et aperte loqui, nec de re obscura, ut physici, aut artificiosa, ut mathematici, sed de illustri et facili et iam in vulgus pervagata loquitur. Quamquam non negatis nos intellegere, quid sit voluptas, sed quid ille dicat; e quo efficitur, non ut nos non intellegamus, quae vis sit istius verbi, sed ut ille suo more loquatur, nostrum neglegat. **16.** Si enim idem dicit, quod Hieronymus, qui censet summum bonum esse sine ulla molestia vivere, cur mavult dicere voluptatem quam vacuitatem doloris, ut ille facit, qui, quid dicat, intellegit? sin autem voluptatem putat adiungendam eam, quae sit in motu (sic enim appellat hanc dulcem, in motu, illam nihil dolentis, in stabilitate), quid tendit? cum effi-

15. cognomento. Hexameters from some old comic poet, probably Lucilius. C. has put *qui* in the place of some other word, to link on the quotation; in the second line *quia* is scanned as a monosyllable. *Cognomentum*, *memorare* (for commemorare), *perhibetur* are all archaic or poetic. The obscurity of Heraclitus, whether intentional or not, gained him many admirers, according to Lucretius, who calls him 'clarus ob obscuram linguam magis inter inanis Quam de gravis inter Graios qui vera requirunt'.

16. qui, quid dicat, intellegit. Contrasts Hieronymus with Epic. who was said § 6, 'non intellegere interdum quid sonet haec vox voluptatis'.

tendit. *Tendo* only here in C., but often in Livy, = *contendo*.

cere non possit, ut cuiquam, qui ipse sibi notus sit, hoc est, qui suam naturam sensumque perspexerit, vacuitas doloris et voluptas idem esse videatur. Hoc est vim afferre, Torquate, sensibus, extorquere ex animis cognitiones verborum, quibus imbuti sumus. Quis est enim, qui non videat, haec esse in natura rerum tria? unum, cum in voluptate sumus, alterum, cum in dolore, tertium hoc, in quo nunc equidem sum, credo item vos, nec in dolore nec in voluptate, ut in voluptate sit, qui epuletur, in dolore, qui torqueatur. Tu autem inter haec tantam multitudinem hominum interiectam non vides nec laetantium nec dolentium? **17.** Non prorsus, inquit, omnesque, qui sine dolore sint, in voluptate, et ea quidem summa, esse dico. Ergo in eadem voluptate eum, qui alteri misceat mulsum ipse non sitiens, et eum, qui illud sitiens bibat?

VI. Tum ille: Finem, inquit, interrogandi, si videtur, quod quidem ego a principio ita me malle dixeram, hoc ipsum providens, dialecticas captiones. Rhetorice igitur, inquam, nos mavis quam dialectice disputare? Quasi vero, inquit, perpetua oratio rhetorum solum, non etiam philosophorum sit. Zenonis est, inquam, hoc Stoici; omnem vim loquendi, ut iam ante Aristoteles, in duas tributam esse partes, rhetoricam palmae, dialecticam pugni similem esse dicebat, quod latius loquerentur rhetores, dialectici autem compressius. Obsequar igitur voluntati tuae dicamque, si potero, rhetorice, sed hac rhetorica philosophorum, non nostra illa forensi, quam necesse est, cum populariter loquatur, esse

cognitiones verborum, i.e. *notiones.* Cf. Nat. D. i. 36, '(Zeno) tollit omnino usitatas perceptasque *cognitiones* deorum; neque enim Jovem neque Junonem neque Vestam . . . habet in deorum numero, sed rebus inanimis et mutis per quandam significationem haec docet tributa nomina'. Habit 'ingrains' in our minds certain ideas as the meaning of certain names. To say, with Zeno, '*Juppiter* does not mean a person, but the Aether', or with Epic., '*Voluptas* does not mean a positive feeling but a negative,' is merely to 'cram the words into our ear Against the stomach of our sense.' (*vim afferre sensibus.*)

17. Finem, inquit, sc. *faciamus.* Cf. infr. iv. 1, *finem ille*; iii. 94, *Cotta finem.*

Zenonis. *Ζήνων ὁ Κιττιεὺς ἐρωτηθείς, ὅτῳ διαφέρει διαλεκτικὴ ῥητορικῆς, συστρέψας τὴν χεῖρα καὶ πάλιν ἐξαπλώσας, ἔφη· Τούτῳ, κατὰ μὲν τὴν συστροφὴν τὸ στρογγύλον καὶ βραχὺ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς τάττων ἰδίωμα, διὰ δὲ τῆς ἐξαπλώσεως τῶν δακτύλων τὸ πλατὺ τῆς ῥητορικῆς δυνάμεως αἰνιττόμενος.* Sext. Emp. adv. Math. ii. 7.

interdum paulo hebetiorem. **18.** Sed dum dialecticam, Torquate, contemnit Epicurus, quae una continet omnem et perspiciendi, quid in quaque re sit, scientiam et iudicandi, quale quidque sit, et ratione ac via disputandi, ruit in dicendo, ut mihi quidem videtur, nec ea, quae docere vult, ulla arte distingvit; ut haec ipsa, quae modo loquebamur. Summum a vobis bonum voluptas dicitur. Aperiendum est igitur, quid sit voluptas; aliter enim explicari, quod quaeritur, non potest. Quam si explicavisset, non tam haesitaret; aut enim eam voluptatem tueretur, quam Aristippus, id est, qua sensus dulciter ac iucunde movetur, quam etiam pecudes, si loqui possent, appellarent voluptatem, aut, si magis placeret suo more loqui quam ut

> Omnes Danai atque Mycenenses,
> Attica pubes,

reliquique Graeci, qui hoc anapaesto citantur, hoc non dolere solum voluptatis nomine appellaret, illud Aristippeum contemneret, aut, si utrumque probaret, ut probat, coniungeret doloris vacuitatem cum voluptate et duobus ultimis uteretur. **19.** Multi enim et magni philosophi haec ultima bonorum iuncta fecerunt; ut Aristoteles virtutis usum cum vitae perfectae prosperitate coniunxit, Callipho adiunxit ad honestatem voluptatem, Diodorus ad eandem honestatem addidit vacuitatem doloris. Idem fecisset Epicurus, si sententiam hanc, quae nunc Hieronymi est, coniunxisset cum Aristippi vetere sententia. Illi enim inter se dissentiunt; propterea singulis finibus utuntur, et, cum uterque Graece egregie loquatur, nec Aristippus, qui voluptatem summum bonum dicit, in voluptate ponit non dolere, neque Hieronymus, qui summum bonum statuit non dolere, voluptatis

18. hoc anapaesto citantur, 'are summoned in these anapaestic verses'. Cf. Tusc. iii. 57, 'nec siletur illud potentissimi regis *anapaestum*, qui laudat senem et fortunatum esse dicit'.

19. Callipho. *Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς περὶ Καλλιφῶντα ἕνεκα μὲν τῆς ἡδονῆς παρεισῆλθεν ἡ ἀρετή, χρόνῳ δὲ ὕστερον, τὸ περὶ αὐτὴν κάλλος κατιδοῦσα, ἰσότιμον ἑαυτὴν τῇ ἀρχῇ, τοῦτ' ἔστι, τῇ ἡδονῇ, παρέσχεν* (Clem. Al. Strom. ii. p. 178). Calliphon's view of the Chief Good is all we know about him.

Diodorus (died circa 120 B.C.) succeeded Critolaus as head of the Peripatetic school.

nomine umquam utitur pro illa indolentia, quippe qui ne in expetendis quidem rebus numeret voluptatem.

VII. **20.** Duae sunt enim res quoque, ne tu verba solum putes. Unum est sine dolore esse, alterum cum voluptate; vos ex his tam dissimilibus rebus non modo nomen unum (nam id facilius paterer), sed etiam rem unam ex duabus facere conamini; quod fieri nullo modo potest. Hic, qui utrumque probat, ambobus debuit uti, sicut facit re neque tamen dividit verbis. Cum enim eam ipsam voluptatem, quam eodem nomine omnes appellamus, laudat locis plurimis, audet dicere, ne suspicari quidem se ullum bonum seiunctum ab illo Aristippeo genere voluptatis; atque ibi hoc dicit, ubi omnis eius est oratio de summo bono. In alio vero libro, in quo, breviter comprehensis gravissimis sententiis, quasi oracula edidisse sapientiae dicitur, scribit his verbis, quae nota tibi profecto, Torquate, sunt (quis enim vestrum non edidicit Epicuri *κυρίας δόξας*, id est, quasi maxime ratas, quia gravissimae sint ad beate vivendum breviter enuntiatae sententiae?) animadverte igitur, rectene hanc sententiam interpreter: **21.** 'Si ea, quae sunt luxuriosis efficientia voluptatum, liberarent eos deorum et mortis et doloris metu docerentque, qui

20. ne suspicari quidem se = *οὐδὲ νοῆσαι*. For the Greek, see above on § 7, *quippe qui testificetur*. Cf. Acad. i. 7, 'quod bonum quale sit negat omnino Epic. sine voluptatibus sensum moventibus se ne suspicari quidem.'

ubi omnis eius est oratio, i.e. in his treatise *περὶ τέλους*; see first reference in last note.

In alio vero. We expect a quotation about *indolentia*, to show that Epic. confounds it with 'Aristippean Pleasure,' but C. digresses into a long tirade against his support of the latter. The charge of inconsistency is not resumed till § 28 (*deinde ubi erubuit*).

maxime ratas, sc. *sententias*. C. translates *κυρίαι* not as being obscure in itself, but in order to append an explanation of why the maxims were so called. As *ratum* properly means 'valid' rather than 'authoritative,' he adds *maxime*, and marks the still imperfect equivalence of his rendering by *quasi*. Join *gravissimae . . . ad beate vivendum*. On this collection of Maxims, see Introd. § 22.

21. Si ea, quae. Maxim ix. *Εἰ τὰ ποιητικὰ τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἀσώτους ἡδονῶν ἔλυε τοὺς φόβους τῆς διανοίας, τούς τε περὶ μετεώρων καὶ θανάτου καὶ ἀλγηδόνων, ἔτι τε τὸ πέρας τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐδίδασκεν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε εἴχομεν ὅ τι μεμψαίμεθα αὐτοῖς, πανταχόθεν εἰσπληρουμένοις τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ οὐδαμόθεν οὔτε τὸ ἀλγοῦν οὔτε τὸ λυπούμενον ἔχουσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κακόν* (i.e. physical and mental pain together make up (the sole) Evil). C. elsewhere expresses 'which is the same thing as' by *id est* or *id est enim*; the continuative *autem* has here no force.

essent fines cupiditatum, nihil haberemus, *quod reprehenderemus*, cum undique complerentur voluptatibus nec haberent ulla ex parte aliquid aut dolens aut aegrum, id est autem malum.' Hoc loco tenere se Triarius non potuit. Obsecro, inquit, Torquate, haec dicit Epicurus? Quod mihi quidem visus est, cum sciret, velle tamen confitentem audire Torquatum. At ille non pertimuit saneque fidenter: Istis quidem ipsis verbis, inquit; sed quid sentiat, non videtis. Si alia sentit, inquam, alia loquitur, numquam intellegam, quid sentiat; sed plane dicit, quod intellegit. Idque si ita dicit, non esse reprendendos luxuriosos, si sapientes sint, dicit absurde, similiter et si dicat, non reprendendos parricidas, si nec cupidi sint nec deos metuant nec mortem nec dolorem. Et tamen quid attinet luxuriosis ullam exceptionem dari aut fingere aliquos, qui, cum luxuriose viverent, a summo philosopho non reprenderentur eo nomine dumtaxat, cetera caverent? **22.** Sed tamen nonne reprenderes, Epicure, luxuriosos ob eam ipsam causam, quod ita viverent, ut persequerentur cuiusquemodi voluptates, cum esset praesertim, ut ais tu, summa voluptas nihil dolere? Atqui reperiemus asotos primum ita non religiosos, ut 'edint de patella,' deinde ita mortem non timentes, ut illud in ore habeant ex Hymnide:

saneque fidenter, a friendly hit at the 'grand manner' characteristic of the school. Cf. Nat. Deor. i. 18, 'Tum Velleius fidentur sane, ut solent isti, nihil tam verens, quam ne dubitare aliqua de re videretur, tamquam modo ex deorum concilio et ex Epicuri intermundiis descendisset'.

similiter et si. Lambinus proposed *ut* si; but cf. iv. 31, 'similem habeat vultum *et* si'. A harsh extension of the use of *et* (for ac) after aeque, etc., in comparing two nouns (e.g. amicos aeque et nosmet, i. 67), in which case *et* retains some of its proper copulative character.

22. edint de patella, i.e. take the tit-bits from the paten ('cultrix foci,' Persius, iii. 23) on which they were offered to the gods by way of 'grace before meat.' Mdv. sees no reason to consider this a quotation or proverb. But cf. Athen. v. 179 d, where the 'Symposium' written by Epic. is contrasted with those of Plato and Xenophon, and with the feasts in Homer; *παρὰ δ' Ἐπικούρῳ οὐ σπονδή, οὐκ ἀπαρχὴ θεοῖς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ Σημονίδης ἔφη περὶ τῆς ἀκόσμου γυναικός, 'ἄθυστα δ' ἱρὰ πολλάκις κατεσθίει'*. It seems not impossible that C. is quoting from a Latin imitation of Semonides' famous satire on women, and at least probable that he employs an expression in familiar use.

ex Hymnide. Caecilius' comedy of that name was taken from Menander. 'Qui sex menses vitam ducunt, Orco spondent septimum' is an extant line of Lucilius.

Mihi sex menses sati' sunt vitae; septimum
Orco spondeo.

Iam doloris medicamenta illa Epicurea tamquam de narthecio proment: Si gravis, brevis; si longus, levis. Unum nescio, quomodo possit, si luxuriosus sit, finitas cupiditates habere.

VIII. **23.** Quid ergo attinet dicere: Nihil haberem, quod reprenderem, si finitas cupiditates haberent? Hoc est dicere: Non reprenderem asotos, si non essent asoti. Isto modo ne improbos quidem, si essent boni viri. Hic homo severus luxuriam ipsam per se reprendendam non putat. Et hercule, Torquate, ut verum loquamur, si summum bonum voluptas est, rectissime non putat. Nolim enim mihi fingere asotos, ut soletis, qui in mensam vomant et qui de conviviis auferantur crudique postridie se rursus ingurgitent, qui solem, ut aiunt, nec occidentem umquam viderint nec orientem, qui consumptis patrimoniis egeant. Nemo nostrum istius generis asotos iucunde putat vivere. Mundos, elegantes, optimis cocis, pistoribus, piscatu, aucupio, venatione, his omnibus exquisitis, vitantes cruditatem, quibus 'vinum defusum e pleno sit, † hirsizon' (ut ait Lucilius) 'cui nihil dum sit vis et sacculus abstu-

de narthecio. Perhaps an allusion to the so-called *τετραφάρμακος*, i.e. *ἄφοβον ὁ θεός, ἀναίσθητον ὁ θάνατος, καὶ τἀγαθὸν μὲν εὔκτητον, τὸ δὲ δεινὸν εὐεκκαρτέρητον*, which is a condensed statement of the first four Maxims (extant under that title among the Herculanean Fragments, see Usener, pp. xliv, 69). 'Short if strong, light if long' was the fourth. See on i. 40.

quomodo possit. C. often shifts from plur. to sing. and vice versâ, where a class and a representative member thereof easily alternate as subject, esp. in De Nat. D. when speaking of the gods (e.g. i. 51).

23. qui solem, ut aiunt. Athenaeus mentions the boast of a certain Sybarite that he had not seen the sun rise or set for 20 years. The phrase may have been borrowed from the Greeks along with their luxurious habits, but for their Roman imitators it characteristically implied coarse excess, not refined indolence.

† **hirsizon.** What word or words this corruption (of which MSS show 7 variants) stands for remains a matter for conjecture, no satisfactory restoration of these lines having been proposed. Some word for wine-jar is wanted, agreeing with *pleno*, the general sense required being 'whose wine is drawn from a full jar, and has lost its tang (*cui nihil dum sit vis*) by straining'. Wine was drunk at its best from a full, i.e. freshly unsealed jar, and the 'roughness' (*vires*) of stronger sorts was removed by a fine strainer (*sacculus*).

lerit,' adhibentes ludos et quae sequuntur, illa, quibus detractis clamat Epicurus se nescire, quid sit bonum; adsint etiam formosi pueri, qui ministrent; respondeat his vestis, argentum, Corinthium, locus ipse, aedificium;—hos ergo asotos bene quidem vivere aut beate numquam dixerim. **24.** Ex quo efficitur, non ut voluptas ne sit voluptas, sed ut voluptas non sit summum bonum. Nec ille, qui Diogenem Stoicum adulescens, post autem Panaetium audierat, Laelius, eo dictus est sapiens, quod non intellegeret, quid svavissimum esset (nec enim sequitur, ut, cui cor sapiat ei non sapiat, palatus), sed quia parvi id duceret.

> O lapathe, ut iactare nec es sati' cognitu', qui sis!
> In quo Laeliu' clamores σόφος ille solebat
> Edere, compellans gumias ex ordine nostros.

Praeclare Laelius, et recte σοφός, illudque vere:

> O Publi, o gurges, Galloni, es homo miser, inquit.
> Cenasti in vita numquam bene, cum omnia in ista
> Consumis squilla atque acupensere cum decimano.

Is haec loquitur, qui in voluptate nihil ponens, negat eum bene cenare, qui omnia ponat in voluptate; et tamen non negat, libenter umquam cenasse Gallonium (mentiretur

adsint etiam formosi pueri. Though C. speaks of *living* boys and of *bronze* statues (*Corinthium*), this description curiously recalls that in Lucretius, ii. 25, 'si non aerea sunt iuvenum simulacra per aedes,' etc., of the splendours *not* necessary to Pleasure's true votaries.

hos ergo, 'these, then,' *ergo* sums up, as in i. 72.

24. non ut . . . ne sit . . . sed ut . . . non sit. One of the few examples of *ut ne* consecutive. Mdv. on § 15 *supra* says that even here, though used indifferently for *ut non*, *ut ne* conveys a slight implication of purpose ('non efficitur, *quod vultis*, ut ne'). See his Lat. Gr. § 456.

Diogenem. Laelius was well over 30 when Diogenes, Critolaus and Carneades visited Rome on their famous embassy, 156 B.C. For this, and the relations of Panaetius with Laelius and his circle, see Introd. § 16.

cui cor sapiat. Cf. infra § 91, 'Hoc est non modo cor non habere sed ne palatum quidem'. The archaic cor = mens perhaps lived on in colloquial use.

in quo . . . clamores. Laelius 'shouted approbation' over his mess of sorrel. *Gallonius*, a gormandising auctioneer, was notorious for having introduced *acipenser* (sturgeon?) to Roman tables (Hor. Sat. ii. 2. 47), which was long highly esteemed, but in Pliny's day had gone out of fashion.

enim), sed bene. Ita graviter et severe voluptatem secernit a bono. Ex quo illud efficitur, qui bene cenent, omnes libenter cenare, qui libenter, non continuo bene. Semper Laelius bene. **25.** Quid bene? Dicet Lucilius:

cocto,
Conito;
sed cedo caput cenae:
sermone bono;
quid ex eo?
si quaeri', libenter;

veniebat enim ad cenam, ut animo quieto satiaret desideria naturae. Recte ergo is negat umquam bene cenasse Gallonium; recte miserum, cum praesertim in eo omne studium consumeret. Quem libenter cenasse nemo negat. Cur igitur non bene? Quia, quod bene, id recte, frugaliter, honeste; ille porro [male,] prave, nequiter, turpiter cenabat; non igitur *bene.* Nec lapathi svavitatem acupenseri Gallonii Laelius anteponebat, sed svavitatem ipsam neglegebat; quod non faceret, si in voluptate summum bonum poneret.

IX. Semovenda est igitur voluptas, non solum ut recta sequamini, sed etiam ut loqui deceat frugaliter. **26.** Possumusne ergo in vita summum bonum dicere, cum id ne in

25. Quid bene? Dicet Lucilius. Cf. ad Attic. xiii. 52 (Caesar) Edit et bibit ἀδεῶς et iucunde, opipare sane et apparate, nec id solum, sed *bene cocto, condito, sermone bono et, si quaeri, libenter.* In our passage C. naturally omits *bene* from the quotation, as he is insisting on the higher sense of the word.

recte miserum, sc. *dicit,* from *negat.* This is peculiarly harsh, considering (1) close proximity of *negat,* (2) repetition of *recte,* which suggests that the *same* verb is understood, (3) the fact that *dicit* here = *appellat.*

cum praesertim, 'and that too although.' Cf. iv. 36, and Orat. 32, 'nec vero, si historiam non scripsisset, nomen eius extaret, *cum praesertim* fuisset honoratus et nobilis'. 'The fact is that between this and the more usual sense there is just the same difference as between *cum,* "since," and *cum,* "though"' (Munro on Lucret. iv. 786).

ut loqui deceat frugaliter, 'that you may consistently hold the language of respectable (*frugi*) people'; (as you do when you extol the simple life, or make *indolentia* the Chief Good).

26. Possumusne ergo . . . summum bonum dicere, cum id . . . 'Can we call a thing the Chief Good with regard to living, though we don't consider we can call it the Chief Good even with regard to dining?' The omission of the obj. in the first clause is all the harsher because the emphasis of the sentence falls on it.

cena quidem posse videamur? Quomodo autem philosophus loquitur? 'Tria genera cupiditatum, naturales et necessariae, naturales et non necessariae, nec naturales nec necessariae.' Primum divisit ineleganter; duo enim genera quae erant, fecit tria. Hoc est non dividere, sed frangere. Qui haec didicerunt, quae ille contemnit, sic solent: 'Duo genera cupiditatum, naturales et inanes; naturalium duo, necessariae et non necessariae.' Confecta res esset. Vitiosum est enim in dividendo partem in genere numerare. **27.** Sed hoc sane concedamus. Contemnit disserendi elegantiam; confuse loquitur; gerendus est mos, modo recte sentiat. Equidem illud ipsum non nimium probo et tantum patior, philosophum loqui de cupiditatibus finiendis. An potest cupiditas finiri? Tollenda est atque extrahenda radicitus. Quis est enim, in quo sit cupiditas, quin recte cupidus dici possit? Ergo et avarus erit, sed finite, et adulter, verum habebit modum, et luxuriosus eodem modo. Qualis ista philosophia est, quae non interitum afferat pravitatis, sed sit contenta mediocritate vitiorum? Quamquam in hac divisione rem ipsam prorsus probo, elegantiam desidero. Appellet haec desideria naturae; cupiditatis nomen servet alio, ut eam, cum de avaritia, cum de intemperantia, cum de maximis vitiis loquetur, tamquam capitis accuset. **28.** Sed haec quidem liberius ab eo dicuntur et saepius. Quod equidem non reprendo; est enim tanti philosophi tamque nobilis audacter sua decreta defendere; sed tamen ex eo, quod eam voluptatem, quam omnes gentes hoc nomine appellant, videtur amplexari saepe vehementius, in magnis interdum versatur angustiis, ut, hominum con-

partem in genere numerare, 'to reckon a species as a genus'. This formal objection only applies to the condensed statement of the division in the κυρίαι δόξαι (see on i. 45). In the Letter to Menoeceus Epic. wrote, Ἀναλογιστέον δὲ ὡς τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἳ μέν εἰσι φυσικαί, αἳ δὲ κεναί, καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν αἳ μὲν ἀναγκαῖαι, αἳ δὲ φυσικαὶ μόνον. This is an incidental proof of Usener's contention that Cic. relied on an epitome of Epicurean doctrine (Introd. § 27).

27. Tollenda est. C. chooses to make the ἐπιθυμίαι of Epicurus = the Stoic πάθη (passions) and condemns them in Stoic fashion. Epic., he says, should give different names to natural and non-natural appetites. Epic. was too good a psychologist to do any such thing.

scientia remota, nihil tam turpe sit, quod voluptatis causa non videatur esse facturus. Deinde, ubi erubuit (vis enim est permagna naturae), confugit illuc, ut neget accedere quidquam posse ad voluptatem nihil dolentis. At iste non dolendi status non vocatur voluptas. Non laboro, inquit, de nomine.—Quid, quod res alia tota est?—Reperiam multos vel innumerabiles potius non tam curiosos nec tam molestos, quam vos estis, quibus, quidquid velim, facile persvadeam. —Quid ergo dubitamus, quin, si non dolere voluptas sit summa, non esse in voluptate dolor sit maximus? cur id non ita fit?—Quia dolori non voluptas contraria est, sed doloris privatio.

X. **29.** Hoc vero non videre, maximo argumento esse, voluptatem illam, qua sublata neget se intellegere omnino, quid sit bonum (eam autem ita persequitur, quae palato percipiatur, quae auribus; cetera addit, quae si appelles, honos praefandus sit)—hoc igitur, quod solum bonum severus et gravis philosophus novit, idem non videt ne expetendum quidem esse, quod eam voluptatem hoc eodem auctore non desideremus, cum dolore careamus. Quam haec sunt contraria! **30.** Hic si definire, si dividere didicisset, si loquendi vim, si denique consvetudinem verborum teneret, numquam in tantas salebras incidisset. Nunc vides, quid faciat. Quam nemo umquam voluptatem appellavit, appellat; quae duo sunt, unum facit. Hanc in motu voluptatem (sic enim has svaves et quasi dulces voluptates appellat) interdum ita extenuat, ut M'. Curium putes loqui, interdum ita laudat, ut, quid praeterea sit bonum, neget se

28. **Quia dolori.** C. implies that Epic. has to deny that Pleasure and Pain are contraries. The true answer of course is 'Because the opposite of *dolor* is *voluptas stans*, not *voluptas movens*'. Absence of the latter (*non esse in voluptate*) is not a condition of pain. See i. 37, 38.

29. **Hoc vero non videre.** For omission of the subject of the infin., cf. the same phrase, iv. 72. The construction is broken off after the long parenthesis, a fresh sentence taking the place of *ne expetendam quidem esse, quod*, etc.

quae si appelles honos praefandus sit, 'which one cannot mention without a "saving your presence"'.

30. **M'. Curium.** Manius Curius Dentatus, thrice Consul, and the conqueror of Pyrrhus at Beneventum (274 B.C.). Cic. and Horace couple him with Fabricius as a type of primitive Roman virtue and frugality.

posse ne suspicari quidem. Quae iam oratio non a philosopho aliquo, sed a censore opprimenda est; non est enim vitium in oratione solum, sed etiam in moribus. Luxuriam non reprendit, modo sit vacua infinitā cupiditate et timore. Hoc loco discipulos quaerere videtur, ut, qui asoti esse velint, philosophi ante fiant. **31.** A primo, ut opinor, animantium ortu petitur origo summi boni. Simul atque natum animal est, gaudet voluptate et eam appetit ut bonum, aspernatur dolorem ut malum. De malis autem et bonis ab iis animalibus, quae nondum depravata sint, ait optime iudicari. Haec et tu ita posuisti et verba vestra sunt. Quam multa vitiosa! Summum enim bonum et malum vagiens puer utrā voluptate diiudicabit, stante an movente? quoniam, si dis placet, ab Epicuro loqui discimus. Si stante, hoc natura videlicet vult, salvam esse se, quod concedimus; si movente, quod tamen dicitis, nulla turpis voluptas erit, quae praetermittenda sit, et simul non proficiscitur animal illud modo natum a summa voluptate, quae est a te posita in non dolendo. **32.** Nec tamen argumentum hoc Epicurus a parvis petivit aut etiam a bestiis, quae putat esse specula naturae, ut diceret ab iis duce natura hanc voluptatem expeti nihil dolendi. Neque enim haec movere potest appetitum animi, nec ullum habet ictum, quo pellat animum, status hic non dolendi; itaque in hoc eodem peccat Hieronymus; at ille pellit, qui permulcet sensum voluptate. Itaque Epicurus semper hoc utitur, ut probet voluptatem naturā expeti, quod ea voluptas, quae in motu sit, et parvos ad se alliciat et bestias, non illa stabilis, in qua tantum

31. **stante an movente.** See i. 37. *movens* here is intrans. = ἡ ἐν κινήσει, which C. more commonly renders *quae in motu est*. Cf. *stare movere* (not *moveri*), infr. 36.

32. **at ille pellit,** i.e. *voluptas movens*. But the term *status* is only properly applicable to *voluptas stans*.

non illa stabilis. C. should have written *non quod illa*, the full statements being, *Epic. hoc utitur . . . quod ea voluptas . . . non hoc, quod illa . . . alliciat*. (Dr. Reid makes *hoc* refer to *ille status* preceding, and *quod* = because. But this gives less good sense. *Why* Epic. employs a proof from *voluptas movens* and not from *voluptas stans* has already been stated just above, *Neque enim . . . ullum habet ictum, quo pellat . . . status hic; . . . at ille pellit. . . . Itaque. . . .* C. now emphasises the fact that Epic. *does* employ it.)

inest nihil dolere. Qui igitur convenit ab alia voluptate dicere naturam proficisci, in alia summum bonum ponere?

XI. **33.** Bestiarum vero nullum iudicium puto. Quamvis enim depravatae non sint, pravae tamen esse possunt. Ut bacillum aliud est inflexum et incurvatum de industria, aliud ita natum, sic ferarum natura non est illa quidem depravata mala disciplina, sed natura sua. Nec vero, ut voluptatem expetat, natura movet infantem, sed tantum, ut se ipse diligat, ut integrum se salvumque velit. Omne enim animal, simul est ortum, et se ipsum et omnes partes suas diligit duasque, quae maximae sunt, in primis amplectitur, animum et corpus, deinde utriusque partes. Nam sunt et in animo praecipua quaedam et in corpore, quae cum leviter agnovit, tum discernere incipit, ut ea, quae prima data sint natura, appetat asperneturque contraria. **34.** In his primis naturalibus voluptas insit necne, magna quaestio est; nihil vero putare esse praeter voluptatem, non membra, non sensus, non ingenii motum, non integritatem corporis, non valetudinem, summae mihi videtur inscitiae. Atque ab isto capite fluere necesse est omnem rationem bonorum et malorum. Polemoni et iam ante Aristoteli ea prima visa sunt, quae paulo ante dixi. Ergo nata est sententia veterum Academicorum et Peripateticorum, ut finem bonorum dicerent secundum naturam vivere, id est, virtute adhibita, frui primis a natura datis. Callipho ad virtutem nihil

33. **nullum iudicium puto,** 'I consider it valueless' (whereas Epic. *ait optime iudicari*, etc., § 31).

sed natura sua. C. opposes *natura*, *disciplina*, and forgets that *ferarum naturae*, not *ferae* has gone before. Similarly, though he has just opposed *depravatae*, *pravae*, he now writes *depravatae natura*, which however is defensible as expressing degeneration from an ideal type.

prima data . . . natura, i.e. 'quae natura prima constituta sint, quae appeteremus'. For this Stoic conception of 'primary objects of appetition,' and the false attribution of it to 'the old Academics and Peripatetics' by Antiochus, see Bk. IV. 14 sq., Bk. V. 24 sq., Introd. § 26.

34. **voluptas insit necne.** Most Stoics denied it; see iii. 17. C. means *integra membra*, *integros sensus*; cf. list of *prima naturalia*, v. 18.

Atque ab isto capite. Cf. v. 17, 'quo invento (sc. the earliest source of attraction, which sets up action), omnis ab eo quasi capite de summo bono et malo disputatio ducitur'. On Carneades' famous division of possible ends, which is here adopted, see ib. and Introd. § 25.

adiunxit nisi voluptatem; Diodorus vacuitatem doloris **His omnibus, quos dixi, consequentes sunt fines bonorum, Aristippo simplex voluptas, Stoicis consentire naturae, quod esse volunt e virtute, id est, honeste vivere, quod ita interpretantur, vivere cum intellegentia rerum earum, quae natura evenirent, eligentem ea, quae essent secundum naturam, reicientemque contraria. **35.** Ita tres sunt fines expertes honestatis, unus Aristippi vel Epicuri, alter Hieronymi, Carneadi tertius, tres, in quibus honestas cum aliqua accessione, Polemonis, Calliphontis, Diodori; una simplex, cuius Zeno auctor, posita in decore tota, id est, in honestate; nam Pyrrho, Aristo, Erillus iam diu abiecti. Reliqui sibi constiterunt, ut extrema cum initiis convenirent, ut Aristippo voluptas, Hieronymo doloris vacuitas, Carneadi frui principiis naturalibus esset extremum; XII. Epicurus autem cum in prima commendatione voluptatem dixisset, si eam, quam Aristippus, idem tenere debuit ultimum bonorum, quod ille; sin eam, quam Hieronymus, fecisset idem, ut voluptatem illam [Aristippi] in prima commendatione poneret.

** **His omnibus**, an obvious lacuna. As the sentence stands, (1) *consequentes* is used absolutely = self-consistent, reasonable, 'quod barbarum est' (Mdv.); (2) *Aristippo*, *Stoicis* must be in app. to *his omnibus*, but then *quos dixi* is nonsense. The only remedy is to assume the loss of a statement (corresponding to *Polemoni et Arist. ea prima visa sunt*, etc.) of the *prima* of other philosophers; then just as above C. said that the Peripat. *finis* followed from the Peripat. *prima*, he now says, 'in the case of all the philosophers I have mentioned, their *fines* follow logically from the *prima* they adopt'. *Omnium* suggests that others (Carneades, Hieronymus?) had been mentioned, but the *fines* of two schools only are given, *exempli gratia*.

id est, honeste. *honeste* explains the somewhat unusual *e virtute* (κατ' ἀρετήν). So iii. 29, 'honeste, id est cum virtute.' On this Stoic definition of *honeste vivere* see iv. 14, on *evenirent*, *essent* after *interpretantur*, iii. 67.

35. una simplex, sc. *sententia* or *ratio* (infr. 38). *Finis* in the philosophical sense is always masc. C. writes as if he had begun 'There are three *views of* the Chief End'. *in decore* expresses the Greek τὸ καλόν, rendered by *decus* infra 44, 56.

Pyrrho, Aristo, Erillus. See § 43, iv. 40.

in prima commendatione = *in prima conciliatione naturae* (iii. 22 q.v.). *dixisset* = *nominasset* (i.e. *posuisset*, cf. *poneret* infra). Epic. 'laid down *Pleasure* as the earliest object of appetition' (that which first attracts instinctive desire).

fecisset idem. 'He ought similarly, if he stated Pleasure in H.'s sense of the term to be the initial attraction, to have made *that* Pleasure the initial attraction.' There is no explaining away this sheer tautology.

36. Nam quod ait, sensibus ipsis iudicari voluptatem bonum esse, dolorem malum, plus tribuit sensibus, quam nobis leges permittunt, *cum* privatarum litium iudices sumus. Nihil enim possumus iudicare, nisi quod est nostri iudicii. In quo frustra iudices solent, cum sententiam pronuntiant, addere: si quid mei iudicii est. Si enim non fuit eorum iudicii, nihilo magis, hoc non addito, illud est iudicatum. Quid iudicant sensus? Dulce, amarum, leve, asperum, prope, longe, stare, movere, quadratum, rotundum. **37.** Aequam igitur pronuntiabit sententiam ratio, adhibita primum divinarum humanarumque rerum scientia, quae potest appellari rite sapientia, deinde adiunctis virtutibus, quas ratio rerum omnium dominas, tu voluptatum satellites et ministras esse voluisti; quarum adeo omnium de sententia pronuntiabit primum de voluptate, nihil esse ei loci, non modo ut sola ponatur in summi boni sede, quam quaerimus, sed ne illo quidem modo, ut ad honestatem applicetur. De vacuitate doloris eadem sententia erit. **38.** Reicietur etiam Carneades, nec ulla de summo bono ratio aut voluptatis non dolendive particeps aut honestatis expers probabitur. Ita relinquet duas, de quibus etiam atque etiam consideret. Aut enim statuet, nihil esse bonum nisi honestum, nihil malum nisi turpe, cetera aut omnino nihil habere momenti aut tantum, ut nec expetenda nec fugienda, sed eligenda modo aut reicienda sint, aut anteponet eam,

C. obviously intended this dilemma. 'If Epic. adopted A.'s *initium*, he should have maintained A.'s *finis*; if H.'s *initium*, then . . .' but to conclude 'he should have maintained H.'s *finis*' would not do, for Epic. *did* maintain it. The 2nd 'horn,' C. saw, must be 'If Epic. held H.'s *finis*, he should have held his *initium*'. But, while he substituted a different apodosis to the 2nd clause, he carelessly retained the original protasis. For exx. of this jussive use of the subjunctive see Mdv. ad loc. [*Aristippi*] is a grammarian's futile attempt to remedy the sense.

36. Nam, quod ait. *nam* introduces a fresh criticism, directed against the argument from the senses in i. 30.

38. relinquet duas. Reason 'will retain (allow to remain) two theories (*rationes*) for repeated consideration,' viz. the Stoic and the 'Old Academic'. *aut tantum*, etc., refers to the Stoic doctrine of προηγμένα and ἀποπροηγμένα expounded in iii. 50 sqq. *initia naturae* answer to the Peripatetic 'bodily and external goods,' but the term is Stoic. C., following Antiochus, combines it with the genuinely Aristotelian phrase *perfectio vitae* (βίος τέλειος). See on v. 26.

quam cum honestate ornatissimam, tum etiam ipsis initiis naturae et totius perfectione vitae locupletatam videbit. Quod eo liquidius faciet, si perspexerit, rerum ⌈inter eas⌉ verborumne sit controversia.

XIII. **39.** Huius ego nunc auctoritatem sequens idem faciam. Quantum enim potero, minuam contentiones omnesque sententias simplices eorum, in quibus nulla est virtutis adiunctio, omnino a philosophia semovendas putabo, primum Aristippi Cyrenaicorumque omnium, quos non est veritum in ea voluptate, quae maxima dulcedine sensum moveret, summum bonum ponere, contemnentes istam vacuitatem doloris. **40.** Hi non viderunt, ut ad cursum equum, ad arandum bovem, ad indagandum canem, sic hominem ad duas res, ut ait Aristoteles, ad intellegendum et *ad* agendum esse natum, quasi mortalem deum, contraque ut tardam aliquam et langvidam pecudem ad pastum et ad procreandi voluptatem hoc divinum animal ortum esse voluerunt, quo nihil mihi videtur absurdius. **41.** Atque haec contra Aristippum, qui eam voluptatem non modo summam, sed solam etiam ducit, quam omnes unam appellamus voluptatem. Aliter autem vobis placet. Sed ille, ut dixi, vitiose. Nec enim figura corporis nec ratio excellens ingenii humani significat, ad unam hanc rem natum hominem, ut frueretur voluptatibus. Nec vero audiendus Hieronymus, cui summum bonum est idem, quod vos interdum vel potius nimium saepe dicitis, nihil dolere. Non enim, si malum est dolor, carere eo malo satis est ad bene vivendum. Hoc dixerit potius Ennius:

Nimium boni est, cui nihil est mali;

si perspexerit: a reference to the Antiochean argument that the differences between these theories were merely verbal, which C. reproduces at length in Bk. IV.

39. sententias . . . eorum, in quibus. Though the relative clause ought to define *eorum*, it harshly depends on *sententias*, as if C. had written *eas*, not *eorum*. Render 'of the philosophers' (Reid), although C. obviously had in mind '*those* philosophers'.

veritum, a rare and archaic impersonal passive, like *puditum*, *pigitum*, *miseretur*.

40. ut ait Aristoteles: a dictum not found in his extant works, but thoroughly in accord with his doctrine, and with his division of Virtue into 'theoretic' and 'ethical' (intellectual and moral).

41. Nimium. . . . Hecuba, 627, *κεῖνος ὀλβιώτατος Ὅτῳ κατ' ἦμαρ τυγχάνει μηδὲν κακόν.*

nos beatam vitam non depulsione mali, sed adeptione boni iudicemus, nec eam cessando, sive gaudentem, ut Aristippus, sive non dolentem, ut hic, sed agendo aliquid considerandove quaeramus. **42.** Quae possunt eadem contra Carneadeum illud summum bonum dici, quod is non tam, ut probaret, protulit, quam ut Stoicis, quibuscum bellum gerebat, opponeret; id autem eiusmodi est, ut additum ad virtutem auctoritatem videatur habiturum et expleturum cumulate vitam beatam, de quo omnis haec quaestio est. Nam qui ad virtutem adiungunt vel voluptatem, quam unam virtus minimi facit, vel vacuitatem doloris, quae, etiamsi malo caret, tamen non est summum bonum, accessione utuntur non ita probabili, nec tamen, cur id tam parce tamque restricte faciant, intellego. Quasi enim emendum eis sit, quod addant ad virtutem, primum vilissimas res addunt, deinde singulas potius, quam omnia, quae prima natura approbavisset, ea cum honestate coniungerent. **43.** Quae quod Aristoni et Pyrrhoni omnino visa sunt pro nihilo, ut inter optime valere et gravissime aegrotare nihil prorsus dicerent interesse, recte iam pridem contra eos desitum est disputari. Dum enim in una virtute sic omnia esse voluerunt, ut eam rerum selectione expoliarent nec ei quidquam, aut unde oriretur, darent, aut ubi niteretur, virtutem ipsam, quam amplexabantur, sustulerunt. Erillus autem, ad scientiam

42. non tam, ut probaret. Cf. Acad. ii. 131, 'Introducebat enim Carneades, non quo probaret, sed ut opponeret Stoicis, summum bonum esse frui iis rebus, quas primas natura conciliavisset'. The gist of our passage is the same: 'Carn. put forward a view which he did not himself hold, for the sake of argument'. Similarly, l.c. 139, C. says that Carn. defended the view of Calliphon so assiduously 'ut eam etiam *probare* videretur' (though Clitomachus declared he could never discover '*quid* Carneadi probaretur'). But *non ut probaret*, even apart from *tam*)(*quam*, cannot = *non quo probaret* ('not that he held it true'). Hence some take *probare* here in the sense 'to make good, win assent to,' which it has, de Orat. ii. 161, where Carn. is said 'nullam unquam in illis suis disputationibus rem defendisse, quam non probarit'. This is unsatisfactory; it amounts to saying 'Carn. was less anxious to carry conviction than to controvert the Stoics,' as if he could have damaged his opponents' case *without* making good his argument! It remains to accept Mdv.'s explanation, viz. that C. made *both* clauses final for the sake of symmetry, whereas the first should properly have been causal; thus for *non quo* he substitutes *non ut probaret* with the implied sense, 'non ut haberet ipse, quod probaret et in quo acquiesceret'.

omnia revocans, unum quoddam bonum vidit, sed nec optimum nec quo vita gubernari possit. Itaque hic ipse iam pridem est reiectus; post enim Chrysippum non sane est disputatum.

XIV. Restatis igitur vos; nam cum Academicis incerta luctatio est, qui nihil affirmant et, quasi desperata cognitione certi, id sequi volunt, quodcumque veri simile videatur. **44.** Cum Epicuro autem hoc plus est negotii, quod e duplici genere voluptatis coniunctus est, quodque et ipse et amici eius et multi postea defensores eius sententiae fuerunt, et nescio quomodo, is qui auctoritatem minimam habet, maximam vim, populus cum illis facit. Quos nisi redarguimus, omnis virtus, omne decus, omnis vera laus deserenda est. Ita ceterorum sententiis semotis, relinquitur non mihi cum Torquato, sed virtuti cum voluptate certatio. Quam quidem certationem homo et acutus et diligens, Chrysippus, non contemnit, totumque discrimen summi boni in earum comparatione positum putat. Ego autem existimo, si honestum esse aliquid ostendero, quod sit ipsum sua vi propter seque expetendum, iacere vestra omnia. Itaque eo, quale sit, breviter, ut tempus postulat, constituto, accedam ad omnia tua, Torquate, nisi memoria forte defecerit. **45.** Honestum igitur id intellegimus, quod tale est, ut, detracta omni utilitate, sine ullis praemiis fructibusve per se ipsum possit iure laudari. Quod quale sit, non tam definitione, qua sum usus, intellegi potest (quamquam aliquantum potest) quam communi omnium iudicio et optimi cuiusque studiis atque factis, qui permulta ob eam unam causam faciunt, quia decet, quia rectum, quia honestum est, etsi nullum consecuturum emolumentum vident. Homines enim, etsi aliis multis, tamen hoc uno plurimum a bestiis differunt, quod rationem

44. e duplici genere coniunctus. *conjungi ex*=*componi ex* only here and Phil. xii. 8; in Cic. *junctus ex* several times, e.g. Ac. i. 40. *Epicurus*=the Epicurean theory, by a license more common in English than in Latin. So we say 'Rabelais is a mine of philosophy'.

Chrysippus non contemnit. His treatise περὶ τελῶν seems to have combined exposition of Stoic doctrine with a running criticism of Epicurus. Cf. Acad. ii. 138. 140.

45. Honestum. The same definition and explanation (perhaps quoted from Chrysippus) are given de Off. i. 11 sqq.

habent a natura datam mentemque acrem et vigentem celerrimeque multa simul agitantem et, ut ita dicam, sagacem, quae et causas rerum et consecutiones videat et similitudines transferat et disiuncta coniungat et cum praesentibus futura copulet omnemque complectatur vitae consequentis statum. Eademque ratio fecit hominem hominum appetentem cumque iis natura et sermone et usu congruentem, ut profectus a caritate domesticorum ac suorum serpat longius et se implicet primum civium, deinde omnium mortalium societate atque, ut ad Archytam scripsit Plato, non sibi se soli natum meminerit, sed patriae, sed suis, ut perexigua pars ipsi relinquatur. **46.** Et quoniam eadem natura cupiditatem ingenuit homini veri videndi, quod facillime apparet, cum vacui curis etiam, quid in caelo fiat, scire avemus, his initiis inducti omnia vera diligimus, id est, fidelia, simplicia, constantia, tum vana, falsa, fallentia odimus, ut fraudem, periurium, malitiam, iniuriam. Eadem ratio habet in se quiddam amplum atque magnificum, ad imperandum magis quam ad parendum accommodatum, omnia humana non tolerabilia solum, sed etiam levia ducens, altum quiddam et excelsum, nihil timens, nemini cedens, semper invictum. **47.** Atque his tribus generibus honestorum notatis, quartum sequitur et in eadem pulchritudine et aptum ex illis tribus, in quo inest ordo et moderatio. Cuius similitudine perspecta in formarum specie ac dignitate, transitum est ad honestatem dictorum atque factorum. Nam ex his tribus laudibus, quas ante dixi, et

scripsit Plato. Epistle ix. of the collection bearing his name: *Ἕκαστος ἡμῶν οὐχ αὑτῷ μόνον γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ τῆς γενεσέως ἡμῶν τὸ μέν τι ἡ πατρὶς μερίζεται, τὸ δέ τι οἱ γεννήσαντες, τὸ δὲ οἱ λοιποὶ φίλοι.*

46. veri videndi. The Stoics for the most part taught that Justice arose from a social compact; this attempt to derive it from an instinctive desire of *knowing* Truth, which gradually develops into love of truth in word and deed between man and man, was apparently peculiar to Chrysippus.

47. cuius similitudine: *formae* here = natural species. 'From the recognition of something analogous to this principle in the beautiful works of nature, we advance to beauty in the moral sphere.' Self-control is, as it were, the reflection in the soul of Natural Law. Cf. Wordsworth's Ode to Duty, 'Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong, And the most ancient heavens through Thee are fresh and strong'.

ex his tribus, i.e. each of these three virtues contributes something to the fourth; thus Temperance

temeritatem reformidat et non audet cuiquam aut dicto protervo aut facto nocere, vereturque quidquam aut facere aut eloqui, quod parum virile videatur.

XV. **48.** Habes undique expletam et perfectam, Torquate, formam honestatis, quae tota quattuor his virtutibus, quae a te quoque commemoratae sunt, continetur. Hanc se tuus Epicurus omnino ignorare dicit quam aut qualem esse velint ii, qui honestate summum bonum metiantur. Si enim ad honestatem omnia referantur neque in ea voluptatem dicant inesse, ait eos voce inani sonare (his enim ipsis verbis utitur) neque intellegere nec videre, sub hanc vocem honestatis quae sit subicienda sententia. Ut enim consvetudo loquitur, id solum dicitur honestum, quod est populari fama gloriosum. Quod, inquit, quamquam voluptatibus quibusdam est saepe iucundius, tamen expetitur propter voluptatem. **49.** Videsne, quam sit magna dissensio? Philosophus nobilis, a quo non solum Graecia et Italia, sed etiam omnis barbaria commota est, honestum quid sit, si id non sit in voluptate, negat se intellegere, nisi forte illud, quod multitudinis rumore laudetur. Ego autem hoc etiam turpe esse saepe iudico et, si quando turpe non sit, tum esse non turpe, cum id a multitudine laudetur, quod sit ipsum per se rectum atque laudabile; tamen non ob eam causam illud dici esse honestum, quia laudetur a multis, sed quia tale sit, ut, vel si ignorarent id homines vel si obmutuissent, sua tamen pulchritudine esset specieque laudabile. Itaque idem natura victus, cui obsisti non potest, dicit alio loco id, quod a te etiam paulo ante dictum est, non posse iucunde vivi, nisi etiam honeste. **50.** Quid nunc honeste dicit? idemne, quod iucunde? Ergo ita, non

partakes of all the rest, combining as it does dread of rashness (Prudence), of injuring others (Justice), of doing or saying aught unmanly (Courage).

48. **referantur . . . dicant.** Nothing can be harsher than this change from passive to active, with the verbs thus juxtaposed. Bentley with some reason proposed *referant*.

ipsis verbis, in his περὶ τέλους. Translated by 'voces inanes fundere' (Tusc. iii. 42).

Ut consvetudo loquitur, 'in common parlance.' C. is still reporting Epic. For the change to oratio recta, cf. i. 30, *necesse est*.

50. Ergo ita, C. means, and should have written 'non posse *jucunde* vivi nisi *jucunde*'. *An, nisi*, etc., is

posse honeste vivi, nisi honeste vivatur? An, nisi populari fama? Sine ea igitur iucunde negat posse *se* vivere? Quid turpius quam sapientis vitam ex insipientium sermone pendere? Quid ergo hoc loco intellegit honestum? Certe nihil, nisi quod possit ipsum propter se iure laudari. Nam si propter voluptatem, quae est ista laus, quae possit e macello peti? Non is vir est, ut, cum honestatem eo loco habeat, ut sine ea iucunde neget posse vivi, illud honestum, quod populare sit, sentiat et sine eo neget iucunde vivi posse, aut quidquam aliud honestum intellegat, nisi quod sit rectum ipsumque per se, sua vi, sua sponte, sua natura laudabile.

XVI. **51**. Itaque, Torquate, cum diceres, clamare Epicurum, non posse iucunde vivi, nisi honeste et sapienter et iuste viveretur, tu ipse mihi gloriari videbare. Tanta vis inerat in verbis propter earum rerum, quae significabantur his verbis, dignitatem, ut altior fieres, ut interdum insisteres, ut nos intuens quasi testificarere, laudari honestatem et iustitiam aliquando ab Epicuro. Quam te decebat iis verbis uti, quibus si philosophi non uterentur, philosophia omnino non egeremus. Istorum enim verborum amore, quae perraro appellantur ab Epicuro, sapientiae, fortitudinis, iustitiae, temperantiae, praestantissimis ingeniis homines se ad philosophiae studium contulerunt. **52**. Oculorum, inquit Plato, est in nobis sensus acerrimus, quibus sapientiam non cernimus; quam illa ardentes amores excitaret sui! Cur tandem? an quod ita callida est, ut optime possit architectari voluptates? Cur iustitia laudatur? aut unde est hoc contritum vetustate proverbium: quicum in tenebris? Hoc, dictum in una re, latissime patet, ut in

another slip. We want either *An, populari fama*? or, above, *Quid* 'nisi honeste' *dicit*? *Idem ne quod* 'nisi jucunde'? *Populari fama vivere* is 'to make public opinion one's standard of conduct'.

52. inquit Plato. Phaedrus 250 D, Ὄψις γὰρ ἡμῖν ὀξυτάτη τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔρχεται αἰσθήσεων, ᾗ φρόνησις οὐχ ὁρᾶται· δεινοὺς γὰρ ἂν παρεῖχεν ἔρωτας, εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἑαυτῆς ἐναργὲς εἴδωλον παρείχετο εἰς ὄψιν ἰόν.

quicum in tenebris, sc. *mices digitos*. Cf. de Offic. iii. 77. This 'well-worn proverb' came from the game, still played in Italy under the name of *morra*, which consisted of guessing how many fingers were quickly darted out and withdrawn by the other player. 'A man

omnibus factis re, non teste moveamur. **53.** Sunt enim levia et perinfirma, quae dicebantur a te, animi conscientia improbos excruciari, tum etiam poenae timore, qua aut afficiantur aut semper sint in metu ne afficiantur aliquando. Non oportet timidum aut imbecillo animo fingi non bonum illum virum, qui, quidquid fecerit, ipse se cruciet omniaque formidet, sed omnia callide referentem ad utilitatem, acutum, versutum, veteratorem, facile ut excogitet, quomodo occulte, sine teste, sine ullo conscio fallat. **54.** An tu me de L. Tubulo putas dicere? qui, cum praetor quaestionem inter sicarios exercuisset, ita aperte cepit pecunias ob rem iudicandam, ut anno proximo P. Scaevola tribunus plebis ferret ad plebem, vellentne de ea re quaeri. Quo plebiscito decreta a senatu est consuli quaestio Cn. Caepioni; profectus in exilium Tubulus statim nec respondere ausus; erat enim res aperta.

XVII. Non igitur de improbo, sed *de* callido improbo quaerimus, qualis Q. Pompeius in foedere Numantino infitiando fuit, nec vero omnia timente, sed primum qui animi conscientiam non curet, quam scilicet comprimere nihil est negotii. Is enim, qui occultus et tectus dicitur, tantum abest ut se indicet, perficiet etiam, ut dolere alterius improbe facto videatur; quid est enim aliud esse versutum? **55.** Memini me adesse P. Sextilio Rufo, cum is rem ad amicos ita deferret, se esse heredem Q. Fadio Gallo,

you might play morra with in the dark.'

53. non bonum, i.e. *improbum.* We must not take for our typical villain one who is a coward or a fool, who cannot commit a crime without agonies of fear, but one of the astute, hardened sort, who only sins when it is worth his while, and has the wit to mask his guilt.

54. L. Tubulo: praetor 142 B.C. A regular court for murder cases (quaestio inter sicarios) with its own praetor, is not elsewhere recorded to have existed so early. It does not appear why Tubulus was not tried under the already established lex de repetundis. Cases not falling under the jurisdiction of the regular courts were dealt with as follows: the tribune brought the matter before the assembly of the plebs, which could order a special enquiry, and empower the Senate to appoint some one to hold it. *exercuisset* is a mere slip for *exerceret.*

Q. Pompeius. After his consulship (141 B.C.) he fought in Spain and was forced by the Numantines to conclude terms of peace, which he repudiated on the arrival of his successor.

55. Q. Fadio. One way of evading the lex Voconia, which forbade a will to be made in favour of a woman, was to name as legatee some friend

cuius in testamento scriptum esset, se ab eo rogatum, ut omnis hereditas ad filiam perveniret. Id Sextilius factum negabat; poterat autem impune; quis enim redargueret? Nemo nostrum credebat, eratque veri similius, hunc mentiri, cuius interesset, quam illum, qui id se rogasse scripsisset, quod debuisset rogare. Addebat etiam, se in legem Voconiam iuratum contra eam facere non audere, nisi aliter amicis videretur. Aderamus nos quidem adulescentes, sed multi amplissimi viri, quorum nemo censuit plus Fadiae dandum, quam posset ad eam lege Voconia pervenire. Tenuit permagnam Sextilius hereditatem, unde, si secutus esset eorum sententiam, qui honesta et recta emolumentis omnibus et commodis anteponerent, nummum nullum attigisset. Num igitur eum postea censes anxio animo aut sollicito fuisse? Nihil minus, contraque illa hereditate dives ob eamque rem laetus. Magni enim aestimabat pecuniam non modo non contra leges, sed etiam legibus partam; quae quidem vel cum periculo est quaerenda vobis; est enim effectrix multarum et magnarum voluptatum. **56.** Ut igitur illis, qui, recta et honesta quae sunt, ea statuunt per se, expetenda, adeunda sunt saepe pericula decoris honestatisque causa, sic vestris, qui omnia voluptate metiuntur, pericula adeunda sunt, ut adipiscantur magnas voluptates. Si magna res, magna hereditas agetur, cum pecunia voluptates pariantur plurimae, idem erit Epicuro vestro faciendum, si suum finem bonorum sequi volet, quod Scipioni, magna gloria proposita, si Hannibalem in Africam retraxisset. Itaque quantum adiit periculum! Ad honestatem enim illum omnem conatum suum referebat, non ad

who agreed to hand on the bequest to the intended heiress. Sextilius, to save his face, denied that there was such an agreement between himself and Fadius, but even if he admitted it, it was not binding in law. His alleged oath to maintain the lex Voconia presumably refers to his having taken the customary oath to maintain the laws on entering office of some kind.

plus Fadiae dandum. The precise tenor of the lex Voconia is much disputed, but it seems to have permitted bequests to a woman, provided they did not exceed the amount bequeathed to the 'heir'. Fadia may have had such a minor bequest. But the advice 'Don't give her a penny more than she gets by law,' *may* mean 'Don't give her anything'.

voluptatem. Sic vester sapiens, magno aliquo emolumento commotus, † cum causa, si opus erit, dimicabit. **57.** Occultum facinus esse potuerit; gaudebit; deprehensus omnem poenam contemnet. Erit enim instructus ad mortem contemnendam, ad exilium, ad ipsum etiam dolorem. Quem quidem vos, cum improbis poenam proponitis, impetibilem facitis, cum sapientem semper boni plus habere vultis, tolerabilem.

XVIII. Sed finge non solum callidum eum, qui aliquid improbe faciat, verum etiam praepotentem, ut M. Crassus fuit, qui tamen solebat uti suo bono, ut hodie est noster Pompeius, cui recte facienti gratia est habenda; esse enim quam vellet iniquus poterat impune. Quam multa vero iniuste fieri possunt, quae nemo possit reprehendere! **58.** Si te amicus tuus moriens rogaverit, ut hereditatem reddas suae filiae, nec usquam id scripserit, ut scripsit Fadius, nec cuiquam dixerit, quid facies? Tu quidem reddes; ipse Epicurus fortasse redderet; ut Sex. Peducaeus, Sex. F., is, qui hunc nostrum reliquit effigiem et humanitatis et probitatis suae filium, cum doctus, tum omnium vir optimus et iustissimus, cum sciret nemo eum rogatum a C. Plotio, equite Romano splendido, Nursino, ultro ad mulierem venit eique nihil opinanti viri mandatum exposuit hereditatemque reddidit. Sed ego ex te quaero, quoniam idem tu certe fecisses, nonne intellegas, eo maiorem vim esse naturae quod ipsi vos, qui omnia ad vestrum commodum et, ut ipsi dicitis, ad voluptatem referatis, tamen ea faciatis, e quibus appareat, non voluptatem vos, sed officium sequi, plusque rectam naturam quam rationem pravam valere? **59.** Si scieris, inquit Carneades, aspidem occulte latere

56. **† cum causa.** *causa* cannot be right. 'The *sapiens*, for a sufficient consideration, will fight, if he is put to it, with'—some exceptional antagonist. *cum Medusa* (Haupt) seems far-fetched; *cum amico, amica* (Mdv.), feeble. Perhaps *cum caterva*? The *sapiens* will face great odds, as Scipio did.

57. **suo bono.** Crassus' wealth is the point of the pun. As we might say, 'Though all-powerful, he was content to gain his ends by . . . private means'.

58. **Sex. Peducaeus.** C. was quaestor under him in Sicily. His son was an intimate of both C. and Atticus.

uspiam et velle aliquem imprudentem super eam assidere, cuius mors tibi emolumentum futura sit, improbe feceris, nisi monueris, ne assidat. Sed impunite tamen; scisse enim te quis coarguere possit? Sed nimis multa. Perspicuum est enim, nisi aequitas, fides, iustitia proficiscantur a natura, et si omnia haec ad utilitatem referantur, virum bonum non posse reperiri, deque his rebus satis multa in nostris de re publica libris sunt dicta a Laelio.

XIX. **60.** Transfer idem ad modestiam vel temperantiam, quae est moderatio cupiditatum rationi obediens. Satisne ergo pudori consulat, si quis sine teste libidini pareat? an est aliquid per se ipsum flagitiosum, etiamsi nulla comitetur infamia? Quid? fortes viri voluptatumne calculis subductis proelium ineunt, sangvinem pro patria profundunt, an quodam animi ardore atque impetu concitati? Utrum tandem censes, Torquate, Imperiosum illum, si nostra verba audiret, tuamne de se orationem libentius auditurum fuisse an meam, cum ego dicerem, nihil eum fecisse sua causa omniaque rei publicae, tu contra, nihil nisi sua? Si vero id etiam explanare velles apertiusque diceres, nihil eum fecisse nisi voluptatis causa, quomodo eum tandem laturum fuisse existimas? **61.** Esto: fecerit, si ita vis, Torquatus propter suas utilitates (malo enim dicere quam voluptates, in tanto praesertim viro); num etiam eius collega P. Decius, princeps in ea familia consulatus, cum se devoverat et equo admisso in mediam aciem Latinorum irruebat, aliquid de voluptatibus suis cogitabat? Ubi ut eum caperet aut quando, cum sciret confestim esse moriendum, eamque mortem ardentiore studio peteret, quam Epicurus voluptatem petendam putat? Quod quidem eius factum nisi

59. de re publica, Bk. III., in which Laelius refutes Carneades' thesis (expounded by Philo) that Justice is based on expediency.

60. Imperiosum illum. T. Manlius Torquatus (i. 23) is meant. It was his father, L. Manlius, who gained the *cognomen* by his military severity (Livy, vii. 2, 4), but both C. and Livy (iv. 29) wrongly suppose the son to have done the same, whereas he merely inherited it.

61. malo . . . dicere. We might expect *ita dicere*, but cf. ad Fam. iii. 10, 1, 'pro tua dignitate; malo enim dicere quam pro salute'.

P. Decius. See on i. 23. His son and namesake followed his example at Sentinum, in the Samnite war, B.C. 295.

esset iure laudatum, non esset imitatus quarto consulatu suo filius, neque porro ex eo natus cum Pyrrho bellum gerens consul cecidisset in proelio seque e continenti genere tertiam victimam rei publicae praebuisset. **62.** Contineo me ab exemplis. Graecis hoc modicum est, Leonidas, Epaminondas, tres aliqui aut quattuor; ego si nostros colligere coepero, perficiam illud quidem, ut se virtuti tradat constringendam voluptas; sed dies me deficiet, et, ut A. Varius, qui est habitus iudex durior, dicere consessori solebat, cum, datis testibus, alii tamen citarentur: 'Aut hoc testium satis est aut nescio, quid satis sit,' sic a me satis datum est testium. Quid enim? te ipsum, dignissimum maioribus tuis, voluptasne induxit, ut adulescentulus eriperes P. Sullae consulatum? Quem cum ad patrem tuum rettulisses, fortissimum virum, qualis ille vel consul vel civis cum semper, tum post consulatum fuit! Quo quidem auctore nos ipsi ea gessimus, ut omnibus potius quam ipsis nobis consuluerimus. **63.** At quam pulchre dicere videbare, cum ex altera parte ponebas cumulatum aliquem plurimis et maximis voluptatibus, nullo nec praesenti nec futuro dolore, ex altera autem, cruciatibus maximis toto corpore, nulla nec adiuncta nec sperata voluptate, et quaerebas, quis aut hoc miserior aut superiore illo beatior; deinde concludebas, summum malum esse dolorem, summum bonum voluptatem!

XX. L. Thorius Balbus fuit, Lanuvinus, quem meminisse tu non potes; is ita vivebat, ut nulla tam exquisita posset inveniri voluptas, qua non abundaret. Erat et cupidus voluptatum et eius generis intellegens et copiosus; ita non superstitiosus, ut illa plurima in sua patria sacrificia et fana contemneret; ita non timidus ad mortem, ut in acie sit ob rem publicam interfectus. **64.** Cupiditates non Epicuri divisione finiebat, sed sua satietate. Habebat tamen

62. **tres aliqui**, indefinite, τρεῖς τινες. Varius is otherwise unknown.

ut adulescentulus eriperes, see Introd. § 6.

63. **eius generis intellegens et copiosus**, 'a man of taste and inventiveness in that line'; this Thorius is otherwise unknown.

rationem valetudinis; utebatur iis exercitationibus, ut ad cenam et sitiens et esuriens veniret, eo cibo, qui et svavissimus esset et idem facillimus ad concoquendum, vino et ad voluptatem et ne noceret. Cetera illa adhibebat, quibus demptis negat se Epicurus intellegere, quid sit bonum. Aberat omnis dolor; qui si adesset, nec molliter ferret et tamen medicis plus quam philosophis uteretur. Color egregius, integra valetudo, summa gratia, vita denique conferta voluptatum omnium varietate. **65.** Hunc vos beatum; ratio quidem vestra sic cogit; at ego quem huic anteponam, non audeo dicere; dicet pro me ipsa virtus, nec dubitabit isti vestro beato M. Regulum anteponere, quem quidem, cum sua voluntate, nulla vi coactus praeter fidem, quam dederat hosti, ex patria Carthaginem revertisset, tum ipsum, cum vigiliis et fame cruciaretur, clamat virtus beatiorem fuisse quam potantem in rosa Thorium. Bella magna gesserat, bis consul fuerat, triumpharat, nec tamen sua illa superiora tam magna neque tam praeclara ducebat quam illum ultimum casum, quem propter fidem constantiamque susceperat; qui nobis miserabilis videtur audientibus, illi perpetienti erat voluptarius. Non enim hilaritate nec lascivia nec risu aut ioco, comite levitatis, saepe etiam tristes firmitate et constantia sunt beati. **66.** Stuprata per vim Lucretia a regis filio, testata cives se ipsa interemit. Hic dolor populi Romani, duce et auctore Bruto, causa civitati libertatis fuit, ob eiusque mulieris memoriam primo anno et vir et pater eius consul est factus. Tenuis L. Verginius unusque de multis sexagesimo anno post libertatem receptam virginem filiam sua manu occidit potius, quam ea Ap. Claudii libidini, qui tum erat cum summo imperio, dederetur.

XXI. **67.** Aut haec tibi, Torquate, sunt vituperanda aut patrocinium voluptatis repudiandum. Quod autem patrocinium aut quae ista causa est voluptatis, quae nec testes ullos e claris viris nec laudatores poterit adhibere?

66. Hic dolor, i.e. dolor huius rei. Only noteworthy from the addition of a subjective gen. (*populi Romani*).

67. laudatores. The technical

Ut enim nos ex annalium monumentis testes excitamus eos, quorum omnis vita consumpta est in laboribus gloriosis, qui voluptatis nomen audire non possent, sic in vestris disputationibus historia muta est. Numquam audivi in Epicuri schola Lycurgum, Solonem, Miltiadem, Themistoclem, Epaminondam nominari, qui in ore sunt ceterorum philosophorum omnium. Nunc vero, quoniam haec nos etiam tractare coepimus, suppeditabit nobis Atticus noster e thesauris suis quos et quantos viros! **68.** Nonne melius est de his aliquid quam tantis voluminibus de Themista loqui? Sint ista Graecorum; quamquam ab iis philosophiam et omnes ingenuas disciplinas habemus; sed tamen est aliquid, quod nobis non liceat, liceat illis. Pugnant Stoici cum Peripateticis. Alteri negant quidquam esse bonum, nisi quod honestum sit, alteri, plurimum se et longe longeque plurimum tribuere honestati, sed tamen et in corpore et extra esse quaedam bona. Et certamen honestum et disputatio splendida! Omnis est enim de virtutis dignitate contentio. At cum tuis cum disseras, multa sunt audienda etiam de obscenis voluptatibus, de quibus ab Epicuro saepissime dicitur. **69.** Non potes ergo ista tueri, Torquate, mihi crede, si te ipse et tuas cogitationes et studia perspexeris; pudebit te, inquam, illius tabulae, quam Cleanthes sane commode

term for 'witnesses to character,' as 'excitare' for 'calling' a witness.

audire non possent, 'would not have borne to hear'. *Non posse videre* is similarly used. For the tense cf. v. 18.

thesauris. C.'s letters attest his frequent indebtedness to these historical and biographical miscellanies. This Book abounds in Roman *exempla* possibly drawn from them.

68. **Themista,** wife of Leonteus of Lampsacus, and like him, a disciple and correspondent of Epic. Her learning was celebrated, and she is spoken of as the only woman philosopher. *tantis voluminibus* is rhetorical exaggeration. Epic. wrote several ethical discourses in the form of laudations of various friends whose virtues illustrated his principles, including a πρὸς Θεμίσταν. The practice was continued by later Epicureans.

69. **illius tabulae.** Cf. Aug. de civit. dei v. 20, 'solent philosophi, qui finem boni humani in ipsa virtute constituunt, ad ingerendum pudorem quibusdam philosophis, qui virtutes quidem probant, sed eas voluptatis corporalis fine metiuntur et illam per se ipsam putant expetendam, istas propter ipsam, tabulam quandam verbis pingere, ubi voluptas in sella regali quasi delicata quaedam regina considat, eique virtutes famulae subiciantur,

verbis depingere solebat. Iubebat eos, qui audiebant, secum ipsos cogitare pictam in tabula voluptatem pulcherrimo vestitu et ornatu regali in solio sedentem; praesto esse virtutes ut ancillulas, quae nihil aliud agerent, nullum suum officium ducerent, nisi ut voluptati ministrarent, et eam tantum ad aurem admonerent (si modo id pictura intellegi posset), ut caveret, ne quid faceret imprudens, quod offenderet animos hominum, aut quidquam, e quo oriretur aliquis dolor. 'Nos quidem virtutes sic natae sumus, ut tibi serviremus; aliud negotii nihil habemus.'

XXII. **70.** At negat Epicurus (hoc enim vestrum lumen est), quemquam, qui honeste non vivat, iucunde posse vivere. Quasi ego id curem, quid ille aiat aut neget; illud quaero, quid ei, qui in voluptate summum bonum ponat, consentaneum sit dicere. Quid affers, cur Thorius, cur † Chius Postumius, cur omnium horum magister, Orata, non iucundissime vixerit? Ipse negat, ut ante dixi, luxuriosorum vitam reprendendam, nisi plane fatui sint, id est, nisi aut cupiant aut metuant. Quarum ambarum rerum cum medicinam pollicetur, luxuriae licentiam pollicetur. His enim rebus detractis negat se reperire in asotorum vita, quod reprendat. **71.** Non igitur potestis voluptate omnia dirigentes aut tueri aut retinere virtutem. Nam nec vir bonus ac iustus haberi debet, qui, ne malum habeat, abstinet se ab iniuria; nosti, credo, illud:

Nemo pius est, qui pietatem—

observantes eius nutum ut faciant quod illa imperavit, (each of the Four Virtues is assigned a special task) . . . nihil hac pictura dicunt esse ignominiosius et deformius . . . et verum dicunt'.

70. † Chius Postumius. Mdv. conjectures *C. Hirrius*, *Postumius*. Pliny mentions a C. Hirrius who was the first to fatten lampreys in tanks for his table. If Postumius is the name of a third epicure, *omnium horum* makes better sense, 'all three'. C. Sergius, a noted bon vivant, was nicknamed *Orata* (Aurata) from his fondness for a kind of fish so called.

plane fatui . . . id est. 'Utter idiots, for that is what having neither desires nor fears amounts to.' For *id est*=*id est enim* see on i. 33. C. misquotes Epic. (see § 21) to suit his purpose.

71. nec vir bonus: *nec* is left unbalanced like *et* in i. 33.

qui pietatem, sc. *metu colit* or something equivalent.

cave putes quidquam esse verius. Nec enim, dum metuit, iustus est et certe, si metuere destiterit, non erit; non metuet autem, sive celare poterit sive opibus magnis, quidquid fecerit, obtinere, certeque malet existimari vir bonus, ut non sit, quam esse, ut non putetur. Ita, quod certissimum est, pro vera certaque iustitia simulationem nobis iustitiae traditis praecipitisque quodam modo, ut nostram stabilem conscientiam contemnamus, aliorum errantem opinionem aucupemur. **72.** Quae dici eadem de ceteris virtutibus possunt, quarum omnia fundamenta vos in voluptate tamquam in aqua ponitis. Quid enim? fortemne possumus dicere eundem illum Torquatum?—(delector enim, quamquam te non possum, ut ais, corrumpere, delector, inquam, et familia vestra et nomine; et hercule mihi vir optimus nostrique amantissimus, A. Torquatus, versatur ante oculos, cuius quantum studium et quam insigne fuerit erga me temporibus illis, quae nota sunt omnibus, scire necesse est utrumque vestrum; quae mihi ipsi, qui volo et esse et haberi gratus, grata non essent, nisi eum perspicerem mea causa mihi amicum fuisse, non sua; nisi hoc dicis, sua, quod interest omnium recte facere. Si id dicis, vicimus; id enim volumus, id contendimus, ut officii fructus sit ipsum officium. **73.** Hoc ille tuus non vult omnibusque ex rebus voluptatem quasi mercedem exigit; sed ad illum redeo;) si voluptatis causa cum Gallo apud Anienem depugnavit provocatus et ex eius spoliis sibi et torquem et cognomen induit ullam aliam ob causam, nisi quod ei talia facta digna viro videbantur, fortem non puto. Iam si pudor, si modestia, si pudicitia, si uno verbo temperantia poenae aut infamiae metu coërcebuntur, non sanctitate sua se tuebuntur, quod adulterium, quod stuprum, quae libido non se proripiet ac proiciet aut

72. **A. Torquatus.** His relationship to the Torquatus of this dialogue, and in what way he supported C. (against Clodius) are unknown. He was a Pompeian, and when this passage was written was living in exile at Athens. C.'s letters to him there are full of affection.

73. **coërcebuntur.** The plural is exceptional after subjects not only separated by *si* but expressly summed up *uno verbo*.

occultatione proposita aut impunitate aut licentia? **74.** Quid? illud, Torquate, quale tandem videtur, te isto nomine, ingenio, gloria, quae facis, quae cogitas, quae contendis, quo referas, cuius rei causa perficere, quae conaris, velis, quid optimum denique in vita iudices, non audere in conventu dicere? Quid enim mereri velis, iam cum magistratum inieris et in contionem ascenderis (est enim tibi edicendum, quae sis observaturus in iure dicendo, et fortasse etiam, si tibi erit visum, aliquid de maioribus tuis et de te ipso dices more maiorum),—quid merearis igitur, ut dicas, te in eo magistratu omnia voluptatis causa facturum esse teque nihil fecisse in vita nisi voluptatis causa?—An me, inquis, tam amentem putas, ut apud imperitos isto modo loquar?—At tu eadem ista dic in iudicio aut, si coronam times, dic in senatu. Numquam facies. Cur, nisi quod turpis oratio est? Mene ergo et Triarium dignos existimas, apud quos turpiter loquare?

XXIII. **75.** Verum esto: verbum ipsum voluptatis non habet dignitatem, nec nos fortasse intellegimus; hoc enim identidem dicitis, non intellegere nos, quam dicatis voluptatem. Rem videlicet difficilem et obscuram! Individua cum dicitis et intermundia, quae nec sunt ulla nec possunt esse, intellegimus; voluptas, quae passeribus nota est omnibus, a nobis intellegi non potest? Quid, si efficio, ut fateare, me non modo, quid sit voluptas, scire (est enim iucundus motus in sensu), sed etiam, quid eam tu velis esse? Tum enim eam ipsam vis, quam modo ego dixi, et nomen imponis, in motu ut sit et faciat aliquam varietatem, tum aliam quandam summam voluptatem, cui addi nihil possit; eam tum adesse, cum dolor omnis absit; eam stabilem appellas. **76.** Sit sane ista voluptas. Dic in quovis conventu, te omnia facere, ne doleas. Si ne hoc quidem satis ample, satis honeste dici putas, dic te omnia et in isto magistratu et in omni vita utilitatis tuae causa

75. intermundia. *τὰ μετακόσμια.* 'The lucid interspace 'twixt world and world.' C. here, and N. D. i. 13, uses the word as already current; it was probably coined by some Roman Epicurean writer. (Not used by Lucretius.)

facturum, nihil nisi quod expediat, nihil denique nisi tua causa; quem clamorem contionis aut quam spem consulatus eius, qui tibi paratissimus est, futuram putas? Eamne rationem igitur sequere, qua tecum ipse et cum tuis utare, profiteri et in medium proferre non audeas? At vero illa, quae Peripatetici, quae Stoici dicunt, semper tibi in ore sunt, in iudiciis, in senatu. Officium, aequitatem, dignitatem, fidem, recta, honesta, digna imperio, digna populo Romano, omnia pericula pro re publica, mori pro patria, haec cum loqueris, nos barones stupemus, tu videlicet tecum ipse rides. **77.** Nam inter ista tam magnifica verba tamque praeclara non habet ullum voluptas locum, non modo illa, quam in motu esse dicitis, quam omnes urbani, rustici, omnes, inquam, qui Latine loquuntur, voluptatem vocant, sed ne haec quidem stabilis, quam praeter vos nemo appellat voluptatem.

XXIV. Vide igitur, ne non debeas verbis nostris uti, sententiis tuis. Quod si vultum tibi, si incessum fingeres, quo gravior viderere, non esses tui similis; verba tu fingas et ea dicas, quae non sentias? aut etiam, ut vestitum, sic sententiam habeas aliam domesticam, aliam forensem, ut in fronte ostentatio sit, intus veritas occultetur? Vide, quaeso, rectumne sit. Mihi quidem eae verae videntur opiniones, quae honestae, quae laudabiles, quae gloriosae, quae in senatu, quae apud populum, quae in omni coetu concilioque profitendae sint, ne id non pudeat sentire, quod pudeat dicere. **78.** Amicitiae vero locus ubi esse potest aut quis amicus esse cuiquam, quem non ipsum amet propter ipsum? Quid autem est amare, e quo nomen ductum amicitiae est, nisi velle bonis aliquem affici quam maximis, etiamsi ad se ex iis nihil redundet? Prodest, inquit, mihi eo esse animo. Immo videri fortasse. Esse enim, nisi eris, non potes; qui

77. **Mihi . . . eae verae videntur . . . ne**: elliptical statement of purpose (*Hoc ideo statuo*) *ne*, etc.

78. **Esse enim, nisi eris**, 'unless you *really* are'. The remark has a touch of absurdity, and emendd. have been proposed, but are not satisfactory. C.'s point is that love is essentially disinterested and spontaneous; if you say, 'It pays me to love my friends' you can only mean 'seeming to love them pays,' for you cannot genuinely love to order.

autem esse poteris, nisi te amor ipse ceperit? quod non subducta utilitatis ratione effici solet, sed ipsum a se oritur et sua sponte nascitur. 'At enim sequor utilitatem.' Manebit ergo amicitia tam diu, quam diu sequetur utilitas, et, si utilitas constituet amicitiam, tollet eadem. **79.** Sed quid ages tandem, si utilitas ab amicitia, ut fit saepe, defecerit? Relinquesne? quae ista amicitia est? Retinebis? qui convenit? quid enim de amicitia statueris utilitatis causa expetenda, vides. 'Ne in odium veniam, si amicum destitero tueri.' Primum cur ista res digna odio est, nisi quod est turpis? Quod si, ne quo incommodo afficiare, non relinques amicum, tamen, ne sine fructu alligatus sis, ut moriatur, optabis. Quid, si non modo utilitatem tibi nullam afferet, sed iacturae rei familiaris erunt faciundae, labores suscipiendi, adeundum vitae periculum? ne tum quidem te respicies et cogitabis, sibi quemque natum esse et suis voluptatibus? Vadem te ad mortem tyranno dabis pro amico, ut Pythagoreus ille Siculo fecit tyranno, aut, Pylades cum sis, dices te esse Oresten, ut moriare pro amico, aut, si esses Orestes, Pyladem refelleres, te indicares, et, si id non probares, quo minus ambo una necaremini, non deprecarere?

XXV. **80.** Faceres tu quidem, Torquate, haec omnia; nihil enim arbitror magna laude dignum esse, quod te praetermissurum credam aut mortis aut doloris metu. Non quaeritur autem, quid naturae tuae consentaneum sit, sed quid disciplinae. Ratio ista, quam defendis, praecepta, quae didicisti, quae probas, funditus evertunt amicitiam, quamvis eam Epicurus, ut facit, in caelum efferat laudibus. 'At coluit ipse amicitias.' Quis, quaeso, illum negat et bonum

79. **Pythagoreus ille**, Phintias. Dionysius, according to the well-known story, pardoned him and Damon and begged to become a third in such a friendship.

si id non probares, 'if you could not get your tale believed'. In the Dulorestes of Pacuvius, the Tauric king wishes to kill whichever of the two captives is Orestes. Pylades declares *he* is, and Orestes contradicts him. To end the difficulty, the friends entreat that they should both be killed, as neither wishes to survive the other. See v. 63, *Ambo ergo una necarier precamur*. C. puts the question in negative form: 'Would you (have the firmness to) refrain from entreating *not* to die with your friend?'

virum et comem et humanum fuisse? De ingenio eius in his disputationibus, non de moribus quaeritur. Sit ista in Graecorum levitate perversitas, qui maledictis insectantur eos, a quibus de veritate dissentiunt. Sed quamvis comis in amicis tuendis fuerit, tamen, si haec vera sunt (nihil enim affirmo), non satis acutus fuit. 'At multis se probavit.' **81**. Et quidem iure fortasse; sed tamen non gravissimum est testimonium multitudinis. In omni enim arte vel studio vel quavis scientia, vel in ipsa virtute, optimum quidque rarissimum est. Ac mihi quidem, quod et ipse bonus vir fuit et multi Epicurei et fuerunt et hodie sunt et in amicitiis fideles et in omni vita constantes et graves nec voluptate, sed officio consilia moderantes, hoc videtur maior vis honestatis et minor voluptatis. Ita enim vivunt quidam, ut eorum vita refellatur oratio. Atque ut ceteri dicere existimantur melius quam facere, sic hi mihi videntur facere melius quam dicere.

XXVI. **82**. Sed haec nihil sane ad rem; illa videamus, quae a te de amicitia dicta sunt. E quibus unum mihi videbar ab ipso Epicuro dictum cognoscere, amicitiam a voluptate non posse divelli ob eamque rem colendam esse, quod, *cum* sine ea tuto et sine metu vivi non posset, ne iucunde quidem posset. Satis est ad hoc responsum. Attulisti aliud humanius horum recentiorum, numquam dictum ab ipso illo, quod sciam, primo utilitatis causa amicum expeti, cum autem usus accessisset, tum ipsum amari per se, etiam omissa spe voluptatis. Hoc etsi multis modis reprendi potest, tamen accipio, quod dant; mihi enim satis est, ipsis non satis. Nam aliquando posse recte fieri dicunt, nulla expectata nec quaesita voluptate. **83**. Posuisti etiam, dicere alios, foedus quoddam inter se facere sapientes, ut, quemadmodum sint in se ipsos animati, eodem modo sint erga amicos; id et fieri posse et saepe esse factum et ad voluptates percipiendas maxime pertinere. Hoc foedus facere si potuerunt, faciant etiam illud, ut aequitatem, modestiam, virtutes omnes per se ipsas gratis diligant. An vero, si fructibus et emolumentis et utilitatibus amicitias

colemus, si nulla caritas erit, quae faciat amicitiam ipsam sua sponte, vi sua, ex se et propter se expetendam, dubium est, quin fundos et insulas amicis anteponamus? **84.** Licet hic rursus ea commemores, quae optimis verbis ab Epicuro de laude amicitiae dicta sunt. Non quaero, quid dicat, sed quid convenienter possit rationi et sententiae suae dicere. 'Utilitatis causa amicitia est quaesita.' Num igitur utiliorem tibi hunc Triarium putas esse posse, quam si tua sint Puteolis granaria? Collige omnia, quae soletis: 'Praesidium amicorum.' Satis est tibi in te, satis in legibus, satis in mediocribus amicitiis praesidii; iam contemni non poteris; odium autem et invidiam facile vitabis; ad eas enim res ab Epicuro praecepta dantur. Et tamen tantis vectigalibus ad liberalitatem utens, etiam sine hac Pyladea amicitia multorum te benevolentia praeclare tuebere et munies. **85.** At quicum ioca, seria, ut dicitur, quicum arcana, quicum occulta omnia? Tecum optime, deinde etiam cum mediocri amico. Sed fac ista esse non importuna; quid ad utilitatem tantae pecuniae? Vides igitur, si amicitiam sua caritate metiare, nihil esse praestantius, sin emolumento, summas familiaritates praediorum fructuosorum mercede superari. Me igitur ipsum ames oportet, non mea, si veri amici futuri sumus.

XXVII. Sed in rebus apertissimis nimium longi sumus. Perfecto enim et concluso, neque virtutibus neque amicitiis usquam locum esse, si ad voluptatem omnia referantur, nihil praeterea est magno opere dicendum. Ac tamen, ne cui loco non videatur esse responsum, pauca etiam nunc dicam ad reliquam orationem tuam. **86.** Quoniam igitur omnis summa philosophiae ad beate vivendum refertur,

83. insulas, i.e. the rents (mercedes) of these tenement-houses.

84. granaria where the corn from Sicily, Egypt, etc., was stored on arrival at the port. They were private property (Mdv.) and the allusion is to their rental value; cf. *tantis vectigalibus*, infra.

Et tamen. 'And, granting the contrary (i.e. supposing the laws, etc., do *not* afford you protection) still,' . . . *tamen* has this force, §§ 15, 21, 64; i. 11, 15; iv. 62.

86. omnis summa. Cf. i. 62; v. 12, 16, 86; and Varro ap. Aug. de civ. dei xix. 1, 'Nulla est homini causa philosophandi nisi ut beatus sit'.

idque unum expetentes homines se ad hoc studium contulerunt, beate autem vivere alii in alio, vos in voluptate ponitis, item contra miseriam omnem in dolore, id primum videamus, beate vivere vestrum quale sit. Atque hoc dabitis, ut opinor, si modo sit aliquid esse beatum, id oportere totum poni in potestate sapientis. Nam si amitti vita beata potest, beata esse non potest. Quis enim confidit semper sibi illud stabile et firmum permansurum, quod fragile et caducum sit? Qui autem diffidit perpetuitati bonorum suorum, timeat necesse est, ne aliquando, amissis illis, sit miser. Beatus autem esse in maximarum rerum timore nemo potest. **87.** Nemo igitur esse beatus potest. Neque enim in aliqua parte, sed in perpetuitate temporis vita beata dici solet, nec appellatur omnino vita nisi confecta atque absoluta, nec potest quisquam alias beatus esse, alias miser; qui enim existimabit, posse se miserum esse, beatus non erit. Nam cum suscepta semel est beata vita, tam permanet quam ipsa illa effectrix beatae vitae sapientia, neque expectat ultimum tempus aetatis, quod Croeso scribit Herodotus praeceptum a Solone. At enim, quemadmodum tute dicebas, negat Epicurus ne diuturnitatem quidem temporis ad beate vivendum aliquid afferre, nec minorem voluptatem percipi in brevitate temporis, quam si illa sit sempiterna. **88.** Haec dicuntur inconstantissime. Cum enim summum bonum in voluptate ponat, negat infinito tempore aetatis voluptatem fieri maiorem quam finito atque modico. Qui bonum omne in virtute ponit, is potest dicere, perfici beatam vitam perfectione virtutis; negat enim summo bono afferre incrementum

si modo sit aliquid, 'if there *is* such a thing as happiness'. The following arguments are Stoic. Cf. iii. 45 *sqq.*

87. **nec appellatur omnino vita.** Emphasis on *vita*. 'We don't use the term *life* (in this connection) unless we are speaking of a completed life.' Not strictly true, but C. seems to mean 'we say of persons still living that their past has been, or their present is, happy, but do not pronounce on their *lives*'.

88. **perfectione virtutis,** 'i.e. cum virtus perfecta sit, statim perfectam esse beatam vitam'. Thus Mdv. who says C. expresses himself 'paulo brevius,' for the Stoics held that Virtue does not admit of degrees, being itself a *perfectio* (*rationis*, according to them, *naturae* acc. to the Peripatetics, cf. iv. 35, v. 38, Tusc. v. 39, Acad. i. 20).

diem; qui autem voluptate vitam effici beatam putabit, qui sibi is conveniet, si negabit voluptatem crescere longinquitate? Igitur ne dolorem quidem. An dolor longissimus quisque miserrimus, voluptatem non optabiliorem diuturnitas facit? Quid est igitur, cur ita semper deum Epicurus beatum appellet et aeternum? Dempta enim aeternitate, nihilo beatior Iuppiter quam Epicurus; uterque enim summo bono fruitur, id est, voluptate. 'At enim hic etiam dolore!' At eum nihili facit; ait enim, se, si uratur, 'Quam hoc svave!' dicturum. **89.** Qua igitur re a deo vincitur, si aeternitate non vincitur? In qua quid est boni praeter summam voluptatem et eam sempiternam? Quid ergo attinet gloriose loqui, nisi constanter loquare? In voluptate corporis (addam, si vis, animi, dum ea ipsa, ut vultis, sit e corpore) situm est vivere beate. Quid? istam voluptatem perpetuam quis potest praestare sapienti? Nam quibus rebus efficiuntur voluptates, eae non sunt in potestate sapientis. Non enim in ipsa sapientia positum est beatum esse, sed in iis rebus, quas sapientia comparat ad voluptatem. Totum autem id externum est, et quod externum, id in casu est. Ita fit beatae vitae domina fortuna, quam Epicurus ait exiguam intervenire sapienti.

XXVIII. **90.** Age, inquies, ista parva sunt. Sapientem locupletat ipsa natura, cuius divitias Epicurus parabiles esse docuit.—Haec bene dicuntur, nec ego repugno; sed inter

But C.'s very familiarity with these definitions seems to me a reason for doubting whether he would speak, even 'brevius,' of Virtue *itself* being perfected. I should rather take *virtutis* as definitive (epexegetic) genitive (cf. *finem summi boni*, iv., *caussas rerum efficientium*, Acad. i. 6, and exx. in Reid's note) and tr. 'by the consummation which consists in Virtue'. This again is 'brevius,' 'consummation of man's nature, or reason' being understood, but at least is a perfectly legitimate expression from the Stoic standpoint which C. here assumes. On the sufficiency of Virtue for Happiness see iv. 88 *sqq.* and Tusc. v. *passim.*

Igitur ne dolorem quidem, i.e. *ne dolor quidem* (crescet). By a not uncommon form of attraction, the subject of the finite verb, which is understood from a preceding infinitive, takes the case of the subject of that infinitive. Cf. N. Deor. i. 82, 'Apim . . . nonne (censes) deum videri Aegyptiis? Tam hercle, quam tibi . . . Sospitam,' i.e. 'tam videtur, quam Sospita'.

si uratur, i.e. in the brazen bull of the tyrant Phalaris, mentioned in most of C.'s references to this saying (Tusc. ii. 17; v. 31, 75: in Pison. 42), which is not extant in Gk. Cf. infra v. 80, 85.

sese ipsa pugnant. Negat enim tenuissimo victu, id est, contemptissimis escis et potionibus minorem voluptatem percipi quam rebus exquisitissimis ad epulandum. Huic ego, si negaret quidquam interesse ad beate vivendum, quali uteretur victu, concederem; laudarem etiam; verum enim diceret, idque Socratem, qui voluptatem nullo loco numerat, audio dicentem, cibi condimentum esse famem, potionis sitim. Sed qui, ad voluptatem omnia referens, vivit ut Gallonius, loquitur ut Frugi ille Piso, non audio, nec eum, quod sentiat, dicere existimo. **91.** Naturales divitias dixit parabiles esse, quod parvo esset natura contenta. Certe, nisi voluptatem tanti aestimaretis. Non minor, inquit, voluptas percipitur ex vilissimis rebus quam ex pretiosissimis. Hoc est non modo cor non habere, sed ne palatum quidem. Qui enim voluptatem ipsam contemnunt, iis licet dicere, se acipenserem maenae non anteponere; cui vero in voluptate summum bonum est, huic omnia sensu, non ratione sunt iudicanda, eaque dicenda optima, quae sunt svavissima. **92.** Verum esto; consequatur summas voluptates non modo parvo, sed per me nihilo, si potest; sit voluptas non minor in nasturcio illo, quo vesci Persas esse solitos scribit Xenophon, quam in Syracusanis mensis, quae a Platone graviter vituperantur; sit, inquam, tam facilis, quam vultis, comparatio voluptatis; quid de dolore dicemus? cuius tanta tormenta sunt, ut in iis beata vita, si modo dolor summum malum est, esse non possit. Ipse enim Metrodorus, paene alter Epicurus, beatum esse describit his fere verbis: cum

90. Negat enim. Diog. L. x. 130, *Οἱ λιτοὶ χυλοὶ ἴσην πολυτελεῖ διαίτῃ τὴν ἡδονὴν προσφέρουσιν, ὅταν ἅπαν τὸ ἀλγοῦν κατ' ἔνδειαν ἐξαιρεθῇ· καὶ μᾶζα καὶ ὕδωρ τὴν ἀκροτάτην ἀποδίδωσιν ἡδονήν, ἐπειδὰν ἐνδέων τις αὐτὰ προσφέρηται.* See on i. 45.

cibi condimentum esse famem. See Xenophon Memor. i. 3, 5 and 6, 5.

Gallonius, see § 24. *ille Piso* was so universally known as Frugi that his enemy, Gracchus, was forced to designate him by that name in public when he wished to summon him to an assembly (Tusc. iii. 16). *frugi*, 'thrifty,' is always a term of praise; 'parcius hic vivit . . . frugi dicatur' (Horace).

92. Xenophon. Cyropaed. i. 2, 8. Also quoted Tusc. v. 99, where C. translates 'Plato's' account of the Syracusan banquets (Plat. Epp. vii. 326 B).

his fere. *Ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς τί ἄλλο ἢ τὸ σαρκὸς εὐσταθὲς κατάστημα καὶ τὸ περὶ ταύτης πιστὸν ἔλπισμα*; (Clem. Alex. Stromat, ii. 179, quoting from Metrodorus' treatise, *Περὶ τοῦ μείζονα εἶναι τὴν παρ' ἡμᾶς αἰτίαν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν τῆς ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων*).

corpus bene constitutum sit et sit exploratum, ita futurum. An id exploratum cuiquam potest esse, quomodo se hoc habiturum sit corpus, non dico ad annum, sed ad vesperum? Dolor igitur, id est, summum malum metuetur semper, etiamsi non aderit; iam enim adesse poterit. Qui potest igitur habitare in beata vita summi mali metus? **93** Traditur, inquit, ab Epicuro ratio neglegendi doloris. Iam id ipsum absurdum, maximum malum neglegi. Sed quae tandem ista ratio est? Maximus dolor, inquit, brevis est. Primum quid tu dicis breve? deinde dolorem quem maximum? Quid enim? Summus dolor plures dies manere non potest? Vide, ne etiam menses! Nisi forte eum dicis, qui, simul atque arripuit, interficit. Quis istum dolorem timet? Illum mallem levares, quo optimum atque humanissimum virum, Cn. Octavium, M. F., familiarem meum, confici vidi, nec vero semel nec ad breve tempus, sed et saepe et plane diu. Quos ille, di immortales! cum omnes artus ardere viderentur, cruciatus perferebat! Nec tamen miser esse, quia summum id malum non erat, tantummodo laboriosus videbatur. At miser, si in flagitiosa atque vitiosa vita afflueret voluptatibus.

XXIX. **94.** Quod autem magnum dolorem brevem, longinquum levem esse dicitis, id non intellego quale sit. Video enim et magnos et eosdem bene longinquos dolores; quorum alia toleratio est verior, qua uti vos non potestis, qui honestatem ipsam per se non amatis. Fortitudinis quaedam praecepta sunt ac paene leges, quae effeminari virum vetant in dolore. Quamobrem turpe putandum est, non dico dolere (nam id quidem est interdum necesse), sed saxum illud Lemnium clamore Philocteteo funestare,

> Quod eiulatu, questu, gemitu, fremitibus
> Resonando mutum flebiles voces refert.

93. **Cn. Octavium**, cos. 76 B.C. Sallust mentions his gentle character, and his lameness.

94. **Quod eiulatu.** The same lines apparently from the *Philoctetes* of Attius are used to point the same moral in *Tusc.* ii. 33.

Huic Epicurus praecentet, si potest, cui

> *E* viperino morsu venae viscerum
> Veneno imbutae taetros cruciatus cient!

Sic Epicurus: 'Philocteta st! Brevis dolor.' At iam decimum annum in spelunca iacet. 'Si longus, levis; dat enim intervalla et relaxat.' **95.** Primum non saepe, deinde quae est ista relaxatio, cum et praeteriti doloris memoria recens est et futuri atque impendentis torquet timor? Moriatur, inquit. Fortasse id optimum, sed ubi illud: 'Plus semper voluptatis?' Si enim ita est, vide, ne facinus facias, cum mori svadeas. Potius ergo illa dicantur, turpe esse, viri non esse debilitari dolore, frangi, succumbere. Nam ista vestra: 'Si gravis, brevis; si longus, levis' dictata sunt. Virtutis, magnitudinis animi, patientiae, fortitudinis fomentis dolor mitigari solet.

XXX. **96.** Audi, ne longe abeam, moriens quid dicat Epicurus, ut intellegas, facta eius cum dictis discrepare: 'Epicurus Hermarcho S. Cum ageremus,' inquit, 'vitae beatum et eundem supremum diem, scribebamus haec. Tanti aderant vesicae et torminum morbi, ut nihil ad eorum magnitudinem posset accedere.' Miserum hominem! Si dolor summum malum est, dici aliter non potest. Sed audiamus ipsum. 'Compensabatur,' inquit, 'tamen cum his omnibus animi laetitia, quam capiebam memoria rationum inventorumque nostrorum. Sed tu, ut dignum est tua erga me et philosophiam voluntate ab adulescentulo suscepta, fac, ut Metrodori tueare liberos.' **97.** Non ego iam Epaminondae, non Leonidae mortem huius morti antepono; quorum alter cum vicisset Lacedaemonios apud Mantineam

praecentet, 'let him croon his spells'. Cf. Varro (ap. Nonius, p. 494), 'ut faciunt pleraeque, *ut adhibeant praecantrices*, nec medico ostendant'.

95. Moriatur. See i. 49, and for *plus semper* i. 62.

96. Hermarcho, of Mitylene, succeeded Epicurus as head of the school. Diogenes (x. 22) quotes this letter as addressed to Idomeneus. Probably several intimate friends received copies. (Usener.)

morbi: he died of dysentery. *vesicae*, gen. of the part affected; *torminum*, gen. of definition.

memoria. ἐπὶ τῇ γεγονότων ἡμῖν διαλογισμῶν μνήμῃ. C. had no Latin equivalent for διαλογισμός.

atque ipse gravi vulnere exanimari se videret, ut primum dispexit, quaesivit, salvusne esset clipeus. Cum salvum esse flentes sui respondissent, rogavit, essentne fusi hostes. Cum id quoque, ut cupiebat, audivisset, evelli iussit eam, qua erat transfixus, hastam. Ita multo sangvine profuso, in laetitia et victoria est mortuus. Leonidas autem, rex Lacedaemoniorum, se in Thermopylis trecentosque eos, quos eduxerat Sparta, cum esset proposita aut fuga turpis aut gloriosa mors, opposuit hostibus. Praeclarae mortes sunt imperatoriae, philosophi autem in suis lectulis plerumque moriuntur. Refert tamen, quomodo. *Beatus* sibi videtur esse moriens. Magna laus. 'Compensabatur,' inquit, 'cum summis doloribus laetitia.' **98.** Audio equidem philosophi vocem, Epicure; sed quid tibi dicendum sit, oblitus es. Primum enim, si vera sunt ea, quorum recordatione te gaudere dicis, hoc est, si vera sunt tua scripta et inventa, gaudere non potes; nihil enim iam habes, quod ad corpus referas; est autem a te semper dictum, nec gaudere quemquam nisi propter corpus nec dolere. Praeteritis, inquit, gaudeo. Quibusnam praeteritis? si ad corpus pertinentibus, rationes tuas te video compensare cum istis doloribus, non memoriam corpore perceptarum voluptatum; sin autem ad animum, falsum est, quod negas animi ullum esse gaudium, quod non referatur ad corpus. Cur deinde Metrodori liberos commendas? quid *in* isto egregio tuo officio et tanta fide (sic enim existimo) ad corpus refers?

XXXI. **99.** Huc et illuc, Torquate, vos versetis licet; nihil in hac praeclara epistula scriptum ab Epicuro congruens et conveniens decretis eius reperietis. Ita redarguitur ipse a sese, convincunturque scripta eius probitate ipsius ac moribus. Nam ista commendatio puerorum, memoria et caritas amicitiae, summorum officiorum in extremo spiritu conservatio indicat, innatam esse homini probitatem gratuitam, non invitatam voluptatibus nec praemiorum mercedibus

97. Refert = *interest.* 'It makes a difference *how* they face death.' They too may show heroism, witness Epicurus, whose last words do him all honour (*magna laus*).

evocatam. Quod enim testimonium maius quaerimus, quae honesta et recta sint, ipsa esse optabilia per sese, cum videamus tanta officia morientis? **100.** Sed ut epistulam laudandam arbitror eam, quam modo totidem fere verbis interpretatus sum, quamquam ea cum summa eius philosophia nullo modo congruebat, sic eiusdem testamentum non solum *a* philosophi gravitate, sed etiam ab ipsius sententia iudico discrepare. Scripsit enim et multis saepe verbis et breviter aperteque in eo libro, quem modo nominavi, 'mortem nihil ad nos pertinere; quod enim dissolutum sit, id esse sine sensu; quod autem sine sensu sit, id nihil ad nos pertinere omnino.' Hoc ipsum elegantius poni meliusque potuit. Nam quod ita positum est, quod dissolutum sit, id esse sine sensu, id eiusmodi est, ut non satis plane dicat, quid sit dissolutum. **101.** Sed tamen intellego, quid velit. Quaero autem, quid sit, quod, cum dissolutione, id est, morte sensus omnis extingvatur, et cum reliqui nihil sit omnino, quod pertineat ad nos, tam accurate tamque diligenter caveat et sanciat, 'ut Amynomachus et Timocrates, heredes sui, de Hermarchi sententia dent, quod satis sit ad diem agendum natalem suum quotannis mense Gamelione, itemque omnibus mensibus vicesimo die lunae dent ad eorum epulas, qui una secum philosophati sint, ut et sui et Metrodori memoria colatur.' **102.** Haec ego non possum dicere non esse hominis quamvis et belli et humani, sapientis vero nullo modo, physici praesertim, quem se ille esse vult, putare ullum esse cuiusquam diem natalem. Quid? idemne potest esse dies saepius, qui semel fuit? Certe non potest.

100. summa . . . philosophia, 'the general tenor of his teaching'.

quem modo nominavi, i.e. in § 20. *modo*, 'a little while ago'. For the Gk. of this maxim see on i. 40.

non satis plane dicat, (the statement, thus worded) 'does not make clear what it is that has been dissolved,' i.e. Epic. should have stated explicitly that he referred to the dissolution of soul from body. C. seems here to borrow from a source also used by Plutarch, who says (ap. Gellius, ii. 8) that Epic. ought to have begun by stating: *ὁ θάνατος ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος διάλυσις.* The point of this criticism (which C. misses, and so makes the merely captious objection above) is that Epic. fails to distinguish *διάλυσις* (process) from *διαλυθέν* (result). It does not follow, because the state of being dissolved is a state of unconsciousness, that dissolution takes place unconsciously.

An eiusdemmodi? Ne id quidem, nisi multa annorum intercesserint milia, ut omnium siderum eodem, unde profecta sint, fiat ad unum tempus reversio. Nullus est igitur cuiusquam dies natalis. 'At habetur.' Et ego id scilicet nesciebam! Sed ut sit, etiamne post mortem coletur? idque testamento cavebit is, qui nobis quasi oraculum ediderit, nihil post mortem ad nos pertinere? Haec non erant eius, qui innumerabiles mundos infinitasque regiones, quarum nulla esset ora, nulla extremitas, mente peragravisset. Num quid tale Democritus? Ut alios omittam, hunc appello, quem ille unum secutus est. **103.** Quid si dies notandus fuit, eumne potius, quo natus, an eum, quo sapiens factus est? Non potuit, inquies, fieri sapiens, nisi natus esset. Isto modo ne si avia quidem eius nata non esset. Res tota, Torquate, non doctorum hominum, velle post mortem epulis celebrari memoriam sui nominis. Quos quidem dies quemadmodum agatis et in quantam hominum facetorum urbanitatem incurratis, non dico; nihil opus est litibus; tantum dico, magis fuisse vestrum agere Epicuri diem natalem, quam illius testamento cavere, ut ageretur.

XXXII. **104.** Sed ut ad propositum (de dolore enim cum diceremus, ad istam epistulam delati sumus), nunc totum illud concludi sic licet: Qui in summo malo est, is

102. multa annorum. This refers to the Great or Secular Year which ancient astronomers calculated must elapse before all the heavenly bodies could return to the exact position in relation to one another which they occupied at a given moment. Cf. Tacitus, de Orat. 16, 'si, ut Cicero in Hortensio scribit, is est magnus et verus annus, quo eadem positio caeli siderumque quae cum maxime (= hoc ipso tempore) est rursum existat, isque annus horum quos nos vocamus annorum duodecim milia nongentos quinquaginta quattuor complectitur'.

'At habetur.' 'But people *do* keep birthdays.' 'Much obliged, I am sure, for the information!' Here Mdv. losing patience thus remonstrates with C., 'Cur igitur tantis physicae doctrinae ambagibus Epic. ad communem morem et opinionem se accommodantem impugnas, ac non id agis paucis, quod agendum est, de vanitate hominis'.

peragravisset. Cf. Lucret. i. 74, 'omne immensum peragravit mente animoque'. C. had read this (ad Qu. Fr. ii. 11, 3) and may be recalling it, or a Gk. original.

103. eumne potius, sc. *notari oportuit*, from *notandus fuit.* See Mdv. for exx. (too long for quotation here) of a gerundive in the first clause of a sentence, from which *oportet* is understood with an infin. (though of a different verb) in the second clause.

104. Sed ut ad propositum, sc. *revertamur.*

tum, cum in eo est, non est beatus; sapiens autem semper beatus est et est aliquando in dolore; non est igitur summum malum dolor. Iam illud quale tandem est, bona praeterita non effluere sapienti, mala meminisse non oportere? Primum in nostrane est potestate, quid meminerimus? Themistocles quidem, cum ei Simonides an quis alius artem memoriae polliceretur, Oblivionis, inquit, mallem; nam memini etiam, quae nolo, oblivisci non possum, quae volo. **105.** Magno hic ingenio; sed res se tamen sic habet, ut nimis imperiosi philosophi sit vetare meminisse. Vide, ne ista sint Manliana vestra aut maiora etiam, si imperes, quod facere non possim. Quid, si etiam iucunda memoria est praeteritorum malorum? ut proverbia nonnulla veriora sint quam vestra dogmata. Vulgo enim dicitur: 'Iucundi acti labores'; nec male Euripides (concludam, si potero, Latine; Graecum enim hunc versum nostis omnes):

Svavis laborum est praeteritorum memoria.

Sed ad bona praeterita redeamus. Quae si a vobis talia dicerentur, qualibus C. Marius uti poterat, ut expulsus, egens, in palude demersus tropaeorum recordatione levaret dolorem suum, audirem et plane probarem. Nec enim absolvi beata vita sapientis neque ad exitum perduci poterit, si prima quaeque bene ab eo consulta atque facta ipsius oblivione obruentur. **106.** Sed vobis voluptatum perceptarum recordatio vitam beatam facit, et quidem corpore perceptarum. Nam si quae sunt aliae, falsum est, omnes animi voluptates esse e corporis societate. Corporis autem voluptas si etiam praeterita delectat, non

an quis. *an* keeps its proper force; 'or was it perhaps some one else?' Simonides invented a system of mnemonics (Pliny, N.H. vii. 59), but C. expresses the same doubt as to whether it was he who inspired this *mot* of Themistocles de Orat. 229, 351. Cf. Acad. ii. 2.

105. imperiosi . . . Manliana. See 60 n.

concludam, 'I shall make a Latin verse of it'. So Horace, 'concludere versum'. The line is from the lost 'Andromeda' of Euripides, Ἀλλ' ἡδύ τοι σωθέντα μεμνῆσθαι πόνων.

prima quaeque, 'one after another,' 'each in turn,' as they are successively recollected. So 106, *prima quaeque avolat*.

intellego, cur Aristoteles Sardanapalli epigramma tanto opere derideat, in quo ille rex Syriae glorietur, se omnes secum abstulisse libidinum voluptates. Quod enim ne vivus quidem, inquit, diutius sentire poterat, quam dum fruebatur, quomodo id mortuo potuit permanere? Fluit igitur voluptas corporis et prima quaeque avolat, saepiusque relinquit causam paenitendi quam recordandi. Itaque beatior Africanus cum patria illo modo loquens:

Desine, Roma, tuos hostes—

reliquaque praeclare:

Nam tibi moenimenta mei peperere labores.

Laboribus hic praeteritis gaudet, tu iubes voluptatibus, et hic se ad ea revocat, e quibus nihil umquam rettulerit ad corpus, tu totus haeres in corpore.

XXXIII. **107.** Illud autem ipsum qui obtineri potest, quod dicitis, omnes animi et voluptates et dolores ad corporis voluptates ac dolores pertinere? Nihilne te delectat umquam (video, quicum loquar), te igitur, Torquate, ipsum per se nihil delectat? Omitto dignitatem, honestatem, speciem ipsam virtutum, de quibus ante dictum est; haec leviora ponam: poëma, orationem cum aut scribis aut legis, cum omnium factorum, cum regionum conquiris historiam, signum, tabula, locus amoenus, ludi, venatio, villa Luculli (nam si tuam dicerem, latebram haberes; ad corpus diceres pertinere) —sed ea, quae dixi, ad corpusne refers? an est aliquid, quod te sua sponte delectet? Aut pertinacissimus fueris,

106. epigramma. One of several current Gk. versions was quoted by Aristotle in a lost work. Tusc. v. 35, 'quid aliud, inquit Arist. in bovis, non in regis sepulcro inscriberes'. C. there translates the conclusion, *κεῖν' ἔχω ὅσσ' ἔφαγον καὶ ἐφύβρισα καὶ σὺν ἔρωτι | τέρπν' ἔπαθον· τὰ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ὄλβια πάντα λέλυνται.* See Burnet's note on Nic. Ethics, i. 5, 3.

Desine . . . The same quotation, probably from the Annales of Ennius, occurs De Orat. iii. 167.

107. villa Luculli, at Tusculum (iii. 7). The villa of Torquatus, C. implies, is also a 'show place,' but 'if I mentioned your own house, you would have a loophole . . . you would tell me it gives you physical pleasure, by its luxury, not mental, by its beauty'. For the anacoluthon see iii. 11.

si perstiteris ad corpus ea, quae dixi, referre, aut deserueris totam Epicuri voluptatem, si negaveris. **108.** Quod vero a te disputatum est, maiores esse voluptates et dolores animi quam corporis, quia trium temporum particeps animus sit, corpore autem praesentia solum sentiantur, qui id probari potest, ut is, qui propter me aliquid gaudeat, plus quam ego ipse gaudeat? [Animo voluptas oritur propter voluptatem corporis, et maior est animi voluptas quam corporis; ita fit, ut gratulator laetior sit quam is, cui gratulatur.] Sed, dum efficere vultis beatum sapientem, cum maximas animo voluptates percipiat omnibusque partibus maiores quam corpore, quid occurrat, non videtis. Animi enim quoque dolores percipiet omnibus partibus maiores quam corporis. Ita miser sit aliquando necesse est is, quem vos beatum semper vultis esse; nec vero id, dum omnia ad voluptatem doloremque referetis, efficietis umquam. **109.** Quare aliud aliquod, Torquate, hominis summum bonum reperiendum est; voluptatem bestiis concedamus, quibus vos de summo bono testibus uti soletis. Quid, si etiam bestiae multa faciunt, duce sua quaeque natura, partim indulgenter vel cum labore, ut in gignendo, in educando, perfacile ut appareat, aliud quiddam iis propositum, non voluptatem? partim cursu et peragratione laetantur; congregatione aliae coetum quodam modo civitatis imitantur; **110.** videmus in quodam volucrium genere nonnulla indicia pietatis, cognitionem, memoriam, in multis etiam desideria videmus; ergo in bestiis erunt secreta a

si perstiteris . . . referre. *persto* with an infin. is found only here in Ciceronian prose (elsewhere poetic or Tacitean). C. once has *insto facere* (In Verr. iii. 136).

108. [Animo . . . gratulator]. Interpolated in clumsy explanation of the preceding simile. *gratulator* is found in no Latin author.

omnibus partibus, 'infinitely greater'; as 'multis partibus maius' is 'many times greater'.

110. cognitionem, memoriam, 'recognition' (of persons kind to them) and 'recollection' (of kindness), as the context shows. *desideria* is a third *indicium pietatis*; these birds in many cases pine at the loss of a friend. We need not, with Mdv. press *quodam genere*, so as to make C. confine these traits to one particular *species* of bird; he is surely thinking merely of 'a certain class of birds,' viz. those kept as pets, such as doves, starlings, etc.

voluptate humanarum quaedam simulacra virtutum, in ipsis hominibus virtus nisi voluptatis causa nulla erit? et homini, qui ceteris animantibus plurimum praestat, praecipui a natura nihil datum esse dicemus?

XXXIV. **111.** Nos vero, si quidem in voluptate sunt omnia, longe multumque superamur a bestiis, quibus ipsa terra fundit ex sese pastus varios atque abundantes nihil laborantibus; nobis autem aut vix aut ne vix quidem suppetunt multo labore quaerentibus. Nec tamen ullo modo summum pecudis bonum et hominis idem mihi videri potest. Quid enim tanto opus est instrumento in optimis artibus comparandis, quid tanto concursu honestissimorum studiorum, tanto virtutum comitatu, si ea nullam ad aliam rem nisi ad voluptatem conquiruntur? **112.** Ut, si Xerxes, cum tantis classibus tantisque equestribus et pedestribus copiis, Hellesponto iuncto, Athone perfosso, mari ambulavisset, terra navigavisset, si, cum tanto impetu in Graeciam venisset, causam quis ex eo quaereret tantarum copiarum tantique belli, mel se auferre ex Hymetto voluisse diceret, certe sine causa videretur tanta conatus, sic nos sapientem, plurimis et gravissimis artibus atque virtutibus instructum et ornatum, non, ut illum, maria pedibus peragrantem, classibus montes, sed omne caelum totamque cum universo mari terram mente complexum, voluptatem petere si dicemus, mellis causa dicemus tanta molitum. **113.** Ad altiora quaedam et magnificentiora, mihi crede, Torquate, nati sumus; nec id ex animi solum partibus, in quibus inest memoria rerum innumerabilium, in te quidem infinita, inest coniectura consequentium non multum a divinatione differens, inest moderator cupiditatis

112. si Xerxes . . . diceret. This long protasis contains a second (*si . . . quis . . . quaereret*) which further limits it, and is logically subsequent. Cf. iv. § 22.

navigavisset. Cf. Isocrates, Panegyr. 89, *ὥστε τῷ στρατοπέδῳ πλεῦσαι μὲν διὰ τῆς ἠπείρου, πεζεῦσαι δὲ διὰ τῆς θαλάττης, τὸν μὲν Ἑλλήσποντον ζεύξας, τὸν δ' Ἄθω διορύξας.*

113. nec id. The sentence, begun as if *sed etiam ex corpore intellegi potest* were to follow, becomes unmanageably long and breaks off with *ergo*, 'well, then'.

in te . . . infinita. Cf. i. 25. Torquatus' 'divina memoria' is mentioned Brut. 265.

pudor, inest ad humanam societatem iustitiae fida custodia, inest in perpetiendis laboribus adeundisque periculis firma et stabilis doloris mortisque contemptio;—ergo haec in animis; tu autem etiam membra ipsa sensusque considera, qui tibi, ut reliquae corporis partes, non comites solum virtutum, sed ministri etiam videbuntur. **114**. Quod si in ipso corpore multa voluptati praeponenda sunt, ut vires, valetudo, velocitas, pulchritudo, quid tandem in animis censes? in quibus doctissimi illi veteres inesse quiddam caeleste et divinum putaverunt. Quod si esset in voluptate summum bonum, ut dicitis, optabile esset in maxima voluptate, nullo intervallo interiecto, dies noctesque versari, cum omnes sensus dulcedine omni quasi perfusi moverentur. Quis est autem dignus nomine hominis, qui unum diem totum velit esse in genere isto voluptatis? Cyrenaici quidem non recusant; vestri haec verecundius; illi fortasse constantius. **115**. Sed lustremus animo non has maximas artes, quibus qui carebant, inertes a maioribus nominabantur, sed quaero, num existimes, non dico Homerum, Archilochum, Pindarum, sed Phidian, Polyclitum, Zeuxim ad voluptatem artes suas direxisse. Ergo opifex plus sibi proponet ad formarum quam civis excellens ad factorum pulchritudinem? Quae autem est alia causa erroris tanti, tam longe lateque diffusi, nisi quod is, qui voluptatem summum bonum esse decernit, non cum ea parte animi, in qua inest ratio atque consilium, sed cum cupiditate, id est, cum animi levissima parte deliberat? Quaero enim de te, si sunt di, ut vos etiam putatis, qui possint esse beati, cum voluptates corpore percipere non possint, aut, si sine eo genere voluptatis beati sunt, cur similem animi usum in sapiente esse nolitis.

XXXV. **116**. Lege laudationes, Torquate, non eorum, qui sunt ab Homero laudati, non Cyri, non Agesilai, non

114. doctissimi illi: including Socrates and Plato, perhaps also such poets as Pindar (Nem. vi.) and Euripides.

115. maximas artes, i.e. the Virtues. See on iv. 4. Hence C.'s derivation of *iners*. For *sed quaero*, instead of *sed leviores illas* or the like, after *lustremus . . . non has*, cf. *non tam . . . sed*, i. 1.

Aristidi aut Themistocli, non Philippi aut Alexandri; lege nostrorum hominum, lege vestrae familiae; neminem videbis ita laudatum, ut artifex callidus comparandarum voluptatum diceretur. Non elogia monumentorum id significant, velut hoc ad portam: HUNC UNUM PLURIMAE CONSENTIUNT GENTES POPULI PRIMARIUM FUISSE VIRUM. **117.** Idne consensisse de Calatino plurimas gentes arbitramur, primarium populi fuisse, quod praestantissimus fuisset in conficiendis voluptatibus? Ergo in iis adulescentibus bonam spem esse dicemus et magnam indolem, quos suis commodis inservituros et, quidquid ipsis expediat, facturos arbitrabimur? Nonne videmus, quanta perturbatio rerum omnium consequatur, quanta confusio? Tollitur beneficium, tollitur gratia, quae sunt vincla concordiae. Nec enim, cum tua causa cui commodes, beneficium illud habendum est, sed feneratio, nec gratia deberi videtur ei, qui sua causa commodaverit. Maximas vero virtutes iacere omnes necesse est voluptate dominante. Sunt etiam turpitudines plurimae, quae, nisi honestas natura plurimum valeat, cur non cadant in sapientem, non est facile defendere. **118.** Ac ne plura complectar (sunt enim innumerabilia), bene laudata virtus voluptatis aditus intercludat necesse est. Quod iam a me expectare noli; tute introspice in mentem tuam ipse eamque omni cogitatione pertractans percontare ipse te, perpetuisne malis voluptatibus perfruens in ea, quam saepe usurpabas, tran-

116. ad portam, sc. Capenam. Tusc. i. 13, 'Tu egressus porta Capena cum Calatini, Scipionum, Serviliorum, Metellorum sepulcra vides. . . .' A. Atilius Calatinus (cos. 258, 254 B.C.) is ranked by C. (de Rep. i. 1) with Duellius and Lucius as a saviour of Rome. His *elogium*, also quoted De Senect. 61, seems to have been one of the pompous formulas which the Romans, like the 18th century English, employed in epitaphs of the great. Cf. the inscription on the tomb of Lucius Scipio (Corp. Inscr. Lat. i. n. 32, p. 18), 'Hunc · oino · ploirume · cosentiont · R(omai) | Duonoro · optumo · fuise · viro'.

117. honestas natura, ἡ ἀρετὴ φύσει. Unless we admit the power of the moral instincts, we shall find it hard to show cause why the Wise Man cannot consistently commit a vast number of base actions (for many such are both safe and expedient). *cadere in* = to befit, be in keeping with, a person's character.

118. bene laudata virtus. 'Any adequate panegyric of Virtue must needs keep Pleasure at arm's length.'

quillitate degere omnem aetatem sine dolore, assumpto etiam illo, quod vos quidem adiungere soletis, sed fieri non potest, sine doloris metu, an, cum de omnibus gentibus optime mererere, cum opem indigentibus salutemque ferres, vel Herculis perpeti aerumnas. Sic enim maiores nostri labores non fugiendos tristissimo tamen verbo aerumnas etiam in deo nominaverunt. **119.** Elicerem ex te cogeremque, ut responderes, nisi vererer, ne Herculem ipsum ea, quae pro salute gentium summo labore gessisset, voluptatis causa gessisse diceres. Quae cum dixissem, Habeo, inquit Torquatus, ad quos ista referam, et, quamquam aliquid ipse poteram, tamen invenire malo paratiores. Familiares nostros, credo, Sironem dicis et Philodemum, cum optimos viros, tum homines doctissimos. Recte, inquit, intellegis. Age sane, inquam; sed erat aequius, Triarium aliquid de dissensione nostra iudicare. Eiuro, inquit arridens, iniquum, hac quidem de re; tu enim ista lenius; hic Stoicorum more nos vexat. Tum Triarius: Posthac quidem, inquit, audacius. Nam haec ipsa mihi erunt in promptu, quae modo audivi; nec ante aggrediar, quam te ab istis, quos dicis, instructum videro. Quae cum essent dicta, finem fecimus et ambulandi et disputandi.

Herculis . . . aerumnas. Cf. Plautus, Epid. ii. 1. 9, 'aerumnam sextam Herculis'. *aerumna* is found in fragments of Pacuvius, Ennius, etc.; in Quintilian's time it was obsolete. Heracles was a favourite hero with the Stoics, and this interpretation of his Labours as a 'Service of Man' (*pro salute gentium*) illustrates their method of harmonising the myths with their own theology by explaining them as allegories. Some Stoic writers regarded Heracles as an ordinary mortal, others (so apparently Cleanthes) as divine or deified, i.e. as a special manifestation of the One Supreme Being. *in deo*, 'in the case of a god'.

119. Familiares. For Philodemus, see Introd. Siro taught in Rome about 50 B.C. Vergil and Varius were among his pupils.

Eiuro . . . iniquum. 'I reject him on oath as prejudiced'; the formula employed in refusing trial by a particular court or judge on the ground of bias.

DE FINIBUS BONORUM ET MALORUM

BOOK III. ARGUMENT

i-ii. *Prologue*, addressed to Brutus. C. considers that he has demolished the Hedonistic position in the last Book; he now prepares to meet more formidable antagonists, *viz.* the Stoics. Their system presents subtle and abstruse ideas in a difficult, not to say crabbed technical phraseology, which makes the translator's task doubly hard. But as every art and science has its own vocabulary, so has Philosophy, and the licence of coining new terms must be still more freely extended to Roman than to Greek writers on that subject. Nay, the former should spare no effort to show that their mother-tongue can equal Greek as a medium of philosophic thought. ii-iii. The Stoic theory of the Chief Good formed the subject of a conversation between C. and Cato, on their chancing to meet in the library of Lucullus at Tusculum. iii-iv. Cato having expressed regret that C. preferred the 'Old Academy' to the Stoic school, C. rejoins that the differences between the two are merely verbal; the grandiose utterances of Zeno and his successors, if pressed to their logical conclusion, lead to the fallacies of Pyrrho and Aristo, and abolish Virtue. Cato assures C. that he has misunderstood the Stoic doctrine, and proceeds to expound it at length. v. Self-preservation is the first instinct of the new-born creature, and its earliest actions are directed towards acquiring things good for it, and avoiding things bad for it. Among the things thus instinctively sought are bodily and mental health and perfection (hence, for man, they include the arts, as developed out of his perceptions), but not Pleasure. vi. These things, and whatsoever is a means to them, we call (1) *aestimabilia*, (2) *sumenda*, and their contraries *inaestimabilia*, *reicienda*, and we lay down as the 'duty' of man, firstly self-preservation, next, selection and rejection of *sumenda* and *reicienda* respectively. When this choice is exercised systematically in conformity to the law of Nature, the Good, and the conception of Good come into being. For Virtue consists in this very exercise of choice, and Virtue is the Chief and Sole Good, and is alone desirable for its own sake. vii. Instinctive appetition, with which Action begins, does not work at random but has for goal a definite type or plan of life; the same is true of (2) Rational Action and (3) Virtuous Action (motivated by *perfecta ratio* Virtue). Virtue has no End extraneous to the activity in which it consists. Every virtuous act includes every species of right action, for Justice, Courage, etc., are but different aspects of Virtue, one and indivisible. The only basis for Morality is the recognition of Virtue as the sole Good and of Vice as the sole Evil. From which it will follow that the virtuous man (*sapiens*) is always happy.

viii. The Stoics demonstrate this their fundamental principle by a series of syllogistic inferences. ix. Nevertheless, those philosophers err who abolish all distinctions between things which are neither goods nor evils; for Virtue consists in discrimination and choice among such things (c. vi.). Thus the Chief Good is 'to live in conformity to the experience we have gained of the course or laws of nature.' Moral actions are praiseworthy from their very outset, independently of their effects. x. (A definition (Diogenes') and discussion of the term 'good.' The emotions are non-natural, and the *sapiens* is entirely free from them.) xi. That whatever is moral is desirable *per se*, and whatever is vile, the reverse, is clear from the general consensus of sentiment and opinion, as shown in men's lives. xii. xiii. xiv. init. (A digression by C. on the word *vitium*.) No mere verbal difference divides Stoics and Peripatetics, for if the latter's doctrine of the Chief Good be true, (1) the *sapiens* is *not* always happy, (2) happiness admits of degrees, which the Stoics deny. xiv. Duration adds nothing to right action, for there is no 'growth in grace;' hence a lifetime of Happiness (*i.e.* Virtue) is no whit preferable to a single hour. No man can be either 'wiser' or a 'greater sinner' than another. But virtues and vices, though they admit no increase, admit 'expansion' in a certain sense. xv. (The view of Diogenes concerning wealth.) xv-xvi. The doctrine of ἀδιαφορα, or things 'indifferent' in so far as they contribute nothing towards Happiness or Misery; these, which include everything whatever, except Virtue and Vice, are differentiated into three classes by a secondary standard of value, viz. 'agreement with nature.' xvi-xviii. Goods are divided into 'final' and 'efficient:' Virtue is both, for it both is, and effects, the Supreme End. The same distinction applies to the class of 'things indifferent' which we term 'preferred.' Stoics have disagreed as to whether Reputation is a thing 'preferred' for its own sake ('final') or as a means ('efficient'). *Officium* defined; it is concerned with things in the neutral sphere. Hence under certain circumstances it is an *officium* for the *sapiens* to kill himself, although completely happy, and for the fool to go on living, though completely miserable. xix. Parental love, which is a natural instinct, is the root of social relations and love of humanity. The Universe is as it were the City-State of the gods and the whole human race; as citizens whereof it behoves each of us to set the common good before our own. xx-xxi. Nature has knit us together in one communion and fellowship; were it not so, Justice and Charity had not been. Accordingly the *sapiens* will not refuse to share in the task of government. Important for the maintenance of this social bond is the tenet that true 'goods' are (1) participated in by all wise men, (2) all absolutely equal, while 'things preferred' are likewise common, but not equal. xxi-xxii. Friendship, like Justice and the other Virtues, is desirable *per se* and not for its utility. Dialectic and Physics must be reckoned among the Virtues. Cato concludes with a description of the ideal *sapiens*, who is alone and always happy, fortunate, rich, and a king.

DE FINIBUS BONORUM ET MALORUM

LIBER TERTIUS

I. **1.** Voluptatem quidem, Brute, si ipsa pro se loquatur nec tam pertinaces habeat patronos, concessuram arbitror, convictam superiore libro, dignitati. Etenim sit impudens, si virtuti diutius repugnet aut si honestis iucunda anteponat aut pluris esse contendat dulcedinem corporis ex eave natam laetitiam quam gravitatem animi atque constantiam. Quare illam quidem dimittamus et suis se finibus tenere iubeamus, ne blanditiis eius illecebrisque impediatur disputandi severitas. **2.** Quaerendum est enim, ubi sit illud summum bonum, quod reperire volumus, quoniam et voluptas ab eo remota est et eadem fere contra eos dici possunt, qui vacuitatem doloris finem bonorum esse voluerunt; nec vero ullum probetur oportet summum bonum, quod virtute careat, qua nihil potest esse praestantius. Itaque quamquam in eo sermone, qui cum Torquato est habitus, non remissi fuimus, tamen haec acrior est cum Stoicis parata contentio. Quae enim de voluptate dicuntur, ea nec acutissime nec abscondite disseruntur; neque enim, qui defendunt eam, versuti in disserendo sunt nec, qui contra dicunt, causam difficilem repellunt; **3.** ipse etiam dicit Epicurus, ne argumentandum quidem esse de voluptate, quod sit positum iudicium eius in sensibus, ut commoneri nos satis sit, nihil attineat doceri. Quare illa nobis simplex fuit in utramque partem disputatio. Nec enim in Torquati sermone quidquam implicatum aut tortuosum fuit, nos-

1. **dignitati,** 'moral worth'. 3. **dicit Epicurus.** Cf. i. 30.

traque, ut mihi videtur, dilucida oratio. Stoicorum autem, non ignoras, quam sit subtile vel spinosum potius disserendi genus, idque cum Graecis, tum magis nobis, quibus etiam verba parienda sunt imponendaque nova rebus novis nomina. Quod quidem nemo mediocriter doctus mirabitur, cogitans, in omni arte, cuius usus vulgaris communisque non sit, multam novitatem nominum esse, cum constituantur earum rerum vocabula, quae in quaque arte versentur. **4**. Itaque et dialectici et physici verbis utuntur iis, quae ipsi Graeciae nota non sint; geometrae vero et musici, grammatici etiam, more quodam loquuntur suo; ipsae rhetorum artes, quae sunt totae forenses atque populares, verbis tamen in docendo quasi privatis utuntur ac suis.

II. Atque ut omittam has artes elegantes et ingenuas, ne opifices quidem tueri sua artificia possent, nisi vocabulis uterentur nobis incognitis, usitatis sibi. Quin etiam agri cultura, quae abhorret ab omni politiore elegantia, tamen eas res, in quibus versatur, nominibus notavit novis. Quo magis hoc philosopho faciendum est; ars est enim philosophia vitae, de qua disserens arripere verba de foro non potest. **5**. Quamquam ex omnibus philosophis Stoici plurima novaverunt, Zenoque, eorum princeps, non tam rerum inventor fuit quam verborum novorum. Quod si in ea lingva, quam plerique uberiorem putant, concessum est, ut doctissimi homines de rebus non pervagatis inusitatis verbis uterentur, quanto id nobis magis est concedendum, qui ea nunc primum audemus attingere? Et quoniam saepe diximus, et quidem cum aliqua querela non Graecorum modo, sed eorum etiam, qui se Graecos magis quam nostros haberi volunt, nos non modo non vinci a Graecis verborum copia, sed esse in ea etiam superiores, elaborandum est, ut hoc non in nostris solum artibus, sed etiam in illorum ipsorum

4. **rhetorum artes**, 'text-books of rhetoric'. The Greek τέχναι.

arripere verba de foro, 'commandeer the vocabulary of the man in the street'. *arripere* is often used in C.'s speeches of unceremoniously appropriating what happens to serve one's turn.

5. **non tam rerum inventor**: a chief point in C.'s criticism of Zeno in Bk. iv. where see cc. 8, 20–22.

assequamur. Quamquam ea verba, quibus instituto veterum utimur pro Latinis, ut ipsa philosophia, ut rhetorica, dialectica, grammatica, geometria, musica, quamquam Latine ea dici poterant, tamen, quoniam usu percepta sunt, nostra ducamus. Atque haec quidem de rerum nominibus. 6. De ipsis rebus autem saepenumero, Brute, vereor, ne reprehendar, cum haec ad te scribam, qui cum in philosophia, tum in optimo genere philosophiae tantum processeris. Quod si facerem quasi te erudiens, iure reprehenderer. Sed ab eo plurimum absum neque, ut ea cognoscas, quae tibi notissima sunt, ad te mitto, sed quia facillime in nomine tuo acquiesco et quia te habeo aequissimum eorum studiorum, quae mihi communia tecum sunt, existimatorem et iudicem. Attendes igitur, ut soles, diligenter, eamque controversiam diiudicabis, quae mihi fuit cum avunculo tuo, divino ac singulari viro. 7. Nam in Tusculano cum essem vellemque e bibliotheca pueri Luculli quibusdam libris uti, veni in eius villam, ut eos ipse, ut solebam, depromerem. Quo cum venissem, M. Catonem, quem ibi esse nescieram, vidi in bibliotheca sedentem, multis circumfusum Stoicorum libris. Erat enim, ut scis, in eo aviditas legendi, nec satiari poterat; quippe qui ne reprensionem quidem vulgi inanem reformidans in ipsa curia soleret legere saepe, dum senatus cogeretur, nihil operae rei publicae detrahens; quo magis tum in summo otio maximaque copia quasi helluari libris, si hoc verbo in tam clara re utendum est, videbatur. 8. Quod cum accidisset, ut alter alterum necopinato videremus, surrexit statim. Deinde prima illa, quae in congressu solemus: Quid tu, inquit, huc? a villa enim, credo; et: Si ibi te esse scissem, ad te ipse venissem. Heri,

usu percepta, i.e. 'usu sic trita, ut intellegantur'. Mdv. who cfs. De Nat. D. ii. 91, 'nomen Graecum, perceptum iam tamen usu a nostris'. Dr. Reid here translates 'thoroughly appropriated'. But is not the point rather that these terms may be regarded as fully naturalised because habitual use has made their meaning familiar? For *percipere nomen* = to know who or what is meant by a name, cf. 'omnium civium nomina perceperat' (De Senec.).

7. **Tusculano.** The magnificence of this villa was referred to, ii. 170. On its library see Plutarch's 'Lucullus,' 42.

inquam, ludis commissis ex urbe profectus veni ad vesperum. Causa autem fuit huc veniendi, ut quosdam hinc libros promerem. Et quidem, Cato, hanc totam copiam iam Lucullo nostro notam esse oportebit; nam his libris eum malo quam reliquo ornatu villae delectari. Est enim mihi magnae curae (quamquam hoc quidem proprium tuum munus est), ut ita erudiatur, ut et patri et Caepioni nostro et tibi tam propinquo respondeat. Laboro autem non sine causa; nam et avi eius memoria moveor (nec enim ignoras, quanti fecerim Caepionem, qui, ut opinio mea fert, in principibus iam esset, si viveret) et L. Lucullus mihi versatur ante oculos, vir cum *virtutibus* omnibus excellens, tum mecum et amicitia et omni voluntate sententiaque coniunctus. **9.** Praeclare, inquit, facis, cum et eorum memoriam tenes, quorum uterque tibi testamento liberos suos commendavit, et puerum diligis. Quod autem meum munus dicis, non equidem recuso, sed te adiungo socium. Addo etiam illud, multa iam mihi dare signa puerum et pudoris et ingenii; sed aetatem vides. Video equidem, inquam; sed tamen iam infici debet iis artibus, quas si, dum est tener, combiberit, ad maiora veniet paratior.—Sic; et quidem diligentius

8. **ludis commissis.** During the Ludi Circenses, held annually from the 4th to the 12th of September, all public business was suspended. We learn from C.'s letters that it was his habit to escape from this Roman 'Bank Holiday' by going to one of his country-houses for a few days' rest and study.

Caepioni. Q. Servius Caepio was Cato's half-brother, and uncle both to the young Lucullus and to Brutus. These various relationships will be best understood from the accompanying table.

M. Livius Drusus (the opponent of Gracchus).
|
Livia m. (1) Q. Servius Caepio. (2) M. Porcius Cato.

Children of (1): Caepio. — Servilia m. M. Junius Brutus. — Servilia m. Lucullus.
Child of (2): Cato.

Servilia m. M. Junius Brutus → Brutus.
Servilia m. Lucullus → Young Lucullus.

Caepionem in the next sentence refers to the same person, though C. by a slip of the pen calls him *avus*, instead of *avunculus*, to young Lucullus. (The elder Caepio, husband of Livia, cannot be meant, as Cicero was barely sixteen when he died.) Caepio was military tribune in the war with Spartacus, and died soon after, in early manhood. Hence C. says that he would have attained the highest positions, *had he lived.* Cato from a child was passionately attached to him. (Plut. Vit. Cat.)

saepiusque ista loquemur inter nos agemusque communiter. Sed residamus, inquit, si placet. Itaque fecimus.

III. **10.** Tum ille: Tu autem, cum ipse tantum librorum habeas, quos hic tandem requiris? Commentarios quosdam, inquam, Aristotelios, quos hic sciebam esse, veni ut auferrem, quos legerem, dum essem otiosus; quod quidem nobis non saepe contingit. Quam vellem, inquit, te ad Stoicos inclinavisses! Erat enim, si cuiusquam, certe tuum nihil praeter virtutem in bonis ducere. Vide, ne magis, inquam, tuum fuerit, cum re idem tibi, quod mihi, videretur, non nova te rebus nomina imponere. Ratio enim nostra consentit, pugnat oratio. Minime vero, inquit ille, consentit. Quidquid enim praeter id, quod honestum sit, expetendum esse dixeris in bonisque numeraveris, et honestum ipsum, quasi virtutis lumen, extinxeris et virtutem penitus everteris. **11.** Dicuntur ista, Cato, magnifice, inquam; sed videsne verborum gloriam tibi cum Pyrrhone et cum Aristone, qui omnia exaequant, esse communem? de quibus, cupio scire, quid sentias. Egone, quaeris, inquit, quid sentiam? quos bonos viros, fortes, iustos, moderatos aut audivimus in re publica fuisse aut ipsi vidimus, qui sine ulla doctrina, naturam ipsam secuti, multa laudabilia fecerunt, eos melius a natura institutos fuisse, quam institui potuissent a philosophia, si ullam aliam probavissent praeter eam, quae nihil aliud in bonis haberet nisi honestum, nihil nisi turpe in malis; ceterae philosophorum disciplinae, omnino alia magis alia, sed tamen omnes, quae rem ullam virtutis expertem aut in bonis aut in malis numerent, eas non modo nihil adiuvare arbitror neque afferre, quo meliores simus, sed ipsam depravare naturam. Nam nisi hoc obtineatur, id solum bonum esse, quod honestum sit, nullo modo probari possit, beatam vitam virtute effici; quod si ita sit, cur opera philosophiae sit danda, nescio. Si enim sapiens aliquis

11. Pyrrhone. For Pyrrho and Aristo see Introd. § 16.

ceterae . . . eas . . . arbitror: a similar anacoluthon to that in ii. 107.

quae rem ullam virtutis expertem. The sense requires *aut vitii* to complete it. If the text is sound, C. has written carelessly, as in iv. 47.

miser esse possit, ne ego istam gloriosam memorabilemque virtutem non magno aestimandam putem.

IV. **12.** Quae adhuc, Cato, a te dicta sunt, eadem, inquam, dicere posses, si sequerere Pyrrhonem aut Aristonem. Nec enim ignoras, iis istud honestum non summum modo, sed etiam, ut tu vis, solum bonum videri; quod si ita est, sequitur id ipsum, quod te velle video, omnes semper beatos esse sapientes. Hosne igitur laudas et hanc eorum, inquam, sententiam sequi nos censes oportere? Minime vero istorum quidem, inquit. Cum enim virtutis hoc proprium sit, earum rerum, quae secundum naturam sint, habere delectum, qui omnia sic exaequaverunt, ut in utramque partem ita paria redderent, uti nulla selectione uterentur, hi virtutem ipsam sustulerunt. **13.** Istud quidem, inquam, optime dicis; sed quaero, nonne tibi faciendum idem sit, nihil dicenti bonum, quod non rectum honestumque sit, reliquarum rerum discrimen omne tollenti. Si quidem, inquit, tollerem; sed relinquo. **14.** Quonam modo? inquam. Si una virtus, unum istud, quod honestum appellas, rectum, laudabile, decorum (erit enim notius, quale sit, pluribus notatum vocabulis idem declarantibus), id igitur, inquam, si solum est bonum, quid habebis praeterea, quod sequare? aut, si nihil malum, nisi quod turpe, inhonestum, indecorum, pravum, flagitiosum, foedum (ut hoc quoque pluribus nominibus insigne faciamus), quid praeterea dices esse fugiendum? Non ignoranti tibi, inquit, quid sim dicturus, sed aliquid, ut ego suspicor, ex mea brevi responsione arripere cupienti non respondebo ad singula; explicabo potius, quoniam otiosi sumus, nisi alienum putas, totam Zenonis Stoicorumque sententiam. Minime id quidem, inquam,

ne ego. νή, ναί; 'nay,' 'verily.' Only used with a personal pron. Cf. § 40, *ne tu, inquam, Cato*.

12. selectione. For this Stoic term (ἐκλογή) see n. on § 20. By the Stoic definition, Virtue was essentially concerned with discrimination and choice among things which were neither right nor wrong *per se*, but relatively preferable in proportion as they were 'consonant with nature'. To abolish this function by levelling all distinction between these neutral things (so that e.g. to sit in wet clothes or to change them would be no ease for *selectio*, because keeping well and getting rheumatic fever are *paria*) was therefore to abolish Virtue.

alienum, multumque ad ea, quae quaerimus, explicatio tua ista profecerit. **15.** Experiamur igitur, inquit; etsi habet haec Stoicorum ratio difficilius quiddam et obscurius. Nam cum in Graeco sermone haec ipsa quondam rerum nomina novarum * * non videbantur, quae nunc consvetudo diuturna trivit; quid censes in Latino fore? Facillimum id quidem est, inquam. Si enim Zenoni licuit, cum rem aliquam invenisset inusitatam, inauditum, quoque ei rei nomen imponere, cur non liceat Catoni? Nec tamen exprimi verbum e verbo necesse erit, ut interpretes indiserti solent, cum sit verbum, quod idem declaret, magis usitatum; equidem soleo etiam, quod uno Graeci, si aliter non possum, idem pluribus verbis exponere. Et tamen puto concedi nobis oportere, ut Graeco verbo utamur, si quando minus occurret Latinum, ne hoc 'ephippiis' et 'acratophoris' potius quam 'proëgmenis' et 'apoproëgmenis' concedatur. Quamquam haec quidem 'praeposita' recte et 'reiecta' dicere licebit. **16.** Bene facis, inquit, quod me adiuvas; et istis quidem, quae modo dixisti, utar potius Latinis; in ceteris subvenies, si me haerentem videbis. Sedulo, inquam, faciam. Sed fortuna fortes; quare conare, quaeso. Quid enim possumus hoc agere divinius?

V. Placet his, inquit, quorum ratio mihi probatur, simul atque natum sit animal (hinc enim est ordiendum), ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari ad se conservandum et [ad] suum statum eaque, quae conservantia sunt eius status,

15. novarum * *: *nova erant, ferenda* (Mdv.) best completes the sense.' 'In the days when these same names were novel in Greek, people thought them unendurable.'

Nec tamen exprimi verbum e verbo. 'There will be no need to represent each term by its literal Latin equivalent, if there is a more familiar term which means the same thing.' So C. rejects *morbi* for *πάθη*, infra 35. But sometimes there was no choice; cf. Acad. ii. 31, '*κατάληψιν*, quam . . . verbum e verbo exprimentes comprehensionem dicemus'.

16. fortuna fortes, sc. *iuvat*. A familiar proverb.

hinc enim est ordiendum. This definition of the primary instinct common to all animate creatures, and of its object, was the starting-point of Stoic Ethics. Cf. Diog. L. vii. 85, *Τὴν πρώτην ὁρμήν φασι τὸ ζῶον ἴσχειν ἐπὶ τὸ τηρεῖν ἑαυτό, οἰκειούσης αὐτῷ τῆς φύσεως ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, καθά φησιν ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ τελῶν, πρῶτον οἰκεῖον λέγων εἶναι παντὶ ζώῳ τὴν αὐτου σύστασιν καὶ τὴν ταύτης σύνδεσιν.* C. renders *σύστασις* (constitution) by *status*; *ταύτης σύνδεσις* by *conservantia eius status.*

diligenda, alienari autem ab interitu iisque rebus, quae interitum videantur afferre. Id ita esse sic probant, quod ante, quam voluptas aut dolor attigerit, salutaria appetant parvi aspernenturque contraria, quod non fieret, nisi statum suum diligerent, interitum timerent. Fieri autem non posset, ut appeterent aliquid, nisi sensum haberent sui eoque se diligerent. Ex quo intellegi debet, principium ductum esse a se diligendo. **17.** In principiis autem naturalibus plerique Stoici non putant voluptatem esse ponendam. Quibus ego vehementer assentior, ne, si voluptatem natura posuisse in iis rebus videatur, quae primae appetuntur, multa turpia sequantur. Satis esse autem argumenti videtur, quamobrem illa, quae prima sunt ascita natura, diligamus, quod est nemo, quin, cum utrumvis liceat, aptas malit et integras omnes partes corporis quam, eodem usu, imminutas aut detortas habere. Rerum autem cognitiones (quas vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones vel, si haec verba aut minus placent aut minus intelleguntur, καταλήψεις appellemus licet), eas igitur ipsas propter se asciscendas arbitramur, quod habeant quiddam in se quasi complexum et continens veritatem. Id autem in parvis intellegi potest, quos delectari videamus, etiamsi eorum nihil intersit, si

Fieri autem non posset, ut appeterent aliquid. That *sensus sui* is necessary to *appetitio* is of course a psychological error. 'The baby, new to earth and sky, What time his tender palm is prest Upon the circle of the breast, Has never felt that "This is I."' *principium* is here used like ἀρχή, 'self-love is the beginning, or first spring' (of action).

17. In principiis. The *principia naturalia*, called below, *quae prima natura appetuntur* and *prima ascita natura* (i.e. which nature prompts us to adopt) are τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν, 'first objects according to nature.' C. most commonly calls them *prima naturae*; v. Introd. § 26 n. for other equivalents. They may be roughly summed up as 'mens sana in corpore sano'. On the Stoic view that Pleasure is not one of these objects of instinctive appetition, cf. Diog. L. vii. 86, Ὃ δὲ λέγουσί τινες, πρὸς ἡδονὴν γίγνεσθαι τὴν πρώτην ὁρμὴν τοῖς ζώοις, ψεῦδος ἀποφαίνουσιν· ἐπιγέννημα γάρ φασιν, εἰ ἄρα ἐστίν, ἡδονὴν εἶναι, ὅταν αὐτὴν καθ' αὑτὴν ἡ φύσις ἐπιζητήσασα τὰ ἁρμόζοντα τῇ συστάσει (things suitable to the organism) ἀπολάβῃ. Pleasure then is a sort of by-product arising from the satisfaction of natural wants. Aristotle too had regarded it as not the end but a concomitant of action, but whereas he held that it was a kind of natural bloom or finish resulting from activity in perfection, the Stoics held that it resulted from *decaying* activity, and was so to speak the bloom of fruit already passing from ripeness to rottenness. Cf. also v. 45.

videamus, Causal subjunctive.

quid ratione per se ipsi invenerint. **18.** Artes etiam ipsas propter se assumendas putamus, cum quia sit in iis aliquid dignum assumptione, tum quod constent ex cognitionibus et contineant quiddam in se ratione constitutum et via. A falsa autem assensione magis nos alienatos esse quam a ceteris rebus, quae sint contra naturam, arbitrantur. Iam membrorum, id est, partium corporis alia videntur propter eorum usum a natura esse donata, ut manus, crura, pedes, ut ea, quae sunt intus in corpore, quorum utilitas quanta sit, a medicis etiam disputatur, alia autem nullam ob utilitatem quasi ad quendam ornatum, ut cauda pavoni, plumae versicolores columbis, viris mammae atque barba. **19.** Haec dicuntur fortasse ieiunius; sunt enim quasi prima elementa naturae, quibus ubertas orationis adhiberi vix potest; nec equidem eam cogito consectari; verum tamen cum de rebus grandioribus dicas, ipsae res verba rapiunt; ita fit cum gravior, tum etiam splendidior oratio. Est, ut dicis, inquam; sed tamen omne, quod de re bona dilucide dicitur, mihi praeclare dici videtur. Istiusmodi autem res dicere ornate velle puerile est, plane autem et perspicue expedire posse docti et intellegentis viri.

VI. **20.** Progrediamur igitur, quoniam, inquit, ab his principiis naturae discessimus, quibus congruere debent, quae sequuntur. Sequitur autem haec prima divisio:

18. cum quia sit: a mere statement of identity. 'The arts are choiceworthy.' Why? Because there is something choiceworthy in them!

constent ex cognitionibus, 'are built up from' (Reid). Every art, according to the Stoics, was a *σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων*.

arbitrantur, sc. *Stoici*, whom Cato throughout indifferently speaks of as 'we' and 'they'.

id est, partium. Not of course added to explain what are meant by *membra*, but by way of reminder—'in other words, the *parts of the body*' (referred to above, as one half of our composite nature).

19. sunt enim quasi prima elementa naturae. 'They are as it were Nature's A B C.' Cf. Hor. Sat. i. 1, 25, 'ut pueris olim dant crustula blandi | doctores, elementa velint ut discere prima'.

ipsae res verba rapiunt, 'the style rises with the subject'.

20. prima divisio. Introduced here as the starting-point of the Stoic theory of Virtue. The other *divisiones* connected with it are treated of, 50 sq. (*Deinceps explicatur differentia rerum*). *Aestimabile* = ἀξίαν ἔχον; inaestimabile = ἀπαξίαν ἔχον; *sumere* or *eligere* = λαμβάνειν, ἐκλέγεσθαι; *reicere* = ἀπεκλέγεσθαι. The Stoics reserved αἱρεῖσθαι (*expetere*) and φεύγειν to denote choice

Aestimabile esse dicunt (sic enim, ut opinor, appellemus) id, quod aut ipsum secundum naturam sit aut tale quid efficiat, ut selectione dignum propterea sit, quod aliquod pondus habeat dignum aestimatione, quam illi *ἀξίαν* vocant, contraque inaestimabile, quod sit superiori contrarium. Initiis igitur ita constitutis, ut ea, quae secundum naturam sunt, ipsa propter se sumenda sint contrariaque item reicienda, primum est officium (id enim appello *καθῆκον*), ut se conservet in naturae statu, deinceps ut ea teneat, quae secundum naturam sint, pellatque contraria; qua inventa selectione et item reiectione, sequitur deinceps cum officio selectio, deinde ea perpetua, tum ad extremum constans consentaneaque naturae, in qua primum inesse incipit et intellegi, quid sit, quod vere bonum possit dici. **21.** Prima est enim conciliatio hominis ad ea, quae sunt secundum naturam; simul autem cepit intellegentiam vel notionem potius, quam appellant *ἔννοιαν* illi, viditque rerum agendarum ordinem et, ut ita dicam, concordiam, multo eam pluris aestimavit quam omnia illa, quae prima dilexerat, atque ita cognitione et ratione collegit, ut statueret, in eo collocatum summum illud hominis per se laudandum et expetendum bonum; quod cum positum sit in eo,

and rejection of *goods and evils* (i.e. virtue and vice).

καθῆκον. For the meaning of this Stoic term see on § 58. *Hominis* is wanted with *officium*, to supply the subject to the following verbs. Cf. infra, *Prima . . . conciliatio hominis . . . simul autem cepit.* [The omission of a 3rd sing. indef. subject is common in legal formulas, otherwise rare except when the subject is implied in a previous clause; 'ita amare oportere ut si aliquando esset osurus'. H. R.]

inventa selectione, 'discovered' not by mankind, for it is an instinctive process, but by philosophers as the starting-point of a theory. *Selectio* is first unconsciously exercised, as by children (16); later, when the agent has learnt the grounds of his preferences and aversions, deliberately. This is *selectio cum officio*, for which satisfactory grounds can be assigned (58). C. inaccurately calls the first stage *primum officium*, whereas *καθῆκον* applies only to the second.

inesse incipit et intellegi. At this third stage, the Good (Virtue) and the idea of Goodness come into being. C. might have written *inesse bonum*, but having added *intellegi*, uses a periphrasis.

21. quae prima dilexerat, i.e. the *prima naturae* (17, *quae primae appetuntur*).

in eo collocatum. We might expect *in ea*; but cf. v. 37, *in eoque*, where *vita* is the antecedent.

quod ὁμολογίαν Stoici, nos appellemus convenientiam, si placet,—cum igitur in eo sit id bonum, quo omnia referenda sunt, honeste facta ipsumque honestum, quod solum in bonis ducitur, quamquam post oritur, tamen id solum vi sua et dignitate expetendum est, eorum autem, quae sunt prima naturae, propter se nihil est expetendum. **22.** Cum vero illa, quae officia esse dixi, proficiscantur ab initiis naturae, necesse est ea ad haec referri, ut recte dici possit, omnia officia eo referri, ut adipiscamur principia naturae, nec tamen ut hoc sit bonorum ultimum, propterea quod non inest in primis naturae conciliationibus honesta actio; consequens est enim et post oritur, ut dixi. Est tamen ea secundum naturam multoque nos ad se expetendam magis hortatur quam superiora omnia. Sed ex hoc primum error tollendus est, ne quis sequi existimet, ut duo sint ultima bonorum. Ut enim si cui propositum sit collineare hastam aliquo aut sagittam, sic nos ultimum in bonis dicimus. [sic illi, facere omnia, quae possit, ut collineet.] Huic, in eiusmodi similitudine, omnia sint facienda, ut collineet, et tamen, ut omnia faciat, quo propositum assequatur, sit hoc quasi ultimum, quale nos summum in vita bonum dicimus, illud autem, ut feriat, quasi seligendum, non expetendum.

quod ὁμολογίαν Stoici. *τὴν ὁμολογίαν λέγουσι (οἱ Στ.) τέλος εἶναι* (Stob. Ecl. Eth. p. 136); 'virtus convenientia constat' (Seneca, Ep. 74, 30).

honeste facta ipsumque honestum. 'Moral actions' (*κατορθώματα*) as concrete manifestations of 'morality,' are themselves goods, and *expetenda* (22, 55); hence C. here combines them with *honestum* as subject to *ducitur*, etc.

22. Ut enim si cui. 'For suppose a man were to set himself to *take a true aim* with javelin or arrow at some mark . . . that purpose of his answers to the Chief End as defined by us. In this illustration, the man's whole endeavour must be *to take a true aim*; and, *nevertheless* (a caution against identifying *aiming straight* and *hitting what you aim at*), his Chief End, as one might call it, answering to what we call the Chief Good in human life is *to do all he can to accomplish his purpose* (ut omnia faciat, quo propositum assequatur), whereas the incidental result of *hitting the mark* is, in our parlance, an object of preference to him, not an object of endeavour.' The Stoics had to meet the objection (urged by Carneades), 'If you say action starts from instinctive appetition, your Chief Good must be to acquire the *prima naturae*. But Virtue is not one of the *prima naturae*, so you set up two Chief Goods.' Their answer was, 'Right endeavour, not success, is the aim of action, and this *is* Virtue'.

VII. **23.** Cum autem omnia officia a principiis naturae proficiscantur, ab iisdem necesse est proficisci ipsam sapientiam. Sed quemadmodum saepe fit, ut is, qui commendatus sit alicui, pluris eum faciat, cui commendatus, quam illum, a quo sit, sic minime mirum est, primo nos sapientia commendari ab initiis naturae, post autem ipsam sapientiam nobis cariorem fieri, quam illa sint, a quibus ad hanc venerimus. Atque ut membra nobis ita data sunt, ut ad quandam rationem vivendi data esse appareant, sic appetitio animi, quae ὁρμή Graece vocatur, non ad quodvis genus vitae, sed ad quandam formam vivendi videtur data, itemque et ratio et perfecta ratio. **24.** Ut enim histrioni actio, saltatori motus non quivis, sed certus quidam est datus, sic vita agenda est certo genere quodam, non quolibet; quod genus conveniens consentaneumque dicimus. Nec enim gubernationi aut medicinae similem sapientiam esse arbitramur, sed actioni illi potius, quam modo dixi, et saltationi, ut in ipsa insit, non foris petatur extremum, id est, artis effectio. Et tamen est etiam alia cum his ipsis artibus sapientiae dissimilitudo,

23. Cum autem omnia: not strictly true. Virtue does not proceed from the *principia* (=*prima*) *naturae* in the same sense as do *officia*, which spring directly from the instinct of self-preservation. It only comes into being when man begins to act in conscious obedience to the Law of the Universe. But our instinctive appetitions include the desire of mental development and of knowledge (§§ 17, 18), and these, as C. more accurately adds, give us an introduction to Virtue, as to a new friend and patron.

Atque ut membra. The Stoics took from Aristotle the ascending scale of Life in three stages: (1) the life of nutrition and growth (plants), (2) vegetative life + sentience and motion (animals), and (3) animal life + reason (man). They, however, made ὁρμή, instinctive appetition, the special *differentia* of animal life. Each stage shows an 'increasing purpose' and power of adaptation to Nature's ends. As we are here dealing with Man, this is first asserted of his *membra*, i.e. the organs of the vegetative life which he has in common with plants. Cf. the imaginary Vine in iv. 38, which has (1) ὁρμή, (2) reason, superadded to its proper 'life'. *perfecta ratio* = *virtus*.

appareant: rare personal use where *appareat* would be regular. Cf. v. 58, *ut plane, qualia sint, intellegantur*.

24. Et tamen est etiam alia. 'A difference of another kind (from the above-mentioned difference between wisdom and the arts of navigation and medicine) exists between wisdom and those very arts (of acting and dancing), notwithstanding' (*tamen*) the *resemblance* just noticed.

propterea quod in illis, quae recte facta sunt, non continent tamen omnes partes, e quibus constant; quae autem nos aut recta aut recte facta dicamus, si placet, illi autem appellant κατορθώματα, omnes numeros virtutis continent. Sola enim sapientia in se tota conversa est, quod idem in ceteris artibus non fit. **25.** Inscite autem medicinae et gubernationis ultimum cum ultimo sapientiae comparatur. Sapientia enim et animi magnitudinem complectitur et iustitiam et ut omnia, quae homini accidant, infra se esse iudicet, quod idem ceteris artibus non contingit. Tenere autem virtutes eas ipsas, quarum modo feci mentionem, nemo poterit, nisi statuerit, nihil esse, quod intersit aut differat aliud ab alio, praeter honesta et turpia.

26. Videamus nunc, quam sint praeclare illa his, quae iam posui, consequentia. Cum enim hoc sit extremum

non continent, i.e. in acting or dancing, the perfect execution of any one action does not involve corresponding perfection in all the various actions which constitute the subject-matter of the art. The best tragedian need not be the best comedian, nor the best waltzer the best ballet-dancer. But every virtuous act is a complete manifestation of all the virtues. Ὁ κατὰ μίαν ἀρετὴν ὁτιοῦν ἐνεργῶν κατὰ πάσας ἐνεργεῖ (Stobaeus Ecl. Eth. pp. 112, 116).

numeros, 'categories,' answers to *partes* just above. One definition of κατόρθωμα was καθῆκον πάντας ἐπέχον τοὺς ἀριθμούς (Stob. l.c. p. 124).

25. Inscite . . . comparatur. Why? Because, in the case of Virtue, the activity itself is the End (as also in the case of such arts as acting, dancing), whereas in the case of medicine, the End is something extraneous (*artis effectio*, viz. health). This sentence comes awkwardly between two which refer to the oneness of Virtue (Mdv.). May its true place be before *Nec enim gubernationi* supra, which gives the above explanation of the difference between the two *ultima*? We should then have *Sola enim sapientia* . . . followed by *Sapientia enim* . . . but cf. Acad. ii. 108, where Dr. Reid notes that 'two successive clauses are not uncommonly introduced by *enim* in Cic.'

et ut omnia . . . iudicet virtually repeats *animi magnitudinem*. As *sapientia* = Virtue but also that mode or aspect of it which is Wisdom in the specific sense of the term, we might expect this statement to be that Wisdom embraces the other three cardinal Virtues, but C. writing hastily, puts a definition of *high-mindedness* in the third place, thus giving Courage twice over and omitting Temperance. The Stoics defined Justice as ἐπιστήμη ἀπονεμητικὴ τῆς ἀξίας ἑκάστῳ (i.e. the knowledge or science of distributing to every man his due); similarly Courage is the knowledge of what ought to be feared, Temperance the knowledge of what ought to be desired.

quod intersit . . . aliud ab alio. For *interesse a* = *differre a*, cf. Acad. ii. 27, *a falsis interesse*; 83, *quod ab eo nihil intersit.*

26. illa, 'the following statements,' introduced by *enim.* Cf. supra i. 18, 32; and the Gk. τάδε· ἐπειδὴ γάρ.

(sentis enim, credo, me iam diu, quod τέλος Graeci dicunt, id dicere tum extremum, tum ultimum, tum summum; licebit etiam finem pro extremo aut ultimo dicere)—cum igitur hoc sit extremum, congruenter naturae convenienterque vivere, necessario sequitur, omnes sapientes semper feliciter, absolute, fortunate vivere, nulla re impediri, nulla prohiberi, nulla egere. Quod autem continet non magis eam disciplinam, de qua loquor, quam vitam fortunasque nostras, id est, ut, quod honestum sit, id solum bonum iudicemus, potest id quidem fuse et copiose et omnibus electissimis verbis gravissimisque sententiis rhetorice et augeri et ornari; sed consectaria me Stoicorum brevia et acuta delectant. VIII. **27.** Concluduntur igitur eorum argumenta sic: Quod est bonum, omne laudabile est; quod autem laudabile est, omne est honestum; bonum igitur quod est, honestum est. Satisne hoc conclusum videtur? Certe; quod enim efficiebatur ex iis duobus, quae erant sumpta, in eo vides esse conclusum. Duorum autem, e quibus effecta conclusio est, contra superius dici solet, non omne bonum esse laudabile; nam, quod laudabile sit, honestum esse, conceditur. Illud autem perabsurdum, bonum esse aliquid, quod non expetendum sit, aut expetendum, quod non placens, aut, si id, non etiam diligendum; ergo et probandum; ita etiam laudabile; id autem honestum. Ita fit, ut, quod bonum sit, id etiam honestum sit. **28.** Deinde quaero, quis aut de misera vita possit gloriari aut de non beata. De sola igitur beata. Ex quo efficitur, gloriatione, ut ita dicam, dignam esse beatam vitam, quod non possit nisi honestae vitae iure

27. Quod est bonum. Chrysippus, quoted by Plutarch (De Stoic. Repugn. 13, p. 1039 c), Τὸ ἀγαθὸν αἱρετόν· τὸ δ' αἱρετὸν ἀρεστόν· τὸ δ' ἀρεστὸν ἐπαινετόν· τὸ δ' ἐπαινετὸν καλόν· καὶ πάλιν· τὸ ἀγαθὸν χαρτόν· τὸ δὲ χαρτὸν σεμνόν· τὸ δὲ σεμνὸν καλόν. (With this last cf. infr. the proof from *gloriatio*. C. uses two more steps than Chrysippus, *diligendum* and *probandum*; but there were doubtless several Greek variants of these *consectaria*.)

28. quod non possit. We should expect *id autem non potest*, for the clause is logically a minor premiss, independent of *efficitur*. But C. substitutes a relative clause defining the predicate of the major premiss, 'a thing which cannot, etc.'

contingere. Ita fit, ut honesta vita beata vita sit. Et quoniam is, cui contingit, ut iure laudetur, habet insigne quiddam ad decus et ad gloriam, ut ob ea, quae tanta sint, beatus dici iure possit, idem de vita talis viri rectissime dicetur. Ita, si beata vita honestate cernitur, quod honestum est, id bonum solum habendum est. **29.** Quid vero? negarine ullo modo possit, *numquam* quemquam stabili et firmo et magno animo, quem fortem virum dicimus, effici posse, nisi constitutum sit, non esse malum dolorem? Ut enim, qui mortem in malis ponit, non potest eam non timere, sic nemo ulla in re potest id, quod malum esse decreverit, non curare idque contemnere; quo posito et omnium assensu approbato, illud assumitur, eum, qui magno sit animo atque forti, omnia, quae cadere in hominem possint, despicere ac pro nihilo putare. Quae cum ita sint, effectum est, nihil esse malum, quod turpe non sit. Atque iste vir altus et excellens, magno animo, vere fortis, infra se omnia humana ducens, is, inquam, quem efficere volumus, quem quaerimus, certe et confidere sibi debet ac suae vitae et actae et consequenti et bene de sese iudicare, statuens nihil posse mali incidere sapienti. Ex quo intellegitur idem illud, solum bonum esse, quod honestum sit, idque esse beate vivere, honeste, id est, cum virtute vivere.

IX. **30.** Nec vero ignoro, varias philosophorum fuisse sententias, eorum dico, qui summum bonum, quod ultimum appello, in animo ponerent. Quae quamquam vitiose quidam secuti sunt, tamen non modo iis tribus, qui virtutem a summo bono segregaverunt, cum aut voluptatem aut vacuitatem doloris aut prima naturae in summis bonis ponerent, sed etiam alteris tribus, qui mancam fore putaverunt sine aliqua

29. idque esse beate vivere id est, 'and that to live happily is *this*, namely . . .'. The pronoun is used to mark a coming definition, iv. 71, *id est convenienter vivere, a natura discedere*, and v. 19, *id honestum sit, facere omnia*, etc.

30. vitiose. But it is the views themselves that are 'false,' not the inferences drawn from them. Mdv. proposes *qui quamquam vitiosa quaedam secuti. . . .*

iis tribus: Epicurus, Hieronymus, Carneades. The second three are Polemo, Calliphon, Diodorus. See ii. 35.

accessione virtutem ob eamque rem trium earum rerum, quas supra dixi, singuli singulas addiderunt, his tamen omnibus eos antepono, cuicuimodi sunt, qui summum bonum in animo atque in virtute posuerunt. **31**. Sed sunt tamen perabsurdi et ii, qui cum scientia vivere ultimum bonorum, et qui nullam rerum differentiam esse dixerunt, atque ita sapientem beatum fore, nihil aliud alii momento ullo anteponentem, *et qui*, ut quidam Academici constituisse dicuntur, extremum bonorum et summum munus esse sapientis obsistere visis assensusque suos firme sustinere. His singulis copiose responderi solet, sed quae perspicua sunt, longa esse non debent. Quid autem apertius quam, si selectio nulla sit ab iis rebus, quae contra naturam sint, earum rerum, quae sint secundum naturam, † tollatur omnis ea, quae quaeratur laudeturque, prudentia? Circumscriptis igitur iis sententiis, quas posui, et iis, si quae similes earum sunt, relinquitur, ut summum bonum sit vivere scientiam adhibentem earum rerum, quae natura eveniant, seligentem, quae secundum naturam, et, quae contra naturam sint, reicientem, id est, convenienter congruenterque naturae vivere. **32**. Sed in ceteris artibus cum dicitur 'artificiose,'

31. Sed sunt tamen. Erillus placed the Chief Good in Knowledge, Pyrrho and Aristo in ἀδιαφορία. See ii. 43.

ut quidam Academici . . . dicuntur. C. so expresses himself because no theory of the Chief Good was definitively adopted by the school. According to Sextus Empiricus, Arcesilas taught Τέλος εἶναι τὴν ἐποχήν, i.e. withholding of judgments (*assensus* = συγκατα-θέσεις).

† tollatur. C. obviously means *quam . . . tolli omnem*, etc. Read *fore ut tollatur* (Lambinus), or *Quid autem apertius? Nam*, etc. (Mdv. Ussing). [Müller considers this an anacoluthon.]

Circumscriptis, lit. 'bracketed,' i.e. put out of the reckoning. Cf. Verr. i. 43, *hoc omni tempore Sullano ex accusatione circumscripto.*

id est, convenienter. For *id est* = *id est enim*, cf. i. 33; for the definition *convenienter . . . naturae vivere*, and the interpretation of it contained in the preceding *vivere . . . reicientem*, see iv. 14 n.

32. Sed in ceteris . . . Every art is an activity. In the case of the other arts [ )(Virtue which is *ars vivendi*] the term *artificiose* must be taken as applying to the finished product (which is 'subsequent to and a result of' the activity itself). This product the Stoics call ἐπι-γεννηματικόν, i.e. of the nature of an ἐπιγέννημα or 'after-birth,' because e.g. in the art of sculpture, a statue 'artistically' wrought is the concomitant of the sculptor's completed activity, but not *part of* that activity. If Pheidias had died before putting the final touches to his Zeus, though his every stroke was faultless, we could not pronounce the result to be *artificiose*

posterum quodam modo et consequens putandum est, quod illi ἐπιγεννηματικόν appellant; cum autem in quo 'sapienter' dicimus, id a primo rectissime dicitur.—Quidquid enim a sapiente proficiscitur, id continuo debet expletum esse omnibus suis partibus; in eo enim positum est id, quod dicimus esse expetendum.—Nam ut peccatum est patriam prodere, parentes violare, fana depeculari, quae sunt in effectu, sic timere, sic maerere, sic in libidine esse peccatum est etiam sine effectu. Verum ut haec non in posteris et in consequentibus, sed in primis continuo peccata sunt, sic ea, quae proficiscuntur a virtute, susceptione prima, non perfectione, recta sunt iudicanda.

X. **33.** Bonum autem, quod in hoc sermone totiens usurpatum est, id etiam definitione explicatur. Sed eorum definitiones paulum oppido inter se differunt, et tamen eodem spectant. Ego assentior Diogeni, qui bonum definierit id, quod esset natura absolutum. Id autem sequens illud etiam, quod prodesset (ὠφέλημα enim sic appellemus), motum aut statum esse dixit e natura absoluto.

factum. But when we say a man has acted 'virtuously,' we are thinking of his act itself, not only apart from its consequences, but as complete from the moment it began. For *sapienter* (*recte*) characterises *doing*, whereas *artificiose* characterises *the thing done*.

33. Bonum autem . . . explicatur, i.e. by the Stoics, 'whose definitions vary slightly but all come to the same thing'. But they never attempted a thorough-going discussion of the meaning of Good. Their so-called definitions consisted either in mere enumeration of 'goods' and effects of Goodness, or in explaining the term by another equally ambiguous term, e.g. ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ὠφέλειαν ἢ οὐκ ἕτερον ὠφελείας (Diog. L. vii. 94). With the above definition of Diogenes ('Babylonius,' on whom v. Introd. § 16) cf. that in Diog. L. l.c. τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλειον κατὰ φύσιν λογικοῦ ὡς λογικοῦ.

definierit, causal subj.; it is implied, though very obscurely, that Diogenes' definition is superior to the rest.

Id autem sequens. In consonance with his definition of Good as 'that which is by nature perfect' (τέλειον κατὰ φύσιν), Diogenes defined 'beneficial' (*quod prodesset*, ὠφέλημα) as 'a condition resulting from that which is by nature perfect'. The Stoics distinguished between Virtue (the Good) in the abstract, and the condition (active or passive) which Virtue produced in the soul, and called the latter ὠφέλημα. Ὠφέλημα οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν, τὸ σωφρονεῖν (Stobaeus, Ecl. Eth. p. 158). Ὠφελεῖν they defined as κινεῖν ἢ ἴσχειν κατ' ἀρετήν (Diog. L. vii. 104), or, as Diogenes expressed it, κατὰ τὸ τέλειον κατὰ φύσιν (φύσει). C. renders this by *motum aut statum e natura absoluto.* The last three words = *ex eo quod esset natura absolutum*; *natura-absoluto* being treated as one word.

Cumque rerum notiones in animis fiant, si aut usu aliquid cognitum sit aut coniunctione aut similitudine aut collatione rationis, hoc quarto, quod extremum posui, boni notitia facta est. Cum enim ab iis rebus, quae sunt secundum naturam, ascendit animus collatione rationis, tum ad notionem boni pervenit. **34.** Hoc autem ipsum bonum non accessione

Cumque rerum notiones cet. Sextus Emp. (Adv. Mathem. iii. 40) gives the same four ways in which notions, or concepts, are formed in the mind, *Καθόλου τε πᾶν τὸ νοούμενον κατὰ δύο τοὺς πρώτους ἐπινοεῖται τρόπους· ἢ γὰρ κατὰ περίπτωσιν ἐναργῆ ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναργῶν μετάβασιν, καὶ ταύτην τρισσήν· ἢ γὰρ ὁμοιωτικῶς ἢ ἐπισυνθετικῶς ἢ ἀναλογιστικῶς.* (Cf. ibid. ix. 393, and Diog. L. vii. 52–53.) C. does not, like Sextus, divide notions into two main classes, according as they are or are not directly derived from sense perception, and he loosely renders *περίπτωσιν* (i.e. the presentation of objects to the senses) by *usum* (experience). *Conjunctio* (*ἐπισύνθεσις*) is the combination in the mind of two such presentations, e.g. we get the notion of a Centaur by 'conjunctio' of the notions 'man' and 'horse'. *Similitudo* (*ὁμοιώτης*) is the resemblance which being perceived to exist between two objects, e.g. a man and his photograph, gives us a notion of the one when we see the other. *Collatio rationes* (*ἀναλογία*) is the resemblance not between the objects themselves, but between their relations, which may be always expressed as a *proportion*, thus e.g. there is an analogy between a priest and a shepherd, not that a priest resembles a shepherd, but a priest : his parishioners :: a shepherd : his flock.

hoc quarto . . . boni notitia facta est. Cf. Seneca (Ep. 120–4) on the question 'quomodo ad nos prima boni honestique notitia pervenerit'. Rejecting the view of some that we have hit on the conception of virtue by chance, he says, 'Nobis videtur observatio collegisse et rerum saepe factarum inter se collatio; *per analogiam* nostri (i.e. Stoici) intellectum et honestum et bonum putant.' So C. says that 'the mind attains the notion of the good' when it advances from simply contemplating a number of objects which are 'in harmony with nature' (i.e. good of their kind), by employing this analogical reasoning. We see, e.g. that a certain breed of horse is swift, that a certain kind of vine produces the best grapes, that a certain doctor cures his patients, and by analogy we grasp what it is that these so different objects have in common, and we call it goodness. Horse, vine and doctor can only be compared in respect of their relation to something else, and we find that the relation is the same in each case; they all fulfil well their proper function.

34. non accessione. Cato adds a caution. Though we get the notion of good in the way just described, we must not think that 'the good' itself differs only *in degree* from that kind of excellence which we perceive in 'objects which are in harmony with nature'. Virtue alone is 'the good,' and we must not predicate 'goodness' of any object either on account of its possessing a superlative degree of excellence, or in comparison with other objects. This is the point of *ascendit*, just above. The mind rises from contemplating natural excellencies to a new and higher conception. But their paradox, 'Nothing is good but Virtue,' lands the Stoics in a serious difficulty when they try to derive the notion of good from sense-perception 'per analogiam'. For analogy is essentially a matter of proportion (*αὐξητική* or *μειωτική* Sextus Emp. l.c.), and although by that process we reach the notion of natural excellence, still if there is a difference *in*

neque crescendo aut cum ceteris comparando, sed propria vi sua et sentimus et appellamus bonum. Ut enim mel, etsi dulcissimum est, suo tamen proprio genere saporis, non comparatione cum aliis dulce esse sentitur, sic bonum hoc, de quo agimus, est illud quidem plurimi aestimandum, sed ea aestimatio genere valet, non magnitudine. Nam cum aestimatio, quae ἀξία dicitur, neque in bonis numerata sit nec rursus in malis, quantumcumque eo addideris, in suo genere manebit. Alia est igitur propria aestimatio virtutis, quae genere, non crescendo valet. **35.** Nec vero perturbationes animorum, quae vitam insipientium miseram acerbamque reddunt—quas Graeci πάθη appellant, poteram ego, verbum ipsum interpretans, morbos appellare, sed non conveniret ad omnia; quis enim misericordiam aut ipsam iracundiam morbum solet dicere? at illi dicunt πάθος; sit igitur perturbatio, quae nomine ipso vitiosa declarari videtur; [nec eae perturbationes vi aliqua naturali moventur;] omnesque eae sunt genere quattuor, partibus plures, aegritudo, formido, libido, quamque Stoici communi nomine corporis et animi ἡδονήν appellant, ego malo laetitiam appellare, quasi gestientis animi elationem voluptariam;

kind between natural excellence and goodness, how can we establish a ratio between them?

quae ἀξία dicitur, i.e. the 'value' which belongs to things which are 'seligenda,' but not 'expetenda.' This ἀξία and that of Virtue differ generically, and cannot be reduced to a common standard. See on §§ 20, 44.

35. **Nec vero perturbationes.** This nom. left suspended by the digression *quas Graeci*, etc., should not be regarded as resumed by *perturbationes autem.* Mdv. compares De Off. i. 153 and shews (1) the intended statement was 'the sapiens is free from emotions,' (2) *nec . . . moventur* is an interpolation, (3) 'numquam sic poni *autem*, quae particula id, quod proxime praecessit, continuat, etiam contrario adiungendo; contra *sed* ea, quae interposita sunt, sic abrumpit, ut, illis relictis, oratio ad primam sententiam redit.' *appellant, poteram . . . appellare*, asyndeton; so infra *appellant, ego malo . . . appellare. poteram*, idiomatic indic. of a modal vb. in apodosis to a condition contrary to fact (*si conveniret* understood); *poteram appellare* = appellassem. This section on the wise man's immunity from emotions, like § 49 on Wealth, seems an excerpt from C.'s Stoic authority, which he has inserted regardless of its irrelevance to the question of the Finis.

sunt genere quattuor. The four *genera* with their species or subdivisions (*partibus*) answer to a fourfold division of objects of emotion, viz. present or future imaginary Good, and present or future imaginary Evil (*imaginary* because the only real Good and Evil are Virtue and Vice).

perturbationes autem nulla naturae vi commoventur, omniaque ea sunt opiniones ac iudicia levitatis; itaque his sapiens semper vacabit.

XI. **36**. Omne autem, quod honestum sit, id esse propter se expetendum, commune nobis est cum multorum aliorum philosophorum sententiis. Praeter enim tres disciplinas, quae virtutem a summo bono excludunt, ceteris omnibus philosophis haec est tuenda sententia, maxime tamen his, qui nihil aliud in bonorum numero nisi honestum esse voluerunt. Sed haec quidem est perfacilis et perexpedita defensio. Quis est enim aut quis umquam fuit aut avaritia tam ardenti aut tam effrenatis cupiditatibus, ut eandem illam rem, quam adipisci scelere quovis velit, non multis partibus malit ad sese, etiam omni impunitate proposita, sine facinore quam illo modo pervenire? **37**. Quam vero utilitatem aut quem fructum petentes scire cupimus, illa, quae occulta nobis sunt, quomodo moveantur quibusque de causis ea quae versantur in caelo? Quis autem tam agrestibus institutis vivit aut quis contra studia naturae tam vehementer obduruit, ut a rebus cognitione dignis abhorreat easque sine voluptate aut utilitate aliqua non requirat et pro nihilo putet? aut quis est, qui maiorum, ut Africanorum aut eius, quem tu in ore semper habes, proavi mei ceterorumque virorum fortium atque omni virtute praestantium facta, dicta, consilia cognoscens nulla animo afficiatur voluptate? **38**. Quis autem honesta in familia institutus et educatus ingenue non ipsa turpitudine, etiamsi eum laesura non sit,

omniaque ea, i.e. *omnes perturbationes*. This agreement with the most important, though not the nearest, noun in the predicate (*iudicia*) seems unparalleled. On the doctrine that the emotions were simply perverted judgments and had no origin in man's natural constitution, see Introd. § 16.

36. tres disciplinas. Those who 'exclude Virtue' are (1) Epicurus, (2) Aristippus, (3) Hieronymus, (4) Carneades (§ 30). But C. takes (1) and (2) together as representing Hedonism. *disciplinas* is not strictly accurate, for Hieronymus founded no school, and Carneades merely advanced the view here referred to for the sake of argument, nor was it adopted by the Academy.

haec . . . defensio, idiomatic for *huius rei defensio*, like *hic dolor*, 'indignation on this account,' etc.

37. proavi: Cato Censor (cos. 195 B.C.) C. delighted in praising his rugged virtues, and made him the chief speaker in the dialogue De Senectute.

offenditur? quis animo aequo videt eum, quem impure ac flagitiose putet vivere? quis non odit sordidos, vanos, leves, futiles? Quid autem dici poterit, si turpitudinem non ipsam per se fugiendam esse statuemus, quo minus homines tenebras et solitudinem nacti nullo dedecore se abstineant, nisi eos per se foeditate sua turpitudo ipsa deterreat? Innumerabilia dici possunt in hanc sententiam; sed non necesse est. Nihil est enim, de quo minus dubitari possit, quam et honesta expetenda per se et eodem modo turpia per se esse fugienda. **39.** Constituto autem illo, de quo ante diximus, quod honestum esset, id esse solum bonum, intellegi necesse est, pluris id, quod honestum sit, aestimandum esse quam illa media, quae ex eo comparentur. Stultitiam autem et timiditatem et iniustitiam et intemperantiam cum dicimus esse fugienda propter eas res, quae ex ipsis eveniant, non ita dicimus, ut cum illo, quod positum est, solum id esse malum, quod turpe sit, haec pugnare videatur oratio, propterea quod ea non ad corporis incommodum referuntur, sed ad turpes actiones, quae oriuntur e vitiis. Quas enim *κακίας* Graeci appellant, vitia malo quam malitias nominare.

XII. **40.** Ne tu, inquam, Cato, verbis illustribus et id, quod vis, declarantibus! Itaque mihi videris Latine docere philosophiam et ei quasi civitatem dare; quae quidem adhuc peregrinari Romae videbatur nec offerre sese nostris sermonibus, et ista maxime propter limatam quandam et rerum et verborum tenuitatem. Scio enim esse quosdam, qui quavis lingva philosophari possint; nullis enim partitionibus, nullis definitionibus utuntur, ipsique dicunt, ea se modo probare, quibus natura tacita assentiatur; itaque in rebus minime obscuris non multus est apud eos disserendi labor. Quare attendo te studiose

39. quae ex eo (honesto) comparentur. These 'media' (*ἀδιάφορα*) are 'procured' by Virtue in the sense that Virtue exercises a perpetual 'selection' of things consonant with nature. Cf. 20 n.

vitia . . . malitias: the same discussion of these terms in Tusc. iv. 34.

40. Ne tu. See § 11 n.

quosdam: the Epicureans. Cf. i. 22, 30.

et, quaecumque rebus iis, de quibus hic sermo est, nomina imponis, memoriae mando; mihi enim erit iisdem istis fortasse iam utendum. Virtutibus igitur rectissime mihi videris et ad consvetudinem nostrae orationis vitia posuisse contraria. Quod enim vituperabile est per se ipsum, id eo ipso vitium nominatum puto, vel etiam a vitio dictum vituperari. Sin κακίαν malitiam dixisses, ad aliud nos unum certum vitium consvetudo Latina traduceret; nunc omni virtuti vitium contrario nomine opponitur. **41.** Tum ille: His igitur ita positis, inquit, sequitur magna contentio, quam tractatam a Peripateticis mollius—(est enim eorum consvetudo dicendi non satis acuta propter ignorationem dialecticae) Carneades tuus egregia quadam exercitatione in dialecticis summaque eloquentia rem in summum discrimen adduxit, propterea quod pugnare non destitit, in omni hac quaestione, quae de bonis et malis appelletur, non esse rerum Stoicis cum Peripateticis controversiam, sed nominum. Mihi autem nihil tam perspicuum videtur, quam has sententias eorum philosophorum re inter se magis quam verbis dissidere; maiorem multo inter Stoicos et Peripateticos rerum esse aio discrepantiam quam verborum, quippe cum Peripatetici omnia, quae ipsi bona appellant, pertinere dicant ad beate vivendum, nostri non ex omni, quod aestimatione aliqua dignum sit, compleri vitam beatam putent.

iam utendum, 'soon'. Cf. i. 37, Erit . . . iam.

ad aliud, i.e. *malitia* commonly denotes one species of *vitium*, and we want a term for the genus. 'Vitia' is the best name for the whole class of things which are opposed to the class 'virtutes'. *Aliud* (for which *aliquod* has been proposed) will stand; *ad aliud unum certum* is C.'s slipshod way of combining *ad aliud* (i.e. ad aliam rem) with *ad unum certum.*

41. quam tractatam a Peripat. mollius. Mdv.'s reasons for doubting that we have here an anacoluthon are hardly convincing. He suggests deleting *rem.* The school of Aristotle, strangely enough, entirely neglected Logic after Theophrastus. Strabo (xiii. 609) says they could not φιλοσοφεῖν πραγματικῶς, ἀλλὰ θέσεις ληκυθίζειν.

quae . . . appelletur. If this clause belongs to the reported statement of Carneades (*non esse*, etc.) we want *appellaretur*, if it is interjected by Cato we want *appellatur*. If C. wrote *appelletur* it was because he confused those two alternatives. Cf. iv. 16, *numeretur.*

maiorem multo: emphatic reassertion of this cardinal difference, on which see iv. cc. i.–ix. xx.–xxiii.

XIII. **42.** An vero certius quidquam potest esse, quam illorum ratione, qui dolorem in malis ponunt, non posse sapientem beatum esse, cum eculeo torqueatur? Eorum autem, qui dolorem in malis non habent, ratio certe cogit, ut in omnibus tormentis conservetur beata vita sapienti. Etenim si dolores eosdem tolerabilius patiuntur, qui excipiunt eos pro patria, quam qui leviore de causa, opinio facit, non natura, vim doloris aut maiorem aut minorem. **43.** Ne illud quidem est consentaneum, ut, si, cum tria genera bonorum sint, quae sententia est Peripateticorum, eo beatior quisque sit, quo sit corporis aut externis bonis plenior, ut hoc idem approbandum sit nobis, ut, qui plura habeat ea, quae in corpore magni aestimantur, sit beatior. Illi enim corporis commodis compleri vitam beatam putant, nostri nihil minus. Nam cum ita placeat, ne eorum quidem bonorum, quae nos bona vere appellemus, frequentia beatiorem vitam fieri aut magis expetendam aut pluris aestimandam, certe minus ad beatam vitam pertinet multitudo corporis commodorum. **44.** Etenim, si et sapere expetendum sit et valere, con-

42. illorum ratione, 'according to their theory'. The opposition in principle between the two schools is next shown from their respective views of what constitutes *evil*. Reckoning pain among evils, the Peripatetics could not assent to the Stoic paradox that a wise man is happy on the rack.

tolerabilius = tolerantius. Cf. *tolerabiliter ferre = toleranter ferre*, *amabiliter = amanter*, etc., in C.'s correspondence.

43. consentaneum, ut, si . . . plenior, ut hoc. The repetition of *ut* does not do much to rescue this sentence from awkwardness. The gist of it is, 'Again, if it is asserted (*si*) that, since there are three kinds of goods (of mind, body and estate, which make up happiness), a man is happier the more he has of bodily or external goods, we Stoics cannot consistently accept this dictum, viz. that a man is happier, etc.' (*ut, qui plura habeat . . . beatior sit*). Note that *quae in corpore*, etc., in this epexegetical *ut* clause (for which cf. iii. 6) = *corporis aut externa bona* above, and includes (like *corporis commoda* infra) the whole class of things reckoned as goods by the Peripatetics, except Virtue.

quae nos bona, i.e. acts of virtue, κατορθώματα. (Cf. 21, 22, 25.) On the Stoic view the happiness of the wise man could not be increased by the multitude of his good deeds, for every one of his actions was not only virtuous, but a complete manifestation of each and every form of Virtue, and it mattered nothing how many such actions he had the opportunity of performing (46). *Appellemus*, because its clause forms part of the sentence depending on *placeat*.

44. si et sapere. For the Peripatetics wisdom and health were both 'expetenda'; for the Stoics wisdom (= virtue) was *expetendum*,

iunctum utrumque magis expetendum sit quam sapere solum, neque tamen, si utrumque sit aestimatione dignum, pluris sit coniunctum quam sapere ipsum separatim. Nam, qui valetudinem aestimatione aliqua dignam iudicamus neque eam tamen in bonis ponimus, iidem censemus, nullam esse tantam aestimationem, ut ea virtuti anteponatur; quod idem Peripatetici non tenent, quibus dicendum est, quae et honesta actio sit et sine dolore, eam magis esse expetendam, quam si esset eadem actio cum dolore. Nobis aliter videtur; recte secusne, postea; sed potestne rerum maior esse dissensio?

XIV. **45.** Ut enim obscuratur et offunditur luce solis lumen lucernae, et ut interit *in* magnitudine maris Aegaei stilla mellis et ut in divitiis Croesi teruncii accessio et gradus unus in ea via, quae est hinc in Indiam, sic, cum sit is bonorum finis, quem Stoici dicunt, omnis ista rerum corporearum aestimatio splendore virtutis et magnitudine obscuretur et obruatur atque intereat, necesse est. Et quemadmodum oportunitas (sic enim appellemus *εὐκαιρίαν*) non fit maior productione temporis (habent enim suum modum, quae oportuna dicuntur), sic recta effectio (*κατόρθωσιν* enim ita appello, quoniam rectum factum *κατόρθωμα*), recta igitur effectio, item convenientia, denique ipsum bonum, quod in eo positum est, ut naturae consentiat, crescendi accessionem nullam habet. **46.** Ut enim oportunitas illa, sic haec, de quibus dixi, non fiunt temporis productione maiora, ob eamque causam Stoicis non videtur

but health merely *sumendum*, and though *utrumque sit aestimatione dignum*, the 'value' of wisdom cannot be augmented by adding the generically different 'value' of health. We cannot add our marks in the Tripos to our balance at the bank. Cf. 34 n.

45. Et quemadmodum. Having shown that happiness is not increased from without, Cato now shows that it does not grow from within (*crescendi accessionem nullam habet*). Cf. 34, where he said Good is not so named *accessione neque crescendo*.

ut consentiat naturae. The grammatical subject is *bonum*, but bonum itself does not 'agree with nature'. C.'s meaning, loosely expressed, is 'which consists in agreement with nature' (Mdv. But is not the subject 'man' or 'the creature' understood? For the omission cf. 20 n. *καθῆκον*).

46. Stoicis non videtur. Plutarch, de Stoic. Repugn. 26, p. 1046 C, Ἐν πολλοῖς εἴρηκεν ὁ Χρύσιππος, ὅτι παρὰ τὸν πλεῖστον χρόνον οὐδὲν μᾶλλον εὐδαιμονοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπ' ἴσης τοῖς τὸν ἀμερῆ χρόνον εὐδαιμονίας μετα-

optabilior nec magis expetenda beata vita, si sit longa, quam si brevis; utunturque simili: Ut, si cothurni laus illa esset, ad pedem apte convenire, neque multi cothurni paucis anteponerentur nec maiores minoribus, sic, quorum omne bonum convenientia atque oportunitate finitur, *ea* nec plura paucioribus nec longinquiora brevioribus anteponentur. **47.** Nec vero satis acute dicunt: Si bona valetudo pluris aestimanda sit longa quam brevis, sapientiae quoque usus longissimus quisque sit plurimi. Non intellegunt, valetudinis aestimationem spatio iudicari, virtutis oportunitate; ut videantur, qui illud dicant, iidem hoc esse dicturi, bonam mortem et bonum partum meliorem longum esse quam brevem. Non vident, alia brevitate pluris aestimari, alia diuturnitate. **48.** Itaque consentaneum est his, quae dicta sunt, ratione illorum, qui illum bonorum finem, quod appellamus extremum, quod ultimum, crescere putent posse, iisdem placere, esse alium alio etiam sapientiorem, itemque alium magis alio vel peccare vel recte facere, quod nobis non licet dicere, qui crescere bonorum finem non putamus. Ut enim, qui demersi sunt in aqua, nihilo magis respirare possunt, si non longe absunt a summo, ut iam iamque possint emergere, quam si etiam tum essent in profundo, nec catulus ille, qui iam appropinquat, ut videat, plus cernit quam is, qui modo est natus, item, qui processit aliquantum ad virtutis habitum, nihilo minus in miseria est quam ille, qui nihil processit.

XV. Haec mirabilia videri intellego; sed cum certe superiora firma ac vera sint, his autem ea consentanea et

σχοῦσιν. Chrysippus, as Plutarch remarks, was therefore inconsistent in declaring that, although a fool could be converted into a *sapiens*, a death-bed conversion profited nothing.

48. iisdem placere, redundant, after *ratione illorum*. C. had in mind to write *ratione illorum, qui . . . crescere putent posse, esse . . . etiam*, etc. (cf. 32, *illorum ratione, qui dolorem in malis ponunt, non posse*, etc.). Cato has said (43) that the Peripatetics hold one man may be happier than another; he now adds that they *also* hold one man may be wiser than another. On the Stoic doctrines here touched on, including προκοπή, see Introd. § 14.

Ut enim. Plutarch (adv. Stoic. 10, p. 1063 A) gives the similes of a drowning man, and of a blind man about to be restored to sight.

ad virtutis habitum, πρὸς ἕξιν ἀρετῆς. Cf. iv. 38, *cum hominem ad rationis habitum perduxerit*.

consequentia, ne de horum quidem est veritate dubitandum. Sed quamquam negant nec virtutes nec vitia crescere, tamen utrumque eorum fundi quodam modo et quasi dilatari putant. **49.** Divitias autem Diogenes censet non eam modo vim habere, ut quasi duces sint ad voluptatem et ad valetudinem bonam, sed etiam uti ea contineant, non idem facere eas in virtute neque in ceteris artibus, ad quas esse dux pecunia potest, continere autem non potest; itaque si voluptas aut si bona valetudo sit in bonis, divitias quoque in bonis esse ponendas; at, si sapientia bonum sit, non sequi, ut etiam divitias bonum esse dicamus. Neque ab ulla re, quae non sit in bonis, id, quod sit in bonis, contineri potest; ob eamque causam, quia cognitiones comprensionesque rerum, e quibus efficiuntur artes, appetitionem movent, cum divitiae non sint in bonis, nulla ars divitiis contineri potest. **50.** Quod si de artibus concedamus, virtutis tamen non sit

fundi quodam modo. Cf. Seneca, Epist. 74, 28, 'Modo latius virtus *funditur*, regna, urbes, provincias temperat, fert leges, colit amicitias, inter propinquos liberosque dispensat officia, modo arto fine circumdatur paupertatis, exilii, orbitatis . . .' Though there are no degrees in virtue or vice, they may be exercised on a larger or smaller scale. The Virtue which gives a cup of cold water is only 'expanded,' not enhanced, when its possessor beggars himself to feed the poor.

49. Divitias, one of C.'s abrupt digressions. The value of wealth is a topic out of place in a systematic exposition of the Finis. Diogenes' argument, as reproduced by C., is somewhat involved. The gist of it is this: (1) wealth is essential to pleasure and to health, but not to virtue or the arts, ∴ if pleasure and health are goods, so is wealth, but if wisdom (virtue) is a good, it does not follow that wealth is. (Thus Peripatetics must, and Stoics need not, reckon wealth among goods.) (2) No not-good is essential to a good (this is introduced by *Neque* as a fresh statement, though assumed in (1)); wealth is a not-good, ∴ wealth is not essential to *the arts*. This implies, of course, that the arts are goods, which is at first sight inconsistent with the dogma that virtue is the sole good. See next note.

cognitiones, καταλήψεις. These, 'which form the raw material of the arts, excite appetition,' i.e. they are among the *prima naturae* (17). But the *prima naturae* are not *bona*, and Diogenes, as if conscious that he has not proved his point, adds (50), '*But even if we grant this in the case of the arts*' (viz. that wealth *is* essential to them). The Stoics did however declare both the καταλήψεις and the arts *of the wise man* to be goods (Plutarch, adv. Stoic. 7, p. 1061 C), and also πάντα ἀγνοεῖν τὸν φαῦλον. But they did not go so far as to say, only the wise man had καταλήψεις—how could they, seeing that they held most, if not all, mankind were fools—and nowhere else reckon καταλήψεις per se among goods.

50. virtutis tamen. 'The same argument will not apply to virtue.' Why not? Because Virtue demands more thought, practice, steadfastness, etc., than the arts! The subjunctives show that Diogenes is still

eadem ratio, propterea quod haec plurimae commentationis et exercitationis indigeat, quod idem in artibus non sit, et quod virtus stabilitatem, firmitatem, constantiam totius vitae complectatur nec haec eadem in artibus esse videamus.

Deinceps explicatur differentia rerum; quam si non ullam esse diceremus, confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristone, neque ullum sapientiae munus aut opus inveniretur, cum inter res eas, quae ad vitam degendam pertinerent, nihil omnino interesset neque ullum dilectum adhiberi oporteret. Itaque cum esset satis constitutum, id solum esse bonum, quod esset honestum, et id malum solum, quod turpe, tum inter illa, quae nihil valerent ad beate misereve vivendum, aliquid tamen, quod differret, esse voluerunt, ut essent eorum alia aestimabilia, alia contra, alia neutrum. **51.** Quae autem aestimanda essent, eorum in aliis satis esse causae, quamobrem quibusdam anteponerentur, ut in valetudine, ut in integritate sensuum, ut in doloris vacuitate, ut gloriae, divitiarum, similium rerum, alia autem non esse eiusmodi; itemque eorum, quae nulla aestimatione digna essent, partim satis habere causae, quamobrem reicerentur, ut dolorem, morbum, sensuum amissionem, paupertatem, ignominiam, similia horum, partim non item. Hinc est illud exortum, quod Zeno *προηγμένον*, contraque quod *ἀποπροηγμένον* nominavit, cum uteretur in lingva copiosa

quoted; if correctly, his proof that 'Wealth is not essential to Virtue' could hardly be feebler.

differentia rerum, i.e. of those which are *ἀδιάφορα* in the wider sense (*media*, 53, 58, 59).

alia aestimabilia, alia contra: *ἀξίαν ἢ ἀπαξίαν ἔχοντα* (*ἐκλεκτικὴν ἢ ἀπεκλεκτικήν, συμβλητικὴν δὲ πρὸς τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον οὐδαμῶς*, Stobaeus, Ecl. Eth. p. 142), and hence *ὁρμῆς ἢ ἀφορμῆς κινητικά, ληπτὰ ἢ ἄληπτα*.

neutrum, indifferent in the strict sense; *καθάπαξ ἀδιάφορα*. Stobaeus l.c. gives as examples, putting out a finger in this or that direction, and having an odd or even number of hairs on one's head.

51. eorum in aliis. Thus the class *aestimabilia*, or things having *ἀξία*, is subdivided into (1) things preferable, *προηγμένα* (defined as those which have *ἱκανὴν*, or *πολλὴν ἀξίαν*), (2) things having not enough *ἀξία* to make them preferable. Similarly, the class *nulla aestimatione digna*, or things having *ἀπαξία*, contains (1) *ἀποπροηγμένα*, (2) things having not enough *ἀπαξία* to make them rejectable. But the second subdivision in each class are practically *καθάπαξ ἀδιάφορα*.

ut gloriae. C., by a slip of the pen, adds these examples of *external* to those of *bodily προηγμένα*, in a different case, as if he had begun *aliorum satis esse . . . ut anteponantur . . . ut valetudinis*, etc.

factis tamen nominibus ac novis, quod nobis in hac inopi lingva non conceditur; quamquam tu hanc copiosiorem etiam soles dicere. Sed non alienum est, quo facilius vis verbi intellegatur, rationem huius verbi faciendi Zenonis exponere.

XVI. **52**. Ut enim, inquit, nemo dicit, in regia regem ipsum quasi productum esse ad dignitatem (id est enim *προηγμένον*), sed eos, qui in aliquo honore sunt, quorum ordo proxime accedit, ut secundus sit, ad regium principatum, sic in vita non ea, quae primo ordine sunt, sed ea, quae secundum locum obtinent, *προηγμένα*, id est, producta nominentur; quae vel ita appellemus (id erit verbum e verbo) vel promota et remota vel, ut dudum diximus, praeposita vel praecipua, et illa reiecta. Re enim intellecta, in verborum usu faciles esse debemus. **53**. Quoniam autem omne, quod est bonum, primum locum tenere dicimus, necesse est, nec bonum esse nec malum hoc, quod praepositum vel praecipuum nominamus; idque ita definimus, quod sit indifferens cum aestimatione mediocri; quod enim illi *ἀδιάφορον* dicunt, id mihi ita occurrit ut indifferens dicerem. Neque enim illud fieri poterat ullo modo, ut nihil relinqueretur in mediis, quod aut secundum naturam esset aut contra, nec, cum id relinqueretur, nihil in his poni, quod satis aestimabile esset, nec, hoc posito, non aliqua esse praeposita. **54**. Recte igitur haec facta distinctio est; atque etiam ab iis, quo facilius res perspici

factis, 'coined for the occasion'.

52. Ut enim, inquit. Stobaeus, Ecl. Eth. p. 156, Οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἶναι προηγμένον, διὰ τὸ μεγίστην ἀξίαν αὐτὰ ἔχειν, τὸ δὲ προηγμένον, τὴν δευτέραν χώραν καὶ ἀξίαν ἔχον, συνεγγίζειν πως τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φύσει. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν αὐλῇ τῶν προηγουμένων εἶναι τὸν βασιλέα, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μετ' αὐτὸν τεταγμένους.

primo ordine. MSS. *primario loco*, but *primarius* means 'first-class,' not 'first'. Mdv. conjectures that *primo ordine* became *primorie* (so one MS.), then *primario*, to which *loco* was added.

promota et remota. C. should have given the Latin equivalents for *προηγμένα* only, but adds their contraries. Cf. i. 41, v. 90.

53. Neque enim illud. 'It was inevitable that (1) the class *media* should include some things which are either according to nature or the reverse (i.e. which have either ἀξία or ἀπαξία), and, this being so, that (2) these things should include some which have "moderate" ἀξία, and, granting (2), that (3) there should be some things which are "preferred".'

possit, hoc simile ponitur: Ut enim, inquiunt, si hoc fingamus esse quasi finem et ultimum, ita iacere talum, ut rectus assistat, qui ita talus erit iactus, ut cadat rectus, praepositum quiddam habebit ad finem, qui aliter, contra, neque tamen illa praepositio tali ad eum, quem dixi, finem pertinebit, sic ea, quae sunt praeposita, referuntur illa quidem ad finem, sed ad eius vim naturamque nihil pertinent. **55.** Sequitur illa divisio, ut bonorum alia sint ad illud ultimum pertinentia (sic enim appello, quae τελικά dicuntur; nam hoc ipsum instituamus, ut placuit, pluribus verbis dicere, quod uno non poterimus, ut res intellegatur), alia autem efficientia, quae Graeci ποιητικά, alia utrumque. De pertinentibus nihil est bonum praeter actiones honestas, de efficientibus nihil praeter amicum, sed et pertinentem et efficientem sapientiam volunt esse. Nam quia sapientia est conveniens actio, est in illo pertinenti genere, quod dixi; quod autem honestas actiones affert et efficit, efficiens dici potest.

XVII. **56.** Haec, quae praeposita dicimus, partim sunt per se ipsa praeposita, partim quod aliquid efficiunt, partim

54. ut rectus assistat, 'so as to stand upright'. The oblong *talus* was said to be *rectus* when lying on its narrowest side, *pronus* when on its broadest side. It might fall *rectus* and then roll over. 'A *talus* which falls upright will have a sort of preferableness in relation to the proposed end of throwing a highest possible, and a *talus* which falls otherwise will have the reverse, nevertheless that preferableness will be something distinct from attainment of that end.' To take a modern illustration, if my *finis* is a good serve at lawn-tennis, a ball which goes over the net is 'preferred' to a ball which does not, because it comes nearer to attaining my end. It may prove a 'fault' all the same, in which case, though it fails of being *bonum*, it remains *praepositum*, for 'preferred' does not imply '*attaining* the end'.

55. Sequitur illa divisio. Diog. L. vii. 96, Ἔτι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι τελικά, τὰ δὲ ποιητικά· τὸν μὲν οὖν φίλον καὶ τὰς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γινομένας ὠφελείας ποιητικὰ εἶναι ἀγαθά· θάρσος δὲ καὶ φρόνημα καὶ ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τέρψιν καὶ εὐφροσύνην καὶ ἀλυπίαν καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν κατ' ἀρετὴν πρᾶξιν τελικά· ποιητικὰ δὲ καὶ τελικὰ εἶναι ἀγαθὰ τὰς ἀρετάς· καθὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀποτελοῦσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ποιητικά ἐστιν ἀγαθά, καθὸ δὲ συμπληροῦσιν αὐτήν, ὥστε μέρη αὐτῆς γίνεσθαι, τελικά. Stobaeus (Ecl. Eth. p. 102) likewise gives the Virtues as examples of ποιητικὰ καὶ τελικά. Cato gives *sapientia* because the Stoics identified Wisdom with Virtue.

56. Haec, quae praeposita. Diog. L. (vii. 107) similarly extends this triple division to *praeposita*, Τῶν προηγμένων τὰ μὲν δι' αὐτὰ προῆκται, τὰ δὲ δι' ἕτερα, τὰ δὲ καὶ δι' αὐτὰ καὶ δι' ἕτερα.

utrumque: per se, ut quidam habitus oris et vultus, ut status, ut motus, in quibus sunt et praeponenda quaedam et reicienda; alia ob eam rem praeposita dicentur, quod ex se aliquid efficiant, ut pecunia, alia autem ob utramque rem, ut integri sensus, ut bona valetudo. **57.** De bona autem fama (quam enim appellant εὐδοξίαν, aptius est bonam famam hoc loco appellare quam gloriam), Chrysippus quidem et Diogenes, detracta utilitate, ne digitum quidem eius causa porrigendum esse dicebant, quibus ego vehementer assentior. Qui autem post eos fuerunt, cum Carneadem sustinere non possent, hanc, quam dixi, bonam famam ipsam propter se praepositam et sumendam esse dixerunt, esseque hominis ingenui et liberaliter educati velle bene audire a parentibus, a propinquis, a bonis etiam viris, idque propter rem ipsam, non propter usum; dicuntque, ut liberis consultum velimus, etiamsi postumi futuri sint, propter ipsos, sic futurae post mortem famae tamen esse propter rem, etiam detracto usu, consulendum. **58.** Sed cum, quod honestum sit, id solum bonum esse dicamus, consentaneum tamen est fungi officio, cum id officium nec in bonis ponamus nec in malis. Est enim aliquid in his rebus probabile, et quidem ita, ut eius ratio

ut quidam habitus, 'such as a certain cast of features and countenance'. *Status* and *motus* make up 'deportment,' to which the Romans attached great importance. Cf. v. 35.

57. De bona autem fama. The earlier Stoics denied that good repute was 'praepositum per se'. Nothing is known of the controversy between Carneades and later Stoics (Antipater? Panaetius?) on this question.

tamen, join with *post mortem,* 'the reputation that will be ours, though after death' (when we cannot profit thereby).

58. Sed cum, quod honestum sit, 'although we hold (1) that morality is the sole good, (2) that duty is neither a good nor an evil, we can consistently practise the fulfilment of duties'. τὸ καθῆκον, lit. the 'fit' or 'appropriate,' which was Zeno's own term, is inadequately rendered by 'officium,' as was seen by Atticus, who criticised C.'s choice of that word. Our 'duty' is still less satisfactory, and is only used here *faute de mieux.* See Introd. § 15.

Est enim in his rebus, i.e. in the sphere of things 'neque bona nec mala'. The Stoics defined τὸ καθῆκον as τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν τῇ ζωῇ, ὃ πραχθὲν εὔλογον ἀπολογισμὸν ἔχει (Diog. L. vii. 107). Hence, as Cato has just stated, 'officia' are not 'bona'; for the only goods are *virtuous* actions, and Virtue consists in a certain congruity (ὁμολόγια) of purpose. For the Stoics, as for Kant, 'There is nothing good but the good will'. We may fulfil all the 'duties of our station,' yet be without Virtue. Nevertheless, the

reddi possit; ergo ut etiam probabiliter acti ratio reddi possit; est autem officium, quod ita factum est, ut eius facti probabilis ratio reddi possit; ex quo intellegitur, officium medium quiddam esse, quod neque in bonis ponatur neque in contrariis. [Quoniamque in iis rebus, quae neque in virtutibus sunt neque in vitiis, est tamen quiddam, quod usui possit esse, tollendum id non est. Est autem eius generis actio quoque quaedam, et quidem talis, ut ratio postulet agere aliquid et facere eorum; quod autem ratione actum est, id officium appellamus; est igitur officium eius generis, quod nec in bonis ponatur nec in contrariis.]

XVIII. **59.** Atque perspicuum etiam illud est, in istis rebus mediis aliquid agere sapientem. Iudicat igitur, cum agit, officium illud esse. Quod quoniam numquam fallitur in iudicando, erit in mediis rebus officium; quod efficitur hac etiam conclusione rationis: Quoniam enim videmus esse quiddam, quod recte factum appellemus, id autem est perfectum officium, erit etiam inchoatum; ut, si iuste depositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis ponatur depositum reddere; illo enim addito, iuste, fit recte factum, per se autem hoc ipsum reddere in officio ponitur. Quoniamque non dubium est, quin in iis, quae media dicamus, sit aliud sumendum, aliud reiciendum, quidquid ita fit aut dicitur, omne officio continetur. Ex quo intellegitur, quoniam se ipsos omnes natura diligant, tam insipientem quam sapientem sumpturum, quae secundum naturam sint, reiecturumque contraria. Ita est quoddam commune officium sapientis et insipientis; ex quo efficitur, versari

Stoic will fulfil them, because the least of them becomes a virtuous action (κατορθῶμα) if done, as we say, on principle. 'Who sweeps a room, *as for Thy laws*, Makes that, and the action, fine.' A καθῆκον in the neutral sense was sometimes distinguished as καθῆκον μέσον from καθῆκον τέλειον, the perfected duty which = κατορθῶμα.

59. quidquid ita fit, 'whatever we do, or describe as being done, in accordance with this principle of selection comes wholly under the category of Duty'; i.e. some actions in the sphere of neutral things are duties.

Ex quo intellegitur. A *non sequitur*, unless *ex quo* refers not to the last conclusion but to the premiss 'some *media* are *sumenda*, and some are *reicienda*'.

in iis, quae media dicamus. **60.** Sed cum ab his omnia proficiscantur officia, non sine causa dicitur, ad ea referri omnes nostras cogitationes, in his et excessum e vita et in vita mansionem. In quo enim plura sunt, quae secundum naturam sunt, huius officium est in vita manere; in quo autem aut sunt plura contraria aut fore videntur, huius officium est e vita excedere. E quo apparet, et sapientis esse aliquando officium excedere e vita, cum beatus sit, et stulti manere in vita, cum sit miser. **61.** Nam bonum illud et malum, quod saepe iam dictum est, postea consequitur; prima autem illa naturae, sive secunda sive contraria, sub iudicium sapientis et dilectum cadunt, estque illa subiecta quasi materia sapientiae. Itaque et manendi in vita et migrandi ratio omnis iis rebus, quas supra dixi, metienda. Nam neque * * * virtute retinetur in vita, nec iis, qui sine virtute sunt, mors est oppetenda. Et saepe officium est sapientis desciscere a vita, cum sit beatissimus, si id oportune facere possit. Sic enim censent, oportunitatis

60. ab his omnia, v. 22. Stobaeus, Ecl. Eth. p. 160, Παραμετρεῖσθαι δὲ τὸ μέσον καθῆκον ἀδιαφόροις τισί, καλουμένοις δὲ παρὰ φύσιν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν, τοιαύτην δὲ εὐφυΐαν προσφερομένοις, ὥστ', εἰ μὴ λαμβάνοιμεν αὐτὰ ἢ διωθοίμεθα ἀπερισπάστως, μὴ ἂν εὐδαιμονεῖν; 'unless we can dispassionately select and reject them, we cannot be happy,' for to do so is the function of virtue.

in his et excessum, i.e. 'inter ceteras cogitationes etiam excedendi e vita et manendi deliberationem'.

61. saepe iam dictum, in §§ 21, 22. In this sentence *prima naturae* which elsewhere always = τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν are oddly made to include things 'contrary to' nature, and stand for the whole range of physical and external conditions which form 'the subject-matter of wisdom' (i.e. of Virtue).

Itaque et manendi. Cf. Stob. Ecl. Eth. p. 226, Φασὶ δέ ποτε καὶ τὴν ἐξαγωγὴν ἐκ τοῦ βίου τοῖς σπουδαίοις καθηκόντως γίγνεσθαι κατὰ πολλοὺς τρόπους, τοῖς δὲ φαύλοις τὴν μονὴν ἐν τῷ ζῆν, καὶ εἰ μὴ μέλλοιεν ἔσεσθαι σοφοί· οὔτε γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν κατέχειν ἐν τῷ ζῆν οὔτε τὴν κακίαν ἐκβάλλειν, τοῖς δὲ καθήκουσι καὶ τοῖς παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον (cf. supra 60, ad *officia* referri, etc.), μετρεῖσθαι τήν τε ζωὴν καὶ τὸν θάνατον. Thus the Stoics held the paradox that it was meet for the happy (virtuous) man to depart from life if he suffered from severe pain or incurable disease, though these were not evils (v. Plutarch, de Stoic. Repug. cc. 14, 18; adv. Stoic. cc. 11, 12). Suicide was in their phrase εὔλογος ἐξαγωγή, whenever a man's life showed a deficit of 'things preferable,' and leading Stoics (including Zeno himself) killed themselves on the most trivial provocation.

neque * * * virtute. The lacuna is evident. The sense requires a subject to *retinetur*,)(*qui sine virtute sunt.* Cf. Stobaeus, l.c. οὔτε γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν κατέχειν ἐν τῷ ζῆν, οὔτε τὴν κακίαν ἐκβάλλειν. Read *neque qui virtute utitur* (Mdv.).

esse beate vivere, quod est convenienter naturae vivere. Itaque a sapientia praecipitur, se ipsam, si usus sit, sapiens ut relinquat. Quamobrem cum vitiorum ista vis non sit, ut causam afferant mortis voluntariae, perspicuum est, etiam stultorum, qui iidem miseri sint, officium esse manere in vita, si sint in maiore parte earum rerum, quas secundum naturam esse dicimus. Et quoniam excedens e vita et manens aeque miser est, nec diuturnitas magis ei vitam fugiendam facit, non sine causa dicitur, iis, qui pluribus naturalibus frui possint, esse in vita manendum.

XIX. **62.** Pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur intellegi, natura fieri, ut liberi a parentibus amentur; a quo initio profectam communem humani generis societatem persequimur. Quod primum intellegi debet figura membrisque corporum, quae ipsa declarant, procreandi a natura habitam esse rationem. Neque vero haec inter se congruere possent, ut natura et procreari vellet et diligi procreatos non curaret. Atque etiam in bestiis vis naturae perspici potest; quarum in fetu et in educatione laborem cum cernimus, naturae ipsius vocem videmur audire. Quare *ut* perspicuum est, natura nos a dolore abhorrere, sic apparet, a natura ipsa, ut eos, quos genuerimus, amemus, impelli. **63.** Ex hoc nascitur, ut etiam communis hominum inter homines naturalis sit commendatio, ut oporteat hominem ab homine ob id ipsum, quod homo sit, non alienum videri. Ut enim in membris alia sunt tamquam sibi nata, ut oculi, ut aures, alia etiam ceterorum membrorum usum adiuvant, ut crura, ut manus, sic immanes quaedam bestiae sibi solum natae sunt, at illa, quae in concha patula pina dicitur, isque, qui enat e

si usus sit: *opportunitas* is implied. 'Wisdom herself bids the wise man desert her,' i.e. cease to be a wise man by ceasing to exist.

62. Pertinere autem. C. enlarges on this theme, which is only briefly touched on in extant Gk. Stoic writings, in De Legibus and De Officiis (i. 50). The Peripatetics, regarding man as ζῷον πολιτικόν, took the same view of the origin of society (see v. 65).

63. naturalis, 'implanted by Nature'.

hominem . . . alienum: a saying turned to comic account in Ter. Haut. 25, Homo sum, nihil humani a me alienum puto.

quae in concha, etc., i.e. *quae in concha patula habitat et pina dicitur.*

concha, qui, quod eam custodit, pinoteres vocatur, in eandemque cum se recepit, includitur, ut videatur monuisse, ut caveret, itemque formicae, apes, ciconiae aliorum etiam causa quaedam faciunt. Multo haec coniunctius homines. Itaque natura sumus apti ad coetus, concilia, civitates. **64.** Mundum autem censent regi numine deorum eumque esse quasi communem urbem et civitatem hominum et deorum, et unumquemque nostrum eius mundi esse partem, ex quo illud natura consequi, ut communem utilitatem nostrae anteponamus. Ut enim leges omnium salutem singulorum saluti anteponunt, sic vir bonus et sapiens et legibus parens et civilis officii non ignarus utilitati omnium plus quam unius alicuius aut suae consulit. Nec magis est vituperandus proditor patriae quam communis utilitatis aut salutis desertor propter suam utilitatem aut salutem. Ex quo fit, ut laudandus is sit, qui mortem oppetat pro re publica, quod deceat cariorem nobis esse patriam quam nosmet ipsos. Quoniamque illa vox inhumana et scelerata ducitur eorum, qui negant se recusare, quo minus, ipsis mortuis, terrarum omnium deflagratio consequatur (quod vulgari quodam versu Graeco pronuntiari solet), certe verum est, etiam iis, qui aliquando futuri sint, esse propter ipsos consulendum. XX. **65.** Ex hac animorum affectione testamenta commendationesque morientium natae sunt. Quodque nemo in summa solitudine vitam agere velit, ne cum infinita quidem voluptatum abundantia, facile intellegitur, nos ad coniunctionem congregationemque hominum et ad naturalem communitatem esse natos. Impellimur autem natura, ut prodesse velimus quam plurimis in primis-

One of Chrysippus' illustrations from natural history, quoted by Athenaeus (iii. p. 89 D). The πίννα is a kind of mussel, which moors itself to rocks by beard-like filaments, in which its so-called guard, a small crab, is often found entangled. Hence the belief in their partnership (cf. Arist. H.A. v. 15, 17; Plin. H.N. ix. 142) and the name πινοτήρης for a parasite (Wasps, 1510).

64. quasi communem urbem. The figure was Zeno's. The government of the world by divine providence (*numen deorum*, προνοία) is a tenet expounded at length, De Nat. Deor. ii. 75 sqq.

illa vox. Ἐμοῦ θανόντος γαῖα μιχθήτω πυρί. The verse is said to have been a pet quotation with Tiberius, and, slightly adapted, with Nero (Suet. Nero, 38). Cf. 'Après moi le déluge'.

que docendo rationibusque prudentiae tradendis. **66**. Itaque non facile est invenire, qui, quod sciat ipse, non tradat alteri; ita non solum ad discendum propensi sumus, verum etiam ad docendum. Atque ut tauris natura datum est, ut pro vitulis contra leones summa vi impetuque contendant, sic ii, qui valent opibus atque id facere possunt, ut de Hercule et de Libero accepimus, ad servandum genus hominum natura incitantur. Atque etiam Iovem cum Optimum et Maximum dicimus, cumque eundem Salutarem, Hospitalem, Statorem, hoc intellegi volumus, salutem hominum in eius esse tutela. Minime autem convenit, cum ipsi inter nos viles neglectique simus, postulare, ut dis immortalibus cari simus et ab iis diligamur. Quemadmodum igitur membris utimur prius, quam didicimus, cuius ea utilitatis causa habeamus, sic inter nos natura ad civilem communitatem coniuncti et consociati sumus. Quod ni ita se haberet, nec iustitiae ullus esset nec bonitati locus. **67.** Sed quomodo hominum inter homines iuris esse vincula putant, sic homini nihil iuris esse cum bestiis. Praeclare enim Chrysippus, cetera nata esse hominum causa et deorum, eos autem communitatis et societatis suae, ut bestiis homines uti ad utilitatem suam possint sine iniuria. Quoniamque ea natura esset hominis, ut ei cum genere humano quasi civile ius intercederet, qui id conservaret, eum iustum, qui migraret, iniustum fore. Sed quemadmodum, theatrum cum commune sit, recte tamen dici potest, eius esse eum locum, quem quisque occuparit, sic in urbe mundove communi non

66. Libero. The legend of Dionysus was rationalised into the life-history of a mortal conqueror who spread the blessings of civilisation wherever he went. Seneca (De Tranq. Anim.) derives the name Liber (which belongs to the old Roman god identified with Dionysus) from the *liberation* of Boeotian towns by the son of Semele!

Salutarem, Hospitalem: *Σωτὴρ* and *Ξένιος*; cult-titles of Zeus. The temple of Jupiter *Stator* (Stayer of Flight) was said to commemorate Romulus' victory over the Sabines.

67. Sed quomodo. Diog. Laert. vii. 129, *Ἔτι ἀρέσκει αὐτοῖς* (the Stoics) *μηδὲν εἶναι ἡμῖν δίκαιον πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα, διὰ τὴν ἀνομοιότητα καθά φησι Χρύσιππος . . . καὶ Ποσειδώνιος.*

eius esse eum locum: *eius* depends on *quisque*; the more natural order of the clauses (*quem quisque occuparit locum, eum eius esse*) is inverted to bring out the antithesis between *commune sit* and *eius esse* (=proprium esse).

adversatur ius, quo minus suum quidque cuiusque sit. **68.** Cum autem ad tuendos conservandosque homines hominem natum esse videamus, consentaneum est huic naturae, ut sapiens velit gerere et administrare rem publicam atque, ut e natura vivat, uxorem adiungere et velle ex ea liberos. Ne amores quidem sanctos a sapiente alienos esse arbitrantur. Cynicorum autem rationem atque vitam alii cadere in sapientem dicunt, si qui eiusmodi forte casus inciderit, ut id faciendum sit, alii nullo modo.

XXI. **69.** Ut vero conservetur omnis homini erga hominem societas, coniunctio, caritas, et emolumenta et detrimenta (quae *ὠφελήματα* et *βλάμματα* appellant) communia esse voluerunt, quorum altera prosunt, nocent altera; neque solum ea communia, verum etiam paria esse dixerunt. Incommoda autem et commoda (ita enim

suum quidque cuiusque sit, i.e. unaquaeque res sit sua cujusque.

68. velit . . . velle. No need, with some MSS., to add *procreare*. *Velle liberas* (cf. quaerere liberos) = *παιδοποιεῖσθαι*, is awkwardly made the object of *velit*, but cf. *ferarum natura . . . natura sua*, ii. 33.

Ne amores quidem. Diog. L. vii. 129, *Καὶ ἐρασθήσεσθαι δὲ τὸν σοφὸν τῶν νέων τῶν ἐμφαινόντων διὰ τοῦ εἴδους τὴν πρὸς ἀρετὴν εὐφυΐαν, ὥς φησι Ζήνων ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ βίων καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν τῇ ἠθικῇ, εἶναι δὲ τὸν ἔρωτα ἐπιβολὴν φιλοποιΐας διὰ κάλλος ἐμφαινόμενον, καὶ μὴ εἶναι συνουσίας, ἀλλὰ φιλίας.* This was borrowed from Plato's philosophy of love.

Cynicorum . . . rationem. Diog. vii. 121, *Κυνιεῖν τε τὸν σοφόν (φασιν)· εἶναι γὰρ τὸν κυνισμὸν σύντομον ἐπ' ἀρετὴν ὁδόν* (a short cut to virtue). On Stoic sympathy with Cynicism, see Introd. § 12.

cadere in sapientem, 'befit the wise man if he happens to be placed in a situation like theirs,' i.e. where some militant protest against social corruption is required. Some Stoics taught that the wise man, if already a Cynic, should remain one, but otherwise should not adopt Cynicism (Stob. Ecl. Eth. p. 238).

69. et emolumenta et detrimenta. *Ὠφελήματα* (= *κατ' ἀρετὴν κινήσεις*) and *βλάμματα* are *moral and immoral actions looked at as productive of certain effects.* Thus moral actions (*τὰ κατορθώματα*) are *emolumenta* (1) to the agent, who participates in the Chief Good by performing them, and (2) through man's solidarity with his kind, and with the Universe, to all other virtuous men. For 'we are all members one of another'. That these *emolumenta* are not only *communia* but *paria* follows from the doctrine that the wise man's greatest and most trivial acts are equally virtuous. Plutarch (adv. Stoic. 22, p. 1068 F) scoffingly observes that the wise man who wisely wags a finger must thereby benefit all the other wise men on the habitable globe, and (33, p. 1076 A) that a philosopher and the Deity are mutual benefactors to an equal extent.

quorum altera . . . altera: added to bring out the proper force of the Greek terms, rendered by *emolumenta* and *detrimenta* in default of nouns derived from *prodesse* and *nocere*.

εὐχρηστήματα et *δυσχρηστήματα* appello) communia esse voluerunt, paria noluerunt. Illa enim, quae prosunt aut quae nocent, aut bona sunt aut mala, quae sint paria necesse est; commoda autem et incommoda in eo genere sunt, quae praeposita et reiecta dicimus; ea possunt paria non esse. Sed emolumenta et detrimenta communia esse dicuntur, recte autem facta et peccata non habentur communia. **70.** Amicitiam autem adhibendam esse censent, quia sit ex eo genere, quae prosunt. Quamquam autem in amicitia alii dicant aeque caram esse sapienti rationem amici ac suam, alii autem sibi cuique cariorem suam, tamen hi quoque posteriores fatentur, alienum esse a iustitia, ad quam nati esse videamur, detrahere quid de aliquo, quod sibi assumat. Minime vero probatur huic disciplinae, de qua loquor, aut iustitiam aut amicitiam propter utilitates ascisci aut probari. Eaedem enim utilitates poterunt eas labefactare atque pervertere. Etenim nec iustitia nec amicitia esse omnino poterunt, nisi ipsae per se expetuntur. **71.** Ius autem, quod ita dici appellarique possit, id esse natura; alienumque esse a sapiente non modo iniuriam

εὐχρηστήματα et δυσχρηστήματα. These terms, only extant in Cicero, answer to *προηγμένα* and *ἀποπροηγμένα*. The conclusion that these are likewise *communia* (so that, e.g. my breaking my leg is a personal misfortune to the rest of mankind) is a reductio ad absurdum of the doctrine that the Universe is an organism; if one member suffers, then the whole suffers with it. On the other hand, *ὠφελήματα* were of course only *communia* among the wise (*μηδένα δὲ φαῦλον μήτε ὠφελεῖσθαι μήτε ὠφελεῖν*, Stob. Ecl. Eth. p. 188), who alone could possess and communicate good. The Stoic inconsistency of combining the doctrine of the oneness of humanity with that of its division into two classes between whom a great gulf was fixed, has its parallel in Calvinism.

Sed emolumenta . . . dicuntur, i.e. *quamquam dicuntur.* C. should have added *et detrimenta.* Moral actions, viewed from the standpoint of results, are *emolumenta* and, so to speak, transferable, but viewed simply as *recta* are non-transferable. This fine-drawn distinction was necessary, if individual responsibility was to be maintained. Otherwise, A's righteous act not merely benefits B, but becomes B's righteous act.

70. ex eo genere, quae, i.e. *ex eorum genere, quae.* Friendship was reckoned among *emolumenta* on account of (1) love received by us, (2) love bestowed by us, being respectively 'external' and 'mental' goods (Stobaeus, Ecl. Eth. p. 186).

Quamquam . . . dicant. For *dicant,* though attested by good MSS., we must read *dicunt,* or else *cum* for *quamquam,* which never takes a subjunctive after it in Cicero, except in potential clauses, and oratio obliqua.

71. Ius . . . esse natura. The Stoics taught *φύσει εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον*

cui facere, verum etiam nocere. Nec vero rectum est cum amicis aut bene meritis consociare aut coniungere iniuriam; gravissimeque et verissime defenditur, numquam aequitatem ab utilitate posse seiungi, et, quidquid aequum iustumque esset, id etiam honestum, vicissimque, quidquid esset honestum, id iustum etiam atque aequum fore. **72.** Ad easque virtutes, de quibus disputatum est, dialecticam etiam adiungunt et physicam easque ambas virtutum nomine appellant, alteram, quod habeat rationem, ne cui falso assentiamur neve umquam captiosa probabilitate fallamur, eaque, quae de bonis et malis didicerimus, ut tenere tuerique possimus; nam sine hac arte quemvis arbitrantur a vero abduci fallique posse. Recte igitur, si omnibus in rebus temeritas ignoratioque vitiosa est, ars ea, quae tollit haec, virtus nominata est.

XXII. **73.** Physicae quoque non sine causa tributus idem est honos, propterea quod, qui convenienter naturae victurus est, ei proficiscendum est ab omni mundo atque ab eius procuratione. Nec vero potest quisquam de bonis et malis vere iudicare, nisi omni cognita ratione naturae et vitae etiam deorum, et utrum conveniat necne natura

καὶ μὴ θέσει (Diog. L. vii. 128), i.e. not a social compact or convention, as Epicurus held.

verum etiam nocere. Thus the wise man will not avenge himself. Herein Stoicism rose to the same ethical height (*δίκης ἄωτος*) as the Platonic Socrates. Cf. Marcus Aurelius, 'The best revenge is, not to become like them'.

quidquid aequum, etc. As this statement is at once irrelevant and incontrovertible, we may suspect that C. wrote *honestum* by oversight for *utile*.

72. dialecticam etiam. Cf. Diog. L. vii. 46, *Αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ἀναγκαίαν εἶναι καὶ ἀρετὴν ἐν εἴδει* [*ἐνὶ εἴδει τέσσαρας*? M.] *περιέχουσαν ἀρετάς, τήν τε* [*τὴν μὲν*?] *ἀπροπτωσίαν, ἐπιστήμην τοῦ, πότε δεῖ συγκατατίθεσθαι καὶ μή·* (*ne cui falso assentiamur*)· *τὴν δὲ ἀνεικαιότητα, ἰσχυρὸν λόγον πρὸς τὸ εἰκός, ὥστε μὴ ἐνδιδόναι αὐτῷ* (*neve umquam captiosa probabilitate fallamur*)· *τὴν δὲ ἀνελεγξίαν, ἰσχὺν ἐν λόγῳ, ὥστε μὴ ἀπάγεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἀντικείμενον* (*eaque . . . ut tenere tuerique possimus*)· *τὴν δὲ ἀματαιότητα, ἕξιν ἀναφέρουσαν τὰς φαντασίας ἐπὶ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον.* Not only Logic and Natural Science, but every branch of knowledge were virtues, just as virtue itself was knowledge.

73. propterea quod, qui. Chrysippus wrote, *Οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλως οὐδ' οἰκειότερον ἐπελθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον οὐδ' ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς οὐδ' ἐπὶ εὐδαιμονίαν, ἀλλ' ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου διοικήσεως* (government, *procuratio*).

conveniat . . . natura hominis. *Μέρη αἱ ἡμέτεραι φύσεις τῆς τοῦ ὅλου* (Chrysippus).

hominis cum universa. Quaeque sunt vetera praecepta sapientium, qui iubent tempori parere et sequi deum et se noscere, et nihil nimis, haec sine physicis quam vim habeant (et habent maximam) videre nemo potest. Atque etiam ad iustitiam colendam, ad tuendas amicitias et reliquas caritates quid natura valeat, haec una cognitio potest tradere. Nec vero pietas adversus deos, nec quanta iis gratia debeatur, sine explicatione naturae intellegi potest. **74.** Sed iam sentio me esse longius provectum, quam proposita ratio postularet. Verum admirabilis compositio disciplinae incredibilisque me rerum traxit ordo; quem, per deos immortales, nonne miraris? Quid enim aut in natura, qua nihil est aptius, nihil discriptius, aut in operibus manu factis tam compositum tamque compactum et coagmentatum inveniri potest? quid posterius priori non convenit? quid sequitur, quod non respondeat superiori? quid non sic aliud ex alio nectitur, ut, si ullam litteram moveris, labent omnia? Nec tamen quidquam est, quod moveri possit.

75. Quam gravis vero, quam magnifica, quam constans conficitur persona sapientis! qui, cum ratio docuerit, quod honestum esset, id esse solum bonum, semper sit necesse est beatus vereque omnia ista nomina possideat, quae irrideri ab imperitis solent. Rectius enim appellabitur rex quam Tarquinius, qui nec se nec suos regere potuit, rectius magister populi (is enim est dictator) quam Sulla, qui trium pestiferorum vitiorum, luxuriae, avaritiae, crudelitatis magister fuit, rectius dives quam Crassus, qui, nisi eguisset, numquam Euphraten, nulla belli causa, transire voluisset. Recte eius omnia dicentur, qui scit uti solus omnibus; recte etiam pulcher appellabitur; animi enim liniamenta sunt pulchriora quam corporis; recte solus liber,

tempori parere. No precise Greek equivalent seems extant, but the sentiment is a favourite one with the gnomic poets. ἕπου θεῷ, (attributed to Pythagoras), γνῶθι σεαυτόν and μηδὲν ἄγαν are the others quoted.

75. is enim est dictator. C. plays on the two meanings of *magister*, (1) *ruler*, in which sense the Dictator was anciently styled *magister populi*, and (2) teacher or leader.

nec dominationi cuiusquam parens nec obediens cupiditati; recte invictus, cuius etiamsi corpus constringatur, animo tamen vincula inici nulla possint. **76**. Nec expectet ullum tempus aetatis, ut tum denique iudicetur, beatusne fuerit, cum extremum vitae diem morte confecerit, quod ille unus e septem sapientibus non sapienter Croesum monuit. Nam si beatus umquam fuisset, beatam vitam usque ad illum a Cyro extructum rogum pertulisset. Quod si ita est, ut neque quisquam nisi bonus vir et omnes boni beati sint, quid philosophia magis colendum aut quid est virtute divinius?

76. Nec expectet. Cf. ii. 87.

DE FINIBUS BONORUM ET MALORUM

BOOK IV. ARGUMENT

i-ii. C. begins by a survey of the 'old Academic and Peripatetic' philosophy in its three departments of Ethics, Dialectic, Physics, in order to show that Zeno had no grounds for seceding from his teachers and founding a new school. iii. He reserves Ethics to the last, but contrasts Zeno's neglect of its branches, Politics and Rhetoric, with the full and fruitful treatment of them by 'the Ancients.' iv. In Dialectic, the Stoics can boast no advance on the older schools, and have not touched one important branch of logical method, the 'discovery of proofs.' v. In Physics, they follow the Ancients on most essential points, and are much their inferiors in extent and thoroughness of investigation. vi. To come now to the supreme question of the Chief Good; the Ancients (Polemo most explicitly) defined it as 'life according to Nature,' a formula which they interpreted to mean 'life endowed with all, or the principal objects according to nature.' The latter definition was that of Aristotle and Xenocrates. vii. For since man consists of body and mind, the Ancients took account of both in determining the Good for Man, though they considered mind infinitely the more important part of his constitution. Hence the mind's goods are infinitely the most valuable, and these are the Virtues, the germs of which are implanted in us by nature. viii-ix. Thus it appears that Zeno originated nothing but a new terminology, so artificial that the Stoics themselves cannot employ it in political, forensic, or everyday discussion of moral questions.

x. C. proceeds to examine Cato's exposition in detail, assuming as granted certain principles which he considers Stoics and Ancients have in common. Now our earliest impulse is towards self-preservation, but the self=body+mind; hence our Chief Good must embrace both mental and bodily goods, in fact we must define it in similar terms to those given in c. vii. xi. But the Stoics, setting out from these same principles, abandon them half-way, and by excluding bodily goods, arrive at a Chief Good which is not that of an animal whose paramount excellence is mind (*i.e.* man), but of a (disembodied) mind. xii. They err in saying that bodily and external goods are 'eclipsed' by mental goods, immensely superior though the latter be; and even if they are eclipsed, they remain integral parts of the sum-total of 'things according to nature.' xiii. Further, the Chief Good of each natural species is some-

thing analogous to the Chief Good of the rest; in all other species it is the Good for the whole creature, not for some part of the creature; hence this must hold true of the Good for Man. So the Stoics should have started, not from the axiom that every creature seeks to preserve and foster its own constitution, but from another, viz. that it seeks to preserve and foster the best and highest part of its constitution. xiv. But this is obviously untrue. Reason's task is to perfect the 'rough sketch of man' which Nature has produced; body and mind alike appear in Nature's outline, and Reason must complete the design in both its parts. Man's perfection will be transcendently manifested in the perfection of his noblest part, i.e. in Virtue; yet Reason must 'have its perfect work' in every part alike, regulating those lower functions in which Virtue has its rise. But the Stoics set up two final goals of action, inasmuch as they deny the name of Good to the objects of instinctive action. xv. So far from its being true that if anything whatever except Virtue be reckoned a cause of Happiness, the foundation of Morality is undermined, the exact contrary is the case. Unless the 'objects according to nature' do contribute to the sum-total of Happiness, Virtue, which consists in selecting such objects, cannot even come into operation. It is her office to protect and minister to our whole being, neglecting no part thereof. xvi. Therefore every theory which makes Virtue the sole Good is fallacious; the Stoics' doctrine of Virtue is identical with those of Pyrrho and Aristo, whom they nevertheless condemn. xvii. It is illogical on their part, since they fix an impassable gulf between 'natural' and moral action, excluding from the latter the acquisition of objects according to nature, to resort to those objects when they have to explain the initial motives of action. For the earliest and the final End of action must be one and the same. Clearly, action does not begin by *Reason* prompting the creature to acquire certain objects, but those objects themselves excite instinctive appetition, which issues in action. (If, then, these objects are not included in the Chief Good, at which rational=moral action aims, (1) natural=instinctive action has one End, and rational another, (2) rational action originates in aiming at an End which it suddenly abandons for a different End.) xviii-xix. Passing to the formal proofs adduced by Cato, C. criticises them as (1) logically invalid, (2) a kind of reasoning which may promote accuracy of expression but cannot convince men's hearts and consciences. The boasted harmony and consistency of the Stoic theory, which is represented as a series of flawless deductions from certain first principles, only tells against it. For its conclusions are demonstrably false, and it is an axiom of Logic that if the conclusion of a correct inference is false, the premisses must be false. The Stoic paradoxes dazzled men's imagination when first promulgated, but time has dimmed their lustre. xx. Zeno himself so modified their import in interpreting them that he virtually presented the doctrines of the ancients in a new dress; beyond controversy, the ancients expressed their meaning better, so it remains to consider the doctrines themselves, apart from verbal differences. xxi. According to the ancients, the constituents of Happiness

were the goods of (1) mind, (2) body, but they gave such pre-eminence to the first of these that they rated the second not a whit more highly than does Zeno, who refuses to call them 'goods' at all. xxii. Where then is the difference? There is none, except in words; Zeno delighted in grandiloquent phrases; the great ancients might justly bid such a man as Cato renounce their imitator and own allegiance to themselves. xxiii-xxiv. Cato's argument that all 'fools' are equally wretched rests on a false analogy, for Vice admits of gradual decrease. Instead of arguing from the *assumption* that Virtue has no degrees to the conclusion that all sins are equal, we should rather conclude from the *fact* that some sins are greater than others, that there are degrees of Virtue. xxv. The Stoics are betrayed into these logical straits by their love of ostentation. Their theory annuls the criteria of choice as completely as Aristo's; but instead of frankly accepting its logical consequences, as he did, they smuggle in the very same criteria as the Ancients laid down, under new names. xxvi. For their *προηγμένα* precisely correspond to the 'bodily and external goods' of Aristotle and Plato's other pupils. xxvii. Their paradoxes lose all claim to admiration, when closely examined. Their favourite analogies are not really analogies at all. xxviii. The cardinal defect of their system is that it attempts to combine two incompatible theories.

DE FINIBUS BONORUM ET MALORUM

LIBER QUARTUS

I. **1.** Quae cum dixisset, finem ille. Ego autem: Ne tu, inquam, Cato, ista exposuisti, ut tam multa, memoriter, ut tam obscura, dilucide. Itaque aut omittamus contra omnino velle aliquid aut spatium sumamus ad cogitandum; tam enim diligenter, etiamsi minus vere (nam nondum id quidem audeo dicere), sed tamen accurate non modo fundatam, verum etiam exstructam disciplinam non est facile perdiscere. Tum ille: Ain' tandem? inquit; cum ego te hac nova lege videam eodem die accusatori respondere et tribus horis perorare, in hac me causa tempus dilaturum putas? quae tamen a te agetur non melior, quam illae sunt, quas interdum obtines. Quare istam quoque aggredere, tractatam praesertim et ab aliis et a te ipso saepe, ut tibi deesse non possit oratio. **2.** Tum ego: Non mehercule, inquam, soleo temere contra Stoicos, non quo illis admodum assentiar, sed pudore impedior; ita multa dicunt, quae vix intellegam. Obscura, inquit, quaedam esse confiteor; nec tamen ab illis ita dicuntur de industria, sed inest in rebus ipsis obscuritas. Cur igitur easdem res, inquam, Peripateticis dicentibus, verbum nullum est, quod non intellegatur? Easdemne res? inquit; an parum disserui, non verbis Stoicos a Peripate-

1. hac nova lege. Carried by Pompey in his third consulship (52 B.C.) to expedite legal procedure. It limited the concluding speeches for the prosecution and defence to two and three hours respectively, and required both to be delivered on the same day. Cato says, 'I am not going to let you adjourn your present case, though you will find it as weak as any of those you now and then win (by sheer dexterity)'.

ticis, sed universa re et tota sententia dissidere? Atqui, inquam, Cato, si istud obtinueris, traducas me ad te totum licebit. Putabam equidem satis, inquit, me dixisse. Quare ad ea primum, si videtur; sin aliud quid voles, postea. Immo istud quidem, inquam, quo loco quidque, nisi iniquum postulo, arbitratu meo. Ut placet, inquit; etsi enim illud erat aptius, aequum cuique concedere.

II. 3. Existimo igitur, inquam, Cato, veteres illos Platonis auditores, Speusippum, Aristotelem, Xenocratem, deinde eorum, Polemonem, Theophrastum, satis et copiose et eleganter habuisse constitutam disciplinam, ut non esset causa Zenoni, cum Polemonem audisset, cur et ab eo ipso et a superioribus dissideret; quorum fuit haec institutio, in qua animadvertas velim, quid mutandum putes, nec expectes, dum ad omnia dicam, quae a te dicta sunt; universa enim illorum ratione cum tota vestra confligendum puto. 4. Qui cum viderent, ita nos esse natos, ut et communiter ad eas virtutes apti essemus, quae notae illustresque sunt, iustitiam dico, temperantiam, ceteras generis eiusdem

2. quo loco quidque †. *Occurrerit* or the like has fallen out. 'Nay, unless you think it an unfair stipulation, I shall use my own discretion as to *that* matter, and deal with each point as it presents itself.' 'Have it your own way; *my* plan would be more appropriate, but it is only fair to give everyone his choice.'

3. institutio, concisely used for 'the general outline of the theory set up by them'. Cf. § 19, *hac antiqua constitutione.*

4. Qui cum viderent. The tripartite division of Philosophy (wrongly ascribed to Plato and Aristotle, Acad. i. 19, for it was not earlier than Xenocrates) is here derived from a corresponding division of human faculties. Man is (1) formed and fitted for Justice, Temperance, etc.; (2) desirous of knowledge; (3) essentially social. As (1) corresponds to Ethics, (2) to Physics and Dialectic, (3) to Politics, C. might more naturally have grouped (1) and (3) together. But he adds a separate mention of the social instinct, although it is the same thing as the aptitude for Justice, in order to eulogise the 'Ancients'' treatment of Politics. After *quorum fuit haec institutio* we might expect simply *cum viderent*, but having interposed a parenthesis containing *illorum ratione*, C. links the beginning of the expected exposition to it by *Qui*. After the parenthesis in this long sentence we have a similar anacoluthon to i. 45, ii. 16. Regularly constructed the sentence would run, *cum viderent ita nos esse natos, ut et . . . essemus, . . . et eas ipsas . . . appeteremus, haberemus etiam . . ., totam . . . diviserunt.* But for a 2nd clause depending on *ita nos esse natos ut*, C. substitutes *easque ipsas*, etc., depending on *cum*, and repeats *viderent*. Thus *et* before *communiter* is left unbalanced, as *neque* in i. 23 and *et* in i. 40.

ceteras generis eiusdem. C. seems to have in view Aristotle's division of Virtues into Moral (ἠθικαί)

(quae omnes similes artium reliquarum materia tantum ad meliorem partem et tractatione differunt), easque ipsas virtutes viderent nos magnificentius appetere et ardentius, habere etiam insitam quandam vel potius innatam cupiditatem scientiae, natosque esse ad congregationem hominum et ad societatem communitatemque generis humani, eaque in maximis ingeniis maxime elucere, totam philosophiam tres in partes diviserunt, quam partitionem a Zenone esse retentam videmus. **5.** Quarum cum una sit, qua mores conformari putantur, differo eam partem, quae quasi stirps est huius quaestionis; qui sit enim finis bonorum, mox; hoc loco tantum dico, a veteribus Peripateticis Academicisque, qui re consentientes vocabulis differebant, eum locum, quem civilem recte appellaturi videmur (Graeci πολιτικόν), graviter et copiose esse tractatum.

III. Quam multa illi de re publica scripserunt! quam multa de legibus! quam multa non solum praecepta in artibus, sed etiam exempla in orationibus bene dicendi reliquerunt! Primum enim ipsa illa, quae subtiliter disserenda erant, polite apteque dixerunt, tum definientes, tum

and Intellectual (διανοητικαί). Cf. §18, where he traces them 'partly' to inborn love of knowledge and 'partly' to those instincts which ripen into Justice and Temperance. *ceteras* then refers not to the other Cardinal Virtues, Wisdom and Courage, but to sub-species of Justice and Temperance (e.g. *aequitas*, *bonitas*); so, v. 36, after mentioning all Four Virtues C. adds *et reliquas eiusdem generis*. We do not know by whom the three Aristotelian ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταὶ were reduced to two (Courage being omitted), but the latter division appears as well-known, De Offic. ii. 18, 'omnis virtus tribus in rebus fere vertitur; una in perspiciendo' (διανοητική), then follow Temperance and Justice. In our passage, we have διανοητική plainly indicated as a distinct division by *habere etiam . . . cupiditatem scientiae*.

quae omnes similes artium. Cf. ii. 115, iii. 49, iv. 67. With *magnificentius appetere* sc. *quam artes*. The Virtues work by a nobler method, and on the finer material of character. Cf. Tacitus, Agric. fin, 'non quia intercedendum puto imaginibus quae marmore aut aere finguntur, sed ut vultus hominum, ita simulacra vultus imbecilla ac mortalia sunt, forma mentis aeterna, quam tenere et exprimere non per alienam materiam et artem, sed tuis ipsis moribus possis'.

5. qui re consentientes. The view of Antiochus. Cf. de Legg. i. 38, 'Aristotelem et Theophrastum, cum Speusippo, Xenocrate, Polemone congruentes re, genere docendi paulum differentes'.

in artibus, 'in text-books' (*rhetorum artes*, iii. 4), e.g. Aristotle's Rhetoric. As an important aid to the statesman, Rhetoric is here connected with Politics. In v. 10, and elsewhere C. gives it its usual place as one branch of λογική (the other was διαλεκτική = our Logic).

partientes, ut vestri etiam; sed vos squalidius; illorum, vides, quam niteat oratio. 6. Deinde ea, quae requirebant orationem ornatam et gravem, quam magnifice sunt dicta ab illis, quam splendide! de iustitia, de temperantia, de fortitudine, de amicitia, de aetate degenda, de philosophia, de capessenda re publica, hominum *non* spinas vellentium, ut Stoici, nec ossa nudantium, sed eorum, qui grandia ornate vellent, enucleate minora dicere. Itaque quae sunt eorum consolationes, quae cohortationes, quae etiam monita et consilia, scripta ad summos viros! Erat enim apud eos, ut est rerum ipsarum natura, sic dicendi exercitatio duplex. Nam quidquid quaeritur, id habet aut generis ipsius sine personis temporibusque aut, iis adiunctis, facti aut iuris aut nominis controversiam. Ergo in utroque exercebantur; eaque disciplina effecit tantam illorum utroque in genere dicendi copiam. 7. Totum genus hoc Zeno et qui ab eo sunt, aut non potuerunt *tueri* aut noluerunt, certe reliquerunt. Quamquam scripsit artem rhetoricam Cleanthes,

partientes. Distinguish *partitio*, rhetorical division of a subject into heads, from *divisio*, logical division, explained infra § 8 n.

6. **hominum.** 'Their writings on justice . . . were the work of men.' The gen. is boldly used as if *quam magnifice sunt dicta* had been *quam magnifica sunt*! (Haec sunt magnifica, hominum . . .) Perhaps *vellere spinas*, 'to split hairs,' is a metaphor from dainty picking at sardines, etc. *Spina* means 'fish-bone' as well as 'thorn.' Cf. 'to make no bones about it.' *Ossa* constantly recurs, among other figures derived from the human body, in descriptions of style. Cf. Brutus 68, utinam imitarentur nec ossa solum sed etiam sanguinem; Quintil. v. 12, 6, plus habebunt decoris (argumenta) si non nudos et velut carne spoliatos artus ostenderint.

dicendi exercitatio duplex, *dicendi* regularly)(*disserendi* as ῥητορική)(διαλεκτική [also)(*loquendi*. Orat. 113, nec idem loqui esse quod dicere; . . . disputandi ratio et *loquendi* dialectorum sit, oratorum autem *dicendi* et ornandi]. The twofold training referred to was in arguing (1) for or against some general proposition (θέσις, *quaestio infinita*), e.g. 'Justice is better than Injustice'; (2) special cases, e.g. 'Was Orestes justified in killing his mother?' in which the persons and circumstances involved must be taken account of. The latter class is again subdivided according as the argument turns on a point of fact, law, or nomenclature (so in Orat. 45; de Orat. 104, 113; but Quintil. iii. 31, gives different subdivisions by C. and others).

7. **scripsit . . . Cleanthes.** The definition of Rhetoric in Quintil. ii. 15, as 'scientia bene dicendi' may be his (Pearson, Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes, p. 243). Quintilian adds, that of Chrysippus, 'scientia *recte* dicendi' is 'derived from' Cleanthes, and the context shows that *bene* (εὖ) implied 'morally,' 'cum bene dicere non possit nisi bonus'. Chrysippus' *recte* (ὀρθῶς), then, carries the implication 'only the *sapiens* is a good orator'.

Chrysippus etiam, sed sic, ut, si quis obmutescere concupierit, nihil aliud legere debeat. Itaque vides, quomodo loquantur. Nova verba fingunt, deserunt usitata. At quanta conantur!—Mundum hunc omnem oppidum esse nostrum. Vides, quantam rem agat, ut, Circeiis qui habitet, totum hunc mundum suum municipium esse existimet. Incendit igitur eos, qui audiunt. Quid? ille incendat? Restingvet citius, si ardentem acceperit. Ista ipsa, quae tu breviter, regem, dictatorem, divitem solum esse sapientem, a te quidem apte ac rotunde; quippe; habes enim a rhetoribus; illorum vero ista ipsa quam exilia de virtutis vi! quam tantam volunt esse, ut beatum per se efficere possit. Pungunt enim, quasi aculeis, interrogatiunculis angustis, quibus etiam qui assentiuntur, nihil commutantur animo et iidem abeunt, qui venerant; res enim fortasse verae, certe graves, non ita tractantur, ut debent, sed aliquanto minutius.

IV. **8.** Sequitur disserendi ratio cognitioque naturae; nam de summo bono mox, ut dixi, videbimus et ad id explicandum disputationem omnem conferemus. In his igitur partibus duabus nihil erat, quod Zeno commutare gestiret; res enim se praeclare habebat, et quidem in utraque parte. Quid enim ab antiquis ex eo genere, quod ad disserendum valet, praetermissum est? qui et definierunt plurima et definiendi artes reliquerunt, quodque est definitioni adiunctum, ut res in partes dividatur, id et

Treatises based on these definitions were not likely to commend themselves to Cicero! Cf. his remarks on Chrysippus' work, de Orat. 50.

quantam rem agat. The subject is 'Any Stoic'. His high mission is to teach obscure provincials to 'take the petty murmur of their burg For the great wave that echoes round the world!' Circeii, in Latium, had one title to fame—its oysters (Hor. Sat. iii. 4, 33).

Pungunt enim. Their 'nice, sharp quillets,' like pin-pricks, only go skin-deep.

8. quodque est definitioni adiunctum. Logical Division is the process of dividing a class of objects into sub-classes on any given principle (*fundamentum divisionis*), e.g. books into folios, quartos, etc., according to size, or into history, fiction, etc., according to subject-matter. Any class so divided forms a *genus*, of which the constituent sub-classes are *species*. The allied process of Definition marks out *one* species of a genus by adding to the common qualities of a class, a quality common only to part of it. This distinguishing quality is called *differentia*. Thus to define 'man' is to state his *genus* (animal) + his *differentia* (rationality), in other words, to state his *species* (rational animal).

fit ab illis et, quemadmodum fieri oporteat, traditur; item de contrariis, a quibus ad genera formasque generum venerunt. Iam argumenti ratione conclusi caput esse faciunt ea, quae perspicua dicunt; deinde ordinem sequuntur; tum, quid verum sit in singulis, extrema conclusio est. **9.** Quanta autem ab illis varietas argumentorum ratione concludentium eorumque cum captiosis interrogationibus dissimilitudo! Quid, quod pluribus locis quasi denuntiant, ut neque sensuum fidem sine ratione nec rationis sine sensibus exquiramus atque ut eorum alterum ab altero *ne* separemus? Quid? ea, quae dialectici nunc tradunt et docent, nonne ab illis instituta sunt? [inventa sunt?] De quibus etsi a Chrysippo maxime est elaboratum, tamen a Zenone minus multo quam ab antiquis; ab hoc autem quaedam non melius, quam veteres; quaedam omnino relicta. **10.** Cumque duae sint artes, quibus perfecte ratio et oratio compleatur, una inveniendi, altera disserendi, hanc posteriorem et Stoici

item de contrariis. 'Again, they expounded the Law of Contradictories, from which they arrived at genera and species.' This Law, sometimes expressed by the formula No *A* is not – *A*, is one of the three fundamental Laws of Thought on which all reasoning depends. Prominent in Aristotle's theory of Predication, and of the Syllogism, it was also the basis of the logical process called Dichotomy, or Exhaustive Division. For since the Law asserts that no quality can be at once present and absent, taking any class *X* and any quality *A*, we can divide *X* into two species, *X*s which are *A*s, and *X*s which are not *A*s, and these two species must contain the *whole* genus *X*.

argumenti ratione conclusi. The regular phrase for 'deduction,' 'syllogistic reasoning.' *arg. concludens* infra is simply a variant. *perspicua* (πρόδηλα, ἐναργῆ), 'self-evident propositions,' like the axioms of geometry. *ordinem*, 'the arrangement by rule of terms and premisses.' *quid verum sit*, 'what is the valid inference in each case,' i.e. from any combination of premisses.

9. Quanta . . . varietas. 'How many different forms' (regular, hypothetical, disjunctive, etc.) *ab illis*, sc. traditur. *captiosa interrogatio* = sophistical syllogism.

10. una inveniendi. *inventio*, the discovery of arguments, was elaborately treated in text-books of Rhetoric. Cf. Cic. Top. 6, 'iudicandi enim vias diligenter persecuti sunt (Stoici) ea scientia quam διαλεκτικήν appellant: inveniendi artem, quae τοπική dicitur . . . totam reliquerunt'. Tac. de Orat. 31 (some audiences will be most influenced by display of dialectical skill), 'Alios fusa et aequalis et ex communibus ducta sensibus (i.e. appealing to universal sentiments) oratio magis delectat: ad hos permovendos mutuabimur *a Peripateticis* aptos et in omnem disputationem paratos iam *locos*'. From these *loci* (τόποι, 'general heads,' 'topics') arguments appropriate to the case in hand may be drawn, according to the different

et Peripatetici, priorem autem illi egregie tradiderunt, hi omnino ne attigerunt quidem. Nam e quibus locis quasi thesauris argumenta depromerentur, vestri ne suspicati quidem sunt, superiores autem artificio et via tradiderunt. Quae quidem ars efficit, ne necesse sit iisdem de rebus semper quasi dictata decantare neque a commentariolis suis discedere. Nam qui sciet, ubi quidque positum sit quaque eo veniat, is, etiamsi quid obrutum erit, poterit eruere semperque esse in disputando suus. Quod etsi ingeniis magnis praediti quidam dicendi copiam sine ratione consequuntur, ars tamen est dux certior quam natura. Aliud est enim poëtarum more verba fundere, aliud ea, quae dicas, ratione et arte distingvere.

V. **11.** Similia dici possunt de explicatione naturae, qua *et* hi utuntur et vestri, neque vero ob duas modo causas, quomodo Epicuro videtur, ut pellatur mortis et religionis metus; sed etiam modestiam quandam cognitio rerum caelestium affert iis, qui videant, quanta sit etiam apud deos moderatio, quantus ordo, et magnitudinem animi deorum opera et facta cernentibus, iustitiam etiam, cum cognitum habeas, quod sit summi rectoris ac domini numen, quod consilium, quae voluntas; cuius ad naturam apta ratio vera illa et summa lex a philosophis dicitur. **12.** Inest in eadem explicatione naturae insatiabilis quaedam e cognoscendis rebus voluptas, in qua una, confectis rebus necessariis, vacui negotiis honeste ac liberaliter possimus vivere. Ergo in hac ratione tota de maximis fere rebus Stoici illos secuti sunt, ut et deos esse et

kinds of issues raised. Top. 8, 'locos nosse debemus; sic enim appellatae sunt ab Aristotele hae quasi sedes e quibus argumenta promuntur'. Orat. 46, 'Aristoteles . . . locos—sic enim appellat—quasi argumentorum notas (concise abstracts) tradidit (i.e. in his *Topics*) unde omnis traheretur oratio'.

ubi quidque positum sit: 'under what general heading (*locus*) each argument comes, and along what lines he may arrive at it'. With *poterit eruere*, cf. de Orat. ii. 146, 'scrutari locos, ex quibus argumenta eruamus'. An instance from C.'s own practice is pro Mur. xxviii, where he adroitly argues from general principles that the high reputation of the prosecutor, Cato, should actually tell in favour of the defendant, instead of against him.

11. summi rectoris. Stoic conceptions of God and of Reason wholly conformed to His nature as the supreme Law, are here fathered upon "the Ancients."

quattuor ex rebus omnia constare dicerent. Cum autem quaereretur res admodum difficilis, num quinta quaedam natura videretur esse, ex qua ratio et intellegentia oriretur, in quo etiam de animis, cuius generis essent, quaereretur, Zeno id dixit esse ignem; nonnulla deinde aliter, sed ea pauca; de maxima autem re eodem modo, divina mente atque natura mundum universum atque eius maximas partes administrari. Materiam vero rerum et copiam apud hos exilem, apud illos uberrimam reperiemus. **13.** Quam multa ab iis conquisita et collecta sunt de omnium animantium genere, ortu, membris, aetatibus! quam multa de rebus iis, quae gignuntur e terra! quam multae quamque de variis rebus et causae, cur quidque fiat, et demonstrationes, quemadmodum quidque fiat! qua ex omni copia plurima et certissima argumenta sumuntur ad cuiusque rei naturam explicandam. Ergo adhuc, quantum equidem intellego, causa non videtur fuisse mutandi nominis; non enim, si omnia non sequebatur, idcirco non erat ortus illinc. Equidem etiam Epicurum, in physicis quidem, Democriteum puto. Pauca mutat, vel plura sane; at cum de plurimis eadem dicit, tum certe de maximis. Quod idem cum vestri faciant, non satis magnam tribuunt inventoribus gratiam.

VI. **14.** Sed haec hactenus. Nunc videamus, quaeso, de summo bono, quod continet philosophiam, quid tandem attulerit, quamobrem ab inventoribus tamquam a parentibus

12. quinta quaedam natura. Aristotle held that the heavenly bodies consisted of a fifth element, the *αἰθήρ*. C. calls it 'quintum genus e quo essent astra mentesque' (Acad. i. 26) and 'quintam naturam ex qua superiores sensus et mentem effici rebantur' (ib. 39). In several difficult passages Aristotle appears to connect *ψυχή* and even *νοῦς* most intimately with this *αἰθήρ*, and Dr. Reid on Acad. l.c. zealously defends C.'s statements. But in face of Aristotle's repeated assertions that the soul is immaterial, and of the general tenor of his psychology, it seems impossible to maintain that he *identified* it with a material substance. If later Peripatetics did so (in proof of which Dr. Reid cites Stob. Phys. 870) it was doubtless under Stoic influence, just as C.'s authority Antiochus has equated Aristotle's *quinta natura* with the Stoic 'fiery aether' = universal soul.

13. de rebus iis, quae gignuntur, *περὶ φυτῶν*. C. uses the same periphrasis, v. 33, Acad. i. 26, etc., Latin having no general term = plant. Aristotle and Theophrastus are the writers specially referred to.

dissentiret. Hoc igitur loco, quamquam a te, Cato, diligenter est explicatum, finis hic bonorum et qui a Stoicis et quemadmodum diceretur, tamen ego quoque exponam, ut perspiciamus, si potuerimus, quidnam a Zenone novi sit allatum. Cum enim superiores, e quibus planissime Polemo, secundum naturam vivere summum bonum esse dixissent, his verbis tria significari Stoici dicunt, unum eiusmodi, vivere adhibentem scientiam earum rerum, quae natura evenirent; hunc ipsum Zenonis aiunt esse finem, declarantem illud, quod a te dictum est, convenienter naturae vivere; **15.** alterum significari idem, ut si diceretur, officia media omnia aut pleraque servantem vivere. Hoc sic expositum dissimile est superiori; illud enim rectum est (quod *κατόρθωμα* dicebas) contingitque sapienti soli; hoc autem inchoati cuiusdam officii est, non perfecti, quod cadere in nonnullos insipientes potest. Tertium autem, omnibus aut maximis rebus iis, quae secundum naturam sint, fruentem vivere. Hoc non est positum in nostra actione; completur enim et ex eo genere vitae, quod virtute fruitur, et ex iis rebus, quae sunt secundum naturam neque sunt in nostra

14. planissime Polemo. See Introd. § 26, on the history of the formula attributed to him here, and ii. 34; and on the third interpretation of it below (*Tertium autem*), which is due to Antiochus.

unum eiusmodi. We might expect *huiusmodi*, or *eiusmodi ut sit.*

evenirent. For the tense, see on the same formula, ii. 34. This was Chrysippus' definition, *ζῆν κατ' ἐμπειρίαν τῶν φύσει συμβαινόντων*, Introd. § 15. 'This definition they say is identical with Zeno's, being an explanation of your phrase *convenienter naturae vivere*' (cf. iii. 31), i.e. of *ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν τῇ φύσει*, which Diog. L. ascribes to Zeno, though, according to others, *τῇ φύσει* was added by Cleanthes.

15. alterum . . . officia. *πάντα τὰ καθήκοντα ἐπιτελοῦντας ζῆν*; the definition of Archedemus' (Introd. § 16) framed to meet Carneades' objection that the Stoics set up *two* Ends of Action, the *prima naturae* being the object of *καθήκοντα* but not of *κατορθώματα* (*recte facta*). The earlier Stoics would not of course have allowed that the performance of 'relative duties' which is not *per se* virtuous, could be the *finis*, nor was the definition accepted by their orthodox successors. Poseidonius said, 'This is not the End, but only its necessary concomitant; such a mode of expression may be useful for the refutation of objections put forward by the sophists, but it contains nothing of morality or well-being' (quoted from Galen de Plac. Hipp. et Plat. p. 470 K in Encyc. Brit. Art. Stoics).

illud enim rectum est. As *illud* refers to *vivere adhibentem* cet. we might expect 'actions' in the plural to be mentioned. But every single *κατόρθωμα* was complete in itself and in all respects equal to a whole life of right actions.

potestate. Sed hoc summum bonum, quod tertia significatione intellegitur, eaque vita, quae ex summo bono degitur, quia coniuncta ei virtus est, in sapientem solum cadit, isque finis bonorum, ut ab ipsis Stoicis scriptum videmus, a Xenocrate atque ab Aristotele constitutus est. Itaque ab iis constitutio illa prima naturae, a qua tu quoque ordiebare, his prope verbis exponitur.

VII. **16.** Omnis natura vult esse conservatrix sui, ut et salva sit et in genere conservetur suo. Ad hanc rem aiunt artes quoque requisitas, quae naturam adiuvarent, in quibus ea numeretur in primis, quae est vivendi ars, ut tueatur, quod a natura datum sit, quod desit, acquirat; iidemque diviserunt naturam hominis in animum et corpus; cumque eorum utrumque per se expetendum esse dixissent, virtutes quoque utriusque eorum per se expetendas esse dicebant; et cum animum infinita quadam laude anteponerent corpori, virtutes quoque animi bonis corporis anteponebant. **17.** Sed cum sapientiam totius hominis custodem et procuratricem esse vellent, quae esset naturae comes et adiutrix, hoc sapientiae munus esse dicebant, ut, *cum* eum tueretur, qui constaret ex animo et corpore, in utroque iuvaret eum ac contineret. Atque ita re simpliciter primo collocata, reliqua subtilius persequentes, corporis bona facilem quandam rationem habere censebant; de animi bonis accuratius exquirebant, in primisque reperiebant, esse in iis iustitiae semina, primique ex omnibus philosophis

a Xenocrate. He defined *εὐδαιμονία* as *κτῆσις τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς ὑπηρετικῆς δυνάμεως. Εἶτα ὡς μὲν ἐν ᾧ γίνεται, φαίνεται λέγων τὴν ψυχήν· ὡς δ' ὑφ' ὧν, τὰς ἀρετάς . . . ὡς δ' ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ* (*sine quibus non*, necessary conditions) *τὰ σωματικὰ καὶ τὰ ἐκτός* (*corporis et externa bona*). (Clem. Strom. ii. 22, p. 500 (Potter).) So too Speusippus defined *εὐδαιμονία* as *ἕξις τελεία ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν* ('the perfect condition of beings in a natural state,' ib. 21). Aristotle's great advance on these Academic definitions lay in substituting *ἐνέργεια* for *ἕξις* 'or what comes to the same thing, *χρῆσις* for *κτῆσις*' (Burnet on Nic. Eth. i. 9). He saw that the mere *possession* of Virtue is compatible with living the life of the Seven Sleepers or of a cabbage; Happiness, to be truly human, must be *ἐνέργεια τις τῆς ψυχῆς κατ' ἀρετήν*. C. here as elsewhere betrays his merely second-hand knowledge of Aristotle's ethics.

16. Omnis natura cet. Cf. v. 24 sqq.

17. esse in iis. C. should have said *esse in* eo (animo). The *germs* of justice are not *bona*.

natura tributum esse docuerunt, ut ii, qui procreati essent, a procreatoribus amarentur, et, id quod temporum ordine antiquius est, ut coniugia virorum et uxorum natura coniuncta esse dicerent, qua ex stirpe orirentur amicitiae cognationum. Atque ab his initiis profecti omnium virtutum et originem et progressionem persecuti sunt. Ex quo magnitudo quoque animi existebat, qua facile posset repugnari obsistique fortunae, quod maximae res essent in potestate sapientis. Varietates autem iniuriasque fortunae facile veterum philosophorum praeceptis instituta vita superabat. **18.** Principiis autem a natura datis, amplitudines quaedam bonorum excitabantur, partim profectae a contemplatione rerum occultarum, quod erat insitus menti cognitionis amor, e quo etiam rationis explicandae disserendique cupiditas consequebatur; quodque hoc solum animal natum est pudoris ac verecundiae particeps appetensque convictum hominum ac societatem animadvertensque in omnibus rebus, quas ageret aut diceret, ut ne quid ab eo fieret nisi honeste ac decore, his initiis *et*, ut ante dixi, seminibus a natura datis, temperantia, modestia, iustitia et omnis honestas perfecte absoluta est.

VIII. **19.** Habes, inquam, Cato, formam eorum, de quibus loquor, philosophorum. Qua exposita, scire cupio, quae causa sit, cur Zeno ab hac antiqua constitutione desciverit, quidnam horum ab eo non sit probatum: quodne omnem naturam conservatricem sui dixerint, an quod omne animal ipsum sibi commendatum, ut se [et] salvum in suo

ut conjugia . . . dicerent. This clause, which depends on *natura tributum esse docuerunt*, should have been *ut conjugia virorum et uxorum inirentur*. C. by some oversight allows the sentence to run, 'They taught that nature appointed *that they should say* that conjugal unions are ordained by Nature'.

18. excitabantur, 'were built up'. Cf. Pro Sestio, ii. 5, *quibus initiis ac fundamentis hae tantae . . . laudes excitatae sint*. The 'spacious fabric of goods, moral and intellectual' is, of course, the ethical system of the 'ancients,' which C. rhetorically describes in terms (*profectae, absoluta*) properly applicable to the evolution of the virtues themselves.

partim profectae. The same twofold division of the virtues is indicated as in § 4. C. traces the origin of (1) wisdom, (2) the moral virtues, but substitutes a clause of different form (*quodque solum* cet.) for *partim profectae a pudore et appetitione convictus* cet.

genere incolumeque vellet, an *quod*, cum omnium artium finis is esset, quem natura maxime quaereret, idem statui debere de totius arte vitae, an quod, cum ex animo constaremus et corpore, et haec ipsa et eorum virtutes per se esse sumendas. An vero displicuit ea, quae tributa est animi virtutibus tanta praestantia? an, quae de prudentia, de cognitione rerum, de coniunctione generis humani, quaeque ab iisdem de temperantia, de modestia, de magnitudine animi, de omni honestate dicuntur? Fatebuntur Stoici, haec omnia dicta esse praeclare neque eam causam Zenoni desciscendi fuisse. **20.** Alia quaedam dicent, credo, magna antiquorum esse peccata, quae ille, veri investigandi cupidus, nullo modo ferre potuerit. Quid enim perversius, quid intolerabilius, quid stultius quam bonam valetudinem, quam dolorum omnium vacuitatem, quam integritatem oculorum reliquorumque sensuum ponere in bonis potius, quam dicerent, nihil omnino inter eas res iisque contrarias interesse? ea enim omnia, quae illi bona dicerent, praeposita esse, non bona; itemque illa, quae in corpore excellerent, stulte antiquos dixisse per se esse expetenda; sumenda potius quam expetenda; ea denique omni vita, quae in virtute una consisteret, illam vitam, quae etiam ceteris rebus, quae essent secundum naturam, abundaret, magis expetendam non esse, sed magis sumendam; cumque ipsa virtus efficiat ita beatam vitam, ut beatior esse non possit, tamen quaedam deesse sapientibus tum, cum sint beatissimi; itaque eos id agere, ut a se dolores, morbos, debilitates repellant.

IX. **21.** O magnam vim ingenii causamque iustam, cur nova existeret disciplina! Perge porro. Sequuntur enim ea, quae tu scientissime complexus es, omnium insipientiam,

19. finis is esset, quem. Strictly speaking, Nature does not seek the *finis*. C. means that the End of every art is to supply some natural need, e.g. health.

20. ponere in bonis potius, quam dicerent. 'To class among goods, instead of saying (with Zeno) . . .' *Dicerent*, imperfect because with *Quid perversius* . . . *fuit* is understood. *Ea enim omnia* . . . *magis sumendam* depends on *dixit Zeno* understood.

cumque . . . efficiat. The resumption of the present tense seems to contrast this clause with the foregoing ipsissima verba of Zeno, as a reductio ad absurdum of his theory ironically put into his mouth by C.

iniustitiam, alia vitia similia esse, omniaque peccata esse paria, eosque, qui natura doctrinaque longe ad virtutem processissent, nisi eam plane consecuti essent, summe esse miseros, neque inter eorum vitam et improbissimorum quidquam omnino interesse, ut Plato, tantus ille vir, si sapiens non fuerit, nihilo melius quam quivis improbissimus nec beatius vixerit. Haec videlicet est correctio philosophiae veteris et emendatio, quae omnino aditum nullum habere potest in urbem, in forum, in curiam. Quis enim ferre posset ita loquentem eum, qui se auctorem vitae graviter et sapienter agendae profiteretur, cumque idem sentiret, quod omnes, quibus rebus eandem vim tribueret, alia nomina imponentem, verba modo mutantem, de opinionibus nihil detrahentem? **22.** Patronusne causae in epilogo pro reo dicens negaret esse malum exilium, publicationem bonorum? haec reicienda esse, non fugienda? nec misericordem iudicem esse oportere? In contione autem si loqueretur, si Hannibal ad portas venisset murumque iaculo traiecisset, negaret esse in malis capi, venire, interfici, patriam amittere? An senatus, cum triumphum Africano decerneret, 'quod eius virtute' aut 'felicitate' posset dicere, si neque virtus in ullo nisi *in* sapiente nec felicitas vere dici potest? Quae est igitur ista philosophia, quae communi more in foro loquitur, in libellis suo? praesertim cum, quod illi suis verbis significant, in eo nihil novetur, eaedem res maneant alio modo. **23.** Quid enim interest, divitias, opes, valetudinem bona dicas anne praeposita, cum ille, qui ista bona dicit, nihilo plus iis tribuat quam tu, qui eadem illa praeposita nominas? Itaque homo in primis ingenuus et gravis, dignus illa familiaritate Scipionis et Laelii, Panaetius, cum ad Q. Tuberonem de dolore patiendo

22. **murumque iaculo traiecisset,** 'had hurled a javelin over the wall'. This construction has everywhere else a different meaning, the ablative being instrumental, as in *femur hasta traicere, amnem navi traicere*.

quod eius virtute aut felicitate. *aut* does not imply two alternative formulas, *quod eius virtute ac felicitate* being that regularly used in such decrees. C. asks, Could the Senate employ either of the customary *terms*?

23. **cum ad Q. Tuberonem.** For Panaetius, see Introd. § 16. Q.

scriberet, quod esse caput debebat, si probari posset, nusquam posuit, non esse malum dolorem, sed quid esset et quale, quantumque in eo esset alieni, deinde, quae ratio esset perferendi; cuius quidem, quoniam Stoicus fuit, sententia condemnata mihi videtur esse inanitas ista verborum.

X. **24.** Sed ut propius ad ea, Cato, accedam, quae a te dicta sunt, pressius agamus eaque, quae modo dixisti, cum iis conferamus, quae tuis antepono. Quae sunt igitur communia vobis cum antiquis, iis sic utamur quasi concessis; quae in controversiam veniunt, de iis, si placet, disseramus. Mihi vero, inquit, placet agi subtilius et, ut ipse dixisti, pressius. Quae enim adhuc protulisti, popularia sunt; ego autem a te elegantiora desidero. A mene tu? inquam; sed tamen enitar, et, si minus multa mihi occurrent, non fugiam ista popularia. **25.** Sed positum sit primum, nosmet ipsos commendatos esse nobis primamque ex natura hanc habere appetitionem, ut conservemus nosmet ipsos. Hoc convenit; sequitur illud, ut animadvertamus, qui simus ipsi, ut nos, quales oportet esse, servemus. Sumus igitur homines; ex animo constamus et corpore, quae sunt cuiusdam modi, nosque oportet, ut prima appetitio naturalis postulat, haec diligere constituereque ex his finem illum summi boni atque ultimi; quem, si prima vera sunt, ita constitui necesse est, earum rerum, quae sint secundum naturam, quam plurima et quam maxima adipisci. **26.** Hunc igitur finem illi tenuerunt, quodque ego pluribus verbis, illi brevius, secundum naturam vivere, hoc iis bonorum videbatur extremum.

XI. Age nunc isti doceant, vel tu potius (quis enim ista melius?), quonam modo ab iisdem principiis profecti efficiatis, ut honeste vivere (id est enim vel e virtute vel

Tubero was a nephew of Scipio Africanus the Younger. This tract addressed to him is apparently quoted Acad. ii. 135, Tusc. iv. 4.

26. id est enim. 'For that is the equivalent of your "life according to virtue" (κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν) or life in harmony with Nature' (ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει). Cf. i. 33, iii. 52, 75.

naturae congruenter vivere) summum bonum sit, et quonam modo aut quo loco corpus subito deserueritis omniaque ea, quae, secundum naturam cum sint, absint a nostra potestate, ipsum denique officium. Quaero igitur, quomodo hae tantae commendationes a natura profectae subito a sapientia relictae sint. **27.** Quod si non hominis summum bonum quaereremus, sed cuiusdam animantis, is autem esset nihil nisi animus (liceat enim fingere aliquid eiusmodi, quo verum facilius reperiamus), tamen illi animo non esset hic vester finis. Desideraret enim valetudinem, vacuitatem doloris, appeteret etiam conservationem sui earumque rerum custodiam, finemque sibi constitueret secundum naturam vivere, quod est, ut dixi, habere ea, quae secundum naturam sint, vel omnia vel plurima et maxima. **28.** Cuiuscumque enim modi animal constitueris, necesse est, etiamsi id sine corpore sit, ut fingimus, tamen esse in animo quaedam similia eorum, quae sunt in corpore, ut nullo modo, nisi ut exposui, constitui possit finis bonorum. Chrysippus autem, exponens differentias animantium, ait alias earum corpore excellere, alias autem animo, nonnullas valere utraque re; deinde disputat, quod cuiusque generis animantium statui deceat extremum. Cum autem hominem in eo genere posuisset, ut ei tribueret animi excellentiam, summum bonum id constituit, non ut excellere animus, sed ut nihil esse praeter animum videretur. XII. Uno autem modo in virtute sola summum bonum recte poneretur, si quod esset animal, quod totum ex mente constaret, id ipsum tamen sic, ut ea mens nihil haberet in se, quod esset secundum naturam, ut valetudo est. **29.** Sed id, ne cogitari quidem potest, quale sit, ut non repugnet ipsum sibi.

Quaero igitur. The gist of C.'s argument appears in the following passage of the last Peripatetic philosopher, Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. 200 A.D.). Ἔτι εἰ μὴ ψυχῆς εὐδαιμονία ζητεῖται, ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπου, ὁμολογεῖται δέ, τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ ψυχῆς εἶναι καὶ σώματος, ὧν ἑκατέρου ἔστι καὶ ἀγαθὰ οἰκεῖα καὶ κακὰ διαφέροντα ἀλλήλων, . . . πῶς οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ, τὸ τέλος τοῦ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ὄντος προσδεῖσθαι τοῦ ἑκατέρου τούτων, ἐξ ὧν ἐστιν, ἀγαθοῦ; εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐκ αὔταρκες τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀγαθὸν πρὸς τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τέλος.

Sin dicunt obscurari quaedam nec apparere, quia valde parva sint, nos quoque concedimus; quod dicit Epicurus etiam de voluptate, quae minimae sint voluptates, eas obscurari saepe et obrui; sed non sunt in eo genere tantae commoditates corporis tamque productae temporibus tamque multae. Itaque in quibus propter eorum exiguitatem obscuratio consequitur, saepe accidit, ut nihil interesse nostra fateamur, sint illa necne sint; ut in sole, quod a te dicebatur, lucernam adhibere nihil interest aut teruncium adicere Croesi pecuniae; **(30.)** quibus autem in rebus tanta obscuratio non fit, fieri tamen potest, ut id ipsum, quod interest, non sit magnum. Ut ei, qui iucunde vixerit annos decem, si aeque vita iucunda menstrua addatur, quia momentum aliquod habeat ad iucundum accessio, bonum sit; si autem id non concedatur, non continuo vita beata tollitur. Bona autem corporis huic sunt, quod posterius posui, similiora. Habent enim accessionem dignam, in qua elaboretur, ut mihi in hoc Stoici iocari videantur interdum, cum ita dicant, si ad illam vitam, quae cum virtute degatur, ampulla aut strigilis accedat, sumpturum sapientem eam vitam potius, quo haec adiecta sint, nec beatiorem tamen ob eam causam fore. **31.** Hoc simile tandem est? non risu potius quam oratione eiciendum? Ampulla enim sit necne sit, quis non iure optimo irrideatur, si laboret? At vero pravitate membrorum et cruciatu dolorum si quis quem levet, magnam ineat gratiam; nec, si ille sapiens ad tortoris eculeum a tyranno ire cogatur, similem habeat vultum et si ampullam perdidisset, sed ut magnum et difficile certamen iniens, cum sibi cum capitali adversario, dolore,

29. Sin dicunt obscurari. As Cato stated, iii. 45, Epicurus referred, of course, to the eclipse of trifling pleasures by greater, the former being foregone to obtain the latter (i. 32, 47).

sed non sunt: 'The importance, permanence and multiplicity of physical Goods puts them in a different category' from those Goods which are intrinsically negligible.

30. dignam, in qua elaboretur, 'worth making an effort for'.

ampulla. Plutarch, adv. Stoicos 22, p. 1069 c, *Κρασπέδοις καὶ ἀμίσι χρυσαῖς καὶ νὴ Δία ληκύθοις, ὅταν τύχωσι, παραβάλλουσι (οἱ Στωϊκοὶ) τὸν μέγιστον πλοῦτον.*

quo haec adiecta sint: no need to read *cui* (*quoi*). Cf. *id . . . quo omnia referretur* (ii. 5); *apud eos, quo se contulit* (Verr. iv. 38); *ex iis oppidis, qua ducebantur* (Verr. v. 66).

depugnandum videret, excitaret omnes rationes fortitudinis ac patientiae, quarum praesidio iniret difficile illud, ut dixi, magnumque proelium. Deinde non quaerimus, quid obscuretur aut intereat, quia sit admodum parvum, sed quid tale sit, ut expleat summam. Una voluptas e multis obscuratur in illa vita voluptaria; sed tamen ea, quamvis parva sit, pars est eius vitae, quae posita est in voluptate. Nummus in Croesi divitiis obscuratur, pars est tamen divitiarum. Quare obscurentur etiam haec, quae secundum naturam esse dicimus, in vita beata; sint modo partes vitae beatae.

XIII. **32.** Atqui si, ut convenire debet inter nos, est quaedam appetitio naturalis ea, quae secundum naturam sunt, appetens, eorum omnium est aliqua summa facienda. Quo constituto, tum licebit otiose ista quaerere, de magnitudine rerum, de excellentia, quanta in quoque sit ad beate vivendum, de istis ipsis obscurationibus, quae propter exiguitatem vix aut ne vix quidem appareant. Quid, de quo nulla dissensio est? Nemo enim est, qui aliter dixerit, quin omnium naturarum simile esset id, ad quod omnia referrentur, quod est ultimum rerum appetendarum. Omnis enim est natura diligens sui. Quae est enim, quae se umquam deserat aut partem aliquam sui aut eius partis habitum aut vim aut ullius earum rerum, quae secundum naturam sunt, aut motum aut statum? Quae autem natura

31. **Deinde.** The *second* point (*non sunt in eo genere* being the first) is not whether such and such a *bonum* is so trivial as to be eclipsed and wiped out, but whether it is one of those which go to make up a given total. As the smallest coin in Croesus' hoard contributes, though infinitesimally, to the sum-total, so even the lesser natural goods, which, as we say, do not count, are integral parts of the sum of happiness.

32. **aliqua summa facienda.** The Stoics go the wrong way to work. They should begin by reducing all these objects to a common denominator (viz. capacity for satisfying natural desires), and have added up the sum of them. When, and not till when (*tum* emphatic), the total is determined, we may indulge at leisure in investigating the relative value of the units taken separately. *obscurationibus, quae* . . . obviously means *obsc. eorum, quae* . . . (which should perhaps be read).

omnium naturarum simile, i.e. the *finis* of all creatures is (not the same, but) analogous. This is explained, v. 25, 26. For *natura* in this section and in § 33 (*in ceteris naturis*), 34 (*reliquas naturas*) = natural *species*, cf. de Legg. i. 22, 'animantium genera et naturas'.

suae primae institutionis oblita est? Nulla profecto *est,* quin suam vim retineat a primo ad extremum. **33.** Quomodo igitur evenit, ut hominis natura sola esset, quae hominem relinqueret, quae oblivisceretur corporis, quae summum bonum non in toto homine, sed in parte hominis poneret? Quomodo autem, quod ipsi etiam fatentur constatque inter omnes, conservabitur, ut simile sit omnium naturarum illud ultimum, de quo quaeritur? Tum enim esset simile, si in ceteris quoque naturis id cuique esset ultimum, quod in quaque excelleret. Tale enim visum est ultimum Stoicorum. **34.** Quid dubitas igitur mutare principia naturae? Quid enim dicis, omne animal, simul atque sit ortum, applicatum esse ad se diligendum esseque in se conservando occupatum? quin potius ita dicis, omne animal applicatum esse ad id, quod in eo sit optimum, et in eius unius occupatum esse custodia, reliquasque naturas nihil aliud agere, nisi ut id conservent, quod in quaque optimum sit? Quomodo autem optimum, si bonum praeterea nullum est? Sin autem reliqua appetenda sunt, cur, quod est ultimum rerum appetendarum, id non aut ex omnium earum aut ex plurimarum et maximarum appetitione concluditur? Ut Phidias potest a primo instituere signum idque perficere, potest ab alio inchoatum accipere et absolvere, huic similis est sapientia; non enim ipsa genuit hominem, sed accepit a natura inchoatum; hanc ergo intuens debet institutum illud quasi signum absolvere. **35.** Qualem igitur hominem natura inchoavit? et quod est munus, quod opus sapientiae? quid est, quod ab ea absolvi et perfici debeat? Si nihil in eo, quod perficiendum est, praeter motum ingenii quendam, id

33. **Tale enim visum est**: 'For of this character (i.e. non in toto homine sed in parte hominis positum) we have seen the Stoic *summum bonum* to be'. Cf. supra, 28.

34. **Ut Phidias . . . huic similis.** The first member of the comparison would be regularly balanced by 'sic sapientia hominem, quem a natura inchoatum accepit, absolvere debet, qualis institutus est'. With the simile cf. 'There's a divinity that shapes our ends, *Rough-hew* them how we will'.

35. **Si nihil in eo,** i.e. si nihil absolvi et perfici debet in eo, quod perficiendum est, praeter . . . rationem (Müller). *ex virtute agere* = *ἐνεργεῖν κατ' ἀρετήν*, i.e. *ζῆν κατ' ἀρετήν*. 'Activity motivated by Virtue must be the highest Good of such an organism' (*huic*).

est, rationem, necesse est, huic ultimum esse ex virtute agere; rationis enim perfectio est virtus; si nihil nisi corpus, summa erunt illa, valetudo, vacuitas doloris, pulchritudo, cetera. XIV. **36.** Nunc de hominis summo bono quaeritur; quid igitur dubitamus in tota eius natura quaerere quid sit effectum? Cum enim constet inter omnes, omne officium munusque sapientiae in hominis cultu esse occupatum, alii (ne me existimes contra Stoicos solum dicere) eas sententias afferunt, ut summum bonum in eo genere ponant, quod sit extra nostram potestatem, tamquam de inanimo aliquo loquantur, alii contra, quasi corpus nullum sit hominis, ita praeter animum nihil curant, cum praesertim ipse quoque animus non inane nescio quid sit (neque enim id possum intellegere), sed in quodam genere corporis, ut ne is quidem virtute una contentus sit, sed appetat vacuitatem doloris. Quamobrem utrique idem faciunt, ut si laevam partem neglegerent, dexteram tuerentur, aut ipsius animi, ut fecit Erillus, cognitionem amplexarentur, actionem relinquerent. Eorum enim omnium, multa praetermittentium, dum eligant aliquid, quod sequantur, quasi curta sententia; at vero illa perfecta atque plena eorum, qui, cum de hominis summo bono quaererent, nullam in eo neque animi neque corporis partem vacuam tutela reliquerunt. **37.** Vos autem, Cato, quia virtus, ut omnes fatemur, altissimum locum in homine et maxime excellentem tenet et quod eos, qui sapientes sunt, absolutos et perfectos putamus, aciem animorum nostrorum virtutis splendore praestringitis. In omni enim animante est summum aliquid atque optimum, ut in equis, in canibus,

36. quid sit effectum, i.e. *quid et in animo et in corpore a natura effectum sit?* Repeats and renders explicit *Qualem . . . hominem natura inchoavit?* *Effectum* = inchoatum. Nature *makes* the ground-plan for Wisdom to work out (*perficere*).

animus . . . in quodam genere corporis, i.e. *animus quoddam genus corporis sit.* This is much harsher than *non sunt in eo genere* (29), where *genus* means 'a class,' whereas here it means 'a kind' (of substance), and *sit in* means not *belongs to* but *is.* C. turns the Stoics' own doctrine, that the mind is a fiery ethereal substance (σῶμα), against them, 'They ignore everything but the mind, *and that although* (*cum praesertim*) even the mind itself is not an indefinable impalpable something (a conception to me unintelligible), but, being corporeal, can suffer pain, freedom from which must be included in its Supreme Good'.

quibus tamen et dolore vacare opus est et valere; sic igitur in homine perfectio ista in eo potissimum, quod est optimum, id est, in virtute laudatur. Itaque mihi non satis videmini considerare, quod iter sit naturae quaeque progressio. Non enim, quod facit in frugibus, ut, cum ad spicam perduxerit ab herba, relinquat et pro nihilo habeat herbam, idem facit in homine, cum eum ad rationis habitum perduxit. Semper enim ita assumit aliquid, ut ea, quae prima dederit, non deserat. **38.** Itaque sensibus rationem adiunxit, et ratione effecta, sensus non reliquit. Ut si cultura vitium, cuius hoc munus est, ut efficiat, ut vitis cum omnibus partibus suis quam optime se habeat,—sed sic intellegamus (licet enim, ut vos quoque soletis, fingere aliquid docendi causa): si igitur illa cultura vitium in vite insit ipsa, cetera, credo, velit, quae ad colendam vitem attinebunt, sicut antea, se autem omnibus vitis partibus praeferat statuatque nihil esse melius in vite quam se; similiter sensus, cum accessit ad naturam, tuetur illam quidem, sed etiam se tuetur; cum autem assumpta est ratio, tanto in dominatu locatur, ut omnia illa prima naturae huius tutelae subiciantur. **39.** Itaque non discedit ab eorum curatione, quibus praeposita vitam omnem debet gubernare; ut mirari satis istorum inconstantiam non possim. Naturalem enim appetitionem, quam vocant ὁρμήν, itemque officium, ipsam etiam virtutem volunt esse earum rerum, quae secundum naturam sunt. Cum autem ad summum bonum volunt pervenire, transiliunt omnia et duo nobis opera pro uno relinquunt, ut alia sumamus, alia expetamus, potius quam uno fine utrumque concluderent.

38. **Ut si cultura.** The simile is again used, v. 39, 40. For the anacoluthon, cf. 35, *Ut Pheidias . . . huic similis*. C. puts *si igitur illa* for *ut igitur illa, si*, and introduces the second member of the comparison by *similiter*.

sensus, cum accessit. The constitution of the animal is that of the plant *plus* sentience, the constitution of man that of the animal *plus* reason; the super-added principle in either case takes all the lower elements under its protection.

39. **esse earum rerum.** The construction properly belonging to *appetitio* is harshly extended to *virtutem* and *officium*. Natural goods are not the *object*, but the sphere of operation of *virtus* and *officium*.

XV. **40.** At enim [nam] dicitis virtutem non posse constitui, si ea, quae extra virtutem sint, ad beate vivendum pertineant. Quod totum contra est; introduci enim virtus nullo mode potest, nisi omnia, quae leget quaeque reiciet, unam referentur ad summam. Nam si omnino † nos neglegemus, in Aristonea vitia incidemus et peccata obliviscemurque, quae virtuti ipsi principia dederimus; si ea non neglegemus neque tamen ad finem summi boni referemus, non multum ab Erilli levitate aberimus, duarum enim vitarum nobis erunt instituta capienda. Facit enim ille duo seiuncta ultima bonorum quae ut essent vera, coniungi debuerunt; nunc ita separantur, ut diiuncta sint, quo nihil potest esse perversius. **41.** Itaque contra est, ac dicitis; nam constitui virtus nullo modo potest, nisi ea, quae sunt prima naturae, ut ad summam pertinentia tenebit. Quaesita enim virtus est, non quae relinqueret naturam, sed quae tueretur; at illa, ut vobis placet, partem quandam tuetur, reliquam deserit. Atque ipsa hominis institutio si loqueretur, hoc diceret, primos suos quasi coeptus appetendi fuisse, ut se conservaret in ea natura, in qua ortus esset. Nondum autem explanatum satis erat, quid maxime natura vellet. Explanetur igitur. Quid ergo aliud intellegetur, nisi uti ne quae pars naturae neglegatur? In qua si nihil est praeter rationem, sit in una virtute finis bonorum; sin est etiam corpus, ista explanatio naturae nempe hoc effecerit, ut ea, quae ante explanationem tenebamus, relinquamus. Ergo id est convenienter naturae vivere, a natura discedere. **42.** Ut quidam philosophi, cum, a sensibus profecti, maiora

40. si omnino †: *nos* if nom. is otiose, and leaves *neglegemus* without an object; if acc. must mean 'our own constitution' (Reid). But (1) our *bodily* constitution is here in question, to which *nos* is inapplicable, (2) the object of *neglegemus* and of *non neglegemus* must be the same, and we want an antecedent to *ea*. Mdv. conj. *omnino omnia praeter animos neglegemus*. (Baiter's *omnino ea negl.* is simple, but requires *sin non* for *si ea non* in the second clause. Mdv.)

Facit enim ille. See Introd. § 16, and cf. ii. 43.

42. Ut quidam philosophi: the Old Academics in particular. *maiora et diviniora* refers to the intellectual faculties whereby alone we grasp realities, i.e. true Being)(mere Seeming, which is all the senses can acquaint us with.

quaedam et diviniora vidissent, sensus reliquerunt, sic isti, cum ex appetitione rerum virtutis pulchritudinem aspexissent, omnia, quae praeter virtutem ipsam viderant, abiecerunt, obliti naturam omnem appetendarum rerum ita late patere, ut a principiis permanaret ad fines, neque intellegunt, se rerum illarum pulchrarum atque admirabilium fundamenta subducere.

XVI. **43.** Itaque mihi videntur omnes quidem illi errasse, qui finem bonorum esse dixerunt honeste vivere, sed alius alio magis; Pyrrho scilicet maxime, qui, virtute constituta, nihil omnino, quod appetendum sit, relinquat; deinde Aristo, qui nihil relinquere non est ausus, introduxit autem, quibus commotus sapiens appeteret aliquid, quodcumque in mentem incideret et quodcumque tamquam occurreret. Is hoc melior quam Pyrrho, quod aliquod genus appetendi dedit, deterior quam ceteri, quod penitus a natura recessit. Stoici autem, quod finem bonorum in una virtute ponunt, similes sunt illorum; quod autem principium officii quaerunt, melius quam Pyrrho; quod ea non occurrentia fingunt, vincunt Aristonem; quod autem ea, quae ad naturam accommodata et per se assumenda esse dicunt, non adiungunt ad finem bonorum, desciscunt a natura et quodam modo sunt non dissimiles Aristonis. Ille enim occurrentia nescio quae comminiscebatur; hi autem ponunt illi quidem prima naturae, sed ea seiungunt a finibus et summa bonorum; quae cum praeponunt, ut sit aliqua rerum selectio, naturam videntur sequi; cum autem negant ea quidquam ad beatam vitam pertinere, rursus naturam relinquunt.

43. **qui . . . relinquat.** The subj. will stand, though *qui . . . non est ausus* follows. Pyrrho erred 'in leaving nothing . . .'

quodcumque in mentem. Cf. § 47, *quodcumque in mentem veniat* aut *quodcumque occurrat.* C. translates two distinct formulas, as is further indicated by *quibus commotus.*

quod ea non occurrentia fingunt, i.e. *quod non fingunt occurrentia et in iis id* (*principium officii*) *ponunt.* Cf. *haec ultima bonorum* (ii. 19 n.).

hi autem ponunt illi quidem. Other exx. of this concessive use of ille quidem occur iii. 54 (*ea . . . referuntur illa quidem*), v. 68 (*haec . . . sunt illa quidem*), 71 (*illa . . . complent ea quidem*). 'The pronoun serves to recall with emphasis the subject of the sentence, especially when . . . some few words have intervened' (Sandys on Orat. 13).

44. Atque adhuc eam dixi causam, Zenoni non fuisse quamobrem a superiorum auctoritate discederet; nunc reliqua videamus, nisi aut ad haec, Cato, dicere aliquid vis aut nos iam longiores sumus. Neutrum vero, inquit ille. Nam et a te perfici istam disputationem volo nec tua mihi oratio longa videri potest. Optime, inquam. Quid enim mihi potest esse optatius quam cum Catone, omnium virtutum auctore, de virtutibus disputare? **45.** Sed primum illud vide, gravissimam illam vestram sententiam, quae familiam ducit, honestum quod sit, id esse solum bonum honesteque vivere bonorum finem, communem fore vobis cum omnibus, qui in una virtute constituunt finem bonorum; quodque dicitis, informari non posse virtutem, si quidquam, nisi quod honestum sit, numeretur, idem dicetur ab illis, quos modo nominavi. Mihi autem aequius videbatur, Zenonem cum Polemone disceptantem, a quo, quae essent principia naturae, acceperat, a communibus initiis progredientem videre, ubi primum insisteret et unde causa controversiae nasceretur, non, stantem cum iis, qui ne dicerent quidem sua summa bona esse a natura profecta, uti iisdem argumentis, quibus illi uterentur, iisdemque sententiis.

XVII. **46.** Minime vero illud probo, quod, cum docuistis, ut vobis videmini, solum bonum esse, quod honestum sit, tum rursum dicitis, initia proponi necesse esse apta et accommodata naturae, quorum ex selectione virtus possit existere. Non enim in selectione virtus ponenda erat, ut id ipsum, quod erat bonorum ultimum, aliud aliquid

44. Atque adhuc eam dixi causam, i.e. 'eam egi causam, sic disputavi, ut ostenderem'. Mdv., 'My plea so far has been that Zeno had no grounds for seceding . . .'

45. quae familiam ducit, 'which holds front rank in your array of doctrines'. Cf. Ad Fam. vii. 5. 3, *accedit etiam, quod familiam ducit in jure civili, singularis memoria.*

numeretur, sc. *in bonis.*

aequius videbatur. Zeno should have started from the principles he borrowed from his master Polemo, and have indicated the point at which he diverged from him; instead of which he began by ranging himself with the opposite camp, and adopting the arguments of a school whose fundamental tenets were at variance with his own.

46. ut id ipsum. Cato had forestalled this objection, iii. 22. See n.

acquireret. Nam omnia, quae sumenda quaeque legenda aut optanda sunt, inesse debent in summa bonorum, ut is, qui eam adeptus sit, nihil praeterea desideret. Videsne, ut, quibus summa est in voluptate, perspicuum sit, quid iis faciendum sit aut non faciendum? ut nemo dubitet, eorum omnia officia quo spectare, quid sequi, quid fugere debeant? Sit hoc ultimum bonorum, quod nunc a me defenditur; apparet statim, quae sint officia, quae actiones. Vobis autem, quibus nihil est aliud propositum nisi rectum atque honestum, unde officii, unde agendi principium nascatur, non reperietis. **47.** Hoc igitur quaerentes omnes, et ii, qui, quodcumque in mentem veniat aut quodcumque occurrat, se sequi dicent, et vos ad naturam revertemini. Quibus natura iure responderit, non esse verum, aliunde finem beate vivendi, a se principia rei gerendae peti; esse enim unam rationem, qua et principia rerum agendarum et ultima bonorum continerentur, atque ut Aristonis esset explosa sententia, dicentis, nihil differre aliud ab alio nec esse res ullas praeter virtutes et vitia, inter quas quidquam omnino interesset, sic errare Zenonem, qui nulla in re nisi in virtute [aut vitio] propensionem ne minimi quidem momenti ad summum bonum adipiscendum esse diceret et, cum ad beatam vitam nullum momentum cetera haberent, ad appetitionem tamen rerum esse in iis momenta diceret; quasi vero haec appetitio non ad summi boni adeptionem pertineret! **48.** Quid autem minus consentaneum est, quam quod aiunt, cognito summo bono, reverti se ad naturam, ut ex ea petant agendi principium, id est, officii? Non enim actionis aut officii ratio impellit ad ea, quae secundum naturam sunt, appetenda, sed ab iis et appetitio et actio commovetur.

XVIII. Nunc venio ad illa tua brevia, quae consectaria

47. **non esse verum.** *verum* = 'right,' 'fair,' as often.

continerentur. The sequence of tenses is abruptly changed at this point, as if C. had begun with a conditional clause, *si ad naturam reverteremini . . . responderet.*

nihil differre aliud ab alio: *nihil* is the subject.

48. **tua brevia**, iii. 27 sqq. Cato's first syllogism (1) involves petitio principii, i.e. its major premiss, 'whatever is good is praiseworthy,' assumes the conclusion which is to

esse dicebas, et primum illud, quo nihil potest brevius: Bonum omne laudabile; laudabile autem omne honestum; bonum igitur omne honestum. O plumbeum pugionem! Quis enim tibi primum illud concesserit? (quo quidem concesso, nihil opus est secundo; si enim omne bonum laudabile est, omne honestum est); (**49.**) quis igitur tibi istud dabit praeter Pyrrhonem, Aristonem eorumve similes? quos tu non probas. Aristoteles, Xenocrates, tota illa familia non dabit, quippe qui valetudinem, vires, divitias, gloriam, multa alia bona esse dicant, laudabilia non dicant. Et hi quidem ita non sola virtute finem bonorum contineri putant, ut rebus tamen omnibus virtutem anteponant; quid censes eos esse facturos, qui omnino virtutem a bonorum fine segregaverunt, Epicurum, Hieronymum, illos etiam, si qui Carneadeum finem tueri volunt? **50.** Iam aut Callipho aut Diodorus quomodo poterunt tibi istud concedere, qui ad honestatem aliud adiungunt, quod ex eodem genere non sit? Placet igitur tibi, Cato, cum res sumpseris non concessas, ex illis efficere, quod velis? Iam ille sorites *est*,

be proved; (2) is not really a syllogism at all, since it contains only two terms. For its minor premiss, 'whatever is praiseworthy is moral,' merely states an identity. This is less obvious when we translate the terms, since *honestum* and *laudabile* are more nearly synonymous than their English equivalents. Stripped of its sheath, Cato's 'property dagger' is this, All A is B, all B is B, ∴ All A is B!

50. Iam ille sorites est, i.e. *iam illud* (the following syllogism, your second). *illud* becomes *ille* by attraction to the following noun. Cf. *ea occurrentia*, 43. *quo* is masc., 'than which,' i.e. 'than the sorites.' This criticism is a mere blunder. The name sorites (from σωρός) was given to two forms of argument: (1) a cumulative syllogism, usually stated thus, All A's are B's, All B's are C's, All C's are D's, All D's are E's, ∴ All A's are E's. Such a series, however prolonged, will lead to a valid conclusion, provided it is perfectly consecutive, and Cato's sorites is formally valid. What the Stoics condemned was (2) the *fallacy* so called, also known as the 'fallacy of continuous questioning'. It was asked, e.g. Is a man bald who has so many thousand hairs? You answer, No; your antagonist repeats the question with diminishing numbers (*ratione ruentis acervi*, Hor. Ep. ii. 1. 47) till you have either to admit that the loss of one hair makes a man bald, or deny that he is bald with no hair at all. Chrysippus' solution of the sophism which gave its name to the class (How many grains make a heap? 'acervus Chrysippi,' Persius, vi. fin.) was to refuse to be questioned beyond an arbitrarily chosen point (ἐπέχειν, ἡσυχάζειν). Cf. Acad. ii. 49, *captiossimo genere interrogationis utuntur, quod minime in philosophia probari solet, cum aliquid minutatim et gradatim additur aut demitur. Soritas hoc vocant*,

quo nihil putatis esse vitiosius, quod bonum sit, id esse optabile; quod optabile, id expetendum; quod expetendum, id laudabile; dein reliqui gradus. Sed ego in hoc resisto; eodem enim modo tibi nemo dabit, quod expetendum sit, id esse laudabile. Illud vero minime consectarium, sed in primis hebes, illorum scilicet, non tuum, gloriatione dignam esse beatam vitam, quod non possit sine honestate contingere, [ut iure quisquam glorietur.] **51**. Dabit hoc Zenoni Polemo; etiam magister eius et tota illa gens et reliqui, qui, virtutem omnibus rebus multo anteponentes, adiungunt ei tamen aliquid summo in bono finiendo. Si enim virtus digna est gloriatione, ut est, tantumque praestat reliquis rebus, ut dici vix possit, et beatus esse poterit virtute una praeditus, carens ceteris, nec tamen illud tibi concedet, praeter virtutem nihil in bonis esse ducendum. Illi autem, quibus summum bonum sine virtute est, non dabunt fortasse, vitam beatam habere, in quo possit iure

quia acervum efficiunt uno addito grano. C. there, as here, mistakes a legitimate chain-inference for a fallacy, and the introduction of *a new term* for the *gradatim* process.

in hoc resisto: 'At this point I halt'. The verb seems to echo the ἡσυχάζειν of Chrysippus (see last n.), as though C., carrying on his confusion between the two kinds of sorites, imagined that he was turning the Stoics' own method against them. However, he 'halts' not arbitrarily, but at a proposition 'no one will grant'.

eodem modo, 'precisely as before,' refers to *quis igitur tibi istud dabit*, 49.

quod non possit. Mdv. wrongly takes *quod* as causal, and accuses C. of making *gl. dignam esse b. vitam* the *conclusion* of Cato's *consectarium*, whereas it was really the major premiss (iii. 28), on the grounds that (1) *quod non possit* cannot = *nec id posse*, ∴ cannot be co-ordinate with *esse . . . vitam* and ∴ cannot represent the minor premiss. (2) C. quotes *esse vitam* as the *consectarium*, and omits the real conclusion. As to (1), Mdv. forgets that on iii. 28, *gloriatione . . . dignam esse . . . vitam, quod non possit nisi honestae vitae . . . contingere*, he explains that *quod non possit* = *id autem non potest* is the minor premiss (see my note). As to (2), that C. quotes Cato's *premisses* is clear from *dabit. . . Polemo . . . ille non dabunt*; these C. attacks, and naturally omits the conclusion (*honesta vita beata vita est*). The only real difficulty is the clause *ut iure quisquam glorietur*. I follow Manutius in bracketing it as interpolated. C. then says, 'This so-called concise proof is no proof, for Polemo, etc., can grant your minor (Only what is moral is a thing to glory in) without granting your conclusion, while others will deny your major (Only happiness is a thing to glory in)'.

51. magister eius, Xenocrates.

et beatus esse poterit . . . nec . . . concedet. The subject is *Polemo*, dramatically put for the *sapiens* whose case is considered.

gloriari; etsi illi quidem etiam voluptates faciunt interdum gloriosas.

XIX. **52.** Vides igitur, te aut ea sumere, quae non concedantur, aut ea, quae etiam concessa te nihil iuvent. Equidem in omnibus istis conclusionibus hoc putarem philosophia nobisque dignum, et maxime, cum summum bonum quaereremus, vitam nostram, consilia, voluntates, non verba corrigi. Quis enim potest istis, quae te, ut ais, delectant, brevibus et acutis auditis de sententia decedere? Nam cum expectant et avent audire, cur dolor malum non sit, dicunt illi, asperum esse dolere, molestum, odiosum, contra naturam, difficile toleratu, sed, quia nulla sit in dolore nec fraus nec improbitas nec malitia nec culpa nec turpitudo, non esse illud malum. Haec qui audierit, ut ridere non curet, discedet tamen nihilo firmior ad dolorem ferendum quam venerat. **53.** Tu autem negas fortem esse quemquam posse, qui dolorem malum putet. Cur fortior sit, si illud, quod tute concedis, asperum et vix ferendum putabit? Ex rebus enim timiditas, non ex vocabulis nascitur. Et ais, si una littera commota sit, fore, tota ut labet disciplina. Utrum igitur tibi litteram videor an totas paginas commovere? Ut enim sit apud illos, id quod est a te laudatum, ordo rerum conservatus et omnia inter se apta et connexa (sic enim aiebas), tamen persequi non debemus, si a falsis principiis profecta congruunt ipsa sibi et a proposito non aberrant. **54.** In prima igitur constitutione Zeno tuus a natura recessit, cumque summum bonum posuisset in ingenii praestantia, quam virtutem vocamus, nec quidquam aliud esse bonum dixisset, nisi quod esset honestum, nec virtutem posse constare, si in ceteris rebus esset quidquam, quod aliud alio melius esset aut peius, his propositis tenuit prorsus

53. **Tu autem negas**, iii. 29. *Et ais*, infr. iii. 74.

si illud . . . putabit: *illud* is predicate: *si illud dolorem esse putabit, quod tu eum esse concedis.* Cf. § 65, *quis enim hoc* (i.e. *sapiens*)?

54. **in prima constitutione**, 'in framing his fundamental definitions'. Cf. v. 46, *eam constitutionem summi boni, quae est proposita. cumque . . . peius* gives the content of his definitions.

consequentia. Recte dicis; negare non possum; sed ita falsa sunt ea, quae consequuntur, ut illa, e quibus haec nata sunt, vera esse non possint. **55.** Docent enim nos, ut scis, dialectici, si ea, quae rem aliquam sequantur, falsa sint, falsam illam ipsam esse, quam sequantur. Ita fit illa conclusio non solum vera, sed ita perspicua, ut dialectici ne rationem quidem reddi putent oportere: Si illud, hoc; non autem hoc; igitur ne illud quidem. Sic, consequentibus vestris sublatis, prima tolluntur. Quae sequuntur igitur? Omnes, qui non sint sapientes, aeque miseros esse; sapientes omnes summe beatos; recte facta omnia aequalia; omnia peccata paria;—quae cum magnifice primo dici viderentur, considerata minus probabantur. Sensus enim cuiusque et natura rerum atque ipsa veritas clamabat quodam modo, non posse adduci, ut inter eas res, quas Zeno exaequaret, nihil interesset.

XX. **56.** Postea tuus ille Poenulus (scis enim Citieos, clientes tuos, e Phoenica profectos), homo igitur acutus, causam non obtinens, repugnante natura, verba versare coepit; et primum rebus iis, quas nos bonas dicimus, concessit, ut haberentur aestimabiles et ad naturam accommodatae, faterique coepit, sapienti, hoc est, summe beato commodius tamen esse, si ea quoque habeat, quae bona non audet appellare, naturae accommodata esse concedit, negatque Platonem, si sapiens non sit, eadem esse in causa, qua tyrannum Dionysium; huic mori optimum esse propter desperationem sapientiae, illi propter spem vivere; peccata autem partim esse tolerabilia, partim nullo modo, propterea quod alia peccata plures, alia pauciores quasi numeros officii praeterirent; iam insipientes alios ita esse,

55. minus probabantur, sc. by Zeno's hearers.

56. Poenulus. Acad. ii. 98, *homo acutus, ut Poenus.* Plautus, Poen. prol. 113, *Poenus plane est. Poeni* was often used for *Phoenices.* The people of Citium, Zeno's birthplace, which was one of the Phoenician colonies in Cyprus, became clients of Cato when he superintended the reduction of the island to a Roman province. Zeno was called φοινικίδιον by Crates (Diog. L. vii. 3).

huic mori optimum. If C. is quoting correctly, the Stoics here contradict themselves. Cf. iii. 61, *nec iis, qui sine virtute sunt, mors est oppetenda.*

peccata autem. Stobaeus, Ecl. Eth. p. 236, Ἴσων δὲ ὄντων τῶν

ut nullo modo ad sapientiam possent pervenire, alios, qui possent, si id egissent, sapientiam consequi. **57.** Hic loquebatur aliter atque omnes, sentiebat idem, quod ceteri. Nec vero minoris aestimanda ducebat ea, quae ipse bona negaret esse, quam illi, qui ea bona esse dicebant. Quid igitur voluit sibi, qui illa mutaverit? Saltem aliquid de pondere detraxisset et paulo minoris aestimavisset ea quam Peripatetici, ut sentire quoque aliud, non solum dicere videretur. Quid? de ipsa beata vita, ad quam omnia referuntur, quae dicitis? Negatis eam esse, quae expleta sit iis rebus omnibus, quas natura desideret, totamque eam in una virtute ponitis; cumque omnis controversia aut de re soleat aut de nomine esse, utraque earum nascitur, si aut res ignoratur aut erratur in nomine; quorum si neutrum est, opera danda est, ut verbis utamur quam usitatissimis et quam maxime aptis, id est, rem declarantibus. **58.** Num igitur dubium est, quin, si in re ipsa nihil peccatur a superioribus, verbis illi commodius utantur? Videamus igitur sententias eorum; tum ad verba redeamus.

XXI. Dicunt appetitionem animi moveri, cum aliquid ei secundum naturam esse videatur, omniaque, quae secun-

ἁμαρτημάτων, εἶναι τινας ἐν αὐτοῖς διαφοράς, καθόσον τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπὸ σκληρᾶς καὶ δυσιάτου διαθέσεως γίγνεται, τὰ δ' οὔ. Cf. iii. 48.

57. cumque omnis should have been a new sentence. *negatis . . . ponitis* gives the thesis to be attacked; the opening of C.'s criticism is awkwardly tacked on in a co-ordinate clause.

utraque earum, 'one and the other of these two kinds of dispute,' viz. about a fact, and about a name.

58. Dicunt appetitionem. This account is a tissue of blunders and contradictions. Having stated that 'things according to nature' excite appetition, C. proceeds to divide these things into (1) those which do *not* excite appetition, (2) those which excite *pleasure*, and, in the case of man, are objects of the reasoning faculty. The former (*illa superiora*), he superfluously adds, are not 'moral or praiseworthy'. Nevertheless, they are *naturalia* (i.e. they *do* excite appetition!) and, combined with *honesta* they make up *beata vita.* Mdv., who considers C. *capable de tout*, is content to suppose that he has simply garbled his authority, Antiochus, through sheer carelessness. But since throughout Bks. IV. and V., as also in the *Academica*, C. reproduces the views of Antiochus with a fulness and clearness which suggest direct transcription from his writings, we may fairly consider the possibility of textual error in the one passage where he appears to blunder absurdly. I venture to propose two very slight changes, which restore satisfactory

dum naturam sint, aestimatione aliqua digna, eaque pro eo, quantum in quoque sit ponderis, esse aestimanda; quaeque secundum naturam sint, partim nihil habere in sese eius appetitionis, de qua saepe iam diximus, quae nec honesta nec laudabilia dicantur, partim, quae voluptatem habeant in omni animante, sed in homine rationem etiam; ex ea quae sint apta, ea honesta, ea pulchra, ea laudabilia, illa autem superiora naturalia nominantur, quae coniuncta cum honestis vitam beatam perficiunt et absolvunt. **59.** Omnium autem eorum commodorum, quibus non illi plus tribuunt, qui illa bona esse dicunt, quam Zeno, qui negat, longe praestantissimum esse, quod honestum esset atque laudabile; sed si duo honesta proposita sint, alterum cum valetudine, alterum cum morbo, non esse dubium, ad utrum eorum natura nos ipsa deductura sit; sed tamen tantam vim esse honestatis tantumque eam rebus omnibus praestare et excellere, ut nullis nec suppliciis nec praemiis demoveri possit ex eo, quod rectum esse decreverit; omniaque, quae dura, difficilia, adversa videantur, ea virtutibus iis, quibus a natura essemus ornati, obteri posse; non † faciles illas quidem nec contemnendas (quid enim esset in virtute tantum?), sed ut hoc iudicaremus, non esse in his partem maximam positam beate aut secus vivendi. **60.** Ad summam ea, quae Zeno aestimanda et sumenda et apta naturae esse dixit, eadem illi bona appellant; vitam autem beatam illi eam, quae constaret ex iis rebus, quas dixi, aut plurimis aut gravissimis. Zeno autem, quod

sense to the whole account, in Addit. Note iv.

59. **Omnium autem eorum . . . praestantissimum.** C. should have written *omnibus . . . praestantius. honestum* is, of course, not one of these *commoda*.

† faciles illas. The sense clearly is, 'the virtues may trample hardships under foot, not easily indeed, nor are hardships to be made light of (else, what were the great importance of virtue?)'. Mdv. suggests *non facile illa quidem* (obteri posse) *nec contemnenda esse*.

quid enim esset: not *esse*, because the question in or. recta would be 'quid enim *sit*?'

sed ut hoc iudicaremus, i.e. virtue triumphs, not without effort, but so as to make this our verdict; such things have not a paramount influence on our happiness. *beate aut secus* seems to show that *his* means the whole class of things external to the mind, both *commoda* and *incommoda*.

60. **aut plurimis.** Cf. § 15, *aut omnibus aut maximis*, and § 27 n.

suam, quandam propriam speciem habeat, cur appetendum sit, id solum bonum appellat, beatam autem vitam eam solam, quae cum virtute degatur.

XXII. Si de re disceptari oportet, nulla mihi tecum, Cato, potest esse dissensio; nihil est enim, de quo aliter tu sentias atque ego, modo commutatis verbis ipsas res conferamus. Nec hoc ille non vidit, sed verborum magnificentia est et gloria delectatus; qui si ea, quae dicit, ita sentiret, ut verba significant, quid inter eum et vel Pyrrhonem vel Aristonem interesset? Sin autem eos non probabat, quid attinuit cum iis, quibuscum re concinebat, verbis discrepare? **61**. Quid, si reviviscant Platonis illi, et deinceps qui eorum auditores fuerunt, et tecum ita loquantur? 'Nos cum te, M. Cato, studiosissimum philosophiae, iustissimum virum, optimum iudicem, religiosissimum testem, audiremus, admirati sumus, quid esset, cur nobis Stoicos anteferres, qui de rebus bonis et malis sentirent ea, quae ab hoc Polemone Zeno cognoverat, nominibus uterentur iis, quae prima specie admirationem, re explicata risum moverent. Tu autem, si tibi illa probabantur, cur non propriis verbis illa tenebas? sin te auctoritas commovebat, nobisne omnibus et Platoni ipsi nescio quem illum anteponebas? praesertim cum in re publica princeps esse velles ad eamque tuendam cum summa tua dignitate maxime a nobis ornari atque instrui posses. A nobis enim ista quaesita, a nobis descripta, notata, praecepta sunt, omniumque rerum publicarum rectionis genera, status, mutationes, leges etiam et instituta ac mores civitatum perscripsimus. Eloquentiae vero, quae et principibus maximo ornamento est et qua te audimus valere plurimum, quantum tibi ex monumentis nostris addidisses!' Ea cum dixissent, quid tandem talibus viris

solum. C. by a slip makes Zeno merely say, 'Only a moral life is a happy life'. 'The 'Ancients' also said this. Zeno, of course, contended that life is happy even *cum sola virtute*.

61. Platonis illi, sc. *auditores*. 'Plato's pupils and *their* pupils in succession.' *illi* are Speusippus, Aristotle, Xenocrates; *eorum auditores*, Polemo and Theophrastus (§ 3).

responderes? **62.** Rogarem te, inquit, ut diceres pro me tu idem, qui illis orationem dictavisses, vel potius paulum loci mihi, ut iis responderem, dares, nisi et te audire nunc mallem et istis tamen alio tempore responsurus essem, tum scilicet, cum tibi.

XXIII. Atque, si verum respondere velles, Cato, haec erant dicenda, non eos tibi non probatos, tantis ingeniis homines tantaque auctoritate, sed te animadvertisse, quas res illi propter antiquitatem parum vidissent, eas a Stoicis esse perspectas, eisdemque de rebus hos cum acutius disseruisse, tum sensisse gravius et fortius, quippe qui primum valetudinem bonam expetendam negent esse, eligendam dicant, nec quia bonum sit valere, sed quia sit nonnihilo aestimandum; (neque tamen pluris illis videtur, qui illud non dubitant bonum dicere;) hoc vero te ferre non potuisse, quod antiqui illi quasi barbati (ut nos de nostris solemus dicere) crediderint, eius, qui honeste viveret, si idem etiam bene valeret, bene audiret, copiosus esset, optabiliorem fore vitam melioremque et magis expetendam quam illius, qui, aeque vir bonus, multis modis esset, ut Ennii Alcmaeo,

circumventus morbo, exilio atque inopia.

63. Illi igitur antiqui non tam acute optabiliorem illam vitam putant, praestantiorem, beatiorem; Stoici autem tantummodo praeponendam in seligendo, non quo beatior ea vita sit, sed quod ad naturam accommodatior; et, qui sapientes non sint, omnes aeque miseros esse. Stoici hoc videlicet viderunt, illos autem id fugerat superiores, homines sceleribus et parricidiis inquinatos nihilo miseriores

62. **propter antiquitatem**, 'living, as they did, in the Dark Ages'.

sensisse = censuisse. Cf. ii. 6.

hoc vero te . . . potuisse, sc. *diceres*, or *respondendum tibi erat*. This clause takes the place of one beginning *deinde autem*, with the Stoics as subject, which was to be expected after *quippe qui primum*.

barbati. The Romans so nicknamed their 'rude forefathers'. Pro Cael. 33, 'aliquis mihi ab inferis excitandus est ex illis barbatis, non hac barbula, sed illa horrida, quam in statuis antiquis et imaginibus videmus'.

63. **non tam acute . . . putant**, i.e. *non tam acute faciunt, quoniam putant*. Cf. v. 44, *flagitiose descivisse*. This idiomatic use of the adv. to denote less the manner of the action than the judgment passed on it is commoner in Livy and later writers, though not rare in Cic.

esse quam eos, qui, cum caste et integre viverent, nondum perfectam illam sapientiam essent consecuti. **64.** Atque hoc loco similitudines eas, quibus illi uti solent, dissimillimas proferebas. Quis enim ignorat, si plures ex alto emergere velint, propius fore eos quidem ad respirandum, qui ad summam aquam iam appropinquent, sed nihilo magis respirare posse quam eos, qui sint in profundo? Nihil igitur adiuvat procedere et progredi in virtute, quo minus miserrimus sit, antequam ad eam pervenerit, quoniam in aqua nihil adiuvat, et quoniam catuli, qui iam dispecturi sunt, caeci aeque et ii, qui modo nati, Platonem quoque necesse est, quoniam nondum videbat sapientiam, aeque caecum animo ac Phalarim fuisse.

XXIV. **65.** Ista similia non sunt, Cato, in quibus quamvis multum processeris, tamen illud in eadem causa est, a quo abesse velis, donec evaseris. Nec enim ille respirat, antequam emersit, et catuli aeque caeci, priusquam dispexerunt, ac si ita futuri semper essent. Illa sunt similia: Hebes acies est cuipiam oculorum, corpore alius languescit, hi curatione adhibita levantur in dies; valet alter plus cotidie, alter videt; his similes sunt omnes, qui virtuti student; levantur vitiis, levantur erroribus. Nisi forte censes, Ti. Gracchum patrem *non* beatiorem fuisse quam filium, cum alter stabilire rem publicam studuerit, alter evertere. Nec tamen ille erat sapiens; quis enim hoc? aut quando? aut ubi? aut unde? sed quia studebat laudi et dignitati, multum in virtute processerat. **66.** Conferam avum tuum Drusum cum C. Graccho, eius fere aequali? Quae hic rei publicae vulnera imponebat, eadem ille sanabat. Si nihil est, quod tam miseros faciat quam impietas et

64. procedere et progredi in virtute, i.e. in the ordinary sense (for the Stoics denied progress *in* virtue to be possible), whereas *ad eam pervenerit* refers to the instantaneous advance (προκόπτειν εἰς ἀρετήν) by which they held that Virtue was attained completely and once for all.

65. quis enim hoc? sc. *fuit* (i.e. *sapiens*). The neut. pron. does duty for the adj. as in, e.g. § 66, *miseri, quod profecti sunt*; v. 92, *si insipiens, quod certe.* The Stoics themselves could not point to any historical example of a *sapiens*, and doubted if one had ever lived.

66. avum tuum. See n. on Cato's relationships, iii. 8.

scelus, ut iam omnes insipientes sint miseri, quod profecto sunt, non est tamen aeque miser, qui patriae consulit, et is, qui illam extinctam cupit. Levatio igitur vitiorum magna fit in iis, qui habent ad virtutem progressionis aliquantum. **67.** Vestri autem progressionem ad virtutem fieri aiunt, levationem vitiorum fieri negant. At, quo utantur homines acuti argumento ad probandum, operae pretium est considerare. Quarum, inquit, artium summae crescere possunt, earum etiam contrariorum summa poterit augeri; ad virtutis autem summam accedere nihil potest; ne vitia quidem igitur crescere poterunt, quae sunt virtutum contraria. Utrum igitur tandem perspicuisne dubia aperiuntur an dubiis perspicua tolluntur? Atqui hoc perspicuum est, vitia alia aliis esse maiora; illud dubium, ad id, quod summum bonum dicitis, ecquaenam fieri possit accessio. Vos autem, cum perspicuis dubia debeatis illustrare, dubiis perspicua conamini tollere. **68.** Itaque eadem ratione, qua sum paulo ante usus, haerebitis. Si enim propterea vitia alia aliis maiora non sunt, quia ne ad finem quidem bonorum eum, quem vos facitis, quidquam potest accedere, quoniam perspicuum est, vitia non esse omnium paria, finis bonorum vobis mutandus est. Teneamus enim illud necesse est, cum consequens aliquod falsum sit, illud, cuius id consequens sit, non posse esse verum.

XXV. Quae est igitur causa istarum angustiarum? Gloriosa ostentatio in constituendo summo bono. Cum enim, quod honestum sit, id solum bonum esse confirmatur, tollitur cura valetudinis, diligentia rei familiaris, administratio rei publicae, ordo gerendorum negotiorum, officia vitae; ipsum denique illud honestum, in quo uno vultis esse omnia, deserendum est; quae diligentissime contra Aristonem dicuntur a Chrysippo. Ex ea difficultate illae

ut iam, 'granted that'. Mdv. ad loc. collects exx. and remarks that the force of *iam* is 'ut significemus nos, omissis iis, quae aliter dici statuive possint, longius procedere'.

67. **inquit**, the imaginary opponent. Cf. ii. 78.

68. **paulo ante**, in § 54, 55.

ipsum denique illud honestum, which takes its rise in *selectio* (iii. 12). C. ignores Cato's answer to this, iii. 69.

'fallaciloquae,' ut ait Attius, 'malitiae' natae sunt. **69.** Quod enim sapientia, pedem ubi poneret, non habebat sublatis officiis omnibus, officia autem tollebantur dilectu omni et discrimine remoto, quae esse *non* poterant rebus omnibus sic exaequatis, ut inter eas nihil interesset, ex his angustiis ista evaserunt deteriora quam Aristonis. Illa tamen simplicia; vestra versuta. Roges enim Aristonem, bonane ei videantur haec, vacuitas doloris, divitiae, valetudo; neget. Quid? quae contraria sunt his, malane? Nihilo magis. Zenonem roges; respondeat totidem verbis. Admirantes quaeramus ab utroque, quonam modo vitam agere possimus, si nihil interesse nostra putemus, valeamus aegrine simus, vacemus an cruciemur dolore, frigus, famem propulsare possimus necne possimus. Vives, inquit Aristo, magnifice atque praeclare; quod erit cumque visum, ages; numquam angere, numquam cupies, numquam timebis. **70.** Quid Zeno? Portenta haec esse dicit, neque ea ratione ullo modo posse vivi; se dicere, inter honestum et turpe nimium quantum, nescio quid immensum, inter ceteras res nihil omnino interesse. **71.** Idem adhuc; audi reliqua, et risum contine, si potes. Media illa, inquit, inter quae nihil interest, tamen eiusmodi sunt, ut eorum alia eligenda sint, alia reicienda, alia omnino neglegenda, hoc est, ut eorum alia velis, alia nolis, alia non cures.—At modo dixeras, nihil in istis esse, quod interesset.—Et nunc idem dico, inquiet; sed ad virtutes et ad vitia nihil interesse.

XXVI. **72.** Quis istud, quaeso, nesciebat? Verum audiamus.—Ista, inquit, quae dixisti, valere, locupletem esse, non dolere, bona non dico, sed dicam Graece προηγμένα, Latine autem producta (sed praeposita aut praecipua malo; sit tolerabilius et mollius); illa autem, morbum, egestatem, dolorem, non appello mala, sed, si libet, reiectanea. Itaque

fallaciloquae. The same verse seems to be cited de Orat. iii. 154, *Num non vis huius me versutiloquas malitias*—C. probably here puts *fallaciloquae* by a slip of memory.

69. quod erit cumque visum, ages. Cf. 43.

72. Latine autem. Zeno, by a sort of dramatic license, translates his terms. *reiectanea* is a new coinage, more expressive than *reiecta* (iii. 15, 52; Acad. i. 37), of a **permanent** quality residing in the ἀποπροηγμένα. ἀπεκλεγέσθαι is exceptionally (as

illa non dico me expetere, sed legere, nec optare, sed sumere, contraria autem non fugere, sed quasi secernere. Quid ait Aristoteles reliquique Platonis alumni? Se omnia, quae secundum naturam sint, bona appellare, quae autem contra, mala. Videsne igitur Zenonem tuum cum Aristone verbis concinere, re dissidere; cum Aristotele et illis re consentire, verbis discrepare? Cur igitur, cum de re conveniat, non malumus usitate loqui? Aut doceat, paratiorem me ad contemnendam pecuniam fore, si illam in rebus praepositis quam si in bonis duxero, fortioremque in patiendo dolore, si eum asperum et difficilem perpessu, si contra naturam esse quam si malum dixero. **73.** Facete M. Piso, familiaris noster, et alia multa, et hoc loco Stoicos irridebat. Quid enim? aiebat; bonum negas esse divitias, praepositum esse dicis; quid adiuvas? avaritiamne minuis? Quomodo? Si verbum sequimur, primum longius verbum praepositum quam bonum.—Nihil ad rem!—Ne sit sane; at certe gravius. Nam bonum ex quo appellatum sit, nescio; praepositum ex eo credo, quod praeponatur aliis. Id mihi magnum videtur. Itaque dicebat plus tribui divitiis a Zenone, qui eas in praepositis poneret, quam ab Aristotele, qui bonum esse divitias fateretur, sed neque magnum bonum et prae rectis honestisque contemnendum ac despiciendum nec magno opere expetendum; omninoque de istis omnibus verbis a Zenone mutatis ita disputabat, et quae bona negarentur esse ab eo, et quae mala, illa laetioribus nominibus appellari ab eo quam a nobis, haec tristioribus. Piso igitur hoc modo, vir optimus tuique, ut scis, amantissimus; nos, paucis ad haec additis, finem faciamus aliquando; longum est enim ad omnia respondere, quae a te dicta sunt.

XXVII. **74.** Nam ex eisdem verborum praestigiis et regna nata vobis sunt et imperia et divitiae, et tantae quidem, ut

quasi indicates) turned by *secernere*, to avoid *reicere* (iii. 20) after *reiectanea*.

Aut doceat, 'or else (if he denies that our differences are verbal) he should prove'. The logical or actual consequences of denying a preceding statement are frequently thus indicated.

73. M. Piso, the spokesman of the 'restored' Academy in the following Book.

omnia, quae ubique sint, sapientis esse dicatis. Solum praeterea formosum, solum liberum, solum civem; *stultos* omnia contraria, quos etiam insanos esse vultis. Haec παράδοξα illi; nos admirabilia dicamus. Quid autem habent admirationis, cum prope accesseris? Conferam tecum, quam cuique verbo rem subicias; nulla erit controversia. Omnia peccata paria dicitis. Non ego tecum iam ita iocabor, ut iisdem his de rebus, cum L. Murenam te accusante defenderem. Apud imperitos tum illa dicta sunt; aliquid etiam coronae datum; nunc agendum est subtilius. **75**. Peccata paria. Quonam modo? Quia nec honesto quidquam honestius nec turpi turpius. Perge porro; nam de isto magna dissensio est; illa argumenta propria videamus, cur omnia sint paria peccata. Ut, inquit, in fidibus pluribus, si nulla earum ita contenta nervis sit, ut concentum servare possit, omnes aeque incontentae sint, sic peccata, quia discrepant, aeque discrepant; paria sunt igitur. Hic ambiguo ludimur. Aeque enim contingit omnibus fidibus, ut incontentae sint; illud non continuo, ut aeque incontentae. Collatio igitur ista te nihil iuvat; nec enim, omnes avaritias si aeque avaritias esse dixerimus, sequetur, ut etiam aequas esse dicamus. **76**. Ecce aliud simile dissimile. Ut enim, inquit, gubernator aeque peccat, si palearum navem evertit

74. **L. Murenam.** Cf. pro Murena, 60 sqq., where after saying that Cato got his good qualities from Nature, but his defects from his teacher, one Zeno, C. ridicules the Stoic paradoxes: 'solos sapientes esse, si distortissimi sint, formosos, si mendicissimi, divites, si servitutem serviant, reges: nos autem, qui sapientes non sumus, fugitivos, exsules, hostes, insanos denique esse dicunt: . . . nec minus delinquere eum, qui gallum gallinaceum, cum opus non fuerit, quam eum, qui patrem suffocaverit . . .', etc. etc. Plutarch (Cat. min. 21) says that Cato listened with a smile, and said, 'Sirs, how witty our consul is!' *apud imperitos* refers to those very jurors of whom C. had flatteringly remarked, 'non est nobis haec oratio habenda apud imperitam multitudinem' (61). *aliquid etiam coronae datum*, 'I even had to play to the gallery (the public present in court) to some extent'.

75. **Ut, inquit, in fidibus**: 'Just as, in the case of a number of lyres (says my opponent), if not one of them is strung (*contenta nervis*) so as to be in tune (*concentum servare*, i.e. to maintain the proper intervals between its strings), they would all be equally out of tune . . .' Cf. de Off. i. 145, Ut in fidibus aut tibiis, quamvis paulum discrepent, tamen id a sciente animadverti solet, sic videndum est in vita ne forte quid discrepet, vel multo etiam magis, quo maior et melior actionum quam sonorum concentus est. *incontentae* is ἀπ. λεγ.

et si auri, item aeque peccat, qui parentem et qui servum iniuria verberat.—Hoc non videre, cuius generis onus navis vehat, id ad gubernatoris artem nihil pertinere! itaque, aurum paleamne portet, ad bene aut ad male gubernandum nihil interesse; at quid inter parentem et servulum intersit, intellegi et potest et debet. Ergo in gubernando nihil, in officio plurimum interest, quo in genere peccetur. Et, si in ipsa gubernatione neglegentia est navis eversa, maius est peccatum in auro quam in palea. Omnibus enim artibus volumus attributam esse eam, quae communis appellatur prudentia, quam omnes, cuicumque artificio praesunt, debent habere. Ita ne hoc quidem modo paria peccata sunt.

XXVIII. **77.** Urgvent tamen et nihil remittunt. Quoniam, inquiunt, omne peccatum imbecillitatis et inconstantiae est, haec autem vitia in omnibus stultis aeque magna sunt, necesse est paria esse peccata. Quasi vero aut concedatur, in omnibus stultis aeque magna esse vitia et eadem imbecillitate et inconstantia L. Tubulum fuisse, qua illum, cuius is condemnatus est rogatione, P. Scaevolam; et quasi nihil inter res quoque ipsas, in quibus peccatur, intersit, ut, quo hae maiores minoresve sint, eo, quae peccentur in his rebus, aut maiora sint aut minora! **78.** Itaque (iam enim concludatur oratio) hoc uno vitio maxime mihi premi videntur tui Stoici, quod se posse putant duas contrarias sententias obtinere. Quid enim est tam repugnans quam eundem dicere, quod honestum sit, solum id bonum esse; qui dicat appetitionem rerum ad vivendum accommodatarum a natura profectam? Ita cum ea volunt retinere, quae superiori sententiae conveniunt, in Aristonem incidunt; cum id fugiunt, re eadem defendunt, quae Peripatetici, verba tenent mordicus. Quae rursus dum sibi evelli ex ordine nolunt, horridiores evadunt, asperiores, duriores et oratione

77. Quasi vero aut concedatur. For a second disjunctive clause (*aut nihil . . . intersit*) C. substitutes *et quasi* cet. On Tubulus, see ii. 54.

78. in Aristonem incidunt, i.e. in Aristonea vitia et peccata (§ 40).

evelli ex ordine nolunt, 'They will not have their terminology rooted out of their system' (for fear of exposing their plagiarism if they employ the ordinary philosophical terms).

et moribus. **79.** Quam illorum tristitiam atque asperitatem fugiens Panaetius nec acerbitatem sententiarum nec disserendi spinas probavit, fuitque in altero genere mitior, in altero illustrior, semperque habuit in ore Platonem, Aristotelem, Xenocratem, Theophrastum, Dicaearchum, ut ipsius scripta declarant. Quos quidem tibi studiose et diligenter tractandos magno opere censeo. **80.** Sed quoniam et advesperascit et mihi ad villam revertendum est, nunc quidem hactenus; verum hoc idem faciamus saepe. Nos vero, inquit ille; nam quid possumus facere melius? Et hanc quidem primam exigam a te operam, ut audias me, quae a te dicta sunt, refellentem. Sed memento te, quae nos sentiamus, omnia probare, nisi quod verbis aliter utamur, mihi autem vestrorum nihil probari. Scrupulum, inquam, abeunti; sed videbimus. Quae cum essent dicta, discessimus.

80. Scrupulum abeunti, sc. *inicis*. 'That was a parting shot indeed!' (H.R.) C. quotes some unknown proverbial or comic phrase. *Scrupulum*, lit. 'a small sharp stone'. Hence *scrupulum homini inicere*, Terence, 'to give a man a twinge of conscience'.

DE FINIBUS BONORUM ET MALORUM

BOOK V. ARGUMENT

i-iii. *Prologue.* Cicero, his brother Quintus, his nephew Lucius, and his friends Piso and Atticus during their stay at Athens attended the lectures of Antiochus, and after doing so one morning, agreed to walk to the Academia together in the afternoon. Conversation by the way having turned on the influence of localities associated with famous men upon the imagination, the Academic philosophy comes under discussion, and Piso recommends the young Lucius who is attracted by the 'New Academy,' to follow the 'Old'; i.e. the system put forward by Antiochus as that of both the old Academics and the Peripatetics. At Cicero's request, Piso thus expounds the 'Academic and Peripatetic' doctrine of the Chief Good.

iv. The Peripatetics adopted the usual division of Philosophy into Physics, Dialectic, Ethics. Under the last, they included Politics, which was exhaustively treated by both Aristotle and Theophrastus. v. These two hold identical views as to the nature of the Chief Good; but differ as to whether Happiness is attainable by the Wise Man independently of outward circumstances. Theophrastus attaches undue importance to the latter; hence Aristotle must be preferred where they differ. Their successors have diverged from the genuine Peripatetic doctrine, which Antiochus has faithfully reproduced.

vi. As there are so many conflicting theories of the Chief Good, let us avail ourselves of Carneades' classification, which embraces all the possible theories, being based on the generally admitted principle that the End of the Art of Conduct must be something (1) in conformity with Nature, (2) which excites instinctive appetition (ὁρμή). Hence it is the problem of Ethics to determine what it is that Nature strives after, for this must be the End of Conduct, in other words, the Chief Good. vii. The possible objects of instinctive appetition are (1) Pleasure, (2) Freedom from Pain, (3) Natural Goods (i.e. mens sana in corpore sano). But these three give us six Ends of Conduct, for with regard to each either (1) *actual acquisition of* the object or (2) *action aiming at* the object may be considered the End. But no one has advocated the *pursuit* of Pleasure, or of Freedom from Pain as an End; there remains then only the pursuit of Natural Goods, in which Virtue consists, according to the Stoics. Thus we have a fourth simple End. viii. By

combining Virtue with each of the first three Ends, philosophers added three *compound* Ends to this list. Two of these are obviously indefensible. The third (Virtue + Natural Goods) was upheld by the Academics and Peripatetics, on the following grounds. ix. Self-preservation is the first instinct of every creature, and all its actions aim at complete self-development according to the special laws of its nature. Thus the End of all creatures is analogous though not identical, and the End of Man is *to live in harmony with his own nature at its highest stage of evolution.* x-xi. Exceptions to the universal laws of self-love are only apparent. xii. We are led, then, to inquire into the nature of Man, in its two divisions of Body and Mind. Certain characteristic excellences appear in Man's bodily constitution, but far more valuable are his mental excellences (1) innate, (2) acquired. xiii. The latter alone, which depend on the will, are *virtues*, in the strict sense. Now, since the virtues are excellences of the highest part of man's nature, viz. his Reason, they constitute the highest class of human excellences, (xiv.) nevertheless we easily show that Reason does not aim only at realising her own excellence (i.e. at Virtue) but also at fostering and conserving the excellences of the subsidiary parts of our nature. Hence Man's Chief End or Good is the Perfection of his whole composite being. xv. If Man were born fully self-conscious, his Chief Good would be evident to him from infancy; as it is, he only gradually advances from the first blind impulses of Nature to comprehension of his peculiar powers and their goal. (Even children, however, exhibit as it were germs of those virtues which Reason develops.) xvi. So we shall do well to investigate thoroughly what it is that Nature demands. And since, as we saw, her initial promptings are aimed at the perfecting of body and mind, the attainment of that result must be regarded as Nature's goal or End. (Whether Pleasure is or is not among the Goods of the body at which she aims, is immaterial to our argument.) xvii. Hitherto, we have deduced our theory from the instinct of self-preservation; we now proceed to establish it by a fresh proof, viz. we are impelled to cherish each part of ourselves not only as a constituent of the whole, but because each part has its own tendency towards perfection. Hence our instinctive dislike of bodily blemishes, and anxiety to remove them even at the cost of making the part affected less serviceable. xviii-xix. Hence too, both in children and adults, the irrepressible desire of knowledge, apart from its utility; since the cognitive faculty strives to realise its own End. xx. Allied with this is the desire for action, which men satisfy by such various forms of occupation. xxi. Clearly, we are born for activity; now the virtues are activities, at first instinctive, but becoming conscious and deliberate through exercise. Nature gives us the ground plan of Morality; it is the task of Ethics to work out a theory from her data. I postpone the discussion of definitions and confine myself for the present to showing that Virtuous Actions are Ends in themselves. xxii. Proofs are (1) conduct of children, (2) consensus of popular sentiment. xxiii. Nothing in the moral sphere is so magnificent, or has so wide a range, as Justice. In one sense, it includes all the virtues, and

indeed all are so closely interdependent that they can only be distinguished by help of philosophical analysis. Dividing them according to their *function*, we get the fourfold division, Courage, Temperance, Prudence, Justice. Since each Virtue is in a sense altruistic, and seeks the good of others, Goods fall into two classes, (1) internal, subdivided into (*a*) physical, (*b*) mental, and (2) external (e.g. relatives and friends). External Goods are Ends in themselves, yet are not part of the Chief End. xxiv. This is no paradox, for in cultivating these External Goods we are discharging our 'duty to our neighbour.' Parents, e.g. are Goods, because in cherishing them we are acting morally. 'Fame is the spur' to minds which cannot discern the beauty of Virtue, and Fame is a sort of counterfeit presentment of Virtue. xxv. Other schools have based their Ethical systems on this or that fragment of ours; the Stoics have stolen our doctrines wholesale, and disguised their plagiarism by a new terminology. xxvi. *Cicero's criticism.* 'If you admit, that anything non-moral is a Good or an Evil, how can you maintain that Virtue suffices for Happiness?' *Piso.* 'The Stoics make the same admission, in other words, yet maintain precisely what we do.' xxvii-xxviii. *Cicero.* 'My point is precisely that the Stoics, right or wrong, are perfectly consistent in equating Virtue with Happiness, whereas your school is not. You only land yourself in a fresh difficulty by saying that Virtue secures Happiness, but not Perfect Happiness, for (1) Happiness does not admit of degrees, (2) it is one of your tenets that *The Virtuous Man is always happy.*'

xxix-xxx. Piso addresses to Lucius a re-statement and defence of the Academic position. 'All systems of philosophy have the same practical aim—the production of Happiness. Zeno learnt from our school, who derived it from Socrates, that doctrine which he disguised under new-fangled terms, viz. that Virtue alone is true Happiness. His quibbling with names cannot remedy the inconsistencies, if such there be, in the theory he borrowed. But we are not inconsistent; for (1) we attribute no higher value than Zeno does to non-moral Goods, (2) we are justified by common usage in calling a man happy who is happy *on the whole.* xxxi-xxxii. Now the Virtuous Man, inasmuch as he possesses Virtue, always has a balance of Happiness over Unhappiness, for Virtue immeasurably outweighs all other Goods. Thus we can consistently maintain both that the Virtuous Man is always happy and that one man may be happier than another.'

DE FINIBUS BONORUM ET MALORUM

LIBER QUINTUS

I. **1.** Cum audissem Antiochum, Brute, ut solebam, cum M. Pisone in eo gymnasio, quod Ptolemaeum vocatur, unaque nobiscum Q. frater et T. Pomponius Luciusque Cicero, frater noster cognatione patruelis, amore germanus, constituimus inter nos, ut ambulationem postmeridianam conficeremus in Academia, maxime quod is locus ab omni turba id temporis vacuus esset. Itaque ad tempus ad Pisonem omnes. Inde vario sermone sex illa a Dipylo stadia confecimus. Cum autem venissemus in Academiae non sine causa nobilitata spatia, solitudo erat ea, quam volueramus. **2.** Tum Piso: Naturane nobis hoc, inquit, datum dicam an errore quodam, ut, cum ea loca videamus, in quibus memoria dignos viros acceperimus multum esse versatos, magis moveamur, quam si quando eorum ipsorum aut facta audiamus aut scriptum aliquod legamus? Velut ego nunc moveor. Venit enim mihi Platonis in mentem, quem accepimus primum hic disputare solitum; cuius etiam illi propinqui hortuli non memoriam solum mihi afferunt, sed ipsum videntur in conspectu meo ponere. Hic Speusip-

1. Ptolemaeum, built by Ptolemy Philadelphus. It was near the Agora (Paus. i. 17).

Dipylon, the N.W. gate of the city, which led from the inner to the outer part of the Ceramicus quarter. The road to the Academy was lined by tombs of famous men, including that of Pericles (§ 6), and the friends as they followed it had Colonus (§ 3) full in view.

Academiae . . . spatia. The '*walks* of Academe' are contrasted with 'rhetoric-factories,' Orat. 12, where C. calls them *curricula multiplicium variorumque sermonum, in quibus Platonis primum sunt impressa vestigia.*

pus, hic Xenocrates, hic eius auditor Polemo; cuius illa ipsa sessio fuit, quam videmus. Equidem etiam curiam nostram (Hostiliam dico, non hanc novam, quae minor mihi esse videtur, posteaquam est maior) solebam intuens Scipionem, Catonem, Laelium, nostrum vero in primis avum cogitare; tanta vis admonitionis inest in locis; ut non sine causa ex iis memoriae ducta sit disciplina. **3.** Tum Quintus: Est plane, Piso, ut dicis, inquit. Nam me ipsum huc modo venientem convertebat ad sese Coloneus ille locus, cuius incola Sophocles ob oculos versabatur, quem scis quam admirer quamque eo delecter. Me quidem ad altiorem memoriam Oedipodis huc venientis et illo mollissimo carmine, quaenam essent haec ipsa loca, requirentis species quaedam commovit, inaniter scilicet, sed commovit tamen. Tum Pomponius: At ego, quem vos ut deditum Epicuro insectari soletis, sum multum equidem cum Phaedro, quem unice diligo, ut scitis, in Epicuri hortis, quos modo praeteribamus, sed, veteris proverbii admonitu, vivorum memini; nec tamen Epicuri licet oblivisci, si cupiam, cuius imaginem non modo in tabulis nostri familiares, sed etiam in poculis et in anulis habent.

II. **4.** Hic ego: Pomponius quidem, inquam, noster iocari videtur, et fortasse suo iure; ita enim se Athenis collocavit, ut sit paene unus ex Atticis, ut id etiam cognomen videatur habiturus; ego autem tibi, Piso, assentior, usu

2. **posteaquam est maior,** 'since it has been enlarged' (Reid), i.e. by Sulla, about two years before the date of this dialogue. The original building was said to be the work of Tullus Hostilius.

nostrum . . . avum. *Frugi ille Piso*, ii. 90, q.v.

3. **mollissimo carmine.** Τέκνον τυφλοῦ γέροντος, Ἀντιγόνη, τίνας Χώρους ἀφίγμεθ' ἢ τίνων ἀνδρῶν πόλιν (Oedip. Col. 1, 2).

Phaedro, i. 16, n. Atticus banters his own sect for their superstitious cult of the founder's memory. His 'old proverb' occurs only once elsewhere; *Vivorum meminerimus* is said in Petronius (52, 53), apropos of shaking off vain regrets. Cf. 'A living dog is better than a dead lion'.

4. **suo iure,** i.e. being domiciled at Athens he has acquired all the privileges of her citizens—including the use of 'Attic salt'. Hence his flippant remarks on a topic which Piso and the Ciceros discuss with true Roman seriousness. (Mdv. takes C. to mean that Atticus knew the place so well that it had ceased to impress him.)

ut sit . . . ut id etiam. The second *ut* clause is awkwardly made to depend on the preceding. Cf. iii. 61, *nascitur, ut . . . sit commendatio, ut oporteat . . .*

hoc venire, ut acrius aliquanto et attentius de claris viris locorum admonitu cogitemus. Scis enim me quodam tempore Metapontum venisse tecum neque ad hospitem ante devertisse, quam Pythagorae ipsum illum locum, ubi vitam ediderat, sedemque viderim. Hoc autem tempore, etsi multa in omni parte Athenarum sunt in ipsis locis indicia summorum virorum, tamen ego illa moveor exhedra; modo enim fuit Carneadis; quem videre videor (est enim nota imago), a sedeque ipsa, tanta ingenii magnitudine orbata, desiderari illam vocem puto. **5.** Tum Piso: Quoniam igitur aliquid omnes, quid Lucius noster? inquit; an eum locum libenter invisit, ubi Demosthenes et Aeschines inter se decertare soliti sunt? Suo enim quisque studio maxime ducitur. Et ille, cum erubuisset, Noli, inquit, ex me quaerere, qui in Phalericum etiam descenderim, quo in loco ad fluctum aiunt declamare solitum Demosthenem, ut fremitum assvesceret voce vincere. Modo etiam paulum ad dexteram de via declinavi, ut ad Pericli sepulcrum accederem. Quamquam id quidem infinitum est in hac urbe; quacumque enim ingredimur, in aliqua historia vestigium ponimus. **6.** Tum Piso: Atqui, Cicero, inquit, ista studia, si ad imitandos summos viros spectant, ingeniosorum sunt, sin tantummodo ad indicia veteris memoriae cognoscenda, curiosorum; te autem hortamur omnes, currentem quidem, ut spero, ut eos, quos novisse vis, imitari etiam velis. Hic ego: Etsi facit hic quidem, inquam, Piso, ut vides, ea, quae praecipis, tamen mihi grata hortatio tua est. Tum ille amicissime, ut solebat:

Pythagorae. Diog. Laert. (viii. 40) says the Metapontines gave the name of 'Temple of Demeter' to P.'s house, and 'Musaeum' to the street in which it stood. The former name was perhaps an allusion to the Hall of the Mysteries at Eleusis, for P.'s disciples, like the mystae, were initiated into esoteric doctrines at nocturnal assemblies.

5. Suo enim quisque studio. 'Everyone is biassed by his special line of study.' So C. and Piso had spoken of their pet philosophers, Quintus Cicero, who himself wrote tragedies, of Sophocles.

quo in loco. Plutarch (Vit. x. Orat. 8, p. 844 E) says Demosthenes declaimed amid the clamour of the waves, *ἵν, εἴ ποτε θορυβοίη ὁ δῆμος, μὴ ἐκσταίη*; i.e. that he practised speaking composedly amidst uproar, not shouting it down.

quacumque . . . ingredimur. 'Wherever we tread, we set foot on a bit of history.'

Nos vero, inquit, omnes omnia ad huius adulescentiam conferamus, in primisque ut aliquid suorum studiorum philosophiae quoque impertiat, vel ut te imitetur, quem amat, vel ut illud ipsum, quod studet, facere possit ornatius. Sed utrum hortandus es nobis, Luci, inquit, an etiam tua sponte propensus es? Mihi quidem Antiochum, quem audis, satis belle videris attendere. Tum ille timide vel potius verecunde: Facio, inquit, equidem; sed audistine modo de Carneade? Rapior illuc; revocat autem Antiochus; nec est praeterea, quem audiamus.

III. **7.** Tum Piso: Etsi hoc, inquit, fortasse non poterit sic abire, cum hic assit (me autem dicebat), tamen audebo te ab hac Academia nova ad illam veterem vocare, in qua, ut dicere Antiochum audiebas, non ii soli numerantur, qui Academici vocantur, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crantor ceterique, sed etiam Peripatetici veteres, quorum princeps Aristoteles, quem, excepto Platone, haud scio an recte dixerim principem philosophorum. Ad eos igitur converte te, quaeso. Ex eorum enim scriptis et institutis cum omnis doctrina liberalis, omnis historia, omnis sermo elegans sumi potest, tum varietas est tanta artium, ut nemo sine eo instrumento ad ullam rem illustriorem satis ornatus possit accedere. Ab his oratores, ab his imperatores ac rerum publicarum principes extiterunt. Ut ad minora veniam, mathematici, poëtae, musici, medici denique ex hac tamquam omnium artificum officina profecti sunt. **8.** Atque ego: Scis me, inquam, istud idem sentire, Piso, sed a te opportune facta mentio est; studet enim meus audire Cicero, quaenam sit istius veteris, quam commemoras, Academiae de finibus bonorum Peripateticorumque sententia. Censemus autem facillime te id explanare posse, quod et Staseam Neapolitanum multos

6. **audistine modo?** 'Have you been hearing any lectures on Carneades lately?' Lucius would like to hear more of a theory which 'attracts him immensely,' but Antiochus discourages the study of it, and there are no other lectures to go to.

8. **quod . . . habueris.** The clause depends on *posse*, not *censemus.* Hence C. has to keep the mood of oratio obliqua in *videamus*, although that verb *logically* depends on *censemus.* Cf. iii. 17, *arbitramur, quod habeant.* **Staseam.** See § 75. Aristus,

annos habueris apud te et complures iam menses Athenis haec ipsa te ex Antiocho videamus exquirere. Et ille ridens: Age, age, inquit (satis enim scite me nostri sermonis principium esse voluisti), exponamus adulescenti, si quae forte possumus. Dat enim id nobis solitudo, quod si qui deus diceret, numquam putarem, me in Academia tamquam philosophum disputaturum. Sed ne, dum huic obsequor, vobis molestus sim. Mihi, inquam, qui te id ipsum rogavi? Tum, Quintus et Pomponius cum idem se velle dixissent, Piso exorsus est; cuius oratio, attende, quaeso, Brute, satisne videatur Antiochi complexa esse sententiam, quam tibi, qui fratrem eius Aristum frequenter audieris, maxime probatam existimo.

IV. Sic est igitur locutus. **9.** Quantus ornatus in Peripateticorum disciplina sit, satis est a me, ut brevissime potuit, paulo ante dictum. Sed est forma eius disciplinae, sicut fere ceterarum, triplex: una pars est naturae, disserendi altera, vivendi tertia. Natura sic ab iis investigata est, ut nulla pars caelo, mari, terra (ut poëtice loquar) praetermissa sit. Quin etiam, cum de rerum initiis omnique mundo locuti essent, ut multa non modo probabili argumentatione, sed etiam necessaria mathematicorum ratione concluderent, maximam materiam ex rebus per se investigatis ad rerum occultarum cognitionem attulerunt. **10.** Persecutus est Aristoteles animantium omnium ortus, victus, figuras, Theophrastus autem stirpium naturas omniumque fere rerum, quae e terra gignerentur, causas atque rationes; qua ex cognitione facilior facta est investigatio rerum occultissimarum. Disserendique ab iisdem

mentioned below, was another household philosopher.

9. **necessaria.** Cicero de Inv. i. 44, omnis argumentatio aut probabilis aut necessaria debebit esse. The methods of inductive proof belong to the former class; deductive and mathematical reasoning to the latter. We *can* withhold assent even from an induction which rests on an overwhelming series of instances, e.g. All men are mortal; but 'All Men are mortal, Socrates is a man, ∴ Socrates is mortal,' is a *necessaria argumentatio*, i.e. it *compels* assent.

10. **Res occultissimas**, e.g. such as were treated of in Theophrastus' περὶ ζώων μορίων, περὶ ζώων γενέσεως.

Disserendique. C. similarly marks the transition to the second division of the system merely by

non dialectice solum, sed etiam oratorie praecepta sunt tradita; ab Aristoteleque principe de singulis rebus in utramque partem dicendi exercitatio est instituta, ut non contra omnia semper, sicut Arcesilas, diceret, et tamen ut in omnibus rebus, quidquid ex utraque parte dici posset, expromeret. **11.** Cum autem tertia pars bene vivendi praecepta quaereret, ea quoque est ab iisdem non solum ad privatae vitae rationem, sed etiam ad rerum publicarum rectionem relata. Omnium fere civitatum non Graeciae solum, sed etiam barbariae ab Aristotele mores, instituta, disciplinas, a Theophrasto leges etiam cognovimus. Cumque uterque eorum docuisset, qualem in re publica principem *esse* conveniret, pluribus praeterea conscripsisset, qui esset optimus rei publicae status, hoc amplius Theophrastus, quae essent in re publica rerum inclinationes et momenta temporum, quibus esset moderandum, utcumque res postularet. Vitae autem degendae ratio maxime illis quidem placuit quieta, in contemplatione et cognitione posita rerum, quae quia deorum vitae erat simillima, sapiente visa est dignissima. Atque his de rebus et splendida est eorum et illustris oratio.

V. **12.** De summo autem bono quia duo genera librorum sunt, unum populariter scriptum, quod ἐξωτερικόν

que, iii. 73. The school's services to Rhetoric are dilated on, iv. 5.

11. Omnium fere. The works referred to are (1) Aristotle's Πολιτεῖαι; (2) Theophrastus' περὶ νόμων; (3) their respective treatises περὶ βασιλείας; (4) A.'s Politics, T.'s περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας and πολιτικά; (5) the latter's πολιτικὰ πρὸς τοὺς καιρούς, a title sufficiently explained by *quae essent . . . postularet*.

Vitae degendae ratio . . . quieta. Eth. Nicom. Bk. i. 5. 2, τρεῖς γὰρ εἰσι μάλιστα οἱ προύχοντες, ὅ τε . . . (ἀπολαυστικὸς βίος) καὶ ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ τρίτος ὁ θεωρητικός. In Bk. x. this 'third life' is shown to be that which constitutes the highest Happiness for man. *maxime placuit* must be qualified by remembering that Aristotle warns us that this Happiness is only partially realisable by man, being indeed not properly human, but divine, nor must we seek 'a fugitive and cloistered virtue,' but so live our everyday life that our higher selves may in some measure realise their true τέλος.

12. duo genera. The two classes are in reality (1) what Aristotle himself calls 'published' works (ἐκδεδομένοι), and (2) lecture-notes, used by the lecturer himself and also for reference by members of the school (*commentarii*). Exx. of (1) are the lost dialogues of Arist., while his great extant works all belong to (2). But ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι, by which Arist. meant 'extraneous,' or 'everyday' discussions and writings (Burnet, Nic. Eth. p. 58), were later wrongly taken to be

appellabant, alterum limatius, quod in commentariis reliquerunt, non semper idem dicere videntur; nec in summa tamen ipsa aut varietas est ulla, apud hos quidem, quos nominavi, aut inter ipsos dissensio. Sed cum beata vita quaeratur idque sit unum, quod philosophia spectare et sequi debeat, sitne ea tota sita in potestate sapientis an possit aut labefactari aut eripi rebus adversis, in eo nonnumquam variari inter eos et dubitari videtur. Quod maxime efficit Theophrasti de beata vita liber, in quo multum admodum fortunae datur; quod si ita se habeat, non possit beatam vitam praestare sapientia. Haec mihi videtur delicatior, ut ita dicam, molliorque ratio, quam virtutis vis gravitasque postulat. Quare teneamus Aristotelem et eius filium Nicomachum, cuius accurate scripti de moribus libri dicuntur illi quidem esse Aristoteli, sed non video, cur non potuerit patri similis esse filius. Theophrastum tamen adhibeamus ad pleraque, dum modo plus in virtute teneamus, quam ille tenuit, firmitatis et roboris. **13.** Simus igitur contenti his. Namque horum posteri meliores illi quidem, mea sententia, quam reliquarum philosophi disciplinarum, sed ita degenerant, ut ipsi ex se nati esse videantur. Primum Theophrasti, Strato physicum

a division of his own writings)('esoteric' works addressed to advanced pupils only. *limatius* does not refer to style but to method, 'more elaborate' (Reid), i.e. more scientific.

de beata vita liber, *περὶ εὐδαιμονίας*. Cf. Acad. i. 33, 'spoliavit virtutem suo decore, quod negavit in ea sola positum esse beate vivere'.

Quare teneamus Arist. If C. had ever read the Nic. Ethics he could hardly have held this view of its authorship. Nicomachus died when a mere lad, and the name 'Nicomachean' probably records the fact of his having published his father's work under the guidance of Theophrastus. That C. does not speak from first-hand knowledge of the Ethics is clear from several passages of that work where the influence of fortune on happiness is unequivocally asserted (i. 10, 11, 13, 14, x. 9).

13. Primum Theophrasti, sc. *auditor.* Acad. i. 34, 'Strato, cum maxime necessarium partem philosophiae, quae posita est in virtute et in moribus, reliquisset totumque se ad investigationem naturae contulisset, in ea ipsa plurimum discedit a suis'. Lyco, his successor, spoke better than he wrote, according to Diogenes Laertius; Hieronymus (ii. 8) was his contemporary. Aristo (of Ceos, not to be confused with the Stoic A. of Chios) was succeeded as head of the school by Critolaus, whose points of divergence from the true faith are unknown. On Diodorus,

se voluit; in quo etsi est magnus, tamen nova pleraque, et perpauca de moribus. Huius Lyco oratione locuples, rebus ipsis ieiunior; concinnus deinde et elegans huius Aristo; sed ea, quae desideratur a magno philosopho, gravitas in eo non fuit; scripta sane et multa et polita, sed nescio quo pacto auctoritatem oratio non habet. **14.** Praetereo multos, in his doctum hominem et svavem, Hieronymum, quem iam cur Peripateticum appellem, nescio; summum enim bonum exposuit vacuitatem doloris; qui autem de summo bono dissentit, de tota philosophiae ratione dissentit. Critolaus imitari voluit antiquos; et quidem est gravitate proximus et redundat oratio: ac tamen *ne* is quidem in patriis institutis manet. Diodorus, eius auditor, adiungit ad honestatem vacuitatem doloris. Hic quoque suus est, de summoque bono dissentiens dici vere Peripateticus non potest. Antiquorum autem sententiam Antiochus noster mihi videtur persequi diligentissime, quam eandem Aristoteli fuisse et Polemonis docet.

VI. **15.** Facit igitur Lucius noster prudenter, qui audire de summo bono potissimum velit; hoc enim constituto in philosophia, constituta sunt omnia. Nam ceteris in rebus sive praetermissum sive ignoratum est quidpiam, non plus incommodi est, quam quanti quaeque earum rerum est, in quibus neglectum est aliquid; summum autem bonum si ignoretur, vivendi rationem ignorari necesse est; ex quo tantus error consequitur, ut, quem in portum se recipiant, scire non possint. Cognitis autem rerum finibus, cum intellegitur, quid sit et bonorum extremum et malorum, inventa vitae via est conformatioque omnium officiorum, (**16.**) cum exigitur, quo quidque referatur; ex quo, id quod omnes expetunt, beate vivendi ratio inveniri et comparari

e ii. 19. All these, it must be membered, are criticised from the andpoint of Antiochus, who prossed to restore, while really freely odifying, the genuine Aristotelian ctrine.

14. exposuit, 'defined as'. Cf. *expositiones summi boni* (21), *summum bonum sic exponitur, ut* (22).

eandem Aristoteli, 'common to Aristotle and Polemo'. Cf. § 7.

potest. Quod quoniam in quo sit magna dissensio est, Carneadia nobis adhibenda divisio est, qua noster Antiochus libenter uti solet. Ille igitur vidit, non modo, quot fuissent adhuc philosophorum de summo bono, sed, quot omnino esse possent sententiae. Negabat igitur ullam esse artem, quae ipsa a se proficisceretur; etenim semper illud extra est, quod arte comprehenditur. Nihil opus est exemplis hoc facere longius; est enim perspicuum, nullam artem ipsam in se versari, sed esse aliud artem ipsam, aliud, quod propositum sit arti; quoniam igitur, ut medicina valetudinis, navigationis gubernatio, sic vivendi ars est prudentia, necesse est, eam quoque ab aliqua re esse constitutam et profectam. **17.** Constitit autem fere inter omnes, id, in quo prudentia versaretur et quod assequi vellet, aptum et accommodatum naturae esse oportere et tale, ut ipsum per se invitaret et alliceret appetitum animi, quem ὁρμήν Graeci vocant. Quid autem sit, quod ita moveat itaque a natura in primo ortu appetatur, non constat, deque eo est inter philosophos, cum summum bonum exquiritur, omnis dissensio. Totius enim quaestionis eius, quae habetur de finibus bonorum et malorum, cum quaeritur in his, quid sit extremum, quid ultimum, fons reperiendus est, in quo sint prima invitamenta naturae; quo invento, omnis ab eo quasi capite de summo bono et malo disputatio ducitur.

VII. **18.** Voluptatis alii primum appetitum putant et primam depulsionem doloris; vacuitatem doloris alii censent primum ascitam et primum declinatum dolorem; ab iis alii quae prima secundum naturam nominant, proficiscuntur, in quibus numerant incolumitatem conservationemque omnium partium, valetudinem, sensus integros, doloris vacuitatem

16. **Quod quoniam**, i.e. (*Et*) *quoniam magna dissensio est in quo hoc* (*id quo quidque refertur*) *sit*.

Carneadia . . . divisio. With the account in the following §§ cf. ii. 33. On Antiochus' use of the scheme see Introd. § 25, where this passage is discussed in detail.

17. **fons reperiendus est,** i.e. investigandum est, ubi et quae sint invitamenta naturae; eo reperto repertum fore fons illius quaestionis. With the comparison of the starting point of a theory to the source of stream, cf. ii. 34. On *prima invitamenta naturae* = *principia naturalia* § 19, and different from *prima naturae*, Introd. § 26.

vires, pulchritudinem, cetera generis eiusdem, quorum similia sunt prima in animis, quasi virtutum igniculi et semina. Ex his tribus cum unum aliquid sit, quo primum natura moveatur vel ad appetendum vel ad repellendum, nec quidquam omnino praeter haec tria possit esse, necesse est omnino officium aut fugiendi aut sequendi ad eorum aliquid referri, ut illa prudentia, quam artem vitae esse diximus, in earum trium rerum aliqua versetur, a qua totius vitae ducat exordium. **19.** Ex eo autem, quod statuerit esse, quo primum natura moveatur, existet recti etiam ratio atque honesti, quae cum aliquo uno ex tribus illis congruere possit, ut aut id honestum sit, facere omnia [aut] voluptatis causa, etiamsi eam non consequare, aut non dolendi, etiamsi id assequi nequeas, aut eorum, quae secundum naturam sunt, adipiscendi, etiamsi nihil consequare. Ita fit, ut, quanta differentia est in principiis naturalibus, tanta sit in finibus bonorum malorumque dissimilitudo. Alii rursum iisdem a principiis omne officium referent aut ad voluptatem aut ad non dolendum aut ad prima illa secundum naturam obtinenda. **20.** Expositis iam igitur sex de summo bono sententiis, trium proximarum hi principes: voluptatis Aristippus, non dolendi Hieronymus, fruendi rebus iis, quas primas secundum naturam esse diximus, Carneades non ille quidem auctor, sed defensor disserendi causa fuit. Superiores tres erant, quae esse possent; quarum est una sola defensa eaque vehementer. Nam voluptatis causa facere omnia,

18. quorum similia sunt prima in animis. C. does not make it clear whether the 'primary intellective faculties' are here *included* in the *prima secundum naturam* or not. In the account of the Peripatetic Summum Bonum, Bk. iv. 17, they naturally are so included, since Virtue, whose genesis from them is there expounded, is included in that Summum Bonum. But as Virtue forms no part of the Summum Bonum of Carneades (22), its 'sparks and seeds' are not likely to have been among his primary objects of appetition.

officium aut fugiendi aut sequendi. The conceptions of *officium*, and of a morality consisting in acting for Pleasure's sake (§ 19), are illogically intruded into the scheme. Introd. § 25.

19. Ex eo autem, i.e. the principles of right or moral action will be based on that one of the three things aforesaid which Wisdom pronounces to be the real object of natural appetition. Thus, if Pleasure be that object, Virtue will consist not in trying to be good but in trying to enjoy yourself, 'even though you never succeed'.

cum, etiamsi nihil consequamur, tamen ipsum illud consilium ita faciendi per se expetendum et honestum et solum bonum sit, nemo dixit. Ne vitationem quidem doloris ipsam per se quisquam in rebus expetendis putavit, nisi etiam evitare posset. At vero facere omnia, ut adipiscamur, quae secundum naturam sunt, etiamsi ea non assequamur, id esse et honestum et solum per se expetendum et solum bonum Stoici dicunt.

VIII. **21.** Sex igitur hae sunt simplices de summa bonorum malorumque sententiae, duae sine patrono, quattuor defensae. Iunctae autem et duplices expositiones summi boni tres omnino fuerunt, nec vero plures, si penitus rerum naturam videas, esse potuerunt. Nam aut voluptas adiungi potest ad honestatem, ut Calliphonti Dinomachoque placuit, aut doloris vacuitas, ut Diodoro, aut prima naturae, ut antiquis, quos eosdem Academicos et Peripateticos nominamus. Sed quoniam non possunt omnia simul dici, haec in praesentia nota esse debebunt, voluptatem semovendam esse, quando ad maiora quaedam, ut iam apparebit, nati sumus. De vacuitate doloris eadem fere dici solent, quae de voluptate. **22.** Nec vero alia sunt quaerenda contra Carneadiam illam sententiam; quocumque enim modo summum bonum sic exponitur, ut id vacet honestate, nec officia nec virtutes in ea ratione nec amicitiae constare possunt. Coniunctio autem cum honestate vel voluptatis vel non dolendi id ipsum honestum, quod amplecti vult, id efficit turpe. Ad eas enim res referre, quae agas, quarum una, si quis malo careat, in summo eum bono dicat esse, altera versetur in levissima parte naturae, obscurantis est omnem splendorem honestatis, ne dicam inquinantis. Restant Stoici, qui, cum a Peripateticis et Academicis omnia transtulissent, nominibus aliis easdem res secuti sunt. Hos

22. **Ad eas res . . . quarum una . . . dicat.** It is of course not the 'thing' (*indolentia*), but the theory concerning the thing, which 'declares that a man who is free from ill is in possession of the supreme Good'. C. has passed in thought to *sententia* (as subject of *dicat*) but overlooks the want of it just as in ii. 35, *una simplex*. He expresses the same censure, ii. 41.

contra singulos dici est melius; sed nunc, quod agimus; de illis, cum volemus. **23.** Democriti autem securitas, quae est animi tranquillitas, quam appellant *εὐθυμίαν*, eo separanda fuit ab hac disputatione, quia ista animi tranquillitas ea est ipsa beata vita; quaerimus autem, non quae sit, sed unde sit. Iam explosae eiectaeque sententiae Pyrrhonis, Aristonis, Erilli, quod in hunc orbem, quem circumscripsimus, incidere non possunt, adhibendae omnino non fuerunt. Nam cum omnis haec quaestio de finibus et quasi de extremis bonorum et malorum ab eo proficiscatur, quod diximus naturae esse aptum et accommodatum, quodque ipsum per se primum appetatur, hoc totum et ii tollunt, qui in rebus iis, in quibus nihil aut honestum aut turpe sit, negant esse ullam causam, cur aliud alii anteponatur, nec inter eas res quidquam omnino putant interesse, et Erillus, si ita sensit, nihil esse bonum praeter scientiam, omnem consilii capiendi causam inventionemque officii sustulit. Sic exclusis sententiis reliquorum, cum praeterea nulla esse possit, haec antiquorum valeat necesse est. Igitur instituto veterum, quo etiam Stoici utuntur, hinc capiamus exordium.

IX. **24.** Omne animal se ipsum diligit ac, simul est ortum, id agit, ut se conservet, quod hic ei primus ad omnem vitam tuendam appetitus a natura datur, se ut conservet atque ita sit affectum, ut optime secundum naturam affectum esse possit. Hanc initio institutionem confusam habet et

23. εὐθυμίαν. Diog. Laert. ix. 45, Τέλος δὲ εἶναι λέγει (Δημόκριτος) *τὴν εὐθυμίαν, οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν οὖσαν τῇ ἡδονῇ, ὡς ἔνιοι παρακούσαντες ἐξεδέξαντο, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἣν γαληνῶς καὶ εὐσταθῶς ἡ ψυχὴ διάγει, ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ταραττομένη φόβου ἢ δεισιδαιμονίας ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς πάθους· καλεῖ δ' αὐτὴν καὶ εὐεστὼ καὶ πολλοῖς ἄλλοις ὀνόμασι* (e.g. *ἁρμονίαν, συμμετρίαν, ἀταραξίαν*. Stob. Ecl. Eth. 76). Seneca, de Tranquill. Animi, 2. 3, *Hanc stabilem animi sedem Graeci εὐθυμίαν vocant, de qua Democriti volumen egregium est.*

non quae sit, sed unde sit, 'not the definition, but the cause of Happiness'. Yet the Democritean *τέλος* corresponds so closely to the Epicurean that C.'s distinction seems arbitrary.

et Erillus. C.'s point is that no theory which does not start from the primary objects of appetition can be considered; it is irrelevant here to condemn that of Erillus because it subverts rational and moral action.

quo etiam Stoici. See iii. 16.

24. Omne animal. Cf. iv. 16 sqq. Stob. Ecl. Eth. p. 246 (of the Peripatetics), Καὶ *πρῶτον μὲν ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ εἶναι (τὸν ἄνθρωπον λέγουσιν)· φύσει γὰρ ᾠκειῶσθαι πρὸς ἑαυτόν, διὸ καὶ προσηκόντως ἀσμενίζειν μὲν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν, δυσχεραίνειν δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς παρὰ φύσιν.*

institutionem. Cf. iv. 32, 41.

incertam, ut tantummodo se tueatur, qualecumque sit; sed nec quid sit, nec quid possit, nec quid ipsius natura sit, intellegit. Cum autem processit paulum et, quatenus quidque se attingat ad seque pertineat, perspicere coepit, tum sensim incipit progredi seseque agnoscere et intellegere, quam ob causam habeat eum, quem diximus, animi appetitum, coeptatque et ea, quae naturae sentit apta, appetere et propulsare contraria. Ergo omni animali illud, quod appetit, positum est in eo, quod naturae est accommodatum. Ita finis bonorum existit, secundum naturam vivere sic affectum, ut optime affici possit ad naturamque accommodatissime. **25.** Quoniam autem sua cuiusque animantis natura est, necesse est, finem quoque omnium hunc esse, ut natura expleatur (nihil enim prohibet, quaedam esse et inter se animalibus reliquis et cum bestiis homini communia, quoniam omnium est natura communis), sed extrema illa et summa, quae quaerimus, inter animalium genera distincta et dispertita sint et sua cuique propria et ad id apta, quod cuiusque natura desideret. **26.** Quare, cum dicimus, omnibus animalibus extremum esse secundum naturam vivere, non ita accipiendum est, quasi dicamus unum esse omnium extremum; sed ut omnium artium recte dici potest commune esse, ut in aliqua scientia versentur, scientiam autem suam cuiusque artis esse, sic commune animalium omnium secundum naturam vivere, sed naturas esse diversas, ut aliud equo sit e natura, aliud bovi, aliud homini, et tamen in omnibus summa communis, et quidem non solum in animalibus, sed etiam in rebus omnibus iis, quas natura alit, auget, tuetur; in quibus videmus ea, quae gignuntur e terra, multa quodam modo efficere ipsa sibi per se, quae ad vivendum crescendumque valeant, ut in suo genere perveniant ad extremum; ut iam liceat una comprehensione omnia complecti non dubitantemque dicere, omnem naturam esse servatricem sui idque habere propositum quasi finem et extremum, se ut custodiat quam in optimo sui generis statu; ut necesse sit, omnium rerum, quae natura vigeant, similem esse finem, non eundem. Ex quo intellegi debet, homini id esse in bonis

ultimum, secundum naturam vivere, quod ita interpretemur, vivere ex hominis natura undique perfecta et nihil requirente. **27.** Haec igitur nobis explicanda sunt; sed si enodatius, vos ignoscetis. Huius enim aetati nunc haec primum fortasse audientis, servire debemus. Ita prorsus, inquam. Etsi ea quidem, quae adhuc dixisti, quamvis ad aetatem recte isto modo dicerentur.

X. Exposita igitur, inquit, terminatione rerum expetendarum, cur ista se res ita habeat, ut dixi, deinceps demonstrandum est. Quamobrem ordiamur ab eo, quod primum posui, quod idem reapse primum est, ut intellegamus, omne animal se ipsum diligere. Quod quamquam dubitationem non habet (est enim infixum in ipsa natura, comprehenditur*que* suis cuiusque sensibus, sic, ut, contra si quis dicere velit, non audiatur), tamen, ne quid praetermittamus, rationes quoque, cur hoc ita sit, afferendas puto. **28** Etsi qui potest intellegi aut cogitari, esse aliquod animal, quod se oderit? Res enim concurrent contrariae. Nam cum appetitus ille animi aliquid ad se trahere coeperit consulto, quod sibi obsit, quia sit sibi inimicus, cum id sua causa faciet, et oderit se et simul diliget, quod fieri non potest. Necesseque est, si quis ipse sibi inimicus est, eum, quae bona sunt, mala putare, bona contra, quae mala, et, quae appetenda, fugere et, quae fugienda, appetere; quae sine dubio vitae est eversio. Neque enim, si nonnulli reperiuntur, qui aut laqueos aut alia exitia quaerant, aut ille apud Terentium, qui 'decrevit tantisper se minus iniuriae suo nato facere' (ut ait ipse), 'dum fiat miser,' inimicus ipse sibi putandus est. **29.** Sed alii dolore moventur, alii cupiditate; iracundia etiam multi efferuntur et, cum in mala scientes irruunt, tum se optime sibi consulere arbitrantur. Itaque dicunt nec dubitant:

Mihi sic est usus; tibi ut opus est facto, face.

26. quod ita interpretemur. See iv. 15; *Tertium autem*, and Introd. § 26.

28. cum id sua causa faciet. *cum* is causal. Unless *quoniam* should be read, the indic. must be explained as due to the want of a simple fut. subjunc. *facturus sit* would not have given the required sense.

29. Mihi sic, also spoken by the Hautontimorumenos.

Qui ipsi sibi bellum indixissent, cruciari dies, noctes torqueri vellent, nec vero sese ipsi accusarent ob eam causam, quod se male suis rebus consuluisse dicerent; eorum enim est haec querela, qui sibi cari sunt seseque diligunt. Quare, quotienscumque dicetur male quis de se mereri sibique inimicus esse atque hostis, vitam denique fugere, intellegatur, aliquam subesse eiusmodi causam, ut ex eo ipso intellegi possit, sibi quemque esse carum. **30.** Nec vero id satis est, neminem esse, qui ipse se oderit, sed illud quoque intellegendum est, neminem esse, qui, quomodo se habeat, nihil sua censeat interesse. Tolletur enim appetitus animi, si, ut in iis rebus, inter quas nihil interest, neutram in partem propensiores sumus, item in nobismet ipsis, quemadmodum affecti simus, nihil nostra arbitrabimur interesse.

XI. Atque etiam illud, si qui dicere velit, perabsurdum sit, ita diligi a sese quemque, ut ea vis diligendi ad aliam rem quampiam referatur, non ad eum ipsum, qui sese diligat. Hoc cum in amicitiis, cum in officiis, cum in virtutibus dicitur, quomodocumque dicitur, intellegi tamen, quid dicatur, potest; in nobismet ipsis autem *ne* intellegi quidem, *ut* propter aliam quampiam rem, verbi gratia propter voluptatem, nos amemus; propter nos enim illam, non propter eam nosmet ipsos diligimus. **31.** Quamquam quid est, quod magis perspicuum sit, *quam* non modo carum sibi quemque, verum etiam vehementer carum esse? quis est enim aut quotus quisque, cui, mors cum appropinquet, non

refugiat timido sangven atque exalbescat metu?

Etsi hoc quidem est in vitio, dissolutionem naturae tam valde perhorrescere (quod idem est reprehendendum in dolore); sed quia fere sic afficiuntur omnes, satis argumenti est, ab interitu naturam abhorrere; idque quo

30. id satis est. This again is a Stoic touch. Cf. on iii. 16.

31. refugiat. The line is from the same passage of the 'Alcmaeon' of Ennius which C. quotes, iv. 62. Priscian quotes it from his lost 'Hortensius'. Cf. de Orat. 218.

magis quidam ita faciunt, ut iure etiam reprehendantur, hoc magis intellegendum est, haec ipsa nimia in quibusdam futura non fuisse, nisi quaedam essent modica natura. Nec vero dico eorum metum mortis, qui, quia privari se vitae bonis arbitrentur aut quia quasdam post mortem formidines extimescant aut si metuant, ne cum dolore moriantur, idcirco mortem fugiant; in parvis enim saepe, qui nihil eorum cogitant, si quando iis ludentes minamur, praecipitaturos alicunde, extimescunt. Quin etiam ferae, inquit Pacuvius,

quibus abest ad praecavendum intellegendi astutia,

iniecto terrore mortis horrescunt. **32.** Quis autem de ipso sapiente aliter existimat, quin, etiam cum decreverit esse moriendum, tamen discessu a suis atque ipsa relinquenda luce moveatur? Maxime autem in hoc quidem genere vis est perspicua naturae, cum et mendicitatem multi perpetiantur, ut vivant, et angantur appropinquatione mortis confecti homines senectute et ea perferant, quae Philoctetam videmus in fabulis; qui cum cruciaretur non ferendis doloribus, propagabat tamen vitam aucupio; configebat tardus celeres, stans volantes, ut apud Attium est, pennarumque contextu corpori tegumenta faciebat. **33.** De hominum genere aut omnino de animalium loquor, cum arborum et stirpium eadem paene natura sit? Sive enim, ut doctissimis viris visum est, maior aliqua causa atque divinior hanc vim ingenuit, sive hoc ita fit fortuito, videmus ea, quae terra gignit, corticibus et radicibus valida servari, quod contingit animalibus sensuum distributione et

minamur, praecipitaturos, i.e. *nos eos praecipitaturos*. Mdv. holds the omission of the subj. of the infin. (frequent in Livy and in Caesar) to be well attested for C. only here and in three other places (In Verr. i. 97, ii. 93, pro Cluent. 176).

iniecto terrore mortis, a condensed paraphrase of the poet's words, but virtually part of the quotation *ferae . . . horrescunt*. The latter word, which is almost exclusively poetical, doubtless belongs to the actual quotation.

32. **vitam aucupio.** Attius, in the passage referred to, copied Soph. Philoct. 164 sqq. That C. does not here quote verbatim is shown not only by the tense of *configebat*, but by an ancient grammarian's quotation of the next line as follows, *pro veste pinnis membra textis contegit.*

quadam compactione membrorum. Qua quidem de re quamquam assentior iis, qui haec omnia regi natura putant, quae si natura neglegat, ipsa esse non possit, tamen concedo, ut, qui de hoc dissentiunt, existiment, quod velint, ac vel hoc intellegant, si quando naturam hominis dicam, hominem dicere me; nihil enim hoc differt. Nam prius a se poterit quisque discedere quam appetitum earum rerum, quae sibi conducant, amittere. Iure igitur gravissimi philosophi initium summi boni a natura petiverunt et illum appetitum rerum ad naturam accommodatarum ingeneratum putaverunt omnibus, quia continetur ea commendatione naturae, qua se ipsi diligunt.

XII. **34.** Deinceps videndum est, quoniam satis apertum est, sibi quemque natura esse carum, quae sit hominis natura. Id est enim, de quo quaerimus. Atqui perspicuum est, hominem e corpore animoque constare, cum primae sint animi partes, secundae corporis. Deinde id quoque videmus, et ita figuratum corpus, ut excellat aliis, animumque ita constitutum, ut et sensibus instructus sit et habeat praestantiam mentis, cui tota hominis natura pareat, in qua sit

33. **regi natura,** i.e. by the *major causa atque divinior.* Cf. De Nat. Deor. ii. 75, *omnes res subiectas esse naturae sentienti ab eaque omnia pulcherrime geri.*

ipsa esse non possit. Because *natura* is by them conceived as a universal Providence. *natura hominis* is for C. this power immanent in the individual; but those who deny the existence of this universal principle may interpret the phrase in their own sense without affecting his argument. What he asserts as true of the 'nature of man' applies equally to 'man'; for 'each individual man' can no more lose the instinctive appetition of what is good for him, than he can get away from himself. This concession, however, really undermines the whole argument. Unless one 'increasing purpose' governs the evolution of all created things, there is no common goal to which they tend, no standard to determine the values of the objects they pursue, and no criterion of conduct.

34. **perspicuum est.** How closely C. here follows Antiochus, appears from De Civit. Dei xix. 3, where Augustine speaking of Varro as being, like Cicero, a disciple of that philosopher, says *Primum, quia summum bonum in philosophia non arboris, non pecoris, non dei, sed hominis quaeritur, quid sit ipse homo, quaerendum putat* (*Varro*). *Sentit quippe, in eius natura duo esse quaedam, corpus et animum, et horum quidem duorum melius esse animum longeque praestabilius, omnino non dubitat.*

cum primae sint animi partes, 'although'; cf. 40, *cum longe multumque praestet mens atque ratio. partes* = not 'the rôle of the mind' (Reid), but τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρη. So infra *animi partibus*; 36 (xiii.) *eius animi partis, quae princeps est,* etc.

mirabilis quaedam vis rationis et cognitionis et scientiae virtutumque omnium. Nam quae corporis sunt, ea nec auctoritatem cum animi partibus comparandam et cognitionem habent faciliorem. Itaque ab his ordiamur. **35.** Corporis igitur nostri partes totaque figura et forma et statura quam apta ad naturam sit, apparet, neque est dubium, quin, frons, oculi, aures et reliquae partes quales propriae sint hominis, intellegatur; sed certe opus est, ea valere et vigere et naturales motus ususque habere, ut nec absit quid eorum nec aegrum debilitatumve sit. Id enim natura desiderat. Est autem etiam actio quaedam corporis, quae motus et status naturae congruentes tenet; in quibus si peccetur distortione et depravatione quadam ac motu statuve deformi, ut si aut manibus ingrediatur quis aut non ante, sed retro, fugere plane se ipse et hominem exuens ex homine naturam odisse videatur. Quamobrem etiam sessiones quaedam et flexi fractique motus, quales protervorum hominum aut mollium esse solent, contra naturam sunt, ut, etiamsi animi vitio id eveniat, tamen in corpore mutari hominis natura videatur. **36.** Itaque e contrario moderati aequabilesque habitus, affectiones ususque corporis apti esse ad naturam videntur. Iam vero animus non esse solum, sed etiam cuiusdam modi debet esse, ut et omnes partes suas habeat incolumes et de virtutibus nulla desit. Atque in sensibus est sua cuiusque virtus, ut ne quid impediat, quo minus suo sensus quisque munere fungatur in iis rebus celeriter expediteque percipiendis, quae subiectae sunt sensibus. XIII. Animi autem et eius animi partis, quae princeps est quaeque mens nominatur, plures sunt virtutes, sed duo prima genera, unum earum, quae ingenerantur suapte

35. quin, . . . partes quales sint propriae hominis, intellegatur, i.e. intellegi cogitando potest, qualis frons, quales oculi . . . proprii sint hominis (so that they clearly are as they are by design, not by chance). 'Sed nec *frons intelligitur*, nec *frons qualis propria est hominis*, nec soloecismo hoc caret: *frons . . . reliquae partes . . . intellegitur*.' Mdv.

ante. Very rare in this sense. Mdv. could adduce no parallel; Müller cfs. (inter alia) *neque post respiciens neque ante prospiciens* (Varro, Sat. Man. p. 159, 4).

36. sed duo prima genera. Aristotle was the first to distinguish explicitly

natura appellanturque non voluntariae, alterum earum, quae in voluntate positae, magis proprio nomine appellari solent, quarum est excellens in animorum laude praestantia. Prioris generis est docilitas, memoria; quae fere omnia appellantur uno ingenii nomine, easque virtutes qui habent, ingeniosi vocantur. Alterum autem genus est magnarum verarumque virtutum, quas appellamus voluntarias, ut prudentiam, temperantiam, fortitudinem, iustitiam et reliquas generis eiusdem.

37. Et summatim quidem haec erant de corpore animoque dicenda, quibus quasi informatum est, quid hominis natura postulet; ex quo perspicuum est, quoniam ipsi a nobis diligamur, omniaque et in animo et in corpore perfecta velimus esse, ea nobis ipsa cara esse propter se et in iis esse ad bene vivendum momenta maxima. Nam cui proposita sit conservatio sui, necesse est huic partes quoque sui caras esse, carioresque, quo perfectiores sint et magis in suo genere laudabiles. Ea enim vita expetitur, quae sit animi corporisque expleta virtutibus, in eoque summum bonum poni necesse est, quando quidem id tale esse debet, ut rerum expetendarum sit extremum. Quo cognito, dubitari non potest, quin, cum ipsi homines sibi sint per se et sua sponte cari, partes quoque et corporis et animi et earum rerum, quae sunt in utriusque motu et statu, sua caritate

between διανοητικαί and ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταί (Nic. Eth. i. 13) corresponding to the purely rational part of the soul and to the part which 'shares in reason' to the extent of obeying its dictates, i.e. the Will. The virtue or goodness of the Intellect is a natural gift; that of the Will can be acquired by habituation. So in Acad. i. 20, C. says the mental faculties were divided by 'the Ancients' *in naturam et mores* (='in ea quae natura et in ea quae moribus perfici solent,' Reid). Note that C. correctly places *prudentia* (φρόνησις, practical wisdom) among the *voluntariae virtutes*. The author of the Magna Moralia classes it with σοφία (theoretical wisdom) among the 'involuntary,' but Aristotle himself taught οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ἄνευ φρονήσεως, οὐδὲ φρόνιμον ἄνευ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς (Nic. Eth. v. 13, 6). C.'s account, however, has a strong Stoic colouring; σοφία, which Aristotle places highest, is significantly omitted, and ethical Virtue ranks above intellectual.

magis proprio nomine. Mdv. explains, *magis proprium habent id nomen, quod habent* (*virtutis*), but admits the harshness. Schuetz would read *nomine virtutes appellari solent.*

37. Ea enim vita . . . in eoque. Cf. iii. 21, *in eo collocatum* (=in ea vita).

earum rerum. C. should have said *eae res.* He means 'animi et

colantur et per se ipsae appetantur. **38**. Quibus expositis, facilis est coniectura, ea maxime esse expetenda ex nostris, quae plurimum habent dignitatis, ut optimae cuiusque partis, quae per se expetatur, virtus sit expetenda maxime. Ita fiet, ut animi virtus corporis virtuti anteponatur, animique virtutes non voluntarias vincant virtutes voluntariae, quae quidem proprie virtutes appellantur multumque excellunt, propterea quod ex ratione gignuntur, qua nihil est in homine divinius. Etenim omnium rerum, quas et creat natura et tuetur, quae aut sine animo sunt aut *non* multo secus, earum summum bonum in corpore est; ut non inscite illud dictum videatur in sue, animum illi pecudi datum pro sale, ne putisceret. XIV. Sunt autem bestiae quaedam, in quibus inest aliquid simile virtutis, ut in leonibus, ut in canibus, *ut* in equis, in quibus non corporum solum, ut in suibus, sed etiam animorum aliqua ex parte motus quosdam videmus. In homine autem summa omnis animi est et in animo rationis, ex qua virtus est, quae rationis absolutio definitur, quam etiam atque etiam explicandam putant.

39. Earum etiam rerum, quas terra gignit, educatio quaedam et perfectio est non dissimilis animantium; itaque et vivere vitem et mori dicimus, arboremque et novellam et vetulam et vigere et senescere; ex quo non est alienum, ut animantibus, sic illis et apta quaedam ad naturam putare et aliena, earumque augendarum et alendarum quandam cultricem esse, quae sit scientia

corporis et partes et affectiones'. Cf. Stob. Ecl. Eth. p. 248, Φίλον γὰρ εἶναι ἡμῖν τὸ σῶμα, φίλην δὲ τὴν ψυχήν, φίλα δὲ τὰ τούτων μέρη, καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας (*quae sunt in statu et motu*).

38. **propterea quod ex ratione gignuntur.** The superiority of the 'volitional' Virtues, and their origin in the Reason are Stoic doctrines foisted upon the Peripatetics by Antiochus. It is the non-volitional of course which *ex ratione gignuntur* according to Aristotle. But the Stoics, holding the essential unity of the soul, identified Reason and Will, and defined Moral Virtue as *rationis absolutio* (end of this section). Hence they opposed Reason to intellectual attributes independent of the will (*docilitas*, *memoria*, §36), and in contradiction to Aristotle held the latter to be not properly 'virtues' nor 'goods,' but merely 'preferable' as *prima naturae*.

dictum videatur. Chrysippus, according to C. de Nat. Deor. ii. 160. Plutarch, Quaest. Conviv. v. 10. 3 p. 685 c. quotes the saying from 'certain Stoics,' Clement Alex. from Cleanthes.

39. **aliena**, sc. *ab ea*, from *ad*

atque ars agricolarum, quae circumcidat, amputet, erigat, extollat, adminiculet, ut, quo natura ferat, eo possint ire; ut ipsae vites, si loqui possint, ita se tractandas tuendasque esse fateantur. Et nunc quidem, quod eam tuetur, ut de vite potissimum loquar, est id extrinsecus; in ipsa enim parum magna vis inest, ut quam optime se habere possit, si nulla cultura adhibeatur. **40.** At vero si ad vitem sensus accesserit, ut appetitum quendam habeat et per se ipsa moveatur, quid facturam putas? An ea, quae per vinitorem antea consequebatur, per se ipsa curabit? Sed videsne accessuram ei curam, ut sensus quoque suos eorumque omnem appetitum, et si qua sint adiuncta ei membra, tueatur? Sic ad illa, quae semper habuit, iunget ea, quae postea accesserunt, nec eundem finem habebit, quem cultor eius habebat, sed volet secundum eam naturam, quae postea ei adiuncta est, vivere. Ita similis erit ei finis boni, atque antea fuerat, neque idem tamen; non enim iam stirpis bonum quaeret, sed animalis. Quid, si non sensus modo ei datus sit, verum etiam animus hominis? non necesse est, et illa pristina manere, ut tuenda sint, et haec multo esse cariora, quae accesserint, animique optimam quamque partem carissimam, in eaque expletione naturae summi boni finem consistere, cum longe multumque praestet mens atque ratio? Sic *extitit* extremum omnium appetendorum atque ductum a prima commendatione naturae multis gradibus ascendit, ut ad summum perveniret, quod cumulatur ex integritate corporis et ex mentis ratione perfecta.

XV. **41.** Cum igitur ea sit, quam exposui, forma naturae, si, ut initio dixi, simul atque ortus esset, se quisque cognosceret iudicareque posset, quae vis et totius esset naturae et partium singularum, continuo videret, quid esset hoc, quod quaerimus, omnium rerum, quas expetimus, summum et ultimum, nec ulla in re peccare posset. Nunc vero a primo quidem mirabiliter occulta natura est nec perspici nec

naturam. So, iii. 49 *eas* (obj. of *continere*) is understood from *ad quas.*

41. nec perspici nec cognosci, for the double negative cf. i. 30; *negat . . . neque.*

cognosci potest; progredientibus autem aetatibus sensim tardeve potius quasi nosmet ipsos cognoscimus. Itaque prima illa commendatio, quae a natura nostri facta est nobis, incerta et obscura est, primusque appetitus ille animi tantum agit, ut salvi atque integri esse possimus; cum autem dispicere coepimus et sentire, quid simus et quid *ab* animantibus ceteris differamus, tum ea sequi incipimus, ad quae nati sumus. **42.** Quam similitudinem videmus in bestiis, quae primo, in quo loco natae sunt, ex eo se non commovent; deinde suo quaeque appetitu movetur; serpere angviculos, nare anaticulas, evolare merulas, cornibus uti videmus boves, nepas aculeis, suam denique cuique naturam esse ad vivendum ducem. Quae similitudo in genere etiam humano apparet. Parvi enim primo ortu sic iacent, tamquam omnino sine animo sint; cum autem paulum firmitatis accessit, et animo utuntur et sensibus, conitunturque, sese ut erigant, et manibus utuntur, et eos agnoscunt, a quibus educantur; deinde aequalibus delectantur libenterque se cum iis congregant dantque se ad ludendum fabellarumque auditione ducuntur, deque eo, quod ipsis superat, aliis gratificari volunt, animadvertuntque ea, quae domi fiunt, curiosius, incipiuntque commentari aliquid et discere, et eorum, quos vident, volunt non ignorare nomina, quibusque rebus cum aequalibus decertant, si vicerunt, efferunt se laetitia, victi debilitantur animosque demittunt; quorum sine causa fieri nihil putandum est. **43.** Est enim natura sic generata vis hominis, ut ad omnem virtutem percipiendam facta videatur, ob eamque causam parvi virtutum simulacris, quarum in se habent semina, sine doctrina moventur; sunt enim prima elementa naturae, quibus auctis virtutis quasi germen efficitur. Nam cum ita nati factique simus, ut et agendi aliquid et diligendi aliquos et liberalitatis et referendae gratiae principia in nobis contineremus atque ad

tantum agit, 'aims at nothing more than'.

42. Quam similitudinem, i.e. *cuius rei simile aliquid.* So infra, *quae similitudo* = *quiddam huic simile.*

43. vis hominis = *natura hominis* (cf. 66, *cum sic hominis natura generata sit*). *natura* = 'Nature'. Cf. Nat. Deor. ii. 30, *omnem vim mundi natura divina contineri.*

scientiam, prudentiam, fortitudinem aptos animos haberemus a contrariisque rebus alienos, non sine causa eas, quas dixi, in pueris virtutum quasi scintillas videmus, e quibus accendi philosophi ratio debet, ut eam, quasi deum, ducem subsequens ad naturae perveniat extremum. Nam, ut saepe iam dixi, in infirma aetate imbecillaque mente vis naturae quasi per caliginem cernitur; cum autem progrediens confirmatur animus, agnoscit ille quidem naturae vim, sed ita, ut progredi possit longius, per se sit tantum inchoata. XVI. **44.** Intrandum igitur est in rerum naturam et penitus, quid ea postulet, pervidendum; aliter enim nosmet ipsos nosse non possumus. Quod praeceptum quia maius erat, quam ut ab homine videretur, idcirco assignatum est deo. Iubet igitur nos Pythius Apollo noscere nosmet ipsos; cognitio autem haec est una nostri, ut vim corporis animique norimus sequamurque eam vitam, quae rebus iis perfruatur. Quoniam autem is animi appetitus a principio fuit, ut ea, quae dixi, quam perfectissima natura haberemus, confitendum est, cum id adepti simus, quod appetitum sit, in eo quasi in ultimo consistere naturam atque id esse summum bonum; quod certe universum sua sponte ipsum expeti et propter se necesse est, quoniam ante demonstratum est, etiam singulas eius partes esse per se expetendas. **45.** In enumerandis autem corporis commodis si quis praetermissam a nobis voluptatem putabit, in aliud tempus ea quaestio differatur. Utrum enim sit voluptas in iis rebus, quas primas secundum naturam esse diximus, necne sit, ad id, quod agimus, nihil interest. Si enim, ut mihi quidem videtur, non explet bona

44. quam ut ab homine, sc. *ortum.* *Γνῶθι σεαύτον* was one of the precepts inscribed on the wall of the temple at Delphi.

vim corporis animique, 'our physical and mental constitution' (which together make up *vis hominis*). *Perfrui vi corporis animique* is loosely put for *perfrui bonis corporis animique.*

quam perfectissima natura: *perfectissima* is abl. 'Non quaeritur, qualia a natura . . . habeamus, sed quali natura, hoc est, qualia' (Mdv.). C. uses this expression in preference to *perfectissima*, acc. by itself, to indicate that 'perfection of nature' is the perfection meant.

45. Si . . . non explet . . . sin . . . est in ea, 'If the total of natural goods is complete without pleasure (i.e. if pleasure is not a natural good)—if, on the contrary, there *is* in pleasure that which some would have to be its property, i.e. such value that it *is* a natural good . . .'

naturae voluptas, iure praetermissa est; sin autem est in ea, quod quidam volunt, nihil impedit hanc nostram comprehensionem summi boni; quae enim constituta sunt prima naturae, ad ea si voluptas accesserit, unum aliquod accesserit commodum corporis neque eam constitutionem summi boni, quae est proposita, mutaverit.

XVII. **46.** Et adhuc quidem ita nobis progressa ratio est, ut ea duceretur omnis a prima commendatione naturae. Nunc autem aliud iam argumentandi sequamur genus, ut non solum quia nos diligamus, sed quia cuiusque partis naturae et in corpore et in animo sua quaeque vis sit, idcirco in his rebus summa nostra sponte moveamur. Atque ut a corpore ordiar, videsne, ut, si quae in membris prava aut debilitata aut imminuta sint, occultent homines? ut etiam contendant et elaborent, si efficere possint, ut aut non appareat corporis vitium aut quam minimum appareat, multosque etiam dolores curationis causa perferant, ut, si ipse usus membrorum non modo non maior, verum etiam minor futurus sit, eorum tamen species ad naturam revertatur? [Etenim, cum omnes natura totos se expetendos putent, nec id ob aliam rem, sed propter ipsos, necesse est eius etiam partes propter se expeti, quod universum propter se expetatur.] **47.** Quid? in motu et in statu corporis

46. Nunc autem aliud. Mdv. objects that this is not a fresh argument, but resumes and amplifies cc. xii. xiii., and thinks C. in condensing Antiochus' exposition has confused its true order. But, though C. has not marked the distinction very clearly, we have surely in cc. xvii.–xx. a different argument from that of cc. xii. xiii., though based on the same facts, i.e. whereas it was first shown that the instinct of self-preservation extends to cherishing every part of the self, it is now argued that an inherent force or energy resides in every part, which makes for the perfection of its proper organ. Hence our activity in such matters may be called 'self-willed' (*nostra sponte*) *par excellence* (*summe*). For we 'love' e.g. our seeing faculty (1) as serviceable, (2) for its own sake, as an integral part of the self; but further, this faculty is itself a specialised and localised mode of that ruling principle (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν) which we call 'the soul,' and as such it wills to energise, in other words, *we* will that it should. [This explanation assumes that Antiochus based on *Stoic* psychology this long proof, *nos ad agendum natos esse* (xxi. init.). Dr. Reid takes *nostra sponte* differently, 'because we regard ourselves,' but this = *quia nos diligamus*, and is open to Mdv.'s objection. *moveamur* is not pass. but intrans. (cf. i. 14). I follow Dr. Reid in bracketing *Etenim* . . . *expetatur* (end of this section) as certainly interpolated.]

nihil inest, quod animadvertendum esse ipsa natura iudicet? quemadmodum quis ambulet, sedeat, qui doctus oris, qui vultus in quoque sit? nihilne est in his rebus, quod dignum libero aut indignum esse ducamus? Nonne odio multos dignos putamus, qui quodam motu aut statu videntur naturae legem et modum contempsisse? Et quoniam haec deducuntur de corpore, quid est, cur non recte pulchritudo etiam ipsa propter se expetenda ducatur? Nam si pravitatem imminutionemque corporis propter se fugiendam putamus, cur non etiam, ac fortasse magis, propter se formae dignitatem sequamur? Et si turpitudinem fugimus in statu et motu corporis, quid est, cur pulchritudinem non sequamur? Atque etiam valetudinem, vires, vacuitatem doloris non propter utilitatem solum, sed etiam ipsas propter se expetemus. Quoniam enim natura suis omnibus expleri partibus vult, hunc statum corporis per se ipsum expetit, qui est maxime e natura, quae tota perturbatur, si aut aegrum corpus est aut dolet aut caret viribus.

XVIII. **48.** Videamus animi partes, quarum est conspectus illustrior; quae quo sunt excelsiores, eo dant clariora indicia naturae. Tantus est igitur innatus in nobis cognitionis amor et scientiae, ut nemo dubitare possit, quin ad eas res hominum natura nullo emolumento invitata rapiatur. Videmusne, ut pueri ne verberibus quidem a contemplandis rebus perquirendisque deterreantur? ut pulsi recurrant? ut aliquid scire se gaudeant? ut id aliis narrare gestiant? ut pompa, ludis atque eiusmodi spectaculis teneantur ob eamque rem vel famem et sitim perferant? Quid vero? qui ingenuis studiis atque artibus delectantur, nonne videmus eos nec valetudinis nec rei familiaris habere rationem omniaque perpeti ipsa cognitione et scientia captos et cum maximis curis et laboribus compensare eam, quam ex discendo capiant, voluptatem? **49.** Mihi quidem

47. haec deducuntur, 'people take care to expel such habits from the body'. For *deducere* as a medical term, cf. Hor. Ep. i. 2, 48, *aegroto domini deduxit corpore febres.*

Homerus huiusmodi quiddam vidisse videtur in iis, quae de Sirenum cantibus finxerit. Neque enim vocum svavitate videntur aut novitate quadam et varietate cantandi revocare eos solitae, qui praetervehebantur, sed quia multa se scire profitebantur, ut homines ad earum saxa discendi cupiditate adhaerescerent. Ita enim invitant Ulixem (nam verti, ut quaedam Homeri, sic istum ipsum locum):

O decus Argolicum, quin puppim flectis, Ulixes,
Auribus ut nostros possis agnoscere cantus?
Nam nemo haec umquam est transvectus caerula cursu,
Quin prius astiterit vocum dulcedine captus,
Post, variis avido satiatus pectore musis,
Doctior ad patrias lapsus pervenerit oras.
Nos grave certamen belli clademque tenemus,
Graecia quam Troiae divino numine vexit,
Omniaque e latis rerum vestigia terris.

Vidit Homerus, probari fabulam non posse, si cantiunculis tantus vir irretitus teneretur; scientiam pollicentur, quam non erat mirum sapientiae cupido patria *esse* cariorem. Atque omnia quidem scire, cuiuscumquemodi sint, cupere curiosorum, duci vero maiorum rerum contemplatione ad cupiditatem scientiae summorum virorum est putandum.

XIX. **50.** Quem enim ardorem studii censetis fuisse in Archimede, qui dum in pulvere quaedam describit attentius, ne patriam quidem captam esse senserit! quantum Aristoxeni

49. quae . . . finxerit: subj. because the speaker is giving his own view not merely of Homer's allegorical meaning but of the circumstance, 'which, as I understand him, he has fabled about the Sirens' singing,' viz. that not the melody but the promise of knowledge was the lure.

nam verti: from Odyssey xii. 184. C. turns *ἴδμεν* by *tenemus*; *ὅσσα γένηται* by *rerum vestigia*.

50. Archimede. According to the well-known story, when Syracuse fell he was so absorbed in a problem as to be unaware the Romans were sacking the city. Marcellus had given orders to secure him, but he was killed by an impatient would-be captor, to whom he would say nothing but 'Don't spoil my diagram'. C. was proud of having discovered his overgrown and forgotten monument outside the city during his quaestorship in Sicily.

Aristoxenus of Tarentum, a pupil of Aristotle's, left a work on Harmonics, which is our oldest authority for Greek music. His discoveries were epoch-making, and Greek musicians were long divided into the rival camps of 'Pythago-

ingenium consumptum videmus in musicis! quo studio Aristophanem putamus aetatem in litteris duxisse! Quid de Pythagora, quid de Platone aut de Democrito loquar? a quibus propter discendi cupiditatem videmus ultimas terras esse peragratas. Quae qui non vident, nihil umquam magnum ac cognitione dignum amaverunt. Atque hoc loco, qui propter animi voluptates coli dicunt ea studia, quae dixi, non intellegunt, idcirco esse ea propter se expetenda, quod nulla utilitate obiecta delectentur animi atque ipsa scientia, etiamsi incommodatura sit, gaudeant. **51.** Sed quid attinet de rebus tam apertis plura requirere? Ipsi enim quaeramus a nobis, stellarum motus contemplationesque rerum caelestium eorumque omnium, quae naturae obscuritate occultantur, cognitiones quemadmodum nos moveant, et quid historia delectet, quam solemus persequi usque ad extremum; praetermissa repetimus, inchoata persequimur. Nec vero sum nescius, esse utilitatem in historia, non modo voluptatem. Quid, cum fictas fabulas, e quibus utilitas nulla elici potest, cum voluptate legimus? **52.** Quid, cum volumus nomina eorum, qui quid gesserint, nota nobis esse, parentes, patriam, multa praeterea minime necessaria? Quid, quod homines infima fortuna, nulla spe rerum gerendarum, opifices denique delectantur historia? maximeque eos videre possumus res gestas audire et legere velle, qui a spe gerendi absunt confecti senectute. Quocirca intellegi necesse est, in ipsis rebus, quae discuntur et cognoscuntur, invitamenta inesse, quibus ad discendum cognoscendumque moveamur. **53.** Ac veteres quidem philosophi in beatorum insulis fingunt qualis futura sit vita sapientium, quos cura omni liberatos, nullum necessarium vitae cultum aut paratum requirentes, nihil aliud acturos

reans' and 'Aristoxenians'. *Aristophanes* of Byzantium (d. 180 B.C.), 'the greatest philologist of antiquity,' librarian of the famous Library of Alexandria, edited Homer, Pindar, Euripides and Aristophanes, besides writing on grammar and systematising accentuation and punctuation.

Quae qui non vident, i.e. do not observe *and understand* these actions of those great men.

53. **paratum**: only here in Golden Latin, except in a fragment of

putant, nisi ut omne tempus inquirendo ac discendo in naturae cognitione consumant. Nos autem non solum beatae vitae istam esse oblectationem videmus, sed etiam levamentum miseriarum; itaque multi, cum in potestate essent hostium aut tyrannorum, multi in custodia, multi in exilio dolorem suum doctrinae studiis levarunt. **54.** Princeps huius civitatis Phalereus Demetrius, cum patria pulsus esset iniuria, ad Ptolemaeum se regem Alexandream contulit. Qui cum in hac ipsa philosophia, ad quam te hortamur, excelleret Theophrastique esset auditor, multa praeclara in illo calamitoso otio scripsit non ad usum aliquem suum, quo erat orbatus; sed animi cultus ille erat ei quasi quidam humanitatis cibus. Equidem e Cn. Aufidio, praetorio, erudito homine, oculis capto, saepe audiebam, cum se lucis magis quam utilitatis desiderio moveri diceret. Somnum denique nobis, nisi requietem corporibus et medicinam quandam laboris afferret, contra naturam putaremus datum; aufert enim sensus actionemque tollit omnem; itaque si aut requietem natura non quaereret aut eam posset alia quadam ratione consequi, facile pateremur, qui etiam nunc agendi aliquid discendique causa prope contra naturam vigilias suscipere soleamus.

XX. **55.** Sunt autem etiam clariora vel plane perspicua minimeque dubitanda indicia naturae, maxime scilicet in homine, sed in omni animali, ut appetat animus agere semper aliquid neque ulla condicione quietem sempiternam possit pati. Facile est hoc cernere in primis puerorum aetatulis. Quamquam enim vereor, ne nimius in hoc genere videar, tamen omnes veteres philosophi, maxime nostri, ad incunabula accedunt, quod in pueritia facillime se

Sallust. Lambinus read *apparatum.*

54. Phalereus Demetrius. He was in power at Athens 317–307 B.C., and exiled in the latter year, when Demetrius Poliorcetes 'liberated' the city from Cassander's domination. *usum . . . quo erat orbatus* refers to his no longer being able to apply his philosophy to statesmanship.

saepe audiebam. Piso was some years older than C., who was a mere boy when Aufidius was already old (Tusc. v. 112).

55. ne nimius, 'that I may seem to labour this point to a tedious extent'.

ad incunabula accedunt, 'go back to the nursery' (Reid).

arbitrantur naturae voluntatem posse cognoscere. Videmus igitur, ut conquiescere ne infantes quidem possint; cum vero paulum processerunt, lusionibus vel laboriosis delectantur, ut ne verberibus quidem deterreri possint. Eaque cupiditas agendi aliquid adulescit una cum aetatibus. Itaque, ne si iucundissimis quidem nos somniis usuros putemus, Endymionis somnum nobis velimus dari, idque si accidat, mortis instar putemus. **56**. Quin etiam inertissimos homines, nescio qua singulari nequitia praeditos, videmus tamen et corpore et animo moveri semper et, cum re nulla impediantur necessaria, aut alveolum poscere aut quaerere quempiam ludum aut sermonem aliquem requirere, cumque non habeant ingenuas ex doctrina oblectationes, circulos aliquos et sessiunculas consectari. Ne bestiae quidem, quas delectationis causa concludimus, cum copiosius alantur, quam si essent liberae, facile patiuntur sese contineri motusque solutos et vagos a natura sibi tributos requirunt. **57**. Itaque ut quisque optime natus institutusque est, esse omnino nolit in vita, si gerendis negotiis orbatus possit paratissimis vesci voluptatibus. Nam aut privatim aliquid gerere malunt aut, qui altiore animo sunt, capessunt rem publicam honoribus imperiisque adipiscendis, aut totos se ad studia doctrinae conferunt; qua in vita tantum abest ut voluptates consectentur, etiam curas, sollicitudines, vigilias perferunt, optimaque parte hominis, quae in nobis divina ducenda est, ingenii et mentis acie fruuntur, nec voluptatem requirentes nec fugientes laborem; nec vero intermittunt aut admirationem earum rerum, quae sunt ab antiquis repertae, aut investigationem novarum; quo studio cum satiari non possint, omnium ceterarum rerum obliti nihil abiectum, nihil humile cogitant; tantaque est vis talibus in studiis, ut eos etiam, qui sibi alios proposuerunt fines bonorum, quos utilitate aut voluptate dirigunt, tamen in rebus quaerendis explicandisque naturis aetates conterere videamus.

XXI. **58**. Ergo hoc quidem apparet, nos ad agendum esse natos. Actionum autem genera plura, ut obscurentur

etiam maioribus minora, maximae autem sunt primum, ut mihi quidem videtur et iis, quorum nunc in ratione versamur, consideratio cognitioque rerum caelestium et earum, quas a natura occultatas et latentes indagare ratio potest, deinde rerum publicarum administratio aut administrandi scientia, tum prudens, temperata, fortis, iusta ratio, reliquaeque virtutes et actiones virtutibus congruentes, quae uno verbo complexi omnia honesta dicimus; ad quorum et cognitionem et usum iam corroborati, natura ipsa praeeunte, deducimur. Omnium enim rerum principia parva sunt, sed suis progressionibus usa augentur; nec sine causa; in primo enim ortu inest teneritas ac mollitia quaedam, ut nec res videre optimas nec agere possint. Virtutis enim beataeque vitae, quae duo maxime expetenda sunt, serius lumen apparet, multo etiam serius, ut plane, qualia sint, intellegantur. Praeclare enim Plato: Beatum, cui etiam in senectute contigerit, ut sapientiam verasque opiniones assequi possit! Quare, quoniam de primis naturae commodis satis dictum est, nunc de maioribus consequentibusque videamus.

58. **maximae autem sunt.** This threefold division of the chief forms of activity is peculiar. We have (1) Natural Philosophy; (2) Politics, theoretical and applied; (3) The Four Virtues combined with (*a*) other virtues, (*b*) virtuous actions. The division being expressly given as Peripatetic (*et iis quorum nunc in ratione versamur*), at once suggests comparison with Aristotle's division of *βίοι*, i.e. the kinds of lives men lead, and identification of C.'s (1) with the *θεωρητικὸς βιός*, and (2) with the *πολιτικὸς βιός*. But (3) recalls the third member of another Aristotelian division, that of *ζωαί*, i.e. grades of existence, which are (1) *θρεπτική*, (2) *αἰσθητική*, (3) *πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος*. This third *ζωή* is peculiar to Man and is *ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου* (Nic. Eth. I. vii.). Since Virtue is the 'goodness' (*ἀρετή*) of this *ζωή*, the Good of Man is 'an activity according to virtue' (ibid.). I take it that Antiochus, or possibly his Peripatetic authority, combined the two Aristotelian divisions, thus making a cross-division, for the *βίοι* are of course sub-species of the *ζωή*. But further, Antiochus, as usual, adds Stoic colouring; *virtutes* (qualities) are not distinguished from *actiones*, both are summed up as *honesta*, and the specific virtues of 'the rational part of the soul' (*τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος*) become the Stoic Reason in its fourfold aspect (*ratio prudens*, etc.). So infra, *Virtutis . . . serius lumen apparet*, etc., on which cf. iii. 20, 21.

in primo enim ortu, sc. *hominum*, whence the subject to *possint* is understood. In the next sentence *fit* is understood with *multo etiam serius* from the figurative *virtutis lumen serius apparet=fit, ut virtus conspiciatur.*

Plato, 'Laws' ii. 653 A: *Φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ ἀληθεῖς δόξας βεβαίους εὐτυχὲς ὅτῳ καὶ πρὸς τὸ γῆρας παρεγένετο.*

59. Natura igitur corpus quidem hominis sic et genuit et formavit, ut alia in primo ortu perficeret, alia progrediente aetate fingeret, neque sane multum adiumentis externis et adventiciis uteretur; animum autem reliquis rebus ita perfecit, ut corpus; sensibus enim ornavit ad res percipiendas idoneis, ut nihil aut non multum adiumento ullo ad suam confirmationem indigerent; quod autem in homine praestantissimum atque optimum est, id deseruit. Etsi dedit talem mentem, quae omnem virtutem accipere posset, ingenuitque sine doctrina notitias parvas rerum maximarum et quasi instituit docere, et induxit in ea, quae inerant, tamquam elementa virtutis. Sed virtutem ipsam inchoavit; nihil amplius. **60.** Itaque nostrum est (quod nostrum dico, artis est) ad ea principia, quae accepimus, consequentia exquirere, quoad sit id, quod volumus, effectum; quod quidem pluris est haud paulo magisque ipsum propter se expetendum quam aut sensus aut corporis ea, quae diximus, quibus tantum praestat mentis excellens perfectio, ut vix cogitari possit, quid intersit. Itaque omnis honos, omnis admiratio, omne studium ad virtutem et ad eas actiones, quae virtuti consentaneae sunt, refertur, eaque omnia, quae aut ita in animis sunt aut ita geruntur, uno nomine honesta dicuntur. Quorum omnium quae sint notitiae quaeque significentur eorum vocabulis quaeque cuiusque vis et natura sit, mox videbimus; XXII. **61.** hoc autem loco tantum explicemus, haec honesta, quae dico, praeterquam quod nosmet ipsos diligamus, praeterea suapte natura per se esse expetenda. Indicant pueri, in quibus ut in speculis natura cernitur. Quanta studia decertantium sunt! quanta ipsa certamina!

59. **adiumentis . . . uteretur,** i.e. left little for man himself to effect by artificial means.

notitias parvas. Cf. de legg. i. 26, 'natura rerum plurimarum obscuras nec satis claras intellegentias inchoavit'. That we have even 'embryonic ideas' prior to experience is incompatible with the Stoic view that the mind, at birth, is a *tabula rasa*. Antiochus has here tinctured the Stoic account of man's mental development with Platonism.

60. **mox videbimus.** These points are briefly touched on § 67.

61. **praeterquam quod . . . praeterea.** Cf. § 46, *non solum quia . . . sed quia.*

ut illi efferuntur laetitia, cum vicerunt! ut pudet victos! ut se accusari nolunt! quam cupiunt laudari! quos illi labores [non] perferunt, ut aequalium principes sint! quae memoria est in iis bene merentium, quae referendae gratiae cupiditas! Atque ea in optima quaque indole maxime apparent, in qua haec honesta, quae intellegimus, a natura tamquam adumbrantur. **62.** Sed haec in pueris; expressa vero in iis aetatibus, quae iam confirmatae sunt. Quis est tam dissimilis homini, qui non moveatur et offensione turpitudinis et comprobatione honestatis? quis est, qui non oderit libidinosam, protervam adulescentiam? quis contra in illa aetate pudorem, constantiam, etiamsi sua nihil intersit, non tamen diligat? quis Pullum Numitorium, Fregellanum, proditorem, quamquam rei publicae nostrae profuit, non odit? quis *huius* urbis conservatorem Codrum, quis Erechthei filias non maxime laudat? cui Tubuli nomen odio non est? quis Aristidem non mortuum diligit? An obliviscimur, quanto opere in audiendo [in] legendoque moveamur, cum pie, cum amice, cum magno animo aliquid factum cognoscimus? **63.** Quid loquor de nobis, qui ad laudem et ad decus nati, suscepti, instituti sumus? Qui clamores vulgi atque imperitorum excitantur in theatris, cum illa dicuntur:

> Ego sum Orestes,

contraque ab altero:

> Immo enimvero ego sum, inquam, Orestes!

62. **adumbrantur . . . expressa vero.** The metaphor is from sculpture; the design for a statue contrasted with the work itself, modelled in the round. Cf. Tusc. iii. 3, 'solida quaedam res et expressa, non adumbrata'; pro Cael. 12, 'non expressa signa sed adumbrata virtutum'.

Pullum. Q. Numitorius Pullus, the Volscian general, betrayed his city, Fregellae, to the Romans (de Invent. ii. 105).

Codrum, the last of the legendary kings of Athens. In the war between Athens and the Heraclids an oracle foretold victory to the side whose leader should fall in battle. The Heraclids gave command that none should fight with Codrus, but he disguised himself as a common soldier and rushed upon the foemen's spears.

Erechthei filias: *Ἐρεχθεῖ δὲ ὑπὲρ Ἀθηναίων νίκης χρωμένῳ ἔχρησεν ὁ θεὸς κατορθώσειν τὸν πόλεμον* (with Eleusis), *ἐὰν μίαν τῶν θυγατέρων σφάξῃ. καὶ σφάξαντος αὐτοῦ τὴν νεωτάτην καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ ἑαυτὰς κατέφαξαν* (Apoll. iii. 15. 4). For Tubulus, see ii. 54.

63. **Ego sum Orestes.** See ii. 79 n.

Cum autem etiam exitus ab utroque datur conturbato errantique regi: Ambo ergo una necarier precamur,—quotiens hoc agitur, ecquandone nisi admirationibus maximis? Nemo est igitur, quin hanc affectionem animi probet atque laudet, qua non modo utilitas nulla quaeritur, sed contra utilitatem etiam conservatur fides. **64.** Talibus exemplis non fictae solum fabulae, verum etiam historiae refertae sunt, et quidem maxime nostrae. Nos enim ad sacra Idaea accipienda optimum virum delegimus; nos tutores regibus misimus; nostri imperatores pro salute patriae sua capita voverunt; nostri consules regem inimicissimum moenibus iam appropinquantem monuerunt, a veneno ut caveret; nostra in re publica et quae per vim oblatum stuprum voluntaria morte lueret, inventa est, et qui filiam interficeret, ne stupraretur; quae quidem omnia et innumerabilia praeterea, quis est, quin intellegat, et eos, qui fecerint, dignitatis splendore ductos immemores fuisse utilitatum suarum, nosque, cum ea laudemus, nulla alia re nisi honestate duci?

XXIII. Quibus rebus breviter expositis (nec enim sum copiam, quam potui, quia dubitatio in re nulla erat, persecutus), sed his rebus concluditur profecto, et virtutes omnes et honestum illud, quod ex iis oritur et in illis haeret, per se esse expetendum. **65.** In omni autem honesto, de quo

64. **optimum virum**, P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica. The image and cult of the Phrygian Cybele were brought to Rome, 204 B.C., in obedience to an oracle, which directed that the goddess should be received and installed by a man of blameless life. How the fulfilment of this injunction exemplified the sacrifice of expediency to principle is not explained.

tutores regibus, i.e. to princes who were minors. C. implies 'We might have seized the opportunity to annex their kingdoms'. He refers to M. Aemilius Lepidus, who administered Egypt on the death of Ptolemy Epiphanes (181 B.C.) as guardian to his sons Ptolemy Philometer and Physcon.

imperatores, the Decii. *consules*, C. Fabricius and Q. Aemilius Papus (278 B.C.). They warned Pyrrhus that his Court physician had offered to poison him for a bribe.

et eos, qui fecerint . . . nosque. We might expect *eos, qui fecerint, sine ulla spe utilitatis fecisse*, or the like, so that the verb to which *eos* is subject should directly govern *quae quidem omnia*; instead of which the accusatives which begin the sentence harshly depend on the verb of the relative clause, and *ea* has to be added rather awkwardly to supply an object to *laudemus*. For the exceptional *et . . . que*, cf. Acad. ii. 9, *et Lucullus nosque*, where Dr. Reid notes that C.'s fondness for attaching *que* to a personal pron. may explain the irregularity.

loquimur, nihil est tam illustre nec quod latius pateat quam coniunctio inter homines hominum et quasi quaedam societas et communicatio utilitatum et ipsa caritas generis humani, quae nata a primo satu, quod a procreatoribus nati diliguntur et tota domus coniugio et stirpe coniungitur, serpit sensim foras, cognationibus primum, tum affinitatibus, deinde amicitiis, post vicinitatibus, tum civibus et iis, qui publice socii atque amici sunt, deinde totius complexu gentis humanae; quae animi affectio suum cuique tribuens atque hanc, quam dico, societatem coniunctionis humanae munifice et aeque tuens iustitia dicitur, cui sunt adiunctae pietas, bonitas, liberalitas, benignitas, comitas, quaeque sunt generis eiusdem. Atque haec ita iustitiae propria sunt, ut sint virtutum reliquarum communia. **66**. Nam cum sic hominis natura generata sit, ut habeat quiddam ingenitum quasi civile atque populare, quod Graeci πολιτικόν vocant, quidquid aget quaeque virtus, id a communitate et ea, quam exposui, caritate ac societate humana non abhorrebit, vicissimque iustitia, ut ipsa fundet se usu in ceteras virtutes, sic illas expetet. Servari enim iustitia nisi a forti viro, nisi a sapiente non potest. Qualis est igitur omnis haec, quam dico, conspiratio consensusque virtutum, tale est illud ipsum honestum; quando quidem honestum aut ipsa virtus est aut res gesta virtute; quibus rebus vita consentiens virtutibusque respondens recta et honesta et constans et naturae congruens existimari potest. **67**. Atque haec coniunctio confusioque virtutum tamen a philosophis ratione quadam distingvitur. Nam cum ita copulatae connexaeque sint, ut omnes omnium participes sint nec alia ab alia possit separari, tamen proprium suum cuiusque munus est, ut fortitudo in laboribus

65. deinde totius complexu gentis humanae. We should expect *denique*. Notice *gens* = genus, elsewhere only in poetry, the no less rare *aeque* = *cum aequitate*, and the attribution to the Peripatetics of the Stoic doctrine of the solidarity of the human race.

66. πολιτικόν, Arist. Pol. i. 1. 9, ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῶον.

fundet se usu, i.e. Justice is theoretically distinct from the other virtues, but in its actual exercise will merge into courage, etc.

Qualis est igitur: a digression. The argument is resumed 67, *Quando igitur inest.*

periculisque cernatur, temperantia in praetermittendis voluptatibus, prudentia in delectu bonorum et malorum, iustitia in suo cuique tribuendo. Quando igitur inest in omni virtute cura quaedam quasi foras spectans aliosque appetens atque complectens, existit illud, ut amici, ut fratres, ut propinqui, ut affines, ut cives, ut omnes denique (quoniam unam societatem hominum esse volumus) propter se expetendi sint. Atqui eorum nihil est eius generis, ut sit in fine atque extremo bonorum. **68.** Ita fit, ut duo genera propter se expetendorum reperiantur, unum, quod est in iis, in quibus completur illud extremum, quae sunt aut animi aut corporis; haec autem, quae sunt extrinsecus, id est, quae neque in animo insunt neque in corpore, ut amici, ut parentes, ut liberi, ut propinqui, ut ipsa patria, sunt illa quidem sua sponte cara, sed eodem in genere, quo illa, non sunt. Nec vero umquam summum bonum assequi quisquam posset, si omnia illa, quae sunt extra, quamquam expetenda, summo bono continerentur.

XXIV. **69.** Quomodo igitur, inquies, verum esse poterit, omnia referri ad summum bonum, si amicitiae, si propinquitates, si reliqua externa summo bono non continentur? Hac videlicet ratione, quod ea, quae externa sunt, iis tuemur officiis, quae oriuntur a suo cuiusque genere virtutis.

67. **Atqui eorum.** C. probably took this account of external goods direct from Antiochus, who is therefore responsible for its inconsistency with Peripatetic views, if not for its want of clearness. Firstly, because every Virtue 'takes thought for others' (a statement obviously true of Justice, but needing explanation as regards Prudence, Temperance, Courage), it is strangely said to follow that all other persons are Ends in themselves—our external goods include the entire human race. But, further, persons belong to the lower division of goods, viz. those which do not form the Chief Good, and (69) they are only goods because our relations with them afford scope to Duty and Virtue. Here we have the Stoic division of *expetenda* into *pertinentia* and *efficientia*, in which latter class *nihil praeter amicus est* (iii. 55); and whereas for the Stoics only 'right actions' are *pertinentia*, and for the Peripatetics not only goods of mind and body but external goods are *pertinentia* (cf. § 26, 81), Antiochus passes off an arbitrary combination of their respective doctrines as genuine Peripatetic tradition.

68. **quod est in iis, in quibus,** 'which consists of those things which constitute that Chief Good aforesaid, namely mental and bodily goods'. Mdv. strangely takes *iis* and *quibus* as masc., 'in illis hominibus, in quibus completur'. Instead of *alterum, quod est extrinsecus*, C. continues *haec autem* with a change of construction.

[Nam et amici cultus et parentis ei, qui officio fungitur, in eo ipso prodest, quod ita fungi officio in recte factis est, quae sunt orta *a* virtutibus.] Quae quidem sapientes sequuntur [utentes tamquam] duce natura; non perfecti autem homines et tamen ingeniis excellentibus praediti excitantur saepe gloria, quae habet speciem honestatis et similitudinem. Quod si ipsam honestatem undique perfectam atque absolutum, rem unam praeclarissimam omnium maximeque laudandam, penitus viderent, quonam gaudio complerentur, cum tanto opere eius adumbrata opinione laetentur? **70.** Quem enim deditum voluptatibus, quem cupiditatum incendiis inflammatum in iis potiendis, quae acerrime concupivisset, tanta laetitia perfundi arbitramur, quanta aut superiorem Africanum Hannibale victo aut posteriorem Carthagine eversa? Quem Tiberina descensio festo illo die tanto gaudio affecit, quanto L. Paulum, cum regem Persem captum adduceret, eodem flumine invectio? **71.** Age nunc, Luci noster, extrue animo altitudinem excellentiamque virtutum; iam non dubitabis, quin earum compotes homines, magno animo erectoque viventes, semper sint beati; qui omnes motus fortunae mutationesque rerum et temporum leves et imbecillos fore intellegant, si in virtutis certamen venerint. Illa enim, quae sunt a nobis bona corporis numerata, complent ea quidem beatissimam vitam, sed ita, ut sine illis possit beata vita existere. Ita enim parvae et exiguae sunt istae accessiones bonorum, ut, quemadmodum stellae in radiis solis, sic istae in virtutum splendore ne cernantur quidem. **72.** Atque hoc ut vere dicitur, parva

69. **Quae quidem sapientes.** Piso resumes, from 64, end, the thesis that all *honestum* is *per se expetendum*, and argues that if glory is sought for its own sake, so à fortiori is virtue.

70. **concupivisset,** as if *perfusum esse* were to follow. With *perfundi* we expect *concupiverit*.

Tiberina descensio: on the festival of Fors Fortuna (a.d. viii. Kal. Quintiles). Ovid, Fasti vi. 774, *Quam cito venerunt Fortunae Fortis honores! Post septem luces Junius actus erit. Ite, deam laeti Fortem celebrate, Quirites; in Tiberis ripa munera regis* (Servius Tullius, founder of the cult) *habet. Pars pede, pars etiam celeri decurrite cymba, nec pudeat potos inde redire domum.*

71. **Illa enim.** But in iii. 41 the Peripatetics are said to reckon these necessary to *vita beata*, not merely to *vita beatissima*.

esse ad beate vivendum momenta ista corporis commodorum, sic nimis violentum est nulla esse dicere; qui enim sic disputant, obliti mihi videntur, quae ipsi iecerint principia naturae. Tribuendum est igitur his aliquid, dum modo, quantum tribuendum sit, intellegas. Est enim philosophi non tam gloriosa quam vera quaerentis nec pro nihilo putare ea, quae secundum naturam illi ipsi gloriosi esse fateantur, et videre, esse tantam vim virtutis tantamque, ut ita dicam, auctoritatem honestatis, ut reliqua non illa quidem nulla, sed ita parva sint, ut nulla esse videantur. Haec est nec omnia spernentis praeter virtutem et virtutem ipsam suis laudibus amplificantis oratio; denique haec est undique completa et perfecta explicatio summi boni. Hinc ceteri particulas arripere conati suam quisque videri voluit afferre sententiam. XXV. **73.** Saepe ab Aristotele, a Theophrasto mirabiliter est laudata per se ipsa rerum scientia; hoc uno captus Erillus scientiam summum bonum esse defendit, nec rem ullam aliam per se expetendam. Multa dicta sunt ab antiquis de contemnendis ac despiciendis rebus humanis; hoc unum Aristo tenuit; praeter vitia atque virtutes negavit rem esse ullam aut fugiendam aut expetendam. Positum est a nostris, in iis esse rebus, quae secundum naturam essent, non dolere; hoc Hieronymus summum bonum esse dixit. At vero Callipho et post eum Diodorus, cum alter voluptatem adamasset, alter vacuitatem doloris, neuter honestate carere potuit, quae est a nostris laudata maxime. **74.** Quin etiam ipsi voluptarii deverticula quaerunt et virtutes habent in ore totos dies voluptatemque dumtaxat primo expeti dicunt, deinde consvetudine quasi alteram quandam naturam effici, qua impulsi multa faciant, nullam quaerentes voluptatem. Stoici restant. Ei quidem non unam aliquam aut alteram *rem* a nobis, sed totam ad se nostram philosophiam transtulerunt. Atque ut reliqui fures earum rerum, quas ceperunt, signa commutant, sic illi, ut sententiis nostris pro suis uterentur, nomina tamquam rerum notas mutaverunt. Ita relinquitur sola haec

73. ab Aristotele. See § 11 n. **74. qua impulsi multa faciant.** Cf. I. 69.

disciplina digna studiosis ingenuarum artium, digna eruditis, digna claris viris, digna principibus, digna regibus. **75.** Quae cum dixisset paulumque institisset, Quid est? inquit; satisne vobis videor pro meo iure in vestris auribus commentatus? Et ego: Tu vero, inquam, Piso, ut saepe alias, sic hodie ita nosse ista visus es, ut, si tui nobis potestas saepius fieret, non multum Graecis supplicandum putarem. Quod quidem eo probavi magis, quia memini, Staseam Neapolitanum, doctorem illum tuum, nobilem sane Peripateticum, aliquanto ista secus dicere solitum, assentientem iis, qui multum in fortuna secunda aut adversa, multum in bonis aut malis corporis ponerent. Est, ut dicis, inquit; sed haec ab Antiocho, familiari nostro, dicuntur multo melius et fortius quam a Stasea dicebantur. Quamquam ego non quaero, quid tibi a me probatum sit, sed huic Ciceroni nostro, quem discipulum cupio a te abducere.

XXVI. **76.** Tum Lucius: Mihi vero ista valde probata sunt, quod item fratri puto. Tum mihi Piso: Quid ergo? inquit; dasne adulescenti veniam? an eum discere ea mavis, quae cum plane perdidicerit, nihil sciat? Ego vero isti, inquam, permitto; sed nonne meministi, licere mihi ista probare, quae sunt a te dicta? Quis enim potest ea, quae probabilia videantur ei, non probare? An vero, inquit, quisquam potest probare, quod perceptum, quod comprehensum, quod cognitum non habet? Non est ista, inquam, Piso, magna dissensio. Nihil est enim aliud, quamobrem mihi percipi nihil posse videatur,

75. **pro meo iure**, i.e. which C. had given him by requesting him to discourse. Piso uses *commentor*, the regular word for rehearsing a speech, in apology for his improvised effort.

aliquanto ista secus. Staseas followed Theophrastus (§ 12), in other words, he was a genuine Peripatetic, not an eclectic like Antiochus.

76. **quod item fratri puto.** Munro on Lucret. i. 52 takes *quod* to be the old abl. = qua re, which remained stereotyped in certain phrases when the old sense was forgotten (so in *quod si, quod nisi, quod contra*). Cf. 83, *quod vestri non item.*

cum plane perdidicerit, i.e. the scepticism of Arcesilas and Carneades.

Nihil est enim aliud. C. is only prepared to deny that perception is possible if 'perception' is understood in the Stoic sense. For by the Stoic definitions a true percept is one (1) caused by a real object and representing that object such as it is, (2) having a certain

nisi quod percipiendi vis ita definitur a Stoicis, ut negent quidquam posse percipi nisi tale verum, quale falsum esse non possit. Itaque haec cum illis est dissensio, cum Peripateticis nulla sane. Sed haec omittamus; habent enim et bene longam et satis litigiosam disputationem; **77.** illud mihi a te nimium festinanter dictum videtur, sapientes omnes esse semper beatos. Nescio quomodo praetervolavit oratio. Quod nisi ita efficitur, quae Theophrastus de fortuna, de dolore, de cruciatu corporis dixit, cum quibus coniungi vitam beatam nullo modo posse putavit, vereor, ne vera sint. Nam illud vehementer repugnat, eundem beatum esse et multis malis oppressum. Haec quomodo conveniant, non sane intellego. Utrum igitur tibi, inquit, non placet, virtutisne esse tantam vim, ut ad beate vivendum se ipsa contenta sit, an, si id probas, fieri ita posse negas, ut ii, qui virtutis compotes sint, etiam quibusdam malis affecti beati sint? Ego vero volo in virtute vim esse quam maximam; sed, quanta sit, alias, nunc tantum, possitne esse tanta, si quidquam extra virtutem habeatur in bonis. **78.** Atqui, inquit, si Stoicis concedis, ut virtus sola, si assit, vitam efficiat beatam, concedis etiam Peripateticis. Quae enim mala illi non audent appellare, aspera autem et incommoda et reicienda et aliena naturae esse concedunt, ea nos mala dicimus, sed exigua et paene minima. Quare si potest esse beatus is, qui est in asperis reiciendisque rebus, potest is quoque esse, qui est in parvis malis. Et ego: Piso, inquam, si est quisquam, qui acute in causis videre soleat, quae res agatur, is es profecto tu. Quare attende, quaeso. Nam adhuc, meo fortasse vitio, quid ego quae-

quality which enables the percipient to distinguish it infallibly from percepts which do not arise from a real object. Against this the New Academics urged that no such infallible sign exists; there is no true percept such that it may not be false for all we can tell. A hallucination may possess every mark of reality. Hence we cannot be said to 'perceive' objects at all, if 'I perceive' means 'I apprehend a given percept as caused by and corresponding to a real object'.

77. Theophrastus. Cf. supra, § 12.

ram, non perspicis. Istic sum, inquit, expectoque, quid ad id, quod quaerebam, respondeas.

XXVII. **79.** Respondebo, me non quaerere, inquam, hoc tempore, quid virtus efficere possit, sed quid constanter dicatur, quid ipsum a se dissentiat. Quo, inquit, modo? Quia, cum a Zenone, inquam, hoc magnifice tamquam ex oraculo editur: 'Virtus ad beate vivendum se ipsa contenta est,' Quare? inquit; respondet: 'Quia, nisi quod honestum est, nullum est aliud bonum.' Non quaero iam, verumne sit; illud dico, ea, quae dicat, praeclare inter se cohaerere. **80.** Dixerit hoc idem Epicurus, semper beatum esse sapientem; quod quidem solet ebullire nonnumquam; quem quidem, cum summis doloribus conficiatur, ait dicturum: Quam svave est! quam nihil curo! Non pugnem cum homine, cur tantum aberret in natura boni; illud urgveam, non intellegere eum, quid sibi dicendum sit, cum dolorem summum malum esse dixerit. Eadem nunc mea adversum te oratio est. Dicis eadem omnia et bona et mala, quae dicunt ii, qui numquam philosophum pictum, ut dicitur, viderunt, valetudinem, vires, staturam, formam, integritatem ungviculorum omnium *bona*, deformitatem, morbum, debilitatem mala. **81.** Iam illa externa parce tu quidem; sed haec cum corporis bona sint, eorum conficientia certe in bonis numerabis, amicos, liberos, propinquos, divitias, honores, opes. Contra hoc attende me nihil dicere; *illud dicere*, si ista mala sunt, in quae potest incidere sapiens, sapientem esse non satis esse ad beate vivendum. Immo vero,

79. Quia, cum a Zenone. *quia* here, like *enim*, i. 18, ii. 6, promises an explanation which does not immediately follow. It refers, of course, to both *quid constanter dicatur* and *quid ipsum a se dissentiat*, hence the explanation regularly expressed would require two protases and two apodoses, e.g. *quia, cum a Zenone hoc . . . editur* (*Virtus* cet.) *huic decreto convenit, quod iudicat, honestum solum bonum esse; cum ab Epicuro vobisve idem illud dicitur, repugnant, quae de bonis et malis statuitis* (Mdv.).

Quam svave est. See ii. 88, and infra, 85.

81. Iam illa externa parce tu quidem, sc. *laudasti et assumpsisti*; see on 67, 68. C. put *haec* before *cum* for clearness, and as *haec corporis* is not Latin, has to join *corporis* with the predicate (*bona*), though he means *cum hae res* (*vale-*

inquit, ad beatissime vivendum parum est, ad beate satis. Animadverti, inquam, te isto modo paulo ante ponere, et scio, ab Antiocho nostro dici sic solere; sed quid minus probandum, quam esse aliquem beatum nec satis beatum? Quod autem satis est, eo quidquid accesserit, nimium est; et nemo nimium beatus est; nemo ergo beato beatior. **82.** Ergo, inquit, tibi Q. Metellus, qui tres filios consules vidit, e quibus unum etiam et censorem et triumphantem, quartum autem praetorem, eosque salvos reliquit et tres filias nuptas, cum ipse consul, censor, augur fuisset *et* triumphasset, ut sapiens fuerit, nonne beatior quam, ut item sapiens fuerit, qui in potestate hostium vigiliis et inedia necatus est, Regulus?

XXVIII. **83.** Quid me istud, inquam, rogas? Stoicos roga. Quid igitur, inquit, eos responsuros putas? Nihilo beatiorem esse Metellum quam Regulum. Inde igitur, inquit, ordiendum est. Tamen a proposito, inquam, aberramus. Non enim quaero, quid verum, sed quid cuique dicendum sit. Utinam quidem dicerent alium alio beatiorem! iam ruinas videres. In virtute enim sola et in ipso honesto cum sit bonum positum cumque nec virtus, ut placet illis, nec honestum crescat, idque bonum solum sit, quo qui potiatur, necesse est beatus sit, cum augeri id non possit, in quo uno positum est beatum esse, qui potest esse quisquam alius alio beatior? Videsne, ut haec concinant? Et hercule (fatendum est enim, quod sentio) mirabilis est apud illos contextus rerum. Respondent extrema primis, media utrisque, omnia omnibus; quid sequatur, quid repugnet, vident. Ut in geometria, prima si dederis, danda sunt omnia.

tudo cet.) *ad corpus pertinentes bona sint. eorum conficientia* = τὰ τούτων ποιητικά.

paulo ante, § 71. This distinction is again attributed to Antiochus, Acad. ii. 103, and by Varro (apud August. De Civ. Dei, xix. 3), 'Haec ergo vita hominis, quae virtute et aliis animi et corporis bonis, sine quibus virtus esse non potest, fruitur, beata esse dicitur; si vero et aliis, sine quibus virtus esse potest, vel ullis vel pluribus, beatior; si autem prorsus omnibus, ut nullum omnino bonum desit vel animi vel corporis, beatissima'.

82. Q. Metellus, Macedonicus, cos. 143 B.C. Contrasted with Priam as a type of unbroken good fortune, Tusc. i. 35, 'Metellum multi filii filiae, nepotes neptes in rogum imposuerunt'.

Concede, nihil esse bonum, nisi quod honestum sit; concedendum est, in virtute positam *esse* vitam beatam. Vide rursus retro. Dato hoc, dandum est illud. Quod vestri non item. **84.** 'Tria genera bonorum'; proclivi currit oratio. Venit ad extremum; haeret in salebra, cupit enim dicere, nihil posse ad beatam vitam deesse sapienti. Honesta oratio, Socratica, Platonis etiam. Audeo dicere, inquit. Non potes, nisi retexueris illa. Paupertas si malum est, mendicus esse beatus nemo potest, quamvis sit sapiens. At Zeno eum non beatum modo, sed etiam divitem dicere ausus est. Dolere malum est; in crucem qui agitur, beatus esse non potest. Bonum liberi; misera orbitas; bonum patria; miserum exilium; bonum valetudo; miser morbus; bonum integritas corporis; misera debilitas; bonum incolumis acies; misera caecitas. Quae si potest singula consolando levare, universa quomodo sustinebit? Sit enim idem caecus, debilis, morbo gravissimo affectus, exul, orbus, egens, torqueatur eculeo; quem hunc appellas, Zeno? Beatum, inquit. Etiam beatissimum? Quippe, inquiet, cum tam docuerim gradus istam rem non habere quam virtutem, in qua sit ipsum etiam beatum. **85.** Tibi hoc incredibile, quod beatissimum; quid? tuum credibile? Si enim ad populum me vocas, eum, qui ita sit affectus, beatum esse numquam probabis; si ad prudentes, alterum fortasse dubitabunt, sitne tantum in virtute, ut ea praediti vel in Phalaridis tauro beati sint; alterum non dubitabunt, quin et Stoici convenientia sibi dicant et vos repugnantia. Theophrasti igitur, inquit, tibi liber ille placet de beata vita? Tamen aberramus a proposito, et ne longius, prorsus, inquam, Piso, si ista mala sunt, placet. **86.** Nonne igitur, inquit, tibi videntur mala? Id quaeris, inquam, in quo, utrum respondero, verses te huc atque illuc necesse est. Quo tandem modo? inquit. Quia, si mala sunt, is, qui erit in iis, beatus non erit; si mala non sunt, iacet omnis ratio Peripateticorum. Et ille ridens: Video, inquit, quid agas; ne discipulum abducam, times. Tu vero, inquam, ducas licet, si sequetur; erit enim mecum, si tecum erit.

XXIX. Audi igitur, inquit, Luci; tecum enim mihi instituenda oratio est. Omnis auctoritas philosophiae, ut ait Theophrastus, consistit in beata vita comparanda; beate enim vivendi cupiditate incensi omnes sumus. **87.** Hoc mihi cum tuo fratre convenit. Quare hoc videndum est, possitne nobis hoc ratio philosophorum dare. Pollicetur certe. Nisi enim id faceret, cur Plato Aegyptum peragravit, ut a sacerdotibus barbaris numeros et caelestia acciperet? cur post Tarentum ad Archytam? cur ad reliquos Pythagoreos, Echecratem, Timaeum, Arionem Locros, ut, cum Socratem expressisset, adiungeret Pythagoreorum disciplinam eaque, quae Socrates repudiabat, addisceret? cur ipse Pythagoras et Aegyptum lustravit et Persarum magos adiit? cur tantas regiones barbarorum pedibus obiit, tot maria transmisit? cur haec eadem Democritus? qui (vere falsone, quaerere *nolu*mus) dicitur se oculis privasse; certe, ut quam minime animus a cogitationibus abduceretur, patrimonium neglexit, agros deseruit incultos, quid quaerens aliud nisi vitam beatam? Quam si etiam in rerum cognitione ponebat, tamen ex illa investigatione naturae consequi volebat, bono ut esset animo. Id enim ille summum bonum εὐθυμίαν et saepe ἀθαμβίαν appellat, id est, animum terrore liberum. **88.** Sed haec etsi praeclare, nondum tamen perpolita. Pauca enim, neque ea ipsa enucleate, ab hoc de virtute quidem dicta. Post enim haec in hac urbe primum a Socrate quaeri coepta, deinde

87. Plato Aegyptum. On the death of Socrates Plato first withdrew with other disciples to Megara, and then travelled in Egypt and Cyrene, returning to Athens for about eight years before his visit to Italy and to the court of Dionysius in Sicily. Of the Pythagoreans mentioned, *Archytas* was head of the brotherhood during its tenure of political power at Tarentum, and a personal friend of Plato. *Timaeus* of Locri and *Echecrates* of Phlius appear respectively in the *Timaeus* and the *Phaedo*; *Arion* is unknown.

quid quaerens, τί ζητῶν. 'With what object?'

Id enim ille, *enim* explains *volebat* and the required sense is 'For *this* (*bono ut esset animo*) which he names εὐθυμία, etc., is his Chief Good'. But C. instead of *id enim ille summum bonum censet*, after further explaining *id* by Democritus' own terms, has to use a different verb. On εὐθυμία see § 23.

88. praeclare . . . perpolita: a perhaps unique instance of omission of two different verbs (*dixit* or *dicta sunt*, and *sunt*).

in hunc locum delata sunt, nec dubitatum, quin in virtute omnis ut bene, sic etiam beate vivendi spes poneretur. Quae cum Zeno didicisset a nostris, ut in actionibus praescribi solet, DE EADEM RE [FECIT] ALIO MODO. Hoc tu nunc in illo probas. Scilicet vocabulis rerum mutatis inconstantiae crimen ille effugit, nos effugere non possumus! Ille Metelli vitam negat beatiorem quam Reguli; praeponendam tamen; nec magis expetendam, sed magis sumendam et, si optio esset, eligendam Metelli, Reguli reiciendam; ego, quam ille praeponendam et magis eligendam, beatiorem hanc appello, nec ullo minimo momento plus ei vitae tribuo quam Stoici. **89.** Quid interest, nisi quod ego res notas notis verbis appello, illi nomina nova quaerunt, quibus idem dicant? Ita, quemadmodum in senatu semper est aliquis, qui interpretem postulet, sic isti nobis cum interprete audiendi sunt. Bonum appello, quidquid secundum naturam est, quod contra, malum; nec ego solus, sed tu etiam, Chrysippe, in foro, domi; in schola desinis. Quid ergo? aliter homines, aliter philosophos loqui putas oportere? Quanti quidque sit, aliter docti et indocti; sed cum constiterit inter doctos, quanti res quaeque sit,—si homines essent, usitate loquerentur;—dum res maneant, verba fingant arbitratu suo.

XXX. **90.** Sed venio ad inconstantiae crimen, ne saepius dicas me aberrare; quam tu ponis in verbis, ego positam in re putabam. Si satis erit hoc perceptum, in quo

in hunc locum, i.e. in the Academy.

DE EADEM RE. On *praescribi*, cf. ii. 3 n, *praescribere debet*. Ad Fam. xiii. 27. 1, '*sed tamen non parcam operae et, ut vos soletis in formulis, sic ego in epistulis* de eadem re alio modo'. This *praescriptio* would seem to have guarded a plaintiff against being non-suited on the plea that his case was *chose jugée* if he sought to plead it again on different technical grounds.

praeponendam tamen, sc. *dicit*, from *negat*. Cf. ii. 25, *recte . . . negat; recte miserum* (*dicit*).

89. interpretem, i.e. when the Senate gave audience to Greek-speaking envoys.

Quanti quidque sit, i.e. philosophers and the illiterate may value things by different standards, hence there is a real disagreement between them as to what things are *good*; but when philosophers have agreed upon a common standard of value, they ought, as members of human society and not a race apart, to follow universal usage by calling the things they consider valuable *good* (not *preferable*).

adiutores Stoicos optimos habemus, tantam vim esse virtutis, ut omnia, si ex altera parte ponantur, ne appareant quidem, cum omnia, quae illi commoda certe dicunt esse et sumenda et eligenda et praeposita (quae ita definiunt, ut satis magno aestimanda sint), haec igitur cum ego tot nominibus a Stoicis appellata, partim novis et commenticiis, ut ista producta et reducta, partim idem significantibus (quid enim interest, expetas an eligas? mihi quidem etiam lautius videtur, quod eligitur et ad quod delectus adhibetur), sed, cum ego ista omnia bona dixero, tantum refert, quam magna dicam; cum expetenda, quam valde. Sin autem nec expetenda ego magis quam tu eligenda, nec illa pluris aestimanda ego, qui bona, quam tu, qui producta appellas, omnia ista necesse est obscurari nec apparere et in virtutis, tamquam in solis, radios incurrere. **91.** At enim, qua in vita est aliquid mali, ea beata esse non potest. Ne seges quidem igitur spicis uberibus et crebris, si avenam uspiam videris, nec mercatura quaestuosa, si in maximis lucris paulum aliquid damni contraxerit. An hoc usquequaque, aliter in vita? et non ex maxima parte de tota iudicabis? an dubium est, quin virtus ita maximam partem obtineat in rebus humanis, ut reliquas obruat? Audebo igitur cetera, quae secundum naturam sint, bona appellare nec fraudare suo vetere nomine potius quam aliquod novum exquirere, virtutis autem amplitudinem quasi in altera librae lance ponere. **92.** Terram, mihi crede, ea lanx et maria deprimet.

90. **satis magno aestimanda,** i.e. having ἱκανὴ ἀξία, iii. 51.

reducta: the contrary of *producta* is added inadvertently, as *mala*, i. 41.

91. **Ne seges quidem,** sc. *esse potest.* 'Nor, at that rate, can a crop of wheat be heavy and thick if you can anywhere spy a wild oat among it.'

An hoc usquequaque, sc. *fit*; but with *aliter in vita*, sc. *fieri debet. Hoc* refers to the truth latent in the preceding instances. 'Is *this* (that a thing which is *good on the whole* is *good*) the case in every instance whatever . . .'

reliquas: more properly *reliqua* (*quae partem aliquam obtinent*). Cf. § 37, *earum rerum.*

Audebo igitur: 'I shall presume therefore to call the other things [ )(virtue which is also *secundum naturam*] "goods," and to prefer not defrauding them of their ancient name, to ferreting out some new one.'

92. **deprimet.** The metaphor is borrowed from Critolaus; cf. Tusc. v. 51, where also C. uses *deprimere* = outweigh. Strictly speaking, virtue 'weighs down' its own scale, and sends up the other.

Semper enim ex eo, quod maximas partes continet latissimeque funditur, tota res appellatur. Dicimus aliquem hilare vivere; ergo, si semel tristior effectus est, hilara vita amissa est? At hoc in eo M. Crasso, quem semel ait in vita risisse Lucilius, non contigit, ut ea re minus ἀγέλαστος, ut ait idem, vocaretur. Polycratem Samium felicem appellabant. Nihil acciderat ei, quod nollet, nisi quod anulum, quo delectabatur, in mari abiecerat. Ergo infelix una molestia, felix rursus, cum is ipse anulus in praecordiis piscis inventus est? Ille vero, si insipiens (quod certe, quoniam tyrannus), numquam beatus; si sapiens, ne tum quidem miser, cum ab Oroete, praetore Darei, in crucem actus est. 'At multis malis affectus.' Quis negat? sed ea mala virtutis magnitudine obruebantur.

XXXI. **93.** An ne hoc quidem Peripateticis concedis, ut dicant, omnium bonorum virorum, id est, sapientium, omnibus virtutibus ornatorum, vitam omnibus partibus plus habere semper boni quam mali? Quis hoc dicit? Stoici scilicet. Minime; sed isti ipsi, qui voluptate et dolore omnia metiuntur, nonne clamant, sapienti plus semper adesse, quod velit, quam quod nolit? Cum tantum igitur in virtute ponant ii, qui fatentur se virtutis causa, nisi ea voluptatem faceret, ne manum quidem versuros fuisse, quid facere nos oportet, qui quamvis minimam praestantiam animi omnibus bonis corporis anteire dicamus, ut ea ne in conspectu quidem relinquantur? Quis est enim, qui hoc cadere in sapientem dicere audeat, ut, si fieri possit, virtutem in perpetuum abiciat, ut dolore omni liberetur?

M. Crasso, father of Crassus Dives (ii. 56) and grandfather of Crassus who fell in Parthia.

in mari: perhaps a scribe's slip for *in mare*. MSS. have *mare* for *mari* and vice versâ in de Legg. ii. 57. But cf. *ubi cadaver abieceris* (Tac. Ann. i. 22), *cadaveris in via abjecti* (Suet. Nero, 48), where the idea of motion is merged in that of position resulting from the motion. (And correct Lewis and Short, who explain these abls. as indicating place whence a thing is thrown, citing Mdv. ad loc., who *rejects* that explanation.) The story of the ring is told, Herod. iii. 41; Polycrates' death, iii. 120.

sed ea mala, taking the alternative that he was a *sapiens*.

93. Stoici scilicet. Minime; sed, 'You think this is a Stoic dictum; not at all, it belongs to the Epicureans'. Cf. i. 62, *Sic enim ab Epicuro* . . .

Quis nostrum dixerit (quos non pudet ea, quae Stoici aspera dicunt, mala dicere), melius esse turpiter aliquid facere cum voluptate quam honeste cum dolore? **94.** Nobis Heracleotes ille Dionysius flagitiose descivisse videtur a Stoicis propter oculorum dolorem. Quasi vero hoc didicisset a Zenone, non dolere, cum doleret! Illud audierat, nec tamen didicerat, malum illud non esse, quia turpe non esset, et esse ferendum viro. Hic si Peripateticus fuisset, permansisset, credo, in sententia, qui dolorem malum dicunt esse, de asperitate autem eius fortiter ferenda praecipiunt eadem, quae Stoici. Et quidem Arcesilas tuus, etsi fuit in disserendo pertinacior, tamen noster fuit; erat enim Polemonis; is cum arderet podagrae doloribus visitassetque hominem Charmides Epicureus perfamiliaris et tristis exiret, Mane, quaeso, inquit, Charmide noster; nihil illinc huc pervenit. Ostendit pedes et pectus. Ac tamen hic mallet non dolere.

XXXII. **95.** Haec igitur est nostra ratio, quae tibi videtur inconstans, cum propter virtutis caelestem quandam et divinam tantamque praestantiam, ut, ubi virtus sit resque magnae et summe laudabiles virtute gestae, ibi esse miseria et aerumna non possit, tamen labor possit, possit molestia, non dubitem dicere, omnes sapientes semper esse beatos, sed tamen fieri posse, ut sit alius alio beatior. Atqui iste locus est, Piso, tibi etiam atque etiam confirmandus, inquam; quem si tenueris, non modo meum Ciceronem, sed etiam me ipsum abducas licebit. **96.** Tum Quintus: Mihi quidem, inquit, satis hoc confirmatum videtur, laetorque eam philosophiam, cuius antea supellectilem pluris aestimabam quam possessiones reli-

94. Heracleotes ille, a personal disciple of Zeno. He went over to the Cyrenaics (Acad. ii. 71).

qui dolorem. The subj. of *dicunt* has to be supplied from the preceding sing. (*Peripateticus*). Cf. *eam* referring to *voluptatibus*, ii. 61, and Livy, xxii. 57. 3, *Cantilius, scriba pontificis, quos nunc minores pontifices appellant.*

96. possessiones, 'landed estates' contrasted with humble 'household gear' (*supellex*). The latter term is often used of the 'stock-in-trade' or 'outfit' of the orator, and sometimes, as here, denotes the bare necessaries of equipment. Cf. Tac. de Orat. 22; (oratorem volo) non ea solum instrui *supellectile* quae necessariis usibus sufficiat, sed sit in apparatu eius et aurum et gemmae.

quarum (ita mihi dives videbatur, ut ab ea petere possem, quidquid in studiis nostris concupissem), hanc igitur laetor etiam acutiorem repertam quam ceteras, quod quidam ei deesse dicebant. Non quam nostram quidem, inquit Pomponius iocans; sed mehercule pergrata mihi *fuit* oratio tua. Quae enim dici Latine posse non arbitrabar, ea dicta sunt a te, nec minus plane, quam dicuntur a Graecis. Sed tempus est, si videtur; et recta quidem ad me. Quod cum ille dixisset et satis disputatum videretur, in oppidum ad Pomponium perreximus omnes.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

I. i. 30. **'Ea quid percipit aut quid iudicat, quo aut petat aut fugiat aliquid, praeter voluptatem et dolorem?'** On the MSS. readings of this sentence Mdv. notes 'In singulis prope verbis erratur'. Of the three best MSS. Pal. A has *ea* ('postulatque oratio; cum enim demonstrasset, naturae hoc iudicium esse, addit: Ea (igitur, quae iudicat) quid percipit?' Mdv.); but Pal. B and Erl. have *ei*. (So two inferior MSS.; others have *at quid*, *et quid*, *en vel ea quid*.) Three MSS. (cod. Vict., Spir., Gud. 1) and the *editio princeps* (Cologne, 1467) have *praecipit* for *percipit*. May not the true reading be '*Ei* quid *praecipit* aut quid *indicat*'? *indicat* would be very apt to become *iudicat* immediately after *iudicari*. (Similarly, just above, for *aperta iudicari* L Or. have *aperta indicari*, which Manutius and Lambinus read, perhaps rightly.) This would give better sense. The accepted reading states that Feeling is the sole spring of action; this was stated above (*Omne animal* . . .); the point here seems rather that Feeling supplies the senses with the sole *criterion* of action.

II. i. 63. **'In physicis plurimum posuit. Ea scientia et verborum vis et natura orationis et consequentium repugnantiumve ratio potest perspici.'** Mdv. thinks Cicero 'haec mire scripsit et parum recte; nam in physicis verborum vim ceteraque, quae dicit, Epicurus non tractabat.' He proceeds to point out that although the Epicureans τὸ κανονικὸν ὁμοῦ τῷ φυσικῷ συνέταττον (Diog. L. x. 30), Canonic was a distinct branch of their system, and is recognised as such in our passage (infr. *servata illa* . . . *regula* cet.), and that it dealt exclusively with the question of the Criterion. But he too hastily assumes that all the subjects which in other systems belonged to Dialectic must in the Epicurean have been treated of under Canonic, or not at all. It was as the science of the criterion of Truth and the Good that Epicurus substituted Canonic for Dialectic, but it followed from his first principles that other provinces of the latter, far from being neglected, should form part of the domain of Physics. I take it that our sentence is an accurate transcript from Cicero's Epicurean handbook, and sums up just such a reply as Phaedrus or Philodemus would make to Stoic criticism. 'What need of your cumbrous scholastic logic? Our Physics can explain those cardinal points of your logical doctrine, the meaning of terms, the nature of predication, the theory of contradictories.' (*natura orationis*, as Mdv. rightly argues from the context, does

not mean 'the nature,' i.e. origin, 'of language'. *oratio* = 'discourse,' in the logical sense.) Either Cicero, or, more probably, the Greek *epitomator*, omitted any explanation of the three points so briefly referred to; but it is possible, I think, to supply it. (1) As to the *vis verborum*; Epic. regarded words as simply symbols of mental images (προλήψεις). 'In the case of every term of speech,' he says, 'the primary ideas it conveys must be seen (by the mental eye) and not stand in need of demonstration: otherwise we shall have nothing to which to refer the point in question' (Diog. L. x. 33, tr. Wallace). We can only e.g. call a seen object a cat because it corresponds to the πρόληψις which we habitually symbolise by that word. Further, words themselves are the products of natural causes, not of conscious invention (see on i. 29). Hence we must look to physiology and psychology, not to Logic, for an adequate account of 'the meaning of terms'. Definition is a useless process; if we have a clear mental image of the thing symbolised by a term, we can *describe* it; if we have not, definition, which is merely substituting one set of symbols for another, will not help us to get one. (2) If we may take *natura orationis* in the sense I have suggested, it refers to the various kinds of judgments that can be expressed in propositions. Besides affirmative and negative, Formal Logic recognises categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive propositions. The Stoics paid special attention to the two last, and further to the distinction between 'necessary' and 'contingent' truth. Such a statement as 'Either Hermarchus will be alive to-morrow or he will not' was, they said, 'necessarily' or unconditionally true. But Epic. would not admit this. 'Si enim, inquit, alterutrum concessero necessarium esse, necesse erit cras Hermarchum aut vivere aut non vivere; nulla autem est in natura rerum talis necessitas' (Acad. ii. 97). By thus denying that of two contradictory propositions one must be true (a denial which of course cuts away the very foundation of Formal Logic), he asserted an important principle, viz. that what holds good of the relations between our ideas does not necessarily hold good of the relations between things. 'Physics' teaches us that no event is fore-ordained, and that therefore no predication about a future event can be more than 'contingent'; logical 'necessity' is not real but formal, i.e. consists only in a certain fixed connection among our ideas. Similarly, with regard to the Peripatetic use of the Law of Contradictories in division of *genera* and *species* (see on iv. 8, *item de contrariis*), Epic. appealed from Logic to Physics. A bat, according to that law, must be either a bird or not a bird; as a matter of fact it is both. (See the interesting passage from Johannes Siculus, too long to quote here, ap. Usener *Epicurea*, p. 348, fr. 244.)

III. iv. 58. **'quaeque secundum naturam sint, partim nihil habere in sese eius appetitionis, de qua saepe iam diximus, quae nec honesta nec laudabilia dicantur, partim, quae voluptatem habeant in omni animante, sed in homine rationem etiam . . .'** Antiochus is obviously responsible for the Stoic colouring of this passage. But who is responsible for the

statement that some of the things *secundum naturam* possess no power of exciting *appetitio*? Mdv. thinks Cicero has dragged in a reference to the καθάπαξ ἀδιάφορα, which have not enough ἀξία to be objects of ὁρμή. But carelessly as Cicero may transcribe his excerpts, I think it would be difficult to adduce a parallel for his interpolating them in this fashion. We may be pretty sure that he did not make, but found in his Greek original, a division of 'natural objects'. The use of *habere* (ἔχειν) may give us a clue to what that division was. (The slight anacoluthon *partim habere . . . partim, quae habeant* need not detain us.) For it is not parallel in the two clauses; whereas we might expect *habere*, (2) *in omni animante*, (3) *in homine* to correspond to *habere in* (1) some other order of beings, we have (1) *in sese*. The familiar Peripatetic *divisio* of (1) Plant, (2) Animal, (3) Man, suggests itself here. Antiochus, who employs it elsewhere (cf. v. 26. 38, 39), might very naturally apply it in our context to τὰ κατὰ φύσιν. If we read *in stirpe* (ἐν τῷ φυτῷ) for *in sese*, the point of *partim nihil habere* becomes clear. τὰ κατὰ φύσιν may be divided according to the three orders of φύσις—vegetable, animal, rational, and the first or lowest division, the *naturalia* of plants, do not excite ὁρμή. (Cf. v. 39, ex quo non est alienum, ut animantibus, sic illis (rebus, quas terra gignit) et apta quaedam ad naturam putare et aliena. . . . At vero si ad vitem sensus accesserit, ut appetitum quendam habeat et per se ipsa moveatur . . .) Now what, according to our text, is the *differentia* of the next highest division, the *naturalia* of animals? They excite *pleasure*! If Cicero wrote *voluptatem*, there is no method in his madness; he has simply pitchforked a bit of Epicureanism into a Stoico-Peripatetic account of the τέλος. But did he not write *voluntatem*? Cf. Tusc. iv. 12, Quam ob rem simul obiecta species est cuiuspiam, quod bonum videatur, ad id adipiscendum impellit ipsa natura. Id cum constanter prudenterque fit, eius modi adpetitionem Stoici βούλησιν appellant, nos appellemus *voluntatem*. The Stoics gave a technical meaning to βούλησις ('Eam illi putant in solo esse sapiente,' Cic. ib.), but remembering that in Aristotle's *Ethics* it is assigned to the appetitive soul, and is a form of ὄρεξις, we may think it probable that it corresponded in later Peripatetic writings to the Stoic ὁρμή, and that Antiochus may actually have stated that the *naturalia* of animals were objects of βούλησις. Lastly, the clause 'quae nec honesta nec laudabilia dicantur,' which properly applies to the *whole* class of *naturalia*, ought logically to stand immediately after 'quaeque secundum naturam sint'. But the present order of the sentence may very well be Cicero's, who often makes such slips—a different matter, however, from making sheer nonsense of his excerpts. [Cic. usually renders φύτον or φύτα by a periphrasis, *quae terra gignit*, etc., but cf. *stirpium naturas*, v. 10.]

CRITICAL APPENDIX

The appended variations from Madvig's text are in many cases emendd. by himself or others which he regards as certain or probable, but has not received into the text. In the space at my disposal it has been impossible to discuss readings, and for the purposes of this edition it seemed best to adopt only such emendd., other than those just mentioned, as improve not merely the text but the sense. I have deleted without comment a few interpolated words condemned by all editors.

In the following list M. = C. F. W. Müller, ed. Teubner, 1889 ; A = codex Palatinus A ; B = codex Palatinus B ; Erl. = codex Erlangensis.

P. 11. 5 *intimum* coni. Jonas dissert. Berol. 1870; codd. et Mdv. *ultimum.* 'Extremo, i.e. τῇ περιφερείᾳ . . . recte opponitur *intimum*, i.e. medium, quod quoniam ipsum iam oppositum erat *summo* et *infimo*, ut contrarium *extremo* repeti non poterat' M. — P. 12. 2 †*itaque*. Ostendit Mdv. *itaque* non pro *igitur* positum esse, cum nulla omnino hic sit periodi talis inflexio, ut in viam revocanda fuerit; non iniuria igitur suspectum *itaque* fuisse edd.; 'etsi addendi quae potuerit causa esse, non apparet; et fortasse aliud latet mendum, ut exciderit verbum aliquod, cuius subiectum esset *homo acutus*'. — P. 18. 12 *haec* M. Baiter, cod. A. *hoc* Mdv. codd. B, Erl. — P. 29. 15 *impertit* M. Nota lacunae Mdv. (*aliquid affert* coni. cum Bentleio). — P. 30. 29 *voluptatum* M. *voluptatem* codd. et edd. — P. 34. 1 *stultus* Baiter, ed. II. *est* Mdv. codd. — P. 39. 2 *poterit* M. *potuerit* Mdv. codd. quod nullo modo hic ferri posse et nonnunquam alibi falso scriptum esse adnotat M. — P. 47. 21 *non meministi.* 'Non improbabiliter Bremius : *non meministi*,' Mdv. qui tamen *nonne* scrips. cum codd. — P. 61. 10 *simul est ortum* M. (ut v. 24 init. q.v.) coni. Mdv. *simul* [*et*] *ortum est* scrips. e. codd. — P. 73. 31 *cum summo imperio, cum* inseruit M. probante Mdv. 1874. — P. 78. 5 *quod certissimum est.* Totum hoc tollere . . . certissima vis est, Mdv. 1874. — P. 81. 22 *deprecarere* ed. Venet. 1481, Orell. alii. *precarere* Mdv. 'non audeo negare, sic dici potuisse (ut esset; non conor precando impedire); etsi aptius erat *deprecor*.' — P. 89. 25 *quid in isto*, *ex* vulg. *in* coni. Mdv. — P. 94. 23 *perfacile ut appareat, ut* addidit M. — P. 95. 17 *mari . . . terra* pro *maria, terram* (codd. et edd.) Baiter ed. Tauchn. probante Mdv. — P. 101. 13 *oportet* M. *ut* codd. quod uncis inclusit Mdv. — P. 104. 11 *et L. Lucullus* Halm ('probabiliter' Mdv.). *et Lucullus* codd. et edd. — P. 104. 12 *cum virtutibus omnibus* coni. Mdv. *cum omnibus* codd. — P. 105. 29 *afferre* M., Manutium et Lambinum sequens; Mdv. *affirmare* e codd. cum cruce scripsit, *firmare* coni. — P. 120. 17 *ea, quae versantur* coni. Mdv. *ea versantur* cod. A. *versentur*

codd. B, Erl. — P. 120. 22 *ut* pro *aut* coni Mdv. — P. 125. 5 *ea nec plura . . . anteponentur. finitur, nec . . . anteponent* Mdv., *quorum* masculini generis esse statuens, quod sententiam non ferre recte monet M. et cum cod. A. *anteponentur* scripsit addito *ea*. — P. 131. 5 [*Quoniamque . . . nec in contrariis*] inclusit Bait. ed. Tauchn. — P. 131. 26 *se ipsos omnes* Bait. cod. A. *ipsi* Mdv. M. — P. 133. 1 *quod est . . . vivere* hic collocandum esse, non, ut codd. post *facere possit*, vidit Mdv. qui cur non locum clausulae permutavit nescio. (permutavit Bait.) — P. 137. 6 *et detrimenta* add. Lambinus, M. Bait. ed. T. — P. 138. 19 *victurus est* coni. Mdv. *sit* codd. — P. 147. 17 *tueri* Cobet, Mnemosyne N.S. iii. p. 99. — P. 153. 15 *et cum animum. et* ins. Lambinus. — P. 156. 25 *significant* Bait. auctore Kaysero. *significent* Mdv. — P. 161. 28 *Si nihil in eo, quod perficiendum* M. e codd. *Si nihil in quo* (i.e. '*in animali aliquo*') Mdv. — P. 164. 40 *aberimus* Cobet, Mnemos. 1875 p. 101 ('admodum probabiliter' Mdv. p. lxix). *aberrabimus* codd. — P. 171. 21 *aestimabiles* O. Hein. in Fleckeisen Jahrb. 1866 p. 245. *aptae, habiles* codd. *aptae* [*habiles*] Mdv. — P. 174. 1 *suam quandam propriam* coni Mdv. *quod suam, quod propriam* codd. — P. 176. 19 *languescit* codd. det. M. *nescit* codd opt. *senescit* Mdv. — P. 179. 6 *concinere* Cobet, Mnemos. 1875 p. 102. *consistere* Mdv. cum codd. — P. 179. 10 *perpessu, si* Goerenz. Baiter. *perpessu et* Mdv. — P. 181. 12 *ne hoc quidem modo paria* Lamb. Bait. *ne hoc m. p. q.* Mdv. codd. — P. 189. 26 *artificum* codd opt. M. *artium* Mdv. — P. 198. 3 *quidque* Bait. *quidquid* Mdv. codd. — P. 198. 31 *ut in suo genere* M. *ut suo* Mdv. *et suo* codd. — P. 199. 4 *Huius enim aetati . . . audientis* coni. Mdv. scrips. autem e codd. *huius enim aetati et huic . . . audienti.* — P. 200. 31 *idem* pro *item* coni. Mdv. — P. 202. 11 *quia continetur, qui continentur* codd. *qui continetur* Schoemann. Bait. 'Sed . . . *quia* necessarium est: *continetur* vix necessarium etsi aptius' Mdv. — P. 213. 31. — P. 214. 1 *quod . . . arbitrantur* Bait. ed. Tauchn. *qui . . . arbitrentur* cum B. Erl. Mdv. (cui tamen 'prorsus aut *cum arbitrentur* aut *quod* (*quia*) *arbitrantur* dicendum fuisse videtur'). — P. 216. 7 *indigerent* Bremius. *indigeret* Mdv. — P. 216. 25 *quaeque significentur eorum vocabulis, eorum* coni. Mdv. — P. 217. 15 *huius* coni. Mdv. — P. 222. 3 *iecerint* Gifan. Bait. ed. Tauchn. *fecerint* Lamb. Mdv. *egerint* codd. — P. 222. 5 *fateantur* coni. Mdv. *fatentur* scrips. cum Erl. *esse tantam vim* Bait. ed. Tauchn. *honestatis esse* Mdv. — P. 222. 74. init. *quaerunt — habent — dicunt* Lamb. Bait. *quaerant — habeant — dicant* codd. et cum cruce Mdv. 'ter indicativum reponere' non ausus. *faciant* M. *faciunt* codd. Mdv. — P. 225. 15 *aberret* M. *habeat* codd. *abeat* Mdv. — P. 226. 6 *nemo ergo* coni. Mdv. †*et* scrips. *et* codd. — P. 288. 16 *quaerere nolumus* M. *quaereremus* codd. *non quaeremus* Mdv. — P. 230. 84 *potius quam aliquod* Lamb. Bait. M. (9 v. p. xxix) *quam aliquid* (*aliquam*) *potius* codd. Mdv. cum cruce. — P. 231. 23 *nisi ea voluptatem faceret* M. (coni. Mikkelsen. ap. Mdv. p. lxix, alii) †*acciret* Mdv. *voluptate maceret* boni codd. — P. 233. 7 *nec*†*minus plane* Mdv. crucem delevi auctore Muellero. *verbis aptis* quod post *Graecis* habent codd. inclusit Bait. 'manifestum glossema ad adverbium *plane*' existimans, integrum reliquit Mdv.

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